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STELLINGEN
behorend bij het proefschrift "Possibility Theorems for Social
Welfare Functions" van A.J.A. Storcken.
I. Laat a~,al,az,... een rij rangtelwoorden zijn uit een taal
zeg T. Noteer het aantal letters van zo'n woord ai met Iail.
Definieer lim ai -~b~,bl,...,bt~, d.e.s.d.a. er een index k
i-~~
is, zodanig dat voor alle i? k ai - bj, waarbij
j- i-k (modulo ttl). Veronderstel dat voor elke index i? 1
de rekenkundige waarde van aitl gelijk is aanlail. Dan
(a) als T de nederlandse, duitse, resp. engelse taal is,
dan is lim ai gelijk aan ~vier~, ~vier~, resp. ~four~,
i-~~
(b) als T de franse taal is, dan is
lim ai - tcinq, quatre, six, trois).
i-~~
(We identificeren ~cinq, quatre, six, trois~ met b.v.
tquatre, six, trois, cinq~.)
II Laat a~,al,a2,... een rij rangtelwoorden uit de nederlandse
taal zijn, zodanig dat voor elke index i? 1 de rekenkundige
waarde van aitl gelijk is aan IaiI2. Dan is
lim ai óf gelijk aan
i-~~
tvijfhonderdnegenentwintig,zeshonderdvijfentwintig~
óf gelijk aan ~vijfhonderdzesenzeventig~.
III Er is geen koppelprocedure, die zowel stabiel als consistent
is.
Laat V en M twee disjuncte verzamelingen zijn met
IV) - IMI ? 3. Laat Lm(A) het m-voudige cartesische product
zijn van de verzameling van lineaire ordeningen, L(A), op de
verzameling A. Definieer
i
P(V,M) :- {~rA,rB~ : Er zijn m, A c V, en B c M, zodanig dat
~A~ -(B~ - m, rA e Lm(A) en rB e Lm(B)} en
E(A,B) is de verzameling van bijecties van A naar B.
Een koppelprocedure K is nu een afbeelding welke aan alle
~rA,rB~ e P(V,M) een bijectie K(rA,rB) e E(A,B) toevoegt.
Een koppelprocedure K is stabiel, d.e.s.d.a. voor alle
~rA,rB~ e P(V,M) er geen i,j e B en i',j' e A zijn zodanig
dat K(rA,rB)(i) ~ i', K(rA,rB)(j) - j', j' ~ i' : R1 en
i ~ j : R~ .
Een koppelprocedure K is consistent, d.e.s.d.a. voor alle
trA,rB~ e P(V,M) en voor alle j e A en alle i e B, met
K(rA,rB)(j) - i: K(rA , rB )- K(rA,rB) .
~A-{j} ~B-{i} ~A-{j}
(Zie Gale D. 6 Shapley L.S., 1962, College admissions and
the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly,
69,p. 9- 15, en Roth A.E., 1982, The economics of matching:
stability and incentives, Mathematics of Operations
Research, 7, p. 617 - 628)
IV Laat V c Á een classificeerbare vezameling van ordeningen
zijn en H een "decision procedure" op a(V) ( Zie def. 4.2.4).
Dan zijn IV.1 en IV.2 equivalent.
IV.1 H is sterk positief associatief, dat is
{x} fl H(RX) c H(RX) voor alle x e X en RX,RX e V met
~RX,RX~ e S~({x} x X) (Zie def. 1.4.4).
IV.2 V c A(U) ( de verzameling van sterk complete acyclische
ordeningen) en voor alle ~X,Ry~ e a(V) :
H(X,Ry) - Best(Ryl ) (:- {x e X: x ? y: Ry voor alle
X
y e X}).
Dus "rationalizeerbaarheid" van keuzegedrag komt overeen met
een monotonie eigenschap voor keuzegedrag.
ii
V Zij C een keuzefunctie van 2A -{cp} naar A, zodanig dat A
eindig is en C(X) e X voor alle X e 2A -{~}.
C is reconstrueerbaar met ordeningen (Zie def. 4.2.4),
d.e.s.d.a. er een lineaire ordening RA e L(A) is zodanig dat
voor alle X e 2A -{cp} :{C(X)} - Best(RAI ).
X
Aangezien reconstrueerbaarheid een zwakkere eis is dan
"rationalizeerbaarheid" en lineaire ordeningen de meest
gestructureerde ordeningen zijn en derhalve tot de simpelste
structuren leiden, volgt dat "rationalizeerbaar"
keuzegedrag, welk bovendien tot enkelvoudige keuzes leidt,
simpel is.
VI Er is een sociaal keuze theoretisch bewijs voor de volgende
stelling:
Zij R een zwakke ordening van Q2n, zodanig dat voor alle
x,y,z e Rn, met x~ y:
VI.1 als voor alle i e{1,2,...,n} xi ? yi, dan x ~ y: R
(meer is beter)
VI.2 als x~ y: R, dan x t z ~ y t z : R (translatie
invariantie).
VI.3 als voor alle i e {1,2,...,n} xi ~ zi ~ yi of
yi ~ zi ~ xi, dan x ~ z ~ y : R of y~ z~ x: R
(tussen relatie behoudend).
Dan is er een rangschikking il i2 i3 ... in van {1,2,...,n}
zodanig dat voor alle x,y e Qth: x~ y: R, d.e.s.d.a. er is
een nummer k met xit - yit voor alle t~ k en xik ~ yik (R
is een lexicografische ordening).
iii
VII Er is een sociaal keuze theoretisch bewijs voor de volgende
stelling:
Zij R een zwakke ordening van ~tn, zodanig dat voor alle
x,y,z e Rn, met x~ y, en a~ 0:
VI.1 als voor alle i e{1,2,...,n} xi ~ yi, dan x~ y: R
(meer is beter)
VI.2 als x~ y: R, dan x t z~ y t z: R en a~x ~ a.y : R.
VI.3 als a een permutatie is van {1,2,...,n} en
ax :- ~xa(1) ""'xa(n)~' dan als x~ y. R, dan
ax ~ oy : R (neutraliteit).
Dan x? y: R, d.e.s.d.a. S xi ~~ yi'i e {1,.. ,n} i e {1,.. ,n}
voor alle x, y e Ftn
Deze en de vorige stelling geeft een karakterisering van
ordeningen van bijvoorbeeld goederen bundels of verdelingen
van inkomens, op basis van de Sociale Keuze Theorie.
VIII Voor elke a e[0,1] is er een "inequality index" die voldoet
aan de eisen "normalization", "Schur-convexity",
"intermediate inequality concept" op basis van a,
"population replication principle" en "extensibility". (Zie
Bossert W., A note on intermediate inequality indices which
are quasilinear means, Institut fur Wirtschaftstheorie und
Operations Research, Universit~t Karlsruhe, discussion paper
289).
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CHAPTER 1 SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEMS
~ 1.1 Introduction to basic notions
We are all familiar with situations in which a group of
individuals has to agree upon a collectíve choice or preference,
e.g., the election of a president or chairman, the ranking of
true-bred dogs by a jury at a dogshow, or the amendment of a bill
in parliament. Although much time and consideration is absorbed
by discussions and individual points of view about the possible
collective standpoints, the methods which yield the collective
agreement are seldom at stake. Therefore, it is surprising that
the formalizations of these methods are contaminated by serious
defects, such as manipulation of the outcome or non-monotonic
behavíour between two possible outcomes.
In fact, due to the surprising failure to construct
defect-free methods by which a group of individuals may determine
its collective decision, a formal theory of collective decision
making has been developed. This theory is called social choice
theory. Since the theory of social choice is a formal theory with
rather weak assumptions, it may deal with several political,
economic and ethical problems. Therefore, it is not astonishing
that this theory is formalized in several ways. In this monograph
social choice is formalized by means of a mathematical framework
and the emphasis lays on the mathematics induced by social choice
problems.
In this chapter some basic notions, assumptions and
notations are introduced. Furthermore, several of the defects of
some collective decision procedures by which a group of
individuals determines its collective decision, are discussed.
Finally, some prelimimary work is done.
The present work is far from being a review or handbook of
social choice theory. In, for instance, Sen [1970], Sen [1986],
Arrow [1978], Black [1987], Moulin [1983], Arrow k Raymond
[1986], Peleg [1984], Pattanaik [1978], Schofield [1985],
Fishburn [1973], Farquharson [1969] and Brams ~ Fishburn [1982],
one finds reviews, other formalizations of social choice
problems, other ( here left unspoken) defects and other
mathematical formalizations of social choice theory.
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This work concentrates on constitutional decision making of
a group of individuals about a number of alternatives. The
notions of individuals as well as alternatives appear in all
problems of socíal choice theory. They will be regarded as
primitive notions. Furthermore, hereafter it is assumed that both
the number of individuals and the number of alternatives are
finite, which makes it possible to formalize these basic notions
as sets.
Definition 1.1.1 Socíety
A Society r is an ordered pair tA,N~ of non-empty and finite
sets, where A is the set of alternatives and N is the set of
individuals.
~
Clearly, the non-emptiness excludes odd posibilities, e.g.,
an empty set of indíviduals which decides between the
alternatives in A. Note that by definition 1.1.1 trivial
societies, i.e., where the set of individuals or the set of
alternatives is a síngleton, are admittable.
In literature societies with an infinite set of alternatives
or individuals have been studied, see e.g., Kirman ~ Sondermann
[1972] and Chichilnisky k Heal [1983]. The greatest part of
literature of social choice theory, however, is concerned with
finite sets of alternatives as well as of individuals. As
mentioned above, we retain in this monograph the tradition of the
finiteness of the sets of individuals and alternatives. A
disadvantage of this approach is that a lot of fruitful
mathematics, such as measure theory and analysis, are not
applicable here.
Notation 1.1.2 Basic notations of societies
Usually, a,b,c,d,e,f,x,y,z, or al,a2, .,ap are variables
over the set of alternatives A, and i,j,k,l,n and m are
variables over the set of indíviduals N.
If N has n elements, we interpret N as the set {1,2,3...,n},
Most frequently it is supposed that N has n elements and A
has p elements.
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It is expected that the reader is familiar with the
following standards of set theory.
Notation 1.1.3 Basic notations concerning set theory
Below there is a list of two columns. In the left a relation










strictly contained in ~ or c
not element of é
not contained in ~
the empty set ~
is equal to -
is not equal to ~
power set 2~~~
~
We assume that social choice or social preferences depend
only on the profile of individual preferences and on the
constitutional rule of aggregation. Hence, collective group
decisions, choices or preferences will be formalized in terms of
decision or aggregation mechanisms on profiles of individual
preferences. In fact, these mechanisms turn out to be special
functions, i.e., welfare functions and choice correspondences
while preferences are special relations on the set of
alternatives, such as linear orderings, weak orderings,
quasi-orderings, semi-orderings, partial orderings or interval
orderings.
Usually, in social choice theory as well as in other
theories, these orderings or, better, types of orderings are
basic notions. Although in this chapter this is also assumed in
order to simplify the problems discussed in this chapter, in
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chapter 2 a theory of orderings is developed. By this theory the
types of orderings are no longer basic notions. Instead of these
notions one other notion, named classified set of orderings, is
basic. By this the set of, e.g., linear orderings becomes a
derived notion. In this chapter sometimes the notion of set of
orderings is used. At this stage the reader may interpret it as,
e.g., the set of linear orderings or the set of weak orderings or
the set of quasi-orderings, and so on. By chapter 2 this notion
set of orderings becomes much more rich than we are able to
explain here. To indicate the richness the reader is invited to
cast a glance at the inclusion diagram on page ... which shows
several classified sets of orderings discussed in the following
chapter.
1.1.4 Notations Definitions and Interpretations of orderings
A binary relation R on A is a subset of the cartesian
product A x A. Hence R c A x A.
R is reflexive, iff for all x e A: Cx,x~ e R.
R is antisymmetric, iff for all Cx,y~ e A x A:
if Cx,y~ e R and ~y,x~ e R, then x- y.
R is complete, iff for all Cx,y~ e A x A, with x~ y:
Cx,y~ e R or ty,x~ e R.
R is transitive, iff for all ~x,y~, ~y,z~ e R: Cx,z~ e R.
áR indicates the asymmetric part of relation R and sR its
symmetric part.
We have the following standard interpretations.
If Cx,y~ e R, then x is as least as good as y(according to
R). Notation: x? y: R.
If Cx,y~ e R and Cy,x~ ~ R, then x is prefered to y
(according to R). Notation: xy . R or x. .y or
x ~ y . R.
If Cx,y~ e R and ty,x~ e R, then x is indifferent to y
(according to R). Notation: (xy) . R or x. .y or
x - y : R.
If (x,y~ é R and Cy,x~ é R, then x is incomparable to y
(according to R). Notation: (y) . R or x. .y or
x.------.y.
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The reader might think that notations like x? y: R are
contaminated with a lot of redundant information. Although
this thought seems to be true at this stage, this redundancy
disappears later on when, e.g., relations on relations are
introduced.
Often a compound notation is used, such as ((XZ)) : R or
x(yz) : R. These notations should be interpreted as unions
of the pair notations. Hence, x(yz) : R is the abbreviation
of xy : R together with xz : R and (yz) : R. ((XZ)) : R is
the abbreviation of (xy) : R, together with xz : R, (X) : R,
(y) : R, (y) : R and (x) : R. Note that (x) : R, (y) : R andx z z x x
(Z) : R are meaningless here. Hence, ((XZ)) : R is the
abbreviation of (xy) : R, together with xz : R and (Z) : R.
Note that (~) : R and (xy) : R reveal the same information
of R in relation to x and y. Hence, xy : R logically does
not imply: ~x,y~ e R and ~y,x~ ~ R. But as a notational
convention from now on it is assumed that R is completely
described by its notation. Hence, xy : R means
R-{~x,x~,~y,y~,~x,y~} and R c{x,y} x{x,y}.
We define two sets of orderings on A:
the set of linear orderings L(A) on A:
L(A) :- {R c A x A: R is reflexive, complete, antisymmetric
- and transitive},
the set of weak orderings W(A) on A:
W(A) :- {R c A x A: R is reflexive, complete and
transitive}.
It is evident that:
if ~A~ - 1, then L(A) - W(A), and
if ~A~ ? 2, then L(A) ct W(A).
~




Let (xz) : R. R is a relation on {x,y,z}.
~(xy)~yz
R-{ca,b~ e A x A: x e{a,b}, a- b, or (y,z~ - ca,b~}. It
has the following graphical representation: y. .x .z
i . i
Since cz,x~,cx,y~ e R and cz,y~ é R, it follows that R is
not transitive.
Furthermore, since a linear ordering orders the alternatives
from better to worse, we denote these orderings often by
their better to worse sequence. If R e L(A) and
A-{al,a2,...,ap} and al is preferred to a2, a2 is
preferred to a3 and so on, then R is often denoted as
ala2a3...ap : R. (NOte that this coincides with the notation
introduced earlier).
If R is a weak ordering, its symmetric part forms an
equivalence relation. The equivalence classes induced by
this relation are often refered to by indifference classes.
Now, if R e W(A) its indifference classes can be ordered in
a linear way. We get relations of the following form:
(ala2a3...as1)(asltl...as2)(as2tl...as3)...(asttl...ap) :R'.
In R' {ala2a3" 'asl}'{asltl " 'ag2}...{ast}l...ap} are the
índifference classes.
~
Next, the dependency of the individual preferences on the
decísion procedures can be formalized. Let P- cA,N~ be a society
with N-{1,2,...,n}. These numbers are just identifiers. Let us
denote the preference relation of individual 1 by R1, that of 2
by R2 and so on. A profile or combination of individual
preference relations, cR1,R2, ..,Rn~, is denoted by r. Obviously
r e L(A) x L(A) x...x L(A) -: L(A) the n-fold cartesian product, , n
n-times.
of L(A), if all the indivídual preferences R1,R2, ..,Rn are
linear orderings. Ln(A) can be interpreted as the set of possible
profiles, where all the individual preferences are linear
orderings. Similarly Wn(A) is the set of all possible profiles,
where all the individual preferences are weak orderings.
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Now, for any given combination of individual preferences, r,
the constitution or decision rule is assumed to yield a decision.
This can either be a unique ordering on A, in which case we speak
of an aggregated or a social preference of the society, or a
choice of alternatives, i.e., a non-empty subset of A, in which
case we speak of a group choice.
Definition 1.1.6 welfare function Choice Correspondence
Let P-~A,N~ be a society, V(A) and U(A) sets of orderings
on A and Vn(A) the n-fold cartesian product of V(A), where
n - ~N~.
A function F from Vn(A) to U(A) is called a welfare function
on P(from Vn(A) to U(A)).
A function C from Vn(A) to 2A -{~} is called a choice
correspondence on P(from Vn(A) to 2A -{~}).
~
A welfare function F is a decision procedure, which assings
to every possible combination of individual orderings, r e Vn(A),
a collective ordering F(r) in U(A). F(r) is often refered to by
social ordering or the ordering of the society (at profile r).
Similarly a choice correspondence C yields a collective or social
choice of the society C(r) at profile r e Vn(A).
The notions of welfare function and choice correspondence
are too weak to describe constitutional decision procedures on
their own. For this reason it is necessary to impose some
conditions on these functions. In sections 1.2 up to 1.5 several
conditions, often imposed on these functions in social choice
theory, are discussed.
In section 1.6 it is shown that the introduced conditions
can be translated, at least partly, into one language. This
enables a comparison between these conditions. Section 1.7
previews the following three chapters.
7
~ 1.2 Score rules
A frequently used type of correpondence is that in which
every individual votes for one alternative (candidate). The
alternatives, which receive the greatest number of votes, are
chosen. This voting rule is called relative majority voting.
Consider the following example.
Example 1.2.1 Borda's criticism on votina
Let P-~{a,b,c,d,e},{1,2,...,75}~ be a society.
Suppose the relative majority voting rule has to be applied
to profile r e L75({a,b,c,d,e}) as follows:
abcde : R1 for i e{1,2,...,16} (16 individuals),
dbcea : R1 for i e{17,....,31} (15 individuals),
cbeda : R1 for i e{32,....,46} (15 individuals),
bceda : R1 for i e{47,....,61} (15 indíviduals) and
ebcda : R1 for i e{62,....,75} (14 individuals).
Hence, a gets 16, b, c and d get 15 and e gets 14 votes. a
is then chosen. On the other hand, if we consider the
position of a in all the orderings, it is clear that a is
unacceptable for nearly 80~ of the society. Hence, chosing a
at this profile of individual orderings will probably ~evoke
lots of frustation'.
This criticism on voting has already been pointed out by de
Borda in 1781. (See e.g. Black [1987] and Borda [1781]). He
showed that this defect could happen, because only the top
positions of the individual orderings affect the outcomes of
a voting procedure. He therefore introduced a procedure that
takes all the positions of the alternatives in all the
individual orderings into account.
This procedure, known as the Borda rule, goes as follows in
this society: every individual gives 5 points to his best
ordered alternative, 4 to his next best, and so on. So 1
point is given to a worst ordered alternative. The
alternatives with the greatest number of points are chosen.
In our example:
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a gets (16x5) t(15x1) t(15x1) t(15x1) t(14x1) - 139 points
b gets (16x4) t(15x4) t(15x4) t(15x5) t(14x4) - 315 points
c gets (16x3) t(15x3) t(15x5) t(15x4) t(14x3) - 270 points
d gets (16x2) t(15x5) t(15x2) t(15x2) t(14x2) - 195 points
e gets (16x1) t(15x2) t(15x3) t(15x3) t(14x5) - 206 points
when the Borda rule is applied to the above profile r, then
b is the group choice and bceda : Borda(r) the aggregated
preference ordering.
~
Of course the Borda rule does not have the disadvantages of
the majority rule. But a lot of information is needed to
calculate the Borda score (i.e., number of points) of an
alternative. At least two questions arise.
(1) Is it possible to determine a decision in a more regular
way, e.g., by pairwise comparison of all alternatives.
(2) Does a small disturbance lead to a small change in the
outcome of a Borda rule.
The first question is discussed in the following section.
The second question is illustrated by the following example.
Example 1.2.2 Influence of disturbance
Let P-~{a,b,c,d,e},{1,2,3,4}~ be a society. Observe
the following two profiles r and r in W4({a,b,c,d,e}), such
that:
' r : (ea) c (bd) : R1, r : (ea) c (bd) : R1,
(ea) c bd : R2, (ea) c db : R2,
bd c ae : R3, bd c ea : R3,
db c ae : R4, db c ea : R4.
Note that R2 and R2 only differ in the ordering on their
worst pairs. Only one twist of the positions of alternatives
is needed to obtain R2 from R2 or vice versa. The same is
true for R3 and R3, and for R4 and R4. All these relations
differ on precisely one pair. Let us agree that in an
indifference class the points scored by the Borda rule are
divided equally among the members of such an indifference
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class. Hence, e gets 4; -~-(5 t 4) points from R1. Then a
gets 13 points, b 12}, c 12, d 11} and e gets 11 points from
r, where a gets 11, b llZ, c 12, d 12~ and e gets 13 points
from r.
Hence, abcde : Borda(r) and
edcba : Borda(r).
we come to the conclusion that the numbers of pairs in which
Borda(r) and Borda(r) differ, viz. (2) - 10 pairs, is
greater than the total number of pairs in which the
corresponding components of r and r differ, vi2. 3. Hence, a
small change in the combination of individual orderings may
cause a large change in the Borda outcome. The Borda rule is
not non-expansive with respect to those changes. We do not
formalize this non-expansiveness criterion here. This will
be done in chapters 3 and 4.
~
The second question in the previous example has got a clear
answer: No. This criticism on the Borda rule is not well known.
Another defect of this Borda rule has freguently been discussed
in literature.
Example 1.2.3 Manipulation
Let P- ~{a,b,c,d,e},{1,2,...,75}~ be a society and let r
and r be two profiles in L75({a,b,c,d,e}), such thai:
r: abecd : R, r: abcde : R,
aebcd : Rl for i e{2,...,35}, and for the rest r
eabcd : R1 for i e{36,..,74}, is the same as r.
abedc : R75,
By the Borda rule e is chosen at r and a is chosen at r.
Note that a is 1's best alternative. It is clear that,
whenever he is confronted with the orderings R2 up to R75 he
is better off by claiming that his preference is R1 rather
than R1. Hence, this rule is vulnerable for manipulation.
~




Let P- CA,N~ be a society with ~N~ - n, let V(A) be a set
of orderings on A and let C be a choice corresponcence from
Vn(A) to 2A - {~p}.
Then C is non-manipulable (or strategy proof), iff for all
i e N, all r, r e Vn(A), such that for all j e N-{i}
R~ - R~, all x e C(r) and all y e C(r) : x? y: Rl.
~
C is non-manipulable, iff a deviation from a given profile r
by one individual i to profile r is not profitable for i.
It is clear that non-manipulability excludes situations as
described in example 1.2.3. Furthermore, it is pointed out here
that this non-manipulability condition opens a way to introduce
several game theoretical aspects in Social Choice Theory. Gibbard
[1973] introduced the game form concept already at the very
beginning of the study of non-manipulable choice rules. Maskin
[1979] shows the relationship between non-manipulability and
Nash equilibria (See also e.g. Moulin [1983] and Peleg [1984]).
Notwithstanding these defects, rules belonging to the class
of the Borda rule are frequently used. To this class belong those
rules in which alternatives are given a point sl,s2,... or sp,
with sl ? s2 ?...? sp ? 0, by each individual according to his
(her) preference and the alternatives, whose points add up to the
greatest sum, are chosen. Those rule are known as score rules.
Young [1975] gives a nice characterization of these rules.
If we take sl - 1, s2 - 0,... , sp - 0, we are again back to
relative majority voting. If sl - p, s2 - p-1,..., sp - 1, then
the score rule coincides with the Borda rule. For instance, the
jury of the Eurovision Song Contest uses a score rule, where sl -
12, s2 - 10 and so on, to determine the winning song.
we will now answer question 1.
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~ 1.3 Pairwise Comparison
One way of simplifying the calculation, for an outcome of a
welfare function, is to suppose that this outcome can be obtained
from pairwise comparisons of all pairs in A. This can be
demonstrated as follows.
Let P- tA,N~ be a society, such that ~A~ - p and ~N~ - n.
There are (2) -~p(p-1) (not ordered) pairs in A. To demonstrate
the complexity of the calculations of outcomes of a welfare
function let us agree that 1 comparison between two alternatives
in 1 individual ordering stands for 1 unit in the complexity
index.
The Borda rule, (in finding the Borda preference), uses for
every alternative in every individual preference, all the
comparisons with all other alternatives. Hence, its
complexity-index is equal to n-p.(p).2
A calculation based on pairwise comparisons uses for every
individual all the comparisons of one alternative with all other
alternatives. Hence, its complexity is equal to n-(p).2
Compared to the Borda rule, such a pairwise comparison
principle uses less complexity units. But the application of such
a rule requires that the following condition holds for the
welfare function.
Definition 1.3.1 Independence of irrelevant alternatives
Let P- ~A,N~ be a society, let V(A) and U(A) be sets of
orderings on A and let F be a welfare function on P from
Vn(A) to U(A).
F is independent of irrelevant alternatives, iff for all
x,y e A and all r, r e Vn(A):
if rl - rl , then F(r)I - F(r)I
{x,y} {x,y} {x,y} {x,y}
Here rl - CRlI , R~I ..., Rnl ~ and for
{x,y} {x,y} {x,y}~ {x,y}
a relation R on A: RI .- R ~({x,y} x{x,y}). RI is
{x,y} {x,y}
equal to the relation R restricted to {x,y}. It is the
information of R about {x,y}. F is independent of irrelevant
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alternatives, iff for all x,y e A and all pairs of combinations
of individual orderings r and r, which have the same (ordering)
information about x and y(r - r ), it holds that the~(x,Y} ~{x,Y}
corresponding outcomes F(r) and F(r) have the same (ordering)
information about x and y(F(r)I - F(r)I ). In case that
{x,y} {x,y}
r - r and F(r) ~ F(r) , it is clear that F
I{x,y} I{x,y} ~{x,y} ~{x,y}
uses more information than the information about x and y alone,
when determining the preference between them. This explains the
name of the condition as well as the fact that pairwise
comparison presupposes this condition.
The Borda rule is not independent of irrelevant
alternatives. Take r and r of example 1.2.2, then
r - r , but Borda(r) ~ Borda(r) .
~{a,c} ~{a,c} ~{a,c} ~{a,c}
Arrow [1978] introduced this condition. See also e.g. Blau
[1971], who introduced some at first sight seemingly weaker
independency conditions, which all turn out to be equivalent to
the one introduced here (under certain domain conditions that are
usually imposed).
Arrow deduced the need for this condition from the pairwise
majority rule. Condorcet [1785] encountered already some problems
with this rule. The profiles that cause the problem have still
his name.
Example 1.3.2 Condorcet profiles
Let P-~{a,b,c},{1,2,3}~ be a society.
Take the following profile r e L3({a,b,c}),
r: a b c : Rl,
b c a : R2 and
c a b : R3.
Then a compared to b wins by two votes to one,
b compared to c wins by two votes to one, and
c compared to a wins by two votes to one.
Hence, the pairwise majority rule assigns to r the following
relation: a. ~ .b . .c
~ E ~
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This is no longer a transitive ordering with a best element.
Hence, we do not know what to do now!
The combination r is also known as a Condorcet profile.
~
It is clear that if this pairwise majority rule results in a
relation with a best alternative x, this candidate x is a rather
good choice. Each counter-objection for another candidate y would
be rejected, because x, being the best, beats y in pairwise
comparison. This is true in general for every pairwise comparison
rule. For that reason Arrow formulated the condition of
independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Apart from pairwise majority rules, also other pairwise
comparison rules have been introduced. They differ from the
pairwise majority rule only when this yields a cyclic preference
as in a Condorcet profile. Several of the rules such as the
Kramer rule, Copeland rule and Black rule are discussed in e.g.
Moulin [1983]. Hut all these rules have manipulation defects when
there are at least three alternatives.
Since every welfare function is automatically independent of
irrelevant alternatives in the case of a two alternative set, one
may expect that in those societies there is seldom any problem in
finding a feasible decision procedure. Usually this is a majority
(or voting) rule. See also May [1952] who characterized this type
of rule.
Finally it should be noted that Round-Robbin tournaments are
essentially welfare functions based on pairwise comparisons.
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g 1.4 Voting by veto
In this section we discuss rules whose choices are
determined by sequential elimination of alternatives. we start
with the Coombs rule. Its performance is shown by an example; no
formal description is given here (See e.g. Moulin [1983]).
Example 1.4.1 Coombs rule

































According to the Coombs rule, we consecutively eliminate the
worst alternative.
Note that e is 4 times the worst alternative in r, and a, b,
c and d all 3 times. Therefore, e is first eliminated at r.
Next, the worst element of rl is eliminated with
X1
X1 - A-{e}. In rl , a and b are 4 times the worst
X1
alternative, c 3 times and d S times. Hence d is eliminated.
Next, the worst element of rl is eliminated where
X2
X2 - X1 -{d}. In rl , a and b are 5 times the worst
Xz
alternative and c 6 times. Hence, c is eliminated.
Finally, the worst element of rl is eliminated with
X3
X3 - X2 -{c}. This yields to the elimination of b.
Therefore, Coombs choice at r is a, and the Coombs social
preference at r, Coombs(r), is abcde : Coombs(r).
15
The Coombs rule eliminates consecutively the worst
candidates. Elimination procedures to obtain a good
candidate are often used.
Let us indicate one of the most striking defects of such a
rule. Consider r e L16({a,b,c,d,e}), where Rl - R1 for all
i e{2,3,...,16} and dcbea : R1. Hence, r can be obtained
from r by just changing the ordering of one pair of
alternatives in the ordering of aqent 1.
It is straightforward to calculate that at r the Coombs rule
consecutively eliminates first a, then b, then c, then d,
making e the chosen outcome of the Coombs choice
correspondence and edcba : Coombs(r).
But Coombs(r) and Coombs(r) have a completely reversed order
and differ in (P) pairs, where r and r differ only in 1
pair. This rule is certainly not robust against small
changes. On the contrary, it is very sensitive and should
therefore only be applied when the individuals are very sure
about their individual orderings.
Given the same pair of profiles r and r, it follows that the
Coombs rule is not independent of irrelevant alternatives:
r - r , but Coombs(r) ~ Coombs(r)
~{a,d} ~{a,d} ~{a,d} ~{a,d}.
Furthermore, it is straightforward to show that the Coombs
choice correspondence is manipulable.
~
Another voting rule is the veto rule. Its performance is
demonstrated in the following example.
Example 1.4.2 Application of the Sincere Veto rule
We present only a very special application of veto rules.
For more information about veto rules the reader is refered
to e.g., Moulin [1983]. These veto rules have nice
interpretations in terms of cooperative games.
Let P- ~{a,b,c,d,e},{1,2,3,4}~ be a society. To determine
the outcome of the veto rule, discussed here, every
individual is allowed, by turns, to eliminate one
alternative. Since there is one more alternative than
candidates, one alternative is left over.
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we will suppose that agent 1 starts the elimination
procedure, then agent 2 eliminates his candidate and so on,
until agent 4. Furthermore, we suppose that the individuals
do not know anything about the orderings of the others. It
is therefore likely that each eliminates his worst
alternative from the alternatives left over at the moment of
his turn. This explains the word "sincere". Let us now
explain the rule for a given profile r e L4({a,b,c,d,e}).
Let r be defined as follows:
abcde : R1 for i e{1,2}, and
edcba : R1 for i e{3,4}.
It is clear that 1 eliminates e, 2 eliminates d, 3
eliminates a and 4 eliminates b, so that c becomes the
sincere veto winner at r. V(r) -{c}. Here V is the choice
correspondence which assigns the veto winner at a
combination r e L4({a,b,c,d,e}).
An appreciable property of this veto procedure is that it
does not select an alternative which is unacceptable for one
of the individuals, since each eliminates his worst
alternative. As one can see, for r, that alternative is
chosen, which is in the "middle" of all preferences.
On the other hand, it has a defect with respect to a
monotonicity property. To illustrate define
r e L4({a,b,c,d,e}) as follows:
cadbe : R1 for i e{1,2}, and
edcba : R1 for i e{3,4}.
To obtain r from r one has to increase in relation 1 and 2
the preference for c, and to decrease the preference for b.
Now at r 1 eliminates e, 2 eliminates b, 3 eliminates a and
4 finally eliminates c. Hence, V(r) -{d}.
It follows that although the preference for c has been
increased, going from r to r and c has been chosen at r, c
is not chosen at r. So V is not monotone according to this
preference increment.
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We end this section with the introduction of two
monotonicíty conditions: one for choice correspondences and one
for welfare functions. In mathematical analysis, a monotone
function preserves a certain ordering of the originals in its
range. Hence, the function leaves a certain ordering of the
originals invariant. The above meant condition leaves such an
ordering on the originals, in this case profiles, invariant.
Since the ordering which is left invariant, is on profiles, it is
desirable to comment somewhat further on these conditions. We
will not go very deep, however, because the tool by which this is
done, duality, needs a closer investigation. This would lead us
too far away from our goal here.
Let us first look at preference changes between two
alternatives.
Example 1.4.3 Preference chan4es between two alternatives
Let R1 and RZ be two reflexive and complete relations on A,
and let x,y e A. Now there are three orderings possible for
x and y in Ri (i e{1,2}) namely: x~ y: Ri, y~ x: Ri and
x- y: Ri. Hence, there are nine cases possible to describe










x~ y: Rl and x~ y: RZ ,
x~ y: Rl and x- y: RZ ,
x~ y: RI and x t y: Rz,
x- y: R1 and x~ y: Rz,
x- y: RI and x- y: Rz ,
x- y : Rl and x~ y: Rz ,
x C y: Rl and x~ y: RZ ,
x ~ y: R1 and x- y: RZ, and
x~ y: Rl and x~ y: R2.
Let us agree upon the following:
when going from R1 to R2 there is a change:
(A) in favour of the preference of x to y
strictly in case IV, VII, and VIII, and
weakly in case I, V, and IX,
(B) in favour of the preference of y to x
strictly in case II, III, and VI, and
weakly in case I, V, and IX.
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Otherwise stated: R1 is strictly prefered to R2 according to
{tx,y~} in case IV, VII and VIII. R1 is as least as good as
RZ according to {tx,y~} in case I, IV, V, VII, VIII and IX.
~
By example 1.4.3 it is straightforward to define an ordering
on orderings (or combinations of orderings) according to a
specific relation.
Definition 1.4.4 Preference on orderings
Let P- ~A,N~ be a society, with ~N~ - n, let V(A) be a set
of orderings on A, let R be a relation on A and let r,
r E Vn(A).
Then r is as least as much prefered to r according to R, iff
for all i e N and for all ~x,y~ e R:
if ~x,y~ e R1, then ~x,y~ e R1, and
if ~y,x~ e R1, then ~y,x~ e R1.
Notation: ~r,r~ e nn(R) or r? r:~n(R)
Instead of ~1(R) also n(R) is written.
After some trivial identifications (i.e., ~RI~ is identified
with R1) the following becomes apparent:
R1 ? RZ : n({tx,y~}), i.e., ~R1,R2~ e n({~x,y~}) ín the
cases I, IV, V, VII, VIII and IX,
R1 ~ RZ : A({~x,y~}), i.e., ~R1,R2~ e á~({tx,y~}) in the
cases IV, VII and VIII, where á~({~x,y)}) is the asymetric
part of n({x,y}).
R2 ? R1 : n({~x,y~}) in the cases I, II, II, V, VI, and IX,
R2 ~ R1 : n({~x,y~}) in the cases II, III, and VI, and
R2 - R1 : n({tx,y~}), i.e., ~RZ,R1~ e s~({tx,y~}), ín the
cases I, V, and IX.
Hence, for a singleton relation {~x,y~}, ~({~x,y~}) coincides
with the intuitive agreement on ordering two relations as
expressed in example 1.4.3. Furthermore, it is evident that
nn(R) - ~{nn({tx,y~}) : ~x,y~ e R}, Hence, nn(R) is a very
natural way of extending the definition of the singleton relation
case. But this makes it also clear that n is in fact a duality
operator (See Evers k van Maaren [1985]). This means that
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the relation between the pairs of profiles of orderings according
to a specific relation R and that specific relation ís special,
not bijective but more special than an average correspondence.
Some preliminary results on this subject result in the-conclusion
that many so called momotonic conditions for welfare functions
and choice correpondences, can be formulated by virtue of this
duality. Let us give two examples: one concerning positive
assocíativity for welfare functions (See e.g. Ritz [1985] and
McManus [1983]) and one concerning strong positive associativity
for choice correspondences (See e.g. Moulin [1983] and
Satterthwaite á Muller [1977]). These two are the only two
monotonicity properties discussed in this monograph. The reader
may find a lot of varíations to these with respect to welfare
functions in McManus [1983] .
Definition 1.4.5 Positive associativitv
Let P-~A,N~ be a society with ~N~ - n, let V(A) and U(A)
be sets of orderings on A and let F be a welfare function
from Vn(A) to U(A) on P.
F is positively associated, iff for all R c A x A and all
r,r e Vn(A): -
if r? r: Rn(R), then F(r) 2 F(r) : n(R).
~
A welfare function F is positively associated iff F leaves
all orderings nn(R) "invariant", that is, the images are ordered
according to n(R). This condition is called here positive
association because it is equivalent to the property with the
same name often used in literature. To save space and time the
proof of this is left to the reader (It is not evident but
straightforward using the notions of example 1.4.3). To




Let P-~A,N~ be a society, with ~N~ - n, let V(A) and U(A)
be sets of orderings on A and let F be a welfare function on
P from Vn(A) to U(A). Then (1.4.6.1), (1.4.6.2) and
(1.4.6.3) are equivalent.
1.4.6.1 F is independent of irrelevant alternatives.
1.4.6.2 For all R c A x A, such that sR - R, and all r,r e Vn(A):
if r? r-: ~n(sR), then F(r) ? F(r) : n(sR).
1.4.6.3 For all R c A x A, and all r,r e Vn(A):
if r- r: nn(R), then F(r) - F(r) : n(R).
Proof of theorem 1.4.6
The proof of this theorem follows immediately from the
following equivalences, which holds for every n and x,y e A:
r - r , iff ~r,r~ e nn({~x,y~,~x,y~}),
~{x,y} ~{x,y}
iff ~r,r~ e snn({~x,y~}).
~
By theorem 1.4.6 it is shown that the independence condition
is actually also a monotonicity condition. Furthermore, since
~n(R) is transitive, ít follows immediately:
Theorem 1.4.7
Let P- tA,N~ be a society, let V(A) and U(A) be sets of
orderings on A and let F be a positively associated welfare
function on P from Vn(A) to U(A). Then F is independent of
írrelevant alternatives.
~
We will now formulate an equivalent condition for choice
correspondences, often called strong positive association.
Definition 1.4.8
Let P-~A,N~ be a society, let V(A) be a set of orderings
on A and let C be a choice correspondence on P from Vn(A) to
2A - {w}.
C is stronaly positively associated, iff for all
r, r E Vn(A) and all x e C(r):
if r? r: n({x} x A), then x e C(r).n
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Note that ~r,r~ e~n({x} x A), iff in all components i e N
and for all alternatives y e A the preference of x above y
changes weakly in its favour, when going from R1 to R1. It is
therefore easily seen that x is preserved, going from r to r.
Hence, thís condition is equívalent with the one of equal name
mentioned in literature ( 5ee e.g. Moulin [1983]). To see that
this condition is again preserving some ordering ~type' it would
be necessary to define a relation on 2A according to a given
R c A x A. This will not be done here, but is possible. (There
are some preliminary results about this subject).
Returning to our example 1.4.2, it is clear that the sincere
veto rule is not strongly positively associated. Such a defect
would not occur if the choice correspondence were strongly
positively associated.
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~ 1.5 Some other conditions for decision rules
In this section we formulate some other conditions which are
frequently imposed on welfare functions or choice
correspondences.
The first condition we introduce is called neutrality.
Definition 1.5.1 Neutrality
Let P- CA,N~ be a society, with ~N~ - n, let V(A) and U(A)
be sets of orderings on A and let SA be the set of
permutations on A.
For R c A x A and a e SA define:
aR :- {~x,y~ e A x A: ~a-1(x),a-1(y)~ e R},
For r e Vn(A) define: ar :- taRl, aRZ,...,
aRnl~
A welfare function F on P from Vn(A) and U(A) is neutral,
iff for all r e Vn(A) and all a e SA : F(ar) - aF(r).
A choice correpondence C on P from Vn(A) to 2A-{cp} is
neutral, iff for all r e Vn(A) and all a e SA :
C(ar) - aC(r).
~
Since a permutation on A is just a renaming of all
alternatives, it follows that neutral decision procedures cannot
give a discrimínative treatment of a specific alternative in the
decision procedure. The procedure applies to all alternatives the
same rule. Neutrality is often present in decision procedures,
e.g. votinq rules, veto rules and the Borda rule are all neutral.
Another way to look at the neutrality property is to
interpret it as a simplification condition. The rule becomes more
complicated, if it is not neutral, sínce in that case the rule
has to take into account not only the profiles of individual
orderings, but also the names of the alternatives, in order to
derive a decision.
The second condition introduced here is Pareto-optimality.
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Definition 1.5.2 Pareto-optimality
Let I' -~A,N~ be a society, with ~N~ - n, let V(A) and U(A)
be sets of orderings on A, let F be a welfare function on P
from Vn(A) to U(A) and let C be a choice correpondence on P
from Vn(A) to U(A).
F is Pareto-optimal, iff for all r e Vn(A) and R e V(A):
if for all i e R1 - R, then àR c àF(r).
F is strongly Pareto-optimal, iff for-all r e Vn(A) and all
x,y e A:
if for all i e N x? y: R1 and there is a j e N, with
x~ y: R~, then x~ y: F(r).
C is Pareto-optimal, iff for all r e Vn(A) and all x,y e A:
if for all i e N x~ y: Rl, then y~ C(r).
~
Pareto-optimality guarantees a certain degree of autonomy.
That is, at several profiles, where there is a unanimous
agreement between the individuals a Pareto-optimal decision rule
does not defect on that point.
Again, these conditions appear frequently to be fulfilled by
decision rules. A rule which is neither Pareto-optimal nor
neutral is for instance, a decision rule which assigns to every
profile the same outcome (except, in the case of welfare
functions, the total indifference relation is excluded to be that
outcome).
The following type of condition we introduce is that of
non-dictatorship.
Definition 1.5.3 Non-dictatorship
Let P-~A,N~ be a society with ~N~ - n, let V(A) and U(A)
be sets of orderings on A and let F be a welfare function on
P from Vn(A) to U(A).
F is strongly non-dictatorial, iff for all i e N there are
x,y e A and r e Vn(A), such that:
x~ y: R1 and y~ x: F(r).
F is weakly non-dictatorial, iff for all i e N there are
x,y e A and r e Vn(A), such that:
x~ y: Rl and y? x: F(r).
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If a welfare function F is strongly (weakly)
non-dictatorial, then, for every individual i e N, there exists a
profile r such that, at this profile, the society decides
strictly against (not in favour of) i with respect to at least
one pair of alternatives. If F is not strongly (weakly)
non-dictatorial, then there is a weak (strong) dictator i such
that for every r e Vn(A): áRi c F(r) (áRi c áF(r)).
Certainly a dictatorial rule is of a simple nature. An
important weak dictatorial rule is that of unanimity:
F: Wn(A) -~ Q(A) (- the set of quasi-orderings), defined as
follows: ~x,y~ e F(r), iff for all i e N ~x,y~ e R1.
This unanimity rule F yields an incomparability between two
alternatives whenever the individuals are conflicting (disagree
in preference) about these alternatives. In this rule every one
is a weak dictator. F is not strongly dictatorial.
Finally we introduce a single-valuedness condition.
Definition 1.5.4 Single-valuedness
Let P-~A,r~ be a society, with ~N~ - n, and let V(A) be a
set of orderings.
A choice correspondence C on P from Vn(A) to 2A -{~} ís
single-valued, iff for all r e Vn(A) : ~C(r)~ - 1.
~
Single-valued choice correspondences can be identified with
functions from Vn(A) to A. They are often called choice
functions.
All the conditions defined here are well known in literature
(See e.g. Moulin [1983], Sen [1970] or Sen [1986]). In fact this




In the foregoing sections several conditions ón welfare
functions have been introduced. Looking at the formulation of
these conditions it is apparent that they are described by a wide
variety of formulas. Since we are interested in the effects that
one conditions may have on another, it is necessary to have a
common language for all of these conditions. As the original
interpretations become less transparant in this ~new' language,
this language has not been used to introduce the conditions in
the foregoing sections.
The language proposed here is inspired by Kelly [1978],
although here his total vocabulary is not used. That what is used
is transformed into notations which are suitable here and for the
rest of this monograph. The language has a decisiveness
interpretation.
Definition 1.6.1 Decisiveness
Let P-~A,N~ be a society, let S c N, let V(A) and U(A) be
sets of orderings on A, let r e Vn(A), let x,y e A and let F
be a welfare function on P from Vn(A) to U(A).
1.6.1.1 The set of unanimously feasible pairs by S in Vn(A) is
K(Vn(A),S) :- {tx,y~ e A x A: There is a profile r e Vn(A),
such that for all individuals i e S:
x ~ y : R1}.
1.6.1.2 S is (quasi-)decisive at r and F on ~x,y~, iff
if ~x,y~ e K(Vn(A),S) and -
for all i e S: x~ y : Rl ( and
for all i e N-S : y~ x: Rl ),
then x ~ y: F(r).
Notation: (q)D(F,S,~x,y~,r).
1.6.1.3 S is (quasi-)blockíng at r and F on ~x,y~, iff
if Cx,y~ e K(Vn(A),S) and -
for all i e S: x~ y : Rl ( and
for all i e N-S : y~ x: Rl ),
then not y~ x: F(r).
Notation: (q)B(F,S,~x,y~,r).
26
1.6.1.4 S is (QUasi-)decisive at F on cx,y~, iff
for all r e Vn(A) :(q)D(F,S,cx,y~,r).
Notation: (q)D(F,S,cx,y~).
1.6.1.5 S is (quasi-)blockinq at F on cx,y~, iff
for all r e Vn(A) :(q)B(F,S,cx,y~,r).
Notation: (q)B(F,S,cx,y~).
1.6.1.6 S is (quasi-)blocking at F, iff
for all ca,b~ e K(Vn(A),S) :(q)B(F,S,ca,b~).
1.6.1.7 S is (quasi-)decisive at F, iff
for all ~a,b~ e K(Vn(A),S) : (q)D(F,5,ca,b~).
~
when S is decisive at r and F on cx,y~, it follows that, if
x is unanimously strictly prefered to y by S at r, then society
prefers x to y at r, i.e., x~ y: F(r). Hence, at r it seems
that S decides about x and y. S is quasi-decisive at r and F on
cx,y~, if in S everyone prefers x to y(strictly) and outside S
everyone prefers y to x, then x ~ y . F(r). Hence,
quasi-decisiveness is just decisiveness restricted to special
profiles of the orderings of individuals in N- S. All the other
notions are just derivates of these two.
Let (q)D(F,S) :- {cx,y~ e K(Vn(A),S) : (q)D(F,S,cx,y~)} and
(q)B(F,S) :- {cx,y~ e K(Vn(A),S) : (q)B(F,S,cx,y~)}.
we have now the following theorem which characterizes
several conditions in terms of decisiveness. This enables us to
produce deductions from sets of conditions jointly imposed on
welfare functions, which is done in chapter 4.
Theorem 1.6.2
Let P- cA,N~ be a society, with ~N~ - n, let V(A) be a set
of complete, reflexive and antisymmetric relations on A, let
U(A) be a set of reflexive and complete relations on A and
let F be a welfare function from Vn(A) to U(A) on P.
1.6.2.1 F is independent of irrelevant alternatives, iff
for all 5 c N and ca,b~ e K(Vn(A),S) ~ vK(Vn(A),N-S) :
if cb,a~ é qB(F,N-S), then ca,b~ é qD(F,S).
Furthermore, let F be independent of irrelevant
alternatives.
1.6.2.2 F is Pareto-optimal, iff D(F,N) - qD(F,N) - K(Vn(A),N).
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1.6.2.3 F is strongly non-dictatorial, iff for all i e N:
qD(F,N-{i}) ~ cp.
1.6.2.4 F is weakly non-dictatorial, iff for all i e-N:
qB(F,N-{i}) ~ ~,
1.6.2.5 F is neutral, iff for all S c N:
if qD(F,S) fl K(Vn(A),S) fl v(K(Vn(A),N-S) ~ cp,
then K(Vn(A),S) (1 v(K(Vn(A),N-S) c qD(F,S),
(where vR - {~y,x~ : Cx,y~ e R}).
Proof of theorem 1.6.2
(1.6.2.1) (only if) Suppose F is independent of irrelevant
alternatives, S c N, ~a,b~ e K(Vn(A),S) fl vK(Vn(A),N-S) and
tb,a~ é qB(F,N-S).
Then there is a r e Vn(A), such that a~ b: R1 for i e S,
b~ a: Rl for i e N-S and a~ b: F( r).
By the independence condition we have for all r e Vn(A):
if for all i e S a~ b: Rl, and all i e N-S b~ a: Ri,
then a ~ b : F(r).
Hence, Ca,b~ e qD(F,S).
(if) Is of the same simple nature and therefore left to the
reader.
(1.6.2.2), (1.6.2.3) and (1.6.2.4) are simple to prove.
(1.6.2.5) (only if) Suppose F is neutral and
Cx,y~ e qD(F,S) f1 K(Vn(A),S) f1 vK(Vn(A),N-S).
Then there is a profile r e Vn(A), such that:
x~ y: Rl i e S,
y~ x: R1 i e N-S and
x ~ y : F(r).
Take ta,b~ e K(Vn(A),S) fl vK(Vn(A),N-S).
Obviously it follows that there is a r e Vn(A), such that:
a~ b: Rl i e S and
b~ a: Rl i e N-S.
Take a e SA, such that a(a) - x, o(x) - a, a(y) - b,
a(b) - y and a(z) - z for all z e A-{x,y,a,b}.
5ince F(r)I - F(rl )- F(arl )- a(F(r)I )
{a,b} {a,b} {x,y} {x,y}
and x~ y: F(r), it follows that a~ b: F(r).
28
( if ) Let x~ y: Rl and a~ b: Rl for i e S, and
y~ x: Rl and b ~ a: Rl for i e N-S.
It is sufficient to prove:
x? y : F(r), iff a? B: F(r).
This is obviously done by our assumption.
~
The theorem used above wíll extensively be used in our
impossibility theorems of chapter 4. As indicated before it
allows us to compare several conditions and deduce some
inferences between them. One of these inferences becomes quite
obvious namely the impossibility of Sen's minímal liberalism.
This criterion imposes a priori several decisiveness properties
on coalitions. This conflicts of course with the transitivity of
a social preference of a society, because decisiveness is not
defined in relation with this transitivity (See e.g., Sen [1970]
and Breyer [1978]).
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~ 1.7 Organization of this Monograph
Since the path breaking work of Arrow in 1951, it becomes
common knowledge that there does not exist a constitution or
decision rule that is both generally applicable and not
contaminated by serious defects. This knowledge is based on the
so called impossibility theorems, many of which have been derived
at this moment. Considering conditions that may be imposed on
choice correspondences or welfare functions or their domains and
ranges, social choice theory studies the effects such conditions
may have for the existence of such choice correspondences and
welfare functions. Although this theory is formal it is
astonishing that within this theory no theoretical attention is
paid to one of its main materials: the notion of ordering.
In the following chapter a theoretical background for this
notion is developed. It is called a classification system for
orderings. This classification system provídes a format of
primitive concepts in which the usual domains and ranges of
decision rules can be fit. Since it is possible to formulate and
to prove most of the existing impossibility theorems in this
classification system, we are able to come close to the common
roots of these theorems and to arrive at the very fundamentals of
the theory of social choice. We will formalize the intuition
behind the impossibility theorems in chapter 4.
Zn chapter 3 topologies on discrete metric spaces are
introduced. These topologies enable a non-trivial continuity
concept for functions between such díscrete metric spaces. By
virtue of the continuity concept a meaningful weakening of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives can be discussed in
chapter 4.
Chapters 2 and 3 are both preparing for chapter 4. In this
final chapter it is first shown that the most frequently studied
type of welfare function is in fact a morphism, which leaves the
ordering properties introduced in chapter 2 invariant. This
result may motivate the reader to study our classification
system.
Next it is shown that there exists a strong relation between
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welfare functions and choice correspondences, both belonging to
the category of decision rules. Again, in this correspondence the
above described morphisms play an important rdle.
In section 4.3 we investigate possibilities to weaken
conditions on the range of a mapping. Here the usefulness of
chapter 2 is demonstrated as indicated above.
In section 4.4 the independence of irrelevant alternatives
condition is replaced by a weaker continuity condition. There
exist welfare functions with nice properties that are continuous,
but not independent of irrelevant alternatives. However, the same
type of impossibility theorems occur if some reasonable range
restrictions are imposed.
In the final section 4.5 weakenings of the domain conditions
are studied. These conditions are of the following type: the set
of profiles is not required to be the set of all profiles over
the set of linear orderings or weak orderings. That is, the set
of profiles might be a real subset of those sets. In literature
it is often called a restricted domain condition. In this case it
appears that several types of restrictions lead to the existence
of nice welfare functions. The descriptions of these
restrictions, however, do not result into a transparant set of
admissible profiles.
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CHAPTER 2 A CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM FOR ORDERINGS
~ 2.1 Introduction
In literature many 'types' of preference orderings have been
introduced, e.g., linear orderings, weak orderings,
semi-orderings, partial orderings, interval orderings,
quasi-orderings, acyclical orderings, tournaments and many less
well-known orderings. These orderings have been developed in
various fields such as economy, psychology, sociology, operations
research, decision theory, discrete mathematics and many others.
A lot of research on these orderings was dedicated to model these
types of relations and to compare them with each other as well as
with graphtheoretical or combinatorial concepts. However, to the
best of our knowledge, there has not been an investigation into a
system which models all well-known types of orderings. Of course,
all orderings have been introduced by imposing criteria on
relations in such a way that each type of ordering is determined
by its own special set of criteria. Although such a set of
criteria can formalize the phenomenon of "linear", "weak",
"semi", "partial" "interval" or any other type of ordering one
might think of, it does not formalize the phenomenon of
"ordering" itself. Hence, we have no formal criteria which enable
us to classify a set of relations as a set of orderings. Such
criteria may exist since we use the word "ordering" in a specific
way whenever we deal with relations.
In chapter 4 we will investigate formalizations of
constitutional decision procedures in which various types of
orderíngs play a vital róle. We will introduce a classification
system which formalizes the notion of "ordering". Of course, such
a classification system can be used in several other formal
theories mentioned above.
We use the word "classification" system rather than
"axiom"-system, since an axíom system should be precise in all
its definitions, theorems and proofs of these theorems. We will
not be exhaustively precise in the definitions, theorems and
their proofs, but try to find a good balance between precision
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and clearness. It is straightforward, although cumbersome, to
make precise the system introduced in the next sections such that
one could call it an axiomatisation of orderings.
The classification system classifies sets of relations as
sets of orderings. Hence, the system consists of criteria for
sets of relations. According to those criteria a set of relations
can be classified as a set of orderings or not. However, the
criteria imposed on linear, weak orderings, etc. are criteria for
relations and not for sets of relations. we will end this section
by explaining this approach. The decision that a certain relation
R is a linear, weak or semi-ordering etc... is based on the fact
that R belongs to a class of relations called respectively the
set of linear, weak and semi-orderings etc... Hence, the decision
whether R is an ordering or not depends on the fact whether that
relation R belongs to any class, which can be seen as a set of
special orderings. Thus we have to determine how a set of
relations can be classified as a set of orderings. This is why we
introduce criteria for sets of relations instead of criteria for
relations.
This chapter is organized as follows: In section 2 we
introduce the classification system and some general results. In
section 3 we study linear orderings and the phenomenon of
transitivity. In section 4 the minimal extensions of the linear
orderings are studied and in the following two sections
extensions of these extensions are investigated. Finally, in
section 7 we will dwell upon the criteria to discover how slight
changes of these criteria may disturb the system.
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~ 2.2 The Classification Model.
In this section we introduce the model by which the
preference ordenings are classified in the following sections.
Furthermore, we will recall some well-known operations and state
some preliminary results.
Let us start with the model in which we will study
relations. First we state explicitly a restriction on the field
of temporary interest: Throughout this chapter let U be a
countable and infinite set. U is the 'universe' of alternatives
on which preference relations will be defined. Since only finite
relations are studied here, the possible domains which are finite
are of interest to us.
Let lE :- { X e 2U: X is nonempty and finite}. 1E is the set
of finite and non-empty subsets of U. 1E is the set of all
possible domains of relations in which we are interested. The set
of all possible relations in which we are interested is:
A:- {~R,X~: X e lE k R c XxX}.
An element ~R,X~ of A-is called a relation R(on X). In
literature the domain of a relation is usually known and does not
vary. In this approach here, however, several operations on a
relation by which the domain might change are introduced. For
this reason the relation and its domain are explicitly mentioned.
Notation: Let R be a relation on X(~R,X~ e A).
Instead of tR,X~ we also write RX. In (1.1.4) several
notations, definitions and interpretations concerning orderings
have been introduced. If we replace R by RA there, then they
become meaningful here. To save space we pretend that this
substitution took place and use these notations in this chapter.
To simplify the picture of a graph no edges are drawn from a
dot to itself. The context shows whether or not for an element x
it holds that: tx,x~ e RA.
Now some operations on relations are recalled. Let SU be the
set of permutations on U. Hence, SU is equal to {Q : o is a
bijective function from U to U}. Permutations will be indicated
most of the time by the small Greek letters a and i. The identity
permutation is indicated by 'i. Hence, i' e SU such that for all
x e U: i(x)-x.
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Furthermore, we remark that relations will be denoted by
capital "R" possibly together with some sub- or superscripts and
that their domains are denoted by capitals. Operations on
relations will be denoted by small letters superscribed by a bar
or by special mathematical symbols different from the usual
alfabet.
Definition 2.2.1 Binary operations on relations
Suppose: A,B e~, RA,RÁ,RÁ,RB e á and A D B-~.
2.2.1.1 RÁ U RÁ :- C{tx,y~ e A x A: tx,y~ ~ RÁ or ~x,y~ e RÁ},A~
is the uníon of RÁ and RÁ.
2.2.1.2 RÁ ~ RÁ :- ~{~x,y~ e A x A: ~x,y~ e RÁ and ~x,y~ e RÁ},A~
is the intersection of RÁ and RÁ.
2.2.1.3 RÁ , RÁ -~{~x,y) e A x A: there is an element z in A,
such that ~x,z~ e RÁ and tz,y~ e RÁ},A~ is the composition
of RÁ with RÁ.
2.2.1.4 [RA]1 .- RA.
[RA]ktl .- [RA]k , RA for all k?1.
Hence, [RA]k - RA a RA ,...., RA .
~ k timesJ
2.2.1.5 RÁ ~ RB:- ~{tx,y~ e(A U B) x(A U B):
tx,y~ e RÁ or ~x,y~ e RB or ~x,y~ e A x B},A U B~ is called
the concatenation of RÁ with RB.
Since evidently RÁ U RÁ, RÁ ~ RÁ, RÁ , RÁ and RÁ ~ RÁ are in
A, U, D, „ and ~ are binary operations on A. Rosenstein [1982]
calls this concatenation operation 'summation'and Jónsson [1982]
calls it 'lexícographic product'. Let us illustrate the name
~concatenation' for this operation.
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Example 2.2.2
Suppose: A-{x,y,z}, B-{a,b}, A ~ B-~, A,B e~ and
RÁ, RÁ, RB, RB e A, with xyz : RÁ
(So RÁ -~{tx,y~,tx,z~,~y,z~},A~), (xy)z : RÁ, ab : RB and
(b) : RB.
Then xyzab : RÁ ~ RB, abxyz : RB ~ RÁ
xyz(b) : RÁ . RB and (xy)z(b) : RÁ ~ RB.
~
we observe that the concatenation operation is not
commutative and furthermore that the representation of the
concatenated relation is equal to the concatenation of the
representations of each of its argument relations.
Note that the introduced binary operations are associative
and that union as well as intersection is commutative, where
composition and concatenation is not. Furthermore, A is closed
with respect to all of these operations. Two special relations on
a set A e~ are the identity relation on A, indicated by IdA and
the empty relation indicated by ~A.
IdA :- ~{~x,x~: x e A},A~ and ~A :- C~,A~.
Now we íntroduce some monadic operations.
Definition 2.2.3 Monadic operations on relations
Suppose: A e~, RA e A, B c A, with B~~, and c e SU.
2.2.3.1 vRA :- t{~x,y~:~y,x~ e RA},A~ is the converse of RA.
2.2.3.2 cRA :- ~{~x,y~:tx,y~ ~ RA k x e A 6 y e A},A~ is the
(relative) complement of RA.
2.2.3.3 rRA :- RAU IdA is the reflexive closure of RA.
2.2.3.4 aRA .- ~{~a(a),a(b)~:~a,b~ e RA}, a(A)~ is the c
permutation of RA.
2.2.3.5 sRA :- RA ~ vRA is the symmetric part of RA.
2.2.3.6 aRA :- RA~ cvRA is the asymmetric part of RA.
2.2.3.7 RAI .- ~{~x,y~ e B x B: ~x,y~ e RA},B~ is the
B
restriction of RA to B.
2.2.3.8 tRA :- U{[RA]k : k e{1,2,3,...}} is the transitive
closure of RA.
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2.2.3.9 dRA :- RA fl IdA is the diagonal part of RA.





iRA :- RA is the
oRA :-
is non-diaqonal part of RA.
identity operation on ,á.
cpA is the "constant" empty operation on A.
éRA :- IdA is the "constant" identity operation on Á.
qRA :- (RA fl cIdA) U (cRA fl IdA)is the relative
diacxonal complement of RA.
2.2.3.15 mRA : - (áRA U dRA)is the antisymmetric part of RA.
2.2.3.16 Let fl and f2 be two monadic operations on relations,
then for all RA e A:
flf2, defined by
fl and f2,
f1f2RA :- fl(f2RA), is the composition of
fl U f2, defined by (fl U f2)RA :- f1RA U f2RA, is the union
of fl and f2,
fl fl f2, defined by (fl fl f2)RA :- f1RA f1 f2RA, is the
intersection of fl and f2.
Notice that A is closed with respect to all of these
operations.
Furthermore, we write ne instead of né, qós instead of qós
and so on.
Observing the monadic operations introduced above, we can
point out at least three different types of monadic operations
with respect to the information which is used in their
definition:
A. Monadic operations using information which is not completely
contained in the relations which are the arguments of these
operations. These operations are defined by virtue of information
which is not 'known' to the arguments of these operations, e.g.,
the permutation operation a and the restriction operation ~B.
B. Monadic operations using information which is completely
contained in the argument relations but of a global nature. In
such an operation, say f, information, which is not completely
contained in the pairs of elements ~x,y~ with respect to the
argument relation RA, is used to define ~x,y~ e fRA. Hence, f
uses global information of RA. t is such an operation.
C. Monadic operations using only local information. In such an
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operation, say f, only information concerning the pairs of
elements ~x,y~ in A x A with respect to an argument relation RA
is used. Hence, only information of RAI and {x,y} is used to
{x,Y}
define ~x,y~ e fRA.
Such information, only concerning pairs of elements and
relations, will be called local information of a pair with
respect to a relation, or local information for short . These
monadic operations define their images by means of local
information about the pairs of elements. i,c, r and v are of
this type.
In the next section we will use these monadic operations,
which only use local information, in order to describe a general
transitivity property; therefore we study this type of operation
more carefully here. First we investigate the notion of local
information.
Local information about a pair ~x,y~ e A x A and a relation
RA e A is a truthfunctional combination of atomic propositions
about ~x,y~ and RA. We have precisely the following atomic
propositions:
P1: x- y, x is equal to y,
P2: ~x,y~ e RA, x is in relation RA with y, and
P3: ~y,x~ e RA, y is in relation RA with x.
These atomic propositions yield the following atomic monadic
operations:
m1RA:- ~{~x,y~ e AxA : x-y},A~ - eRA,
m2RA:- ~{~x,y~ e AxA :~x,y) e RA},A~ - iRA, and
m3RA:- ~{~x,y~ e AxA :~y,x) e RA},A~ - vRA.
Now it is obvious that every truthfunctional of these atomic
propositions corresponds uniquely to a monadic operation which is
based on local information. Hence, we are interested in the
possible compositions of these atomic propositions. Note that P1,
Pz and P3 yield to the following eight combinations of these
atomic propositions:
Q1' P1 S P2 S~ P3'
Q2: P1 ~ ~PZ k ~P3.
Q3: ~P1 S P2 ~ P3.
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Q4: ~P1 S PZ S ~P3,
Q5: ~P1 b ~PZ k P3,
Q6: ~P1 ~ ~PZ ~ ~P3,
Q~: P1 S ,PZ S P3, and
Q8: P1 k P2 k ~P3.
Since ty,x~ - tx,y~ whenever x- y, neither Q~ nor Q8 can be
fulfilled. The other six can so that there are precisely 26 - 64
truthfunctional operations on P1, PZ and P3. So it is obvious
that there are precisely 64 monadic operations which are based on
local information. Moreover, from the arguments above it is easy
to describe the operations corresponding to Q1 up to Q6:
f1RA - t{tx,y~ e AxA : x- y 6 tx,y~ e RA 6 ty,x~ e RA},A~
-(e ~ i ~ v)RA - dRA,
f2RA - t{tx,y~ e AxA : x- y k tx,y~ ~ RA ~ ty,x~ é RA},A~
-(é ~ c ~ cv)RA - dcRA,
f3RA - t{tx,y~ e AxA : x~ y~ Cx,y~ e RA 6 ty,x~ e RA},A~
-(ce ~ i ~ v)RA - nsRA,
f4RA - t{tx,y~ e AxA : x~ Y~ tx,y~ e RA 6 ty,x~ ~ RA},A~
- (ce ~ 'i ~ cv)RA - áRA,
fSRA - t{tx,y~ e AxA : x~ Y k tx,y~ é RA 6 ty,x~ e RA},A~
-(ce ~ c ~ v)RA - avRA, and
f6RA - t{tx,y~ e AxA : x~ Y k tx,y~ ~ RA k ty,x~ é RA},A~
-(ce ~ c ~ cv)RA - nscRA.
Notice that if g and h are monadic operations based on local
information which correspond to propositions respectively G and
H, then g n h corresponds to G 6 H, cg corresponds to ,G and
q U h corresponds to G v H. Hence, the set of possible monadic
operations based on local information is equal to the set of
possible unions of the operations fl up to f6, and, of course
also equal to the set of all operations, built from ml, mz and m3
by ~, U and c.
The following pictorial interpretations might be very
helpful to understand more easily the theorems and definitions of
this chapter.
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The diagonal of A x A
The square represents the cartesian product A x A and the
shaded area an arbitrary relation RA on A. RA induces a partition
F1, F2, F3, F4, F5 and F6 of A x A. Some parts consist of two
disconnected area's.
F1 - f1RA - dRA is the diagonal part of RA.
F2 - f2RA - dcRA is the relative diagonal complement part of RA.
F3 - f3RA - nsRA is the symmetric part of RA, which is not on the
diagonal.
F4 - f4RA - áRA is the asymmetric part of RA.
F5 - fSRA - avRA is the conversed asymmetric part of RA.
F6 - f6RA - nscRA is the incomparable part of RA.
Let M be the set of all maonadic operations based on local
information. Then M-{h: h- U g~ where gl,g2,..g6 e{ó,fl,..f6}}~' -~ i5j56
Observe M, U, fl , c is a Boolean-algebra. In the following
example we will examine the elements of M.
Example 2.2.4 Elements of M
M consists of all possible unions over fl,f2,f3,f4,f5 and
f6. Let us systematically explore these unions.
2.2.4.0 Empty union: U{fi : i e cp}.
This union is equal to ó since the proposition corresponding
with this union cannot be fulfilled.
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If m is a monadic operator, then mRA is
shaded.
2.2.4.1 Unions of precisely one argument:
U{fi: i e K}, where ~K~ - 1.







2.2.4.2 Unions of precisely two arguments:
U{fi: i e K}, where ~K~ - 2.
There are (2) - 15 of those unions. we will enumerate them:
d U dc - è , dc U ns










dc U nsc - sc ,
d U nsc - qsc, ns U á - n ,
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ns U av - nv
ns U nsc - nsca,
á U av - csca,
á U nsc - ncv , and









2.2.4.3 Unions of precisely three arquments:
U{fi: i e K}, where ~K~ - 3.
There are (3) - 20 of those unions. Notice that
{c1RA,dcRA,áRA,avRA,nsRA,nscRA} is a partition of (A x A)A
for every RA. Hence, whenever the union over K is known, the
union over {1,...,6}-K is just the complement of the former.
It is sufficient to list the following ten and their
complements:
d U dc U ns - rs , crs - ncs
áUác Uá -ra cra - nca
d U dc U av - rav , crav - ncav,
d U dc U nsc - rsc ,
d U ns U á - i
d U ns U áv - v
d U ns U nsc - qscm,
d U á U av - cscm,
d U á U nsc - qcv ,




























2.2.4.4 Unions of precisely four arguments:
U{fi: i e K}, where ~K~ - 4.
They are just the complements of the operations listed in
(2.2.4.21:
ce , cqs ,
cs , cqm ,
cm , cqmv,




cncv - rccv - rv, and









2.2.4.5 Unions of precisely five arguments:
U{fi: i e K}, where ~K~ - 5.
They are just the complements of the operations listed in
(2.2.4.1): cd,cdc,cns,ca,cav and cnsc.
cdRA: ,cdcRA~
~





2.2.4.6 Unions of precisely six arquments:
U{fi: i e K}, where ~K~ - 6.
This is the complement of cp : co.
coRA:
Finally, we like to answer the following two questions:
1. which monadic operations based on local information do
not lose information?
2. which monadic operations based on local information do
not yield imaqes that conflict with its origínal?
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cnscRA:
2.2.9.7 The answer to the first question:
Note that a monadic operation h based on local information,
which loses information, can be characterized as follows:
There is a relation RA e A such that RA is the image of a
relation ín A under h but we do not know which relation.
Since h is based on local information, we can easily
reconstruct possible originals for RA. Hence, h-1(RA) is not
unique. So, h does not lose information precisely when there
is an operation g based on local information such that
g- h-1 or, stated otherwise, h has an inverse operation
based on local information. (Actually h is a permutation on
Á).
It is straightforward to check that the following operations
are the only bijective monadic operations based on local
information: i,v,c,cv,q,qv,qc and qcv.
These are the only operations h based on local information,
such that for all RA e A: {ahRA,avhRA} -{àRA,ávRA},
{nshRA,nschRA} - {nsRA,nscRA}, and
{ dhRA,dchRA} - { dRA,dcRA}.
By this property it is easy to construct RA from h(RA)
whenever h is known. Moreover, let M be the set of these
- r- ~
operations: M-{i,v,c,cv,q,qv,qc,qcv}; M,' is an Abelian
group, where every element is its own inverse with respect
to composition. This is easily deduced from the









i v c q qv cv qc qcv
i v c q qv cv qc qcv
v i cv qv q c qcv qc
è cv i qc qcv v q qv
q gv qc i v qcv c cv
qv q qcv v i qc cv c
cv c v qcv qc i qv q
qc qcv q c cv qv i v
qcv qc qv qcv c q v i
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2.2.4.8 The answer to the second question.
Let us illustrate the questíon with a few examples. There
are relations RA e.4 such that vRA fl avRA ~ cp or
cRA fl avRA ~ cp or caRA fl avRA ~ cp. So v,c and ca yield
images which conflict with their originals.
We are looking for h e M, such that h fl av - ó. It is
straightforward to prove that N-{ó,d,dc,ns,á,nsc,é,s,m,
qsc,qs,qm,sc,n,nsca,ncv,rs,ra,rsc,i,qscm,qcv,q,scm,cv,ncav,
r,sca,rcv,cqmv,cmv,cav} is the set of all monadic operations
which are based on local information and whose images do not
conflict wíth their originals.
~
Now we have the following properties for these operations,
which are easy to prove. Therefore the proof is left to the
reader.
Proposition 2.2.5 Properties of operations
Suppose: RA, RÁ,RÁ,RB e A,, C e 1E, with A ft B- cp and C c A,
and a e S. Then:A
2.2.5.1 v(R1 U R2) -(vRl) U(vR2), (vRl) fl (vR2) - v(R1 (1 R2),A A A A A A A A
v(R1 , R2) - (vR2) , (vRl), v(R lk - (vR lk,A A A A A A
v(R1 ~ R3) - (vR3) ~ (vRl), vvR - R ,
A B B A A A
vcRA - cvRA, vrRA - rvRA,
vaRA - avRA, vsRA - svRA - sRA,
vaRA - avRA, v(RA ) - (vRA)I ,
~C C
vtRA - tvRA,
2.2.5.2 c(R1 U R2) -(cRl) fl (cR2), c(R1 f1 R2) -(cRl) U(cR2),A A A A A A A A
c(RÁ p RB) -(cRB) ~(cRÁ), CcRA - RA,
èaRA - acRA, c(RA ) - (cRA)I ,
~C C
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2.2.5.3 a(R1 U R2) - aRl U aR2, a(R1 f1 R2) -(aRl) fl (aR2),A A A A A A A A
(aRÁ) o (aRÁ) - a(RA , RÁ), a[RAIk - [aRAlk,
a(RÁ n RB) -(aRÁ) w(aRB), arRA - raRA,-
acRA - caRA, asRA - saRA,
aáRA - áaRA, atRA - taRA,
a(R ) - (aR ) ,
AIC A ~a(C)
2.2.5.4 ( RÁ U RÁ) - (RÁ ) U (RÁ ),
~C ~C ~C
(RÁ fl RÁ) I - (RÁI ) fl (RÁI ),
C C C
(RÁIC) , (RÁIC) c ( RÁ , RÁ)I ,
C
(rRA)I - r(RA' ).
C C
2.2.5.5 á(RÁ ~o RB) -(áRÁ) ~(áRB), aaRA - áRA, ttRA - tRA,
saRA - ásRA - cpA, ssRA - sRA, trRA - rtRA, and
2.2.5.6 for all m e M: mvRA - vmRA and m(RA )-( mRA)
~C ~C.
Recalling the notion of groupoid (See Rosenfeld [1968]), a
r igroupoid is a pair V,f , where V is a set and f a binary
operation from V x V to V, (V is closed under the binary
operation f) we can state the following theorem:
Theorem 2.2.6
r- i
2.2.6.1 M,' is a groupoid; it is even a semi group with
identity.
r- i2.2.6.2 N, U, n is a bigroupoid.
r- i
2.2.6.3 N,' is a groupoid; it is even a semi qroup with
identity.
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Proof of Theorem 2.2.6
(2.2.6.1) Let x,y e M.
It is sufficient to prove that x, y e M.
Note that x- fl U f2 U... U f6, where
fi e F-{d,dc,á,av,nsc,ns,ó} for all i e{1,.. ,6}.
r- i
Since M, U, fl is a field, it is sufficient to prove that
f, y e M, for all f e F. This is straightforward to prove.
(2.2.6.2) Let x,y e N.
It is sufficient to prove that x U y e N and x fl y e N.
Now z e N iff zRX c cavRX, for all RX e A.
Hence, xRX c cavRX and yRX c cavRX for all RX e A, and so
(x U y)RX c cavRX and (x fl y)RX c cavRX for all RX e Á.
Hence, x U y, x fl y e N.
(2.2.6.3) Let x,y e N.
It is sufficient to prove that x, y e N.
Note that x- fi U fz U... U f5, where
fi e F' -{d,dc,á,nsc,ns,ó} for all i e{1,.. ,5}.
r- i
Since N, U, f1 is a bigroupoid, it is sufficient to prove
that f' o y e N, for all f' e F'. This is again
straightforward to prove.
Later on the following theorem will be very useful.
Theorem 2.2.7
Suppose: RX, Ry e,4, a, b e Y, x, y e X and m e M.
Furthermore, let x? y: RX iff a? b: RY,
y? x: RX iff b? a: RY, and
x- y iff a- b.
Then ~x,y~ e mRX iff ~a,b~ e mRY.
Proof of theorem 2.2.7
Suppose: a,b,x,y,RX,RY and m are as above.
Furthermore, suppose ~x,y~ e mRX.
For reasons of symmetry it suffices to prove: ~a,b~ e mRY.
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Since m- fl U f2 U f3 U f4 U fs U f6, where
fl,f2,...f6 e{ó,à,av,ns,nsc,d,dc} it is sufficient to prove
~a,b~ e mRy for the case that m e{ó,à,av,ns,nsc,d,dc}. Now:
~x,y~ e àRX iff ~x,y) e RX S~y,x~ ~ RX S~ x~ y,
~x,y~ e àRX iff ~x,y~ ~ RX k ~y,x~ e RX S~ x~ y,
~x,y~ e nsRX iff Cx,y~ e RX ~ ~y,x~ e RX S x~ y,
~x,y~ e nscRx iff ~x,y~ ~ RX S~y,x~ ~ RX 6 x~ y,
~x,y~ e dRX iff ~x,y~ e RX 6~y,x~ e RX ë~ x- y,
~x,y~ e dcRX iff ~x,y~ é RX S~y,x~ ~ RX S~ x- y, and
~x,y~ e óRX iff "False".
Hence, ~a,b~ e mRy follows evidently from the assumptions.
~
we continue by introducing some conditions for relations.
Almost all the conditions stated here are well-known in
literature, therefore we will not dwell upon them.
Definition 2.2.8 Restrictions for relations
Let RA e,4 be a relation on A e lE. Then RA is:














iff tRA - RA,
iff aRA - RA,
iff sRA - RA,
iff RA n IdA - cp,
iff sRA c IdA,
iff r(RA U vRA) - ~A x A, A~
iff RA U vRA -~A x A, A~,
iff t(r(RA U vRA)) -~A x A, A~,
iff t(c(RA)) - cRA,
iff t(à(RA)) is asymmetric,
iff t(à(RA)) c aRA,
iff [aRA]t c àRA (t e N, t? 1),
iff [aRA]t a [sRAlm , [àRAlk c àRA
(t ? 1, m ? O,k ? 0).
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(2.2.8.12) to (2.2.8.14) are just weakenings of the
transitivity condition (2.2.8.2) (See Blau[1979], Blair k
Pollack[1979], and Sen[1970]).
Later on we will state some other weakenings of (2.2.8.2).
Let us recall some well-known properties of these
restrictions.
Proposition 2.2.9
Let A e lE, let RA e á be a relation on A.
Then the following holds:
2.2.9.1 RA is transitive iff tRA c RA
iff RA o RA c RA,
2.2.9.2 RA is negative transitive iff cRA is transitive,
2.2.9.3 cávRA is strongly complete, and
2.2.9.4 RA is complete iff cRA is antisymmetric.
~
The aim of this chapter is to classify special types of
relations, namely preference ordenings. We are looking for
criteria on the basis of which one can say whether or not a
given relation is a preference ordering. These criteria will be
described as conditions on a set of relations. Hence, the
question whether or not a given relation is a preference
ordering, is translated to the problem whether or not the given
relation is an element of a set of relations satisfying the
proposed criteria. we will now íntroduce those criteria and
explain how they are related to sets of preference orderings.
We will now state the first criterion:
Definition 2.2.10 Closed under permutation (Criterion 1)
Let cp ~ V c Á.
V is closed under permutation, iff aRX e V, for all c e SU
and all RX e V.
~
A set V of relations is closed under permutation, iff for
all relations RX in V it holds that for every set of elements Y
in lE, such that ~X~ -(Y~, and for every róle-exchange a in SU,
such that c(X) - Y, there is a relation RY in V, such that the
róle of an arbitrary x in X played in RX is played by a(x) in RY.
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Of course RY - aRX. If V is closed under permutation and RX is in
V, then for every Y in 1E, such that ~Y~ - ~X~, it holds that the
elements in Y can play the róle of the elements in X. So if V is
closed under permutation it cannot give a discriminative
treatment to a specific subset X e 1E. For this reason we shall
demand later on that the classified sets of orderings must be
closed under permutation.
Before stating the second condition we discuss an invariance
property of sets of relatíons which are closed under permutation.
Proposition 2.2.11
Let cp ~ V c A.. Then it holds:
V is closed under permatation, iff V- Va, for all a e SU,
where Vh .- {h(Ry) : Ry e V} for all monadic operations h.
Proof of proposition 2.2.11
Note that RX - aa-1RX, by which (2.2.11) evidently holds.
The second criterion is as follows:
Definition 2.2.12 Closed under conversion (Criterion 2)
Let cp ~ V c Á.
V is closed under conversion, iff vRX e V, for all RX e V.
~
A set of relations W is closed under conversion, iff for
every relation RX in W it holds that reversing all the
preferences between the elements in RX results in a new relation
vRX which is again in w. Criterion 1 and 2 are independent from
each other, since there does not always exist a permutation a
such that for a relation RX e Á, aRX - vRX.
Criterion 2 can also be interpreted as an invariance property,
which is shown by the following proposition:
Proposition 2.2.13
Let cp ~ V c A. Then it holds:
V is closed under conversion, iff V- V~.
Proof of proposition 2.2.13
Note that RX - vvRX, by which (2.2.13) evidently holds.
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The third criterion is as follows:
Definition 2.2.14 Closed under restriction (Críterion 3)
Let cp ~ V c A.
V is closed under restriction, iff for all RA e V and all
B e lE, with B c A, RAI e V.
- B
A set of relations W is closed under restriction, iff for
every relation RX in W it holds that every (complete) part of RX
(RXI , cp ~ Y c X) is an element of W. Alternatively, stated in
Y -
terms ofpreference ordenings: W, a set of preference orderings,
is closed under restriction, iff every relation RX only consists
of "subrelations" RXI (Y c X, cp ~ Y), which are preference
Y
orderings in W. This means that the local ordering of a subset Y
of X does not depend on the cardinality of Y or, stated
otnerwise, that the elements of X- Y are irrelevant with respect
to order the elements of Y.
We have come to the fourth criterion:
Definition 2.2.15 Closed under concatenation (Criterion 4)
Let cp ~ V c Á.
V is closed under concatenation, iff for all RÁ,RB e V, with
A f1 B- cp , RÁ ~ RB e V.
~
A set of relations W is closed under concatenation, iff the
concatenation of two relations RÁ and RB, with A fl B- cp, in W is
again in w. In terms of preference orderings this means that
having two orderings RÁ and RB, such that A fl B- cp, in W
RÁ . RB, which is built by just preferring everything in A to B
and leaving RÁ and RB in RÁ r RB unchanged, is again in W. By
this criterion we exclude sets of relations without any
preference. This is easy to understand, since we create the
possibility to prefer strictly by concatenation. Hence, by
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criterion 4 we demand some "ordering-principle" for a set V c A.
We introduce the fifth criterion: -
Definition 2.2.16 Non-triviality
Let cp ~ V c Á.
V is non-trivial, iff for all X e 1~ there are RX,RX e Á,
such that RX e V and RX ~ V.
~
A set of relations W is non-trivial, iff W does not contain
all possible relations on a set X in 1E and, furthermore, W does
contain at least one relation on that set X. Hence, W restricted
to X is not a trivíal set of relations on X. This criterion could
be omitted, but for simplicity we will impose it on a set of
orderings.
Now we have come to the last criterion. Before stating it we
introduce a substitution operation.
Definition 2.2.17 Substitution
Let RX,RY e A, such that X n Y- cp, x e X and vRi, - RY.
Let Z-(X U Y) -{x}. Then:
Sub (RX,x,R?,):- ~{ta,b~: [a,b e X-{x} k ta,b~ e RX] v
[a,b e Y k~a,b~ e RY] v
[a e Y,b e X-{x} S~ ~x,b~ e RX] v
(a e X-{x},b e Y s~ ~a,x~ e RX]},Z~.
~
Of course Sub(RX, x, RY) e,4. When RY is reversible
(vRY - R~,), then we can substitute RY in RX, where RY plays the
róle of x in X. The following example explains the name of this
operation.
Example 2.2.18
Suppose: X-{x,y,z}, y-{a,b}, with Y fl X- cp
((Yz)) :RX and (b) : RY. RX: x. .z and RY: .a
.y .b
Then Sub(RX,x,RY) has the following representation:
~((b)z)~ : Sub(RX,x,RY). Sub(RX,x,RY) : a. .z .bLLL Y .y
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We state now the last criterion.
Definition 2.2.19 Closed under Substitution (Criterion 6)
Let ~p ~ V c Á.
V is closed under substitution, iff Sub(RX,x,RY) e V, for
all RX, RY e V, with vRY - RY and X n Y- cp, and all x e X.
A set of relations W is closed under substitution iff, for
all relations R1 in W and elements x in X and for all reversibleX
relations RY in W(i.e., RY - vRY) which are completely disjoint
from RX (i.e., X fl Y- cp), there is a relation RZ in W in which
RY plays the róle of x in RX. Of course RZ - Sub(RX,x,RY). Stated
otherwise, a reversible relation can always be substituted in any
preference ordering. The reversibility condition on RY is
essential since otherwise the róle of the reversible "x" has been
taken over by an irreversible RY in RX, which easily leads to
intransitivities. On the other hand, if we drop this criterion
the number of elements in a reversible part of an ordering
becomes relevant. This is excluded by criterion 6.
Notation 2.2.20 Some standard set of relations
The following sets are standard for the rest of this
monograph:
2.2.20.1 Y1 :- {ccpX e á: ~X~ - 1} is the set of reflexive
relations on singletons,
2.2.20.2 Y2 :- {cpX e A: ~X~ - 1} is the set of irreflexive
relations on singletons,
2.2.20.3 Y3 :- {ccpX e.á : X e lE} is the set of reflexive total
indifference relations,
2.2.20.4 Y4 :- {nc~pX e A: X e]E} is the set of irreflexive total
indifference relations,
2.2.20.5 Y5 :- {rcpX e á: X e lE} is the set of reflexive total
incomparable relations,
2.2.20.6 Y6 :- {cpX e A: X e lE} is the set of irreflexive total
incomparable relations,
2.2.20.7 Y7 :- {rRX e A: vRX - RX} is the set of reflexive
reversible relations, and
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2.2.20.8 Y8 :- {nRX e Á: vRX - RX} is the set of irreflexive
reversible relations.
Clearly Y1 - Y2' Y3 - Y4' YS - Y6' Y7 - Y8' Y8av - Y3 and
avY8 - Y6.
Furthermore it is clear that, if W c R is closed under
restrictíon, substitution and permutation then:
. W fl Yi ~ cp iff Yi c W for i e{1,2},
. W fl (Yi - Yj) ~ cp iff Yi c W for
~i,j~ e {c3,1~,c5,1~,c4,2~,t6,2~},
. Y7 c W iff Y5 c W and Y3 c W, and
. Y8 c W iff Y6 c W and Y4 c W.
It is possible to define the substitution mechanism more
subtle, that is only elements in Yi, for precisely one
i e{1,2,3,4,5,6}, may be substituted instead of every reversible
relation. In doing so the theory remains essentially the same
except two things:
(1) Some sets of relations often referred to as orderings will
be classified as set of ordering with this more subtle
substitution (Hence, this would clearly come closer to our
intuitive notion of orderings),
(2) All the definitions, theorems and proofs become much more
complicated.
Since the number of sets of relations that will not be
classified as sets of orderings when using definition 2.2.17, and
which are referred to by orderings, is small (to the best of our
knowledge) and the degree of complexity in the other approach is
great, we simplify the matter discussed in this chapter.
Therefore (2.2.17) is used, although the theory using the more
subtle substitution definition has already been developed (See
earlier versions of this monograph).
Before defining which sets of relations are classified as




Suppose: RX,RX,RY,RY e Á, with X fl Y- cp, RY - vRy and
RY - vRY, and x e X. Then:
2.2.21.1 Sub(RX f1 RX, x, RY fl RY) -
Sub(RX, x, RY) fl Sub(RX, x, RY),
2.2.21.2 Sub(RX U RX, x, RY U RY) -
Sub(RX, x, Ry) U Sub(RX, x, RY),
2.2.21.3 vSub(RX, x, RY) - Sub(vRX, x, vRY),
2.2.21.4 cSub(RX, x, RY) - Sub(cRX, x, cRY),
2.2.21.5 dSub(RX, x, RY) - Sub(dRX, x, dRY), and
2.2.21.6 for all h e M: hSub(RX, x, RY) - Sub(hRX, x, hRY).
Proof of proposition 2.2.21
(2.2.21.6) is an ímmediate result of (2.2.21.1) up to (2.2.21.5),
since the elements of M can be built by fl, U and c from ml,
m2 and m3.
(2.2.21.1) This follows by the following observation:
Ga,b~ e Sub(RX fl RX, x,2RY f1 RY) E9
[ca,b~ e RX S~ ca,b~ e RX S a,b e X-{x}] v
[ca,b~ e RY ~ ca,b~ e RY 6 a,b e Y] v
[cx,b~ e RX S cx,b~ e RX S~ b e X-{x} S a e Y] v
[ca,x~ e RX 6 Ca,x~ e RX S~ a e X-{x} 6 b e Y] Ej
{[ca,b~ e RX S a,b e X-{x}] v
[ca,b~ e RY S~ a,b e Y] v
[cx,b~ e RX k a e Y k b e X- {x}J v
[ca,x~ e RX k a e X- {x} ~ b e Y]} ~
{[ta,b~ e RX ~ a,b e X-{x}] v
[ca,b~ e RY k a,b e Y] v
[cx,b~ e RX S~ a e Y S b e X- {x}] v
[ta,X~ e RX k a e X-{x} 6 b e Y]}
~a,b~ e Sub(RX, x, RY) fl Sub(RX, x, RY).
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(2.2.21.2) up to (2.2.21.5) are proved similarly.
We have come now to the main definition of this section.
Definition 2.2.22 Classifications of orderinas
Let V c A.
V is classified as a set of orderinas, iff
V is non-trivial and V is closed under permutation,
conversion, restriction, concatenation and substitution.
~
In other words, V is classified as a set of orderings if V
satisfies criteria 1 up to 6.
We end this section with some remarkable properties of sets
which are classified as a set of orderings.
Theorem 2.2.23
Let cp ~ V c A.
V is classified as a set of orderings iff (2.2.23.1),
(2.2.23.2), and V is closed under conversion, restriction,
concatenation and substitution, where
2.2.23.1 for all A e 1E, with ~A~ - 1, there is a RA e V, and
2.2.23.2 either all RX e V are reflexive or all RX e V are
irreflexive.
~
Theorem 2.2.23 states that a non-empty set of relatíons
classified as a set of orderings either contains only reflexive
relations or contains only irreflexive relations.
Proof of theorem 2.2.23
(only if) (2.2.23.1) follows immediately from the non-triviality
of V.
It is sufficient to prove (2.2.23.2).
Suppose RX, RY e V such that there is a x e X, with
~x,x~ e RX and there is a y e Y, with ~y,y~ ~ Ri,; we deduce
a contradiction and are done.
V is closed under restriction, so: ~{tx,x~},{x}~ e V and
~~D,{Y}~ e V.
V ís closed under permutation, so: {{~x, x~}{x}~ ~{x}} c V.
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So, for X-{x} the non-triviality of V is not satisfied.
This contradicts our assumptions.
(if) Since permutations are in fact the result of a successive
substitution of relations on singletons, the closedness
under permutation follows from (2.2.23.1), (2.2.23.2) and
the closedness under substitution of V.
The non-triviality is implied by (2.2.23.1), (2.2.23.2) and
the closedness under concatenation of V.
Now the notion of order morphism is introduced.
Definition 2.2.24 Order morphism
Let V and W be two sets of relations, such that V is
classified as a set of orderings. A function h from V to W
is an order morphism, iff:
2.2.24.1 h(RA) e{RB e.4 : B- A} for all RA e V,
2.2.24.2 h(vRA) - vh(RA) for all RA e V,
2.2.24.3 h(oRA) - ah(RA) for all RA e V and a e SU,
2.2.24.4 h(RA )- h(RA)~ for all RA e V and cp ~ B c A,
~B g -
2.2.24.5 h(RX m RY) - h(RX) ~ h(RY) for all RX, RY e V, with
X fl Y- cp, and
2.2.24.6 h(Sub(RX,x,RY)) - Sub(h(RX),x,h(RY)) for all x e X and
RX, RY e V, with vRY - RY and X tl Y- cp.
Furthermore, h is an order isomorphism, iff h is a bijective
order morphism. In that case V and W are isomorph.
Notation V - W.
~
In the following theorem we prove that the image of an order
morphism is classifiable as a set of orderings, whenever the
original space is classified as such. So, an order morphism
preserves the introduced criteria, which explains the name order
morphism.
Theorem 2.2.25
Let V and W be two sets of relations, such that V can be
classified as a set of orderings. Suppose h is an order
morphism from V to W. Then the set h(V) :- {h(RA) : RA e V}
is classified as a set of orderings.
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Proof of theorem 2.2.25
Suppose V is classified as set of orderings and h is an
order morphism. Let RA e h(V) and a e SU. So, there is a
relation RÁ e V, such that h(RÁ) - RA.
Then aRA - ah(RÁ) - h(aRÁ).
Since aRÁ e V, it follows aRA e h(V).
Hence, h(V) is closed permutation.
Similarly it follows that h(V) is closed under conversion,
restriction, concatenation and substitution.
Let X e lE, V(X) :- {RA e V: X- A}, and
h(V)(X) :- {RA e h(V) : X- A}. V(X) and h(V)(X) are finite.
Now h(V(X)) - h(V)(X), by which h(V) is obviously
non-trivial.
~
An investigation of the possible order morphisms between
sets of orderings is the following point of interest. The next
theorem is very useful in that investigation.
Theorem 2.2.26
Let V,W c Á, such that V can be classified as a set of
orderings. Suppose h is an order morphism from V to W.
Then h e{ n, r, ncav, cav, ncv, rcv, á, ra}.
Proof of theorem 2.2.26
The proof will be established in three steps.
Step 1 For all a,b,c,d e U and all RX, Ry e V:
if a? b: RX iff c? d: Ry, and
b? a: RX iff d? c: RY, and
a- b iff c- d,
then a? b: h(RX) iff c? d: h(Ry).
Proof of step 1
Suppose: a,b,c,d e U, RX, Ry e V, a? b: h(RX),
a- b iff c- d,
a? b: RX iff c? d : Ry, and
b? a: RX iff d L c: Ry.
We have to prove c? d: h(RX).
Let a e SU be such that a(a) - c, a(b) - d, a(c) - a,
a(d) - b and a(x) - x for x e U-{a,b,c,d}.
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Then obviously - a( ).
~~ {a,b} ~~ {c,d}
Hence, we have the following sequence of implications:
a ? b : h(RX)
a ? b : h(RX)
~{a,b}
a ? b : h(RXI )
{a,b}
a ? b : h(a(Ry )) -~
~{c,d}
a ? b : a(h(Ry)I )
{c,d}
a(c) ? a(d) : a(h(RY) ) -~
~{c,d}
c ? d : h(RY).
This completes the proof of step 1.
Step 2 For all RX e V: áRX - ah(RX).
Proof of step 2
Suppose a~ b: RX for some a,b e X and RX e V.
Then a~ b: RX E~ a~ b: RX
~(a,b}
E~
RX~{a} ~ ~~{b} - RX~{a,b}
-~ h(RX)~{a} M h(RX)~{b} - h(~)I{a,b}
E~ a ~ b : h(RX).
Hence, áRX c áh(RX) for all RX e V
Suppose not a~ b: RX.
We have to prove that not a~ b: h(RX).
Case 1 b~ a: RX.
By (2.2.26.1) b ~ a : h(RX).
Hence, not a~ b: h(RX).
Case 2(b) : RX or (ab) : RX.
Then we are ready by step 1.
This completes the proof of step 2.
(2.2.26.1)
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Step 3 h e{n, r ncav, cav, ncv, rcv, á, ra}.
By step 1 and step 2 ít follows:
(1) áRX - áh(RX) and avRX - avh(RX) for all RX e V,
(2a) either (xy) : h(RX) for all RX e V and x,y e nsRX
(2b) or (y) : h(RX) for all RX e V and x,y e nsRX,
(3a) either (xy) : h(RX) for all RX e V and x,y e nscRX
(3b) or (y) : h(RX) for all RX e V and x,y e nscRX, and
(4a) either h(RX) is reflexive for all RX e V
(4b) or h(RX) is irreflexive for all RX e V.
Now there are eight cases.
Case 1 (2a), (3a) and (4a).
For all RX e V and all x,y e X:
x~ y: h(RX) iff x~ y: RX,
(xy) : h(RX) iff (xy) : RX, (y) : RX or x- y.
Hence, h - cav.
Case 2(2a), (3a) and (4b). Leads similarly to h- ncav.
Case 3(2a), (3b) and (4a). Leads similarly to h- r.
Case 4(2a), (3b) and (4b). Leads similarly to h- n.
Case 5(2b), (3a) and (4a). Leads similarly to h- rcv.
Case 6(2b), (3a) and (4b). Leads similarly to h- ncv.
Case 7(2b), (3b) and (4a). Leads similarly to h- ra.
Case 8(2b), (3b) and (4b). Leads similarly to h- á.
~
Note that for a classifiable set v of orderings, either all
relations in V are reflexive or all are irreflexive, and that
consequently:
i e{n,r}, q E{n,r}, cv e{ncv, rcv}, and qcv e{ncv, rcv}.
By combining several previous results the following
corollary is deduced, where Vh .- {hRX : RX e V} for all V c A
and h e M. -
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Corollary 2.2.27
Let V,W c Á such that V can be classified as a set of
orderings.
Then the following holds:
2.2.27.1 for all f e{n, r, ncav, cav, ncv, rcv, á, ra}, f is an
order morphism from V to Vf,
2.2.27.2 for all f e{i, q, cv, qcv} - M, f is an order
isomorphism from V to Vf,
2.2.27.3 if f is an order morphism from V to f(V) -: W, then
w e{V, Vcv, Vq, Vqcv Va Vm~ Vqm Vn Vncv Vcav Vrá
Vncav~ Vr~ Vrcv Vcqmv Vcmv} and W can be classified
as a set of orderings, and
2.2.27.4 if W is order isomorph with V, then W is classified as
set of orderings and W e{V, Vcv, Vq, Vqcv}.
Proof of corollary 2.2.27
(2.2.27.1) By (2.2.5) and (2.2.21) it follows that f e{n, r,
ncav, cav, ncv, rcv, á, rá} is an order morphism.
(2.2.27.2) Notice that by theorem 2.2.23 for all RX e V, RX is
irreflexive or for all RX e V, RX is reflexive.
Hence, nRX - iRX, for all RX e V, or nRx - qRX, for all
RX e V, and rRx - qRX, for all RX e V, or rRX - iRX, for all
RX e V, and ncvRX - cvRX, for all RX e V, or ncvRX - qcvRX,
for all RX e V, and revRX - qcvRX, for all RX e V, or
rcvRX - cvRX, for all RX e V.
Since {i, q, cv, qcv} c M we are ready.
(2.2.27.3) is a consequence of (2.2.26).
(2.2.27.4) i, cv, q and qcv are the only prder morphisms with an
inverse.
We end this section with a theorem used later on.
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Theorem 2.2.28
Let Z be a collection of numbers and Vi for all i e I be a
set of relations, which can be classified as a set of
orderinqs. Suppose furthermore W:- ~{Vi : i e I} ~~,
Then W can be classified as a set of orderings.
Proof of theorem 2.2.28
Evident and therefore left to the reader.
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~ 2.3 Linear Orderings.
In this section it is shown that the set of all linear
orderings defined on the sets in k is a set of relations whích
can be classified as a set of orderings. Furthermore, we show
that any set of relations V c A, which can be classified as a set
of orderings, has a subset W c V which is isomorphic to the set
of all linear orderings defined on the sets in ~.
First let us dwell upon the name "linear ordering". In
literature there are several names for an ordering which is
reflexive, antisymmetric, complete and transitive. Some of these
names are: "total ordering". (emphasizing the fact that the
relation is strongly complete), "simple ordering", (emphasizing
the fact that the relation is of a simple 'nature' because of its
restrictive properties), "chain", (emphasizing the fact that the
relation chains its elements from worse to better), or "linear
ordering", (again emphasizing the chain-property of this
ordering). The reader may verify these intuitive properties in,
e.g., Roubens k Vincke [1985]. We will use the name linear
ordering throughout.
In literature a linear ordering on a set X is a relation RX
such that RX is reflexive, complete, antisymmetric and
transitive. Hence, the set of linear orderings is
L(U) :- {RX e Á: RX is reflexive, transitive, antisymmetric,
and complete}.
we will prove that L(U) can be classified as a set of
orderings. In order to prove this, we introduce another way to
describe L(U) and prove some general results which will be used
in the following sections.
First, we introduce a mapping 1 from Á to ~, whose
"nil-points" together form precisely the set of reflexive,
complete, antisymmetric and transitive orderings. We use this
function to describe L(U).
Let 1: A-~ A be defined as follows:
1(RX):- (rRX ~ cRX) U( cr (RX U vRX)) U
(RX ~ vRX ~ cIdX) U((RX , RX) ~ cRX).
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Now 1(RX) - cDX e~ rRX fl cRX - WX 6 cr ( RX U vRX )- cpX S~
( RX fl vRX ) f1 cIdX - cpX 6
RX , RX fl cRX - cpX .
E~ rRX c RX S r(RX U vRX) -~X x X, X~ S
RX ~ vRX c IdX k RX , RX c RX
E~ RX is reflexive,complete, antisymmetric
and transitive.
Hence, L(U) -{ RX e Á: 1(RX) - cpX}.
Let vl(RX) :- rRX fl cRX,
v2(RX) :- c(r(RX U vRX)),
v3(RX) :- (aRX ' aRX) fl caRX)) and
v4(RX) :- RX fl vRX fl cIdX.
Furthermore, let V1(U) -{RX e Á: vl(RX) - cpX},
V2(U) -{RX e á: v2(RX) - cpX} fl Vl(U),
V3(U) -{RX e Á: v3(RX) - cpX} fl Vl(U), and
V4(U) -{RX e A: v4(RX) - NX} fl V1(U).
We will prove that V1(U),V2(U),V3(U) and V4(U) are sets of
relations which can be classified as sets of orderings. As a
corollary of this and theorem 2.2.28 it follows that L(U) can be
classified as a set of orderings, since L(U) -
Vl(U) ~ V2(U) fl V3(U) fl V4(U).
Lemma 2.3.1
V1(U) can be classified as a set of orderings.
Proof of lemma 2.3.1
Evident, since V1(U) is the set of reflexive orderings.
Lemma 2.3.2
V2(U) can be classified as a set of orderings.
Proof of lemma 2.3.2
V2(U) -{RX e Á: vl(RX) U v2(RX) - cpX}.
V2(U) -{RX e á: RX is reflexive and v2(RX) - cpX}.
v2(RX) - cpX iff RX is complete.
So (2.2.23.1) and (2.2.23.2) hold for V2(U).
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It is then sufficient to prove that V2(U) is closed under
conversion, restriction, concatenation and substitution.
By (2.2.6) it follows that v2 e M.
Let RX e V2(U).
Then v2(RX) - cpX and RX is reflexive.
Now we have by (2.2.5.6) v2v(RX) - vv2(RX) - ~~X -~X'
Clearly vRX is reflexive.
Hence, V2(U) is closed under conversion.
Similarly it follows by (2.2.5.6) and (2.2.21.6) that V2(U)
is closed under restriction and substitution.
Let RX and RY be in V2(U), with X fl Y- cp.
Since RX and RY are reflexive and complete, it follows by
the definition of ~ that RX ~o RY is reflexive and complete.
Hence, V2(U) is closed under concatenation and by (2.2.23)
it follows that V2(U) is classified as a set of orderings.
Lemma 2.3.3
V4(U) can be classified as a set of orderings.
Proof of lemma 2.3.3
By (2.2.27.3) and (2.3.2) it is sufficient to prove that
V2(U)rcv - V4(U). Now for all RX e V1(U):
RX e V2(U)rcv iff
rcvRX - cnvRX is reflexive and complete iff
nvRX is irreflexive and antisymmetric (by (2.2.9.4)) iff
RX is reflexive and antisymmetric iff
RX e V4(U).
By this the proof is obvious.
~
A logícal following step would be to prove that V3(U) can be
classified as a set of orderings. Instead of proving this, we
prove a more general theorem, which is used in the next sections.
we will fix our attention to a more general transitivity concept.
In order to clarify to the reader that there are several
transitivity conditions we remind him of definition 2.2.8.2,
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2.2.8.13 and 2.2.8.14 and the following facts for a relation RA
in A:
~ if RA is asymmetric, then RA is Pt-transitive for all
t? 2, whenever RA is transitive, and "
~ if R is reflexive, then R is Pt}k-transitive, wheneverA
RA is ptimpk-transitive.
These facts show that in some 'non-trivial situations' (2.2.8.13)
is a weakening of (2.2.8.14) and (2.2.8.13) is a weakening of
(2.2.8.2). Therefore it is reasonable to call all of these
conditions transitivity conditions. Moreover, in literature
P2-transitivity is often called quasi-transitivity. Obviously, we
can weaken condition (2.2.8.14) even more by introducing
pk1lk2Pk3pk4lk5pkó. .IksPksfl-transitivity, which is defined
similar to (2.2.8.14). Realizing that there are in fact
infinitely many transitivity-conditions, the natural question
arises whether there is a'model' to describe these kinds of
transitivity conditions.
Recall that a relation RA is PIP-transitive, iff
áRA , sRA , aRA c áRA or, stated otherwise, iff
for all ~x0, xl~-e áRA, ~xl, x2~ e sRA and
~x2, x3~ e áRA, it holds that ~x0, x3~ e áRA.
Hence, this PIP-transitivity condition can be interpreted as
follows:
A relation RA is PIP-transitive, iff for all x0,xl,x2,x3 e A
it holds that: if the preference of x0 to xl in RA can pass into
an indifference between xl and x2 in RA and this indifference can
pass into another preference of x2 to x3 then there exists a
short cut of this transition, namely x0 is preferred to x3 in RA.
In this interpretation we notice that if we call "prefer to"
and "indifferent between" preference types of a relation, then
the PIP-transitivity can be described as saying that special
sequences of preference types of a relation can be shortened.
This notion will lead to the general transitivity condition. In
fact, we will formulate this notion in a more abstract sense to
obtain the general transitivity condition.
A preference type of a relation is information about
elements which are ordered according to that preference type.
Hence, a preference type of a relation is in fact a monadic
70
operation on this relation. The next example illustrates what can
happen with respect to transitivity conditions, whenever the
monadic operation, which describes a preference type, is not
based on local information. By this example we hope to convince
the reader that the conditions deduced above are more or less
natural and intuitively correct.
Example 2.3.4
Let RA e Á, B c A, B e 1E, a e SU.
First we will study monadic operations which are based on
information not known to the relation RA. One might
(intuitively) know, that operations on a"system" which are
partly based on information not known to that "system"
easily cause "discontinuities", "discrímination" or other
odd properties. We will give two explicit illustrations of
these facts.
Observe the following conditíon:
RA , aRA c RA. (2.3.4.1)
Suppose RA fulfills condition (2.3.4.1).
Furthermore, let ~x,y~ e RA, ~a(y), z~ e aRA and a(y) ~ y.
(Hence, a is not the identity).
Then it follows that tx,z~ e RA. But there is a
discontinuity in the transition of preference types:
x? y: RA passes into alY) ? z: aRA and then is shortened
to x? z: RA, while a(y) ~ y.
Observe the following condition:
RA , RAI c RA (2.3.4.2)
B
It is evident that this condition discriminates between the
elements in B and in A-B.
Next we concentrate on operations which are based only on
information known to the relation RA while this information
is not local, hence global. Conditions based on this kind of
operations can be very unstable in a special sense
illustrated below.
Observe the following condition:
atRA , átRA c àRA. (2.3.4.3)
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Then RÁ and RÁO do not satisfy condition (2.3.4.3), while
all the others do.
Note that the relations are very similar, hence (2.3.4.3) is
an unstable conditon.
~
In order to avoid oddities as discussed in example 2.3.4 it
is necessary to describe preference types in a transition
sequence of transitivity conditions by monadic operations based
on local information, that is, by operators in M(See example
2.2.4). Now it is clear by the discussion at (2.2.4.8) that only
the monadic operations in N have images which do not conflict
with their originals. Therefore, preference types of a relation
are described by operations in N(See 2.2.4.8).
Next we formalize the above discussed intuitive notions.
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Definition 2.3.5
Let RA e A, C-{x~,...,xk}, C c B c A and fl,f2,...,fk e N.
2.3.5.1 - A word over the alphabet N is the concatenation of zero
or more symbols of N
(See also Lewis S Papadimitriou [1981})
- If w- flf2...fk we say that w has length k, fi is the
ith symbol of w and w~ - fk...fl is the conversed word
of w.
- N} .- {w : w is a word over N of positive length}.
(Whenever a f e N is the composítion of
gl'g2' "''gt e N this composition
will be denoted by a
joint bar over the symbol in w: f- glg2g3" 'gt)'
2.3.5.2 - Suppose: wl,w2 e N}, wl - flf2...fk, and
wl is embedded in w2, iff there is a function
h : {1,...,k} -~ {1,...,m} such that:
h(i) ~ h(j) for all 1 5 i ~ j S k( h is monotonic), and
fi - gh(i) for all 1 5 i S k.
2w - glg2...gm.
- h is called an embedding.
2.3.5.3 - rz- ~x~,xl,...,xk~ is a path (from x~ to xk) (alon RA)
(in B) (of type w- flf2...fk) iff
~xt, xt}1) e ft}1RA for all 0 5 t 5 k-1.
- The length of n. is k.
- Path rz is a cycle iff x~ - xk.
- rz~ -~xk' xk-1'" ',x~~ is the conversed path of n
(along vRA of type w~).
2.3.5.4 - Let rzl - tx~, xl,...,xk~ be a path along RA of type w2,
rz2 -~y0' yl'" '~yn~ a path along RA and wl e N}.
n2 is a wl-short cut of rzl (along RA) iff
n2 is of type wl,
wl is embedded in w2, and
{yp,...,yn} c{x~,...,xk} and y~ - x~, xk - yn.
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Example 2.3.6
Suppose: wl - aaàiiiiéeeééàéeeeeéeàààaaaààààaaàà




w" - asa , and
6w - à.
t Suppose: RA e Á ~x~, xl~ e aRA, ~xl, x2~ e sRA,
~x2, x3~ e àRA and ~x~, x3~ e àRA.
Then ~5~, xl, x2, x3~ is a path from x~ to x3 along RA of
type w .
t Of course w6 is embedded in w5 (h(1):-1), hence ~x~, x3~ is
a w6-short-cut of ~x~, xl, x2, x3).
t Note that the length of wl is 34, the 9th-symbol of w4 is à,
(w2)~ - w2 and (w3)~ - è12à3
t w2 is embedded in wl.
We only define the embedding.
h: {1,...,18} -~ {1, ..,34}
h(t):- t : E~ 1 5 t 5 3
ttg : E~ t - 4
tt16 : E~ 5 5 t 5 18
Clearly h is an embedding.
t w3 is embedded in wl.
Again we only define an embedding.
g . {1,...,15} -~ {1,...,15}.
g(t):- t : E~ 1 5 t 5 3
tt4 : Ej 4 5 t 5 8
tt5 : E~ 9 5 t 5 15
t It is evident that w4 is not embedded in wl, since one can
not find a subsequence of w4 in wl.
~
Intuitively, a word w2 is embedded in wl, whenever we can
find a subsequence of symbols in wl, with the same ordering of
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the symbol occurences as in wl, which is equal to w2. An
embedding h preserves the ordering of the symbol occurences and
the equality to wl is guaranteed by the second condition of
(2.3.5.2).
Let us make some remarks about definition 2.3.5:
t Let n- ~x~,..,xk~ be a path along RA of type w- flf2...fk,
then w is a transition sequence of preference types occurring in
rz. So ~xi-l,xi~ has preference type fi, i.e., txi-l,xi~ e fiRA
for all i e {1,2,....k}.
t Of course a type of a path is not unique. For instance, let
wl - iáécav w2 - cav4 and w3 - i2é cav and rz a path along RA. If
rz is of type wl, then rz is also of type w2 and w3 because
iRA c cavRA, aRA c iRA and eRA c cavRA.
-The following lemma is -used later on and shows some
relationship between paths and their types.
Lemma 2.3.7
Let rz- ~x~,xl,...,xk~ be a path along RA (e .4) of type
w e Nt, wl,w2 two words in N} and a e SU.
Then the following holds:
2.3.7.1 n~ is of type w~,
2.3.7.2 rzo -~ax~,axl,...,axk~ is a path along aRA of type w, and
2.3.7.3 If wl is embedded in w2, then wi is embedded in wz.
Proof of lemma 2.3.7
Let n-~x0,xl,...,xk~ be a path along RA of type
w - flf2...fk.
Furthermore, let wl - w and w2 - glg2...gn and a e SU.
(2.3.7.1) n~ -~xk, xk-1,...xl~ is a path along vRA. Furthermore,
it is evident by (2.2.5) that ~xt,xt-1~ e vftRA - ftvRA, for
all k ? t ? 1.
Hence, rt~ is a path along vRA of type w~.
(2.3.7.2) rzo - ~ax~, axl,...,axk~ is a path along aRA. Note
that for all 0 5 t 5 k-1 it holds that:
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~xt'xt-1~ e ftRA iff ~axt, axt-1~ e aftRA
iff taxt,axt-1~ e ftaRA.
Hence, na is of type w.
(2.3.7.3) Suppose wl is embedded in w2, so there is a h from
{l...k} to {l...n}, such that:
h(i) ~ h(j) for all 1 5 i~ j S k, and
fi - gh( i) for all 1 5 i S k.
Let wl - fkfk-1 "'f1 -: fifZ...fk and
vw2 - gn...gl -: gigZ...gn.
Take h' from {1,...,k} to {1,...,n} such that
h'(i) - n-h(k-itl)tl.
If 1 5 i ~ j 5 k, then (k-jtl) ~(k-itl).
So h(k-jtl) ~ h(k-itl) and
h'(i) - n-h(k-itl)tl ~ h'(j) - n-h(k-jtl)tl.
h' is monotonic.
Furthermore, for all 1 5 i 5 k:
fi - fk-itl - gh(k-itl) - gn-h(k-itl)tl - gh'(i)'
Remember that M-{i, v, c, cv, q, qv, qc, qcv} (Definition
2.2.4.7) is the set of all monadic operations (on relations in
,4), based on local information, which do not loose information.
Now we are able to define a general transitivity condition.
Definition 2.3.8 Transitivity
Let RA e A, wl,w2 e Nt and m e M. Then RA is
~wl, w2)-transitive with respect to m, iff for every path rz
along mRA of type wl there is a w3-short cut along mRA such
that w3 can be embedded in w2.
Let-wl,w2 be two given words in Nt. Furthermore, let RA e,4
and m e M a monadic operator based on local information, which
does not lose information. Then RA in A is twl, w2~-transitive
with repect to m, iff for every path nl from x0 to xk of
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preference transitions, described by the sequence of preference
types in wl, along the relation mRA, which has the same
information value as RA, can be cut short by a path nz from xp to
xk of preference transitions, described by a subsequence of w2,
along mRA, which preserves the ordering of the occurences of the
preference types. Hence, RA is twl, wz~-transitive based on m,
iff all special sequences of preference transitions based on the
information of mRA and described by wl, can be cut short by a
subsequence of preference transitions based on the information of
mRA and described by w2.
If RA is ~wl, w2~-transitive with respect to i, then we say
that RA is ~wl, wZ~-transitive.
In the following example we will show that some of the
well-known transitivity-conditions known from literature can be
described as special cases of (2.3.8).
Example 2.3.9
Let RA e Á be a relation
f Transitive
RA is transitive iff
RA , RA C RA iff
RA is ~i2, i~-transitive.
f Necxatively transitive
RA is negatívely transitive iff
cRA , cRA c cRA iff
RA is ti2, í~-transitive with respect to c.
f puasi transitive
RA is quasi-transitive iff
áRA , áRA c áRA iff
RA is ~á2, á~-transitive.
t Ptimpk-transitive
RA is PtImPk-transitive iff
[áRA]t , [sRA]m , [aRA]k c áRA iff
RA is ~átsmák, á~-transitive.
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t Acyclic
RA is acyclic iff
for all t? 1:[àRA]t 0 avRA -~ iff
for all t? 1:[aRA]t c cavRA iff
RA is ~àt, cav~-transitive for all t? 1.
Note that acyclicity is not a transitivity relation in the
sense of (2.3.8), because infinitely many transitívity
conditions are required to formulate this condition.
~
In the following example we investígate the transitivity-
condition defined in ( 2.3.8) a little bit further in such a way
that we will give some special transitivity conditions, which
cannot lead to a set of relations that can be classified as a set
of orderings.
Example 2.3.10
2.3.10.1 Non-preserving of the irreversibílity
Consider the following transitivity condition:
~as, s~-transitivity.
Suppose: RA is tàs, s~-transitive,
~x0,x1~ e áRA and ~xl,x2~ e sRA.
Then it follows that ~x0,x2~ e RA, which is very natural,
but moreover it follows that ~x2,x0~ e RA, since
tx0,x2~ e sRA. So x0i-~-.xl [x2 This is very odd.
Moreover ~xl,xl~ ~ RA, since this would lead to
~x0,x1) e sRA which contradicts our assumption.
It is easy to show that the set of irreflexive and
~às,s~-transitive relations is not concatenationally closed.
Hence, this set cannot be classified as a set of orderings.
Notice that a path of type às is irreversible but a path of
type s is reversible along RA, i.e., the conversed path is
along RA.
2.3.10.2 Non-conversibility
Consider the following transitivity condition:
~ás, a)-transítivity.
Let A - {x,y,z} RA - {~x,y~,~y,x~,~y,z~}.
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Then RA is cas, a~-transitive, but vRA is not
càs, à~-transitive.
The set of reflexive, càs, à~-transitive, relations cannot
be classified as a set of orderings, because it is not
closed under conversion.
The set of tàs, à~-transitive and csà, à~-transitive
relations, however, can be classified as a set of orderings.
This will be shown below.
2.3.10.3 Discrimination between the diagonal and the reversible
part of a relation





RA is càsà, à~-transitive.
reflexive, then RA is quasi-transitive.
irreflexive, then RA is not necessarily
quasi-transitive.
Suppose RA is cà





set of irreflexive and càsà, à~-transitive
closed under substítution.
Let RA - {cx,y~,cy,z~,}{x,y,z} and RB - {ca,b~,cb,a~}{a,b}~
where ~{x,y,x,a,b}~ - 5.
Then RA : x.-~-.y-~-.z, RB : a. .b, and
Sub(RA, Y, RB) : x.-~-.a-.b-~-.zi ~
RA and RB are irreflexive and tasa, a~-transitive, but
Sub(RA, y, RB) is not càsà, à~-transitive. Notice that the
cà ns a, à~-transitivity discriminates between nscaRA and
èRA, (See example 2.2.4.2), for an arbitrary relation RA,
i.e., a pair cx,y~ e èRA will never occur as an actual step
in a path of type à ns à, whicle a pair ca,b~ e nscaRA may
occur as such a step. This discrimination creates problems
concerning the closedness under substitution.
Let A-{a,b,c}, B-{x,y}, A f1 B- cp,
RA - r~{ca,b~,cb,c~},A~ and RB - rc{cx,y~,cy,x~},B~. Then
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both RA and RB are tá ns á, á~ - transitive, since there is
no path of type á ns á along these relations. But
Sub(RA, b, RB) is not~á ns a, a~ - transitive. This occurs
since the preference type ns in the path á ns á cannot be
transformed in a dummy way, i.e., there is no diagonal pair
on such a path. Clearly RA is not ~ásá, á~ - transitive,
hence by this transitivity the closedness under substitution
is not (yet) violated here.
In example 2.3.10 we discussed several types of transitivity
conditions which by themselves do not lead to a set of relations
that can be classified as a set of orderings. We will state some
conditions for transitivity properties which exclude these odd
transitivity properties discussed in (2.3.10). Furthermore, we
will prove that transitivity conditions with these extra
restrictions lead to a set of relations that can be classified as
a set of orderings.
Definition 2.3.11 Restrictions on transitivitv conditions.
Let wl - flf2...fk and w2 - glg2...gn be two words in N},
let RA e.á and let m e M.
2.3.11.1 ~wl,w2~-transitivity with respect to m is
irreversibilitv preservina iff if there is a t e {1,...,k},
such that á f1 ft ~ ó, then there is a j e{1,...,n}, such
that á fl g. ~ ó.]
2.3.11.2 ~wl,w2~-transitivity with respect to m is d~
admittable iff
for all t e{1,2...,k}, with nsca fl ft ~ ó, ft U é- ft, and
for all t e{1,2...,n}, with e fl gt ~ ó, gt U nsca - gt.
2.3.11.3 RA is ~wl,w2~-classifiable transitive with respect to m
iff the following four hold:
2.3.11.3.1 RA is ~wl,w2~-transitive with respect to m,
2.3.11.3.2 RA is ~wlv,w2v~-transitive with respect to m,
80
2.3.11.3.3 ~wl,w2~-transitivity with respect to m is
irreversibility preserving, and
2.3.11.3.4 twl,w2~-transitivity with respect to m is dummy
admittable.
A few remarks on definition 2.3.11:
t ~wl,w2~-classifiable transitívity with respect to i is
abbreviated by ~wl,w2~-classifiable transitivity.
t Let wl and w2 be two words in Nt such that wl - flf2...fk
and w2 - g1g2...gn. -
Suppose the ~wl,w2~-transítivity with respect to m' e M is dummy
admittable.
If the reversible part of RX e A, i.e., nscaRX, has something ín
common with ftRX, for a t e{1,...,k}, then the diagonal is in
ftRX, i.e., éRX c ftRX. If the diagonal has something in common
with gtRX, for a t e{1,...,n}, then the reversible part nscaRX
is in gtRX. It is straightforward to calculate that:
{fl,f2, . ,fk} c {o,d,dc,à,é,m,qm,rs,ra,rsc,r,sca,rcv,cav}, and
{gl,g2,...,gn} c
{ó,ns,à,nsc,n,nsca,ncv,qscm,scm,ncav,sca,cqmv,cmv,cav}.
t Notice that (2.3.11.3.3) and (2.3.11.3.4) are conditions on
wl and w2 and not on RA.
Now one of the important results of this section is proved.
Theorem 2.3.12 -
Let wl,w2 e Nt, let m e M, and suppose
V1:- {RA: RA is reflexive 6~ RA is ~wl,w2~-classifiable
transitive with respect to m} ~ cp and
V2:- {RA: RA is irreflexive 6 RA is ~wl,w2~-classifiable
transitive with respect to m} ~ cp
Then V1 and V2 can be classified as sets of orderings.
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Proof of theorem 2.3.12
By corollary 2.2.27 we have:
Vi is classifiable as a set of orderings iff
Vi is classifiable as a set of orderings, for i e{1,2}.
Vi :- {mRA e Á: mRA is reflexive and mRA is
cwl,w2~-classifiable transitive with respect to m}.
Because of in e M, it follows that mmRX - RX for all RX e A.
Hence:
Vi :- {mRA e,4 : mRA is reflexive and RA is
cwl,w2~-classifiable transitive}
-{RX e á, : RX is reflexive and RX is
cwl,w2~-classifiable transitive}.
Similarly it follows:
VZ :- {RX e.4 : RX is irreflexive and RX is
~wl,w2~-classifiable transitive}.
Hence, it suffices to prove (2.3.12) for the case that
m - 'i .
We only prove that V1 can be classified as a set of
orderings. The proof for V2 is similar.
By theorem 2.2.23 it is sufficient to prove:
Id{x} e V1, for all x e U, and V1 closed under conversion,
restriction, concatenation and substitution.
Proof of Id{x} e V1 for all x e U
Let A e lE ~A~ - 1.
It suffices to prove IdA is cwl,w2~-transitive and IdA is
~wi,w2~-transitive.
We only prove that IdA is cwl,w2~-transitive; the proof of
the other transitivity is similar.
Suppose rzl - cx~,xl,x2,...,xk~ is a path along IdA of type
wl. Then we have to prove that there is a w3 e N} embedded
in w2, such that there is a w3-short cut n2 of nl.
Since ~A~ - 1, we have x~ - xl - x2 -...- xk.
Since V1 ~ cp it follows there is a RX e V1.
By theorem 2.2.7, n3 - ca0,al,a2,...,ak~ is a path along RX
of type wl, whenever a~ - al - a2 -...- ak.
Hence, there is a rz4, a w3-short cut of n3, such that w3 is
embedded in w2. rr.4 - cb~,bl,b2,...,bt~.
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Since {b~,bl,b2,...,bt} c {aO,al,a2,...,ak} - {a~} it
follows again by (2.2.7) that n5 -~x~,...,xt~ is such a
w3-short cut of rzl.
Proof of the closedness under conversion of VI
Let RX e V1.
It is sufficient to prove that vRX is both ~wl,w2~-
transitive and ~wi,w2~-transitive.
Suppose: nl is a path of type wl along vRX.
Then rzi is a path of type wi along RX. (by lemma 2.3.7)
Hence, ni can be cut short by a path n2 along RX of type w3
embedded in w2.
Hence, by lemma 2.3.7, n2 is a w3-short cut along vRX of rzI
such that w3 is embedded in w2.
Hence, vRX is ~wl,w2~-transitive.
Similarly it follows that vR is ~wi,w2~-transitive.
Proof of the closedness under restriction of VI
Let RX e V and Y c X Y~ cp.
Suppose RX is ~w3,w4~-transitive.
It is sufficient to prove that RXI is ~w3,w4~-transitive.
Y
Let rz3 be a path of type w3 along RXI .
Y
By the definition of RXI and theorem 2.2.7 it follows:
Y
n3 is a path of type w3 along RX.
Since RX is ~w3,w4~-transitive, there is a path rzs along RX
such that n5 is a w5-short cut of rt3 and w5 is embedded in
w4'
By the definition of a short cut, RXI and (2.2.7) it
Y
follows that n5 is a w5-short cut of n3 along RXI and w5 is
Y
embedded in w4.
Proof of the closedness under concatenation of VI
Let RA, RB e Vl with A fl B- cp.
Suppose RA and RB are both ~w3,w4~-transitive, where this
transitivity is irreversibility preserving.
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Then it is sufficient to prove that RA r RB is tw3'w4~-
transitive.
Suppose n3 is a path along RA ~ RB of type w3;
rz3 - tx~,xl,...,xk~. ~
Whenever x~, xk e A or x~, xk e B, rz3 is a path along RA or
RB respectively, by theorem 2.2.7, the definition of a path
and the definition of ~.
Hence, suppose x~ e A and xk e B. (xk e A and x0 e B is
impossible since the path rt3 is along RA M RB).
Then there is a xi e A and xi}1 e B, with fi~l fl á~ cp,
where w3 - fl...fk.
Hence, there is a g~, with w4 - gl...g~...gn and g~ f1 a~ cp.
Hence, ~x~,xk~ is a g~-short cut of rt3 along RA ~ RB, such
that g~ is embedded in w4.
Proof of the closedness under substitution of V1
Suppose RÁ, RB e V, with A fl B- cp and vRB - RB, a e A and
~w3'w4~-transitivity is dummy admittable.
Let rz3 - tx~,...,xk~ be a path of type w3 - fl...fk along
RZ, where RZ :- Sub(RÁ, a, RB).
We have to prove:
There is a path rz5 along RZ of type w5 embedded in w4, such
that n5 is a w5-short cut of n3.
R1:A RZ:
- ~. iff x. e A - {a}
Take n3 - ~y~,...,yk~, where yi 1 1
iff xi e B
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Proof of n3 is a path along RÁ of type w3
It is sufficient to prove that tyi'yitl~ E fit1RÁ for all
i e {0, ..,k-1}.
There are two cases.
Case 1 {yt,yttl} ~ A - {a} ~ ~.
This case is simple to prove by (2.2.7) and the definition
of RZ.
Case 2 {Yt'yttl} c {a}.
Then {xi'xitl} c B and since RB is reversible it follows
that txi,xitl~ e scaRB. Hence, by the dummy admittablility
of the ~w3,w4~-transitivity it follows that
~yi'yitl~ - ~a,a~ e fit1RA'
Since n3 is a path along RÁ of type w3 and RÁ is
~w3'w4~-transitivity it follows that there is a path
n5 -~z~,zi,...,zt~ of type w5 - glg2....gt embedded in w4,
such that n5 is a w5-short cut of n3. ~
Take n~ - ~z~,z,,...,z}~, where z; -
~zi iff zi e A - {a}
x~ iff y~ - zi - a.
Now it follows, similarly to the proof of the fact that n3
is a path along RÁ of type w3, that n5 is a path along RZ of
type w5.
This completes the proof.
As an immediate result we have:
Corollary 2.3.13
L(U) can be classified as a set of orderings.
Proof of corollary 2.3.13
L(U) - V1(U) ~ V2(U) ~ V3(U) ~ V4(U).
V1(U), V2(U) and V4(U) are sets of relations which can
be classified as sets of orderings (see lemma 3.1, 3.2 and
3.3)
V3(U) -{RA e Á: RA is reflexive k RA is ~á2, á~-classi-
fiable transitive}.
Hence, by (2.2.28), (2.3.12), (2.3.1), (2.3.2) and (2.3.3)
we are done.
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We will show now that L(U) is contained in every set of
relations which can be classified as a set of orderings. Thís
result states that there is no set of relations which can be
classified as a set of orderings and which is a non-trivial
subset of L(U). Furthermore, since L(U) is contained in every set
of relations, which can be classified, it is the most simple
classifiable class of orderings. More precisely:
Theorem 2.3.14
Let ~~ V~ Á be such that V can be classified as a set of
orderings.
There is a W c V, such that W e{L(U),L(U)q}.
Proof of theorem 2.3.14
It is sufficient to prove that {L(U),L(U)q} ~ V~~.
There are two cases.
Case 1 RX is reflexive for all RX e V.
By induction on n? 1 we prove:
for all RY e L(U), with ~Y~ - n, RY e V.
Basis: n - 1
For all x e U, Id{x} e V because of the assumptions.
Induction step: Suppose RY e L(U) and ~y~ - nfl.
To prove that RY e V define
Best(Ry) :- {x e Y: x? y: Ry for all y e Y}.
By the transitivity, the completeness, the antisymmetry and
the reflexivity of RY it follows that Best(Ry) -{x} for
some x e Y. Take Y' - Y-{x}. Then RY - Idx N RY' and we
Y'
are done by the induction hypothesis, and by the closedness
under restriction and concatenation of V.
Hence, L(U) c V.
Case 2 RX is irreflexive for all RX e V.
Then L(U) c Vq, hence L(U)q c V.
Corollary 2.3.15
Let ~~ V c A be such that V can be classified as a set of
orderings. Then there is an unique W c V such that w- L(U).
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Proof of corollary 2.3.15
By theorem 2.3.14 and corollary 2.2.27 the existence of W is
evident.
Suppose W1 - L(U), W2 - L(U), W1 c V and W2 c V.
By (2.2.25) W1 and W2 can be classified as sets of
orderings. By (2.3.14) there are W4,W3 e{L(U),L(U)q}, such
that W3 c wl c V and W4 c W2 c V.
Using (2.2.23) W3 - W4.
Obviously, W3 - W1 and W4 - W2.
Hence, W1 - W2, which completes the proof of the uniqueness.
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~ 2.4 Minimal Extensions of L(U)
In ~ 2.3 we introduced L(U) as the set of reflexive,
antisymmetric, complete and transitive relations. Furthermore, we
proved that every set of relations which can be classifíed as a
set of orderings, contains a set which is isomorphic to L(U).
Hence, L(U) is the smallest non-empty set of relations which can
be classified as a set of orderings. In this section several
extensions of L(U) will be studied. Furthermore we will find all
minimal extensions of L(U).
Let us start with some extensions of L(U) which might not be
minimal.
W(U) :- VZ(U) ~ V5(U),
T(U) :- v2(U) ~ V4(U), and
Q(U) :- Vz(U) ~ V3(U),
where V5(U) :- {RX e A: RX is reflexive and
~cav cav,cav~-classifiable transitive},
By the lemma's and theorems of the foregoing sections W(U),
T(U) and Q(U) can be classified as sets of orderings.
Furthermore: W(U) is the set of all reflexive, complete and
transitive relations, T(U) is the set of all reflexive, complete
and antisymmetric relations and Q(U) is the set of all strongly
complete and quasi-transitive relations. In literature (see Sen
[1970], Roubens 6 Vincke [1985}) w(U) is called the set of weak
orderings, T(U) is called the set of tournaments and Q(U) is
called the set of quasi-orderings.
Evidently, L(U) c Q(U), L(U) c W(U)and L(U) c T(U). Observe that
for all A e ~ such that ~A~-? 2 it holds that c~A e W(U) and
c~A e Q(U), but c~A ~ L(U). Hence, LIU) c Q(U) and L(U) c W(U).
Furthermore, let A - {x,y,z}, ~A~ - 3 and
RA :- r~{~x,y~,~y,z~,~z,x~},A~, then RA e T(U) and RA ~ L(U).
Hence, L(U) c T(U). So L(U) is a non-trivial subset of W(U),
Q(U)and T(U).
We continue with formulating some definitions about sets of
relations which can be classified as sets of orderings.
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Definition 2.4.1
Let V and W be two sets of relations which can be classified
as sets of orderings:
2.4.1.1 W is an extension of V iff there is a set w', such that
W' c w and w' ' V, and
2.4.1.2 W is a minimal extension of V iff
W is an extension of V, and
if W' is an extension of V and W' c W then W' - W.
~
If W is a minimal extension of V and V c W, then we write
V ~ W.
Clearly Q(U),w(U) and T(U) are extensions of L(U). In the
remaining part of this section we are going to find out which
subsets in Q(U),W(U) and T(U) are minimal extensions of L(U) and,
finally, we will investigate all minimal extensions of L(U). To
do this, we explore our knowledge about minimal extensions. In
fact, we will state a construction by which for any set of
relations which can be classified as a set of orderings, every
minimal extension of that set is determined. Furthermore, we
characterize all these minimal extensions. First we introduce
mechanisms which are closure operations on sets of relations.
Definition 2.4.2 Closure operations
Let V c.4 be a set of relations.
2.4.2.1 E1 (V) :- {RA e á: there is a a e SU and a RB e V,
such that aRB - RA} is the closure under permutation of V.
2.4.2.2 E2 (V) :- {RA e á: there is a RB e V, such that
vRB - RA or RB - RA} is the closure under conversion of V.
2.4.2.3 E3 (V) :- {RA e,4 : there is a RB e V and a D c B, with
cp ~ D and RBI - RA} is the closure under restriction of V.
D
2.4.2.4 E4 (V) :- {RA e A: there is a k e{1,2,3...} and there
are RA ,RA ,...RA e V, such that RA - RA ~ RA ~o ... ~ RA }
1 2 k 1 2 k
is the closure under concatenation of V.
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2.4.2.5 E6 (U) :- {RA e Á: there is a relation RB e V and
there are relations R R . R e St(V) such that:A1, A2,. .
Ak
(1) A1, A2,...Ak is a partition of A,
(2) there are distinct bl, b2,...bk e U such that
B - {bl, b2,...bk}, and
(3) for all tx,y~ e A x A:
tx,y~ e RA iff there are i,j e{1,2,3,...k}, such that
either i~ j, tx,y~ e Ai x Aj and ~bi,bj~ e RB,
or i- j and ~x,y~ e RA
i
} is the closure under substitution of V, where
S2(V) is the set of reversible relations in V, i.e.,
S2(V) -{RX e V: vRX - RX}.
The following theorem shows that the chosen names for E1(V),
E2(V),E3(V),E4(V) and E6(V) have the intended properties.
Theorem 2.4.3
Let V c A be a set of relations, then
2.4.3.1 E1(V) is closed under permutation and V c E1(V),
2.4.3.2 E2(V) is closed under conversion and V c E2(V),
2.4.3.3 E3(V) is closed under restriction and V c E3(V),
2.4.3.4 E4(V) is closed under concatenation and V c E4(V), and
2.4.3.5 E6(V) is closed under substitution and V c-E6(V).
Moreover, let V c W c.4 be a set of relations, then
2.4.3.6 if W is closed under permutation, then E1(V) c W,
2.4.3.7 if W is closed under conversion, then E2(V) c W,
2.4.3.8 if W is closed under restriction, then E3(V) c W,
2.4.3.9 if W is closed under concatenation, then E4(V) c W, and
2.4.3.10 if W is closed under substitution, then E6(V) c-W.
2.4.3.11 Furthermore Ei Ej (V) c Ej Ei (V), -






Proof of theorem 2.4.3
The proof of (2.4.3.1) up to (2.4.3.10) is elementary, but
cumbersome and therefore left to the reader.
The proof of (2.4.3.11) is indicated by the following table,
where in the cell ti,j~ a reference to an assertion can be
found by which the proof for the case ~i,j~ follows
evidently. The assertions are trivially true.
1 2 3 4 6
1 I II III IV V
2 II I VI VII VIII
3 III VI I IX X
4 VII I
6 VIII IX I
I Trivial, since i- j
II For all RA e A and all a e SU : avRA - vaRA.
III For all RA e Á and all B c A, with b~ cp, and all a e SU:
a(R ) - (oR )~ .
A~B A a(B)
IV For all RA,RB e,4, with A fl B- cp, and all a e SU:
a(RA . RB) - a(RA) ~ a(RB).
V For all RA,RB e,4, with A fl B- cp and vRB - RB, all a e SU
and all a e A: aSub(RA,a,RB) - Sub(aRA,a(a),aRB).
VI For all RA e A and all B c A, with B~ cp: v(RA )-(vRA)~ .
- ~B B
VII For all RA,RB e Á, with A fl B- W: vRA ~ vRB - v(RA ~ RB).
VIII For all RA,RB e.4, with A fl B- cp and vRB - RB, and
all a e A: vSub(RA,a,RB) - Sub(vRA,a,RB).
IX For all RA,RB e A, with A fl B- cp, and all C c A U B, with
C~ W:( RA x RB ) ~ -
C
RAI , lff C c A
C
RBI , iff C c B
C
RA~ (A fl C) -BI (B f1 C)
iff C~ A and C~ B.
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X For all RA,RB e Á, with A fl B- cp and vRB - RB, all a e A
and all C c A U B, with C~ cp :
Sub(RA,a,RB)~ - RA , iff C c A
C ((C-{a}) - ~
IRBI , iff C c B
C
Sub(R ,a,R ),
A~ (C U{a} ) f1 A A~ (B fl C)
XI For all RA,RB,RC e Á, such that A,B and C are pairwise
disjoint from each other and vRC - RC, and all a e A fl B:
Sub(RA ~ RB,a,RC) - Sub(RA,a,RC) s RB, iff a e A
RA ~ Sub(RB,a,RC), iff a e B.
Now we have the following corollary.
CorollarY 2.4.4
Let cp ~ V c A be a set of reflexive relations or a set of
irrefexive relations.
Then ~(V) :- E4(~6(E3(E2(~1(V))))) can be classified as a
set of orderings.
Moreover, for all V c W c Á, such that W can be classified
as a set of orderings, it holds that 4'(V) c W.
Proof of corollary 2.4.4
By theorem 2.4.3 it follows that:
45(V) c Ei(~(V)) c 4'(V) for all i e{1,2,3,4,6},
Hence, again by theorem 2.4.3, 4s(V) is closed under
permutation, conversion, concatenation, restriction and
substitution. The non-triviality of 4'(V) follows immediately
from the (ir)reflexivity of all relations in ~(V) and the
closedness of ~(V) under restriction, concatenation, and
permutation.
Hence, ~(V) can be classífied as a set of orderings.
Suppose V c W and W can be classified as a set of orderings.
Then by (2.4.3.6) up to (2.4.3.10) it follows that
iff C ~A and C~B
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E1(V) c W, E2(S1(V)) c W, E3(E2(E1(V))) c W,
L6(~3(L2(E1(V)))) c W and 4?(V) c w.
This completes the proof.
~
So, if V is a set of reflexive or a set of irreflexive
relations, then 4?(V) is the smallest set which can be classified
as a set of orderings and which contains V. To construct a
smallest set which can be classified as a set of orderings, and
which contains a set V of (ir)reflexive relations, it is
sufficient to close V with respect to the closure operations
X1'~2'E3'E4 and E6. Now, we will show that a minimal
extension of
a set X which can be classified as a set of orderings, can be
obtained by closing a set X' with respect to concatenation and
substitution, where X c X' and ~X' - X~ 5 2.
Theorem 2.4.5
Let V c Á be classified as a set of orderings.
w is a minimal extension of V and V c W, iff
there is a RB e W- V, such that ~B~ ? 2 and
for all C c B, with C~~, RBI e V, and
C
W- 45(V U{RB}) - E4E6(V U{vRB,RB}).
Proof of theorem 2.4.5
Let V c A be classified as a set of orderings.
(if) Suppose W- 45(V U{RB}) - E4E6(V U{vRB,RB}), where
RB e W- V, such that for all C c B, with C~~, RBI e V.
C
From corollary 2.2.4 it follows that W can be classified as
set of orderings.
RB e W- V, so W is an extension of V.
Let V',W' c A, such that V' - V, V' c W' and w' c W.
Since V' c w' there is a RD e W' - V' such that for all
C c D, with C~~, RDI e V'.
C
Now V' c 4'(V' U{RD}) c W' c W.
From (2.2.27.4), V- V' and V' c W it follows that
V' e {V,Vqc~}.
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We have two cases.
Case 1 V' - V.
RD e 4i(V U{RB}) and RD ~ V.
Since RDI e V for all C c D, with C~ cp, it follóws that
C
RD e E2E1(V U {RB}),
But then RD e S2E1({RB}),
Hence, W-~(V U{RB}) -~(V U{RD}) c W',
Case 2 V ~ V'. -
Then V' - Vqc~ and V' ~ V.
Note that, if there are relations RX,RY e V, such that RX is
not antisymmetric and RX is not complete, then Vcq~ - V.
Now it follows that either all relations in V are complete
and all relations in V' are antisymmetric or all relations
in V are antisymmetric and all relations in V' are complete.
Since V' ~ V it follows, that Y~ c W or Ya c W(See 2.2.20).
Hence, RD e(E1({RB}))qc~, RD e V and RB e V'. Hence,
obviously W - W'.
(only if) Suppose V c W and W is a minimal extension of V.
The existence of RB follows evidently by a simple induction
reasoning, the existence of RD e W- V and the finiteness of
D.
By (2.2.4) it follows that ~(V U{RB}) is classified as a
set of orderings and 45(V U{RB}) c W.
Since W is a minimal extension of V there is a set V' c W
such that V' - V and for all W' c W, which can be
classified as a set of orderings, such that V" c W' and
V" - V it follows that W' - W.
Take W' -~(V U{RB}), then it follows that w- 45(V U{RB}),
To complete the proof it is sufficient to prove that
E4E6(V U{vRB,RB}) can be classified as set of orderings
V U{vRB,RB} is closed under restriction and conversion.
Hence, V U{vRB,RB} - E3E2(V U{vRB,RB}).
By theorem 2.4.3.11 it follows that for all i e{2,3,4,6};
~i~4~6~3~2(V U {vRB,RB}) c E4E6E3E2(V U {vRB,RB}).
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Hence, again by (2.4.3) it follows that for all
i e {2,3,4,6}:
EiE4E6E3E2(V U {vRB,RB}) - E4E6E3E2(V U {vRB,RB}).
Hence, E4E6(V U{vRB,RB}) is closed under conversion,
restiction, substitution and concatenation.
Since either all relations in V are reflexive or all
relations in V are irreflexive it follows by the definition
of the E-closure operations that either all relations in
~4~6(V U{vRB,RB}; are reflexive or all relations ín
E4E6(V U {vRB,RB}} are irreflexive.
Since V is classified it follows from (2.2.23) that it has
property (2.2.23.1). From the definition of the E-closure
operations it follows that E4E6(V U{vRB,RB}) has property
(2.2.23.1). Now by (2.2.23) we are done.
~
By theorem 2.4.5 it follows that a minimal extension W of a
classifiable set V of orderings can be described by the closure,
under several operations, of V united with a special chosen
relation of w - V.
Supposing that a minimal extension corresponds with a minimal
weakening of the conditions on the relations in V it follows that
this weakening is brought about by one specific relation.
We will now prove that W(U) is a minimal extension of L(U).
Theorem 2.4.6
W(U) is a minimal extension of L(U).
Proof of theorem 2.4.6
Let Y e 1E such that ~Y~ - 2. It is sufficient to prove that
W(U) c E4E6(L(U) U {ccpY}).
Suppose RX e W(U).
We have to prove that RX e E4S6(L(U) U{ccpY}).
It is a well-known fact (see e.g. Roubens ~ Vincke) that by
the completeness, the reflexivíty and the transitivity of RX
there exist X1,X2,....Xk in lE such that X1,X2,....Xk is a
partition of X and




Let V c A be a classifiable set of orderings, such that
there is a RX e V, which is not complete or which is not
antisymmetric. -
Then there exists a subset W of V such that W(U) - W.
Proof of corollary 2.4.7
Suppose V and RX are as above.
Then there is a m e M such that c~pY e Vm for some Y e ]E,
with ~Y~ - 2.
Hence, W(U) - W(U)m c V.
~
We will now concentrate on another type of extension of
L(U). First consider
T3(U) :- {RX e,4: RX is reflexive ~
RX is antisymmetric 6
RX is complete 6
RX is ~à3, cáv~-classifiable transitive},
Evidently, T3(U) can be classified as a set of orderings.
Let RX e T3(U), then there is no cycle of type à4 along RX, since
RX is ta3, cav~-transitive. Let X - {x,y,z} and
RX - r~{~x,y~,~y,z~,~z,x~},X~, then RX e T3(U).
xi-~-.y-~-~z Hence, there are relations RX in T3(U) such
~
that there is a cycle of type à3 along RX. Hence, T3(U) is an
extension of L(U).
So T3(U) is the set of all tournaments in which circuits of
length 5 3 are admitted.
Next we show that T3(U) is a minimal extension of L(U). This
is established by several lemma's which by themselves give some
further insight in the type of relations of T3(U). We start with
a lemma which states that two cycles of type à3 are disjoint.
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Lemma 2.4.8
Let RX e T3(U) and rz-~x0,xl,x2,x3~ be a
type à3. Then the following holds:
2.4.8.1 for all y e X-{x0,xl,x2} either for
cycle along RX of
all x
ty,x~ e àRX or for all x e{x0,xl,x2} ~x,y~
2.4.8.2 if rz' -~YO'Y1'Y2'Y3~ is a cycle along RX
e {x0,xl,x2}
e àRX, and
of type à3 and
{YO.Y1.Y2} ~ {x0,xl,x2}, then {x0,xl,x2} fl {YO,Y1.Y2}
Proof of lemma 2.4.8
Let RX and rz be as
(2.4.8.1) Suppose y e





symmetry it suffices to prove that
~y,x2~ e àRX. Suppose ~x2,y~ e RX.
Then ~x2,y~ e àRX and ~x2,y,x0,x1~ is a path of type à3.
Hence, ~x2,x1~ e àRX, since RX is ~à3,à~-transitive. But
txl,x2~ e àRX since n is a path of à3. The last two
conclusions are contradicting each other.
Therefore ~y,x2~ e àRX.
Case 2 ~x0,y~ e àRX
Similar to case 1.
(2.4.8.2) Let ~x0,x1,x2,x0~ and ~YO'Y1'Y2'Y0~ be as supposed
above. Let {x0,xl,x2} fl {y0,yl,y2}
~ cp.
Without loss of generality suppose:
x0 ~{YO~Y1.Y2}, YO é{x0,xl,x2} and xl - Y1.
By (2.4.8.1) it follows that ~x0,y0~ e aRX and
~y0,x0~ e àRX, since ~x0,y1~ e àRX and ~y0,x1~ e àRX resp..
Hence, we have a contradiction and are done.
~
The following lemma characteri2es the relations of T3(U) in an
other way. First we need a notation:
Let X,Y c A be two disjoint non-empty sets and RA e á.
Then X~-Y : RA iff (X x Y)A c aRA.
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Lemma 2.4.9
Let RX e Á such that RX is reflexive, complete and
antisymmetric. Then (2.4.9.1) and (2.4.9.2) are equivalent:
2.4.9.1 RX e T3(U). -
2.4.9.2 There is a partition C1,C2,...Ck of X such that:
(a) for all i,j e{1,2,...k}, with i~ j, Ci ~ Cj: RX, and
(b) for all Ci, with ~Ci~ ~ 1, there are x,y,z e A, such
that Ci -{x,y,z} and ~x,y,z,x~ ís a path of type á3 along
R}C'
Proof of lemma 2.4.9
(2.4.9.2) -~ (2.4.9.1)
Evident, because if RX satisfies condition (2.4.9.2), then
RX is ~á3,a~-classifiable transitive.
(2.4.9.1) -~ (2.4.9.2) Suppose RX e T3(U).
Let W:- {C c A: ~C~ - 3 and there are x,y,z such that
{x,y,z} - C and ~x,y,z,x~ is a path of type
á3 along RX, or there is a x such that
{x} - C and for all paths tt - tx~,xl,x2,x0~
of type á3 along RX x~{xQ,xl,x2}}.
Then by (2.4.9.2) it follows that the elements of W form a
partition of X. Let W- {D1,D2,...,Dk}. By (2.4.9.1) it
follows that for all i,j e{1,...k}, i~ j it holds that
Di ~ Dj : RX or Dj ~ Di : RX. Hence, it is sufficient to
prove that for all il,i2,i3 e{1,...,k} it holds that:
[ Di ~ Di : RX 6 Di ~ Di : RXl -~ IDi ~ Di : RX].
1 2 2 3 1 3
Suppose Di ~ Di :RX, Di ~ Di :RX and not Di ~ Di :RX.
1 2 2 3 1 3
Then we have:
D. ~ D. : RX , Di ~ Di : RX and Di ~ Di : RX.
11 12 2 3 3 1
Since D. ~ cp, D. ~ c~ and D. ~ cp it follows that for all11 12 13
x e D. there are y e D. and z e D. such that ~x,y,z,x~ is11 i2 13
a path of á3 along RX. Hence, by (2.4.9.2) it follows that
~D. ~- 3 and D. - D. - D. which contradicts ouril 11 12 13
assumptions.
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By lemma 2.4.9 we see that a relation in T3(U) has cycles of
length at most 3, which can be ordered linearly. Hence, the
intransitivity of a relation in T3(U) is 'minimal' since the
elements which build an intransitive cycle are not separated by
elements not on that cycle (i.e., x,y is separated in RX if
x~ z~ y: RX for some z e X) and the cycles have the smallest
possible length 3.
Furthermore, let X- {x,y,z} e ~, ~X~ - 3 and
RX - rC{cx,y~,cy,z~,cz,x~},X~, then T3(U) - E4E6(L(U) U{RX}).
The following theorem states that T3(U) is a minimal extension of
L(U).
Theorem 2.4.10
Let W c Á be such that it can be classified as a set of
orderings. Furthermore, let RA e W such that RA is
reflexive, complete and antisymmetric. Then the following
holds: if RA is not cáZ,á~-transitive, then T3(U) c W.
Proof of theorem 2.4.10
From RA as given above, we can construct X-{x,y,z} and
RX - rC{cx,y~,cy,z~,cz,x~},X~ such that RX e W.
Then evidently T3(U) - E4E6(L(U) U{RX}) c W.
Corollary 2.4.11
T3(U) is a minimal extension of L(U).
Proof of Corollary 2.4.11
Evident by theorem 2.4.10 and 2.4.5.
Another result evident from lemma 2.4.9 is that not
W(U) - T3(U), since for all A e A:, such that ~A~ ? 2, it holds
that ~{RA e A: RA e W(U)}~ ? ~{RA e A: RA e T3(U)}~
Hence, we have two minimal extensions of L(U). The last theorem




Let W be a minimal extension of L(U), which can be
classified as a set of orderings.
Then W- W(U) or W- T3(U). -
Proof of theorem 2.4.10
Without loss of generality (because of (2.2.23) and
(2.2.27)) suppose RX is reflexive for all RX e W.
By (2.3.14) it follows that L(U) c W.
Since W is an extension we have L(U) c W.
Now there is a RX e W, such that RX is not antisymmetric or
RX is not complete or RX is not transitive.
Case 1 RX is not antisymmetric or RX is not complete.
By (2.4.7) we have W(U) ` W' for some W' c W.
Since W is a minimal extension of L(U) ( c W(U)) it must be
such tkiat W' - W.
Case 2 RX is not transitive, RX is antisymmetric and RX is
complete.
By (2.4.10) we have T3(U) c W. Since L(U) c T3(U) c W and W
is a minimal extension of L(U) it follows that W- T3(U).
This completes the proof.
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~ 2.5 Extensions of T3(U)
Consider the inclusion diagram of minimal extensions at the
end of ~ 2.6. In the previous section we have determined the most
left inclusions between L(U) and T3(U) and between L(U) and W(U).
In this section we will study extensions of T3(U). Hence, we will
develop the top line of the diagram. In fact, we will only
consider extensions of T3(U) which are subsets of T(U). Hence, we
will investigate tournaments.
Since T3(U) c T(U) there exists extensions of T3(U), which
are subsets of T(U).
First we will develop some notions introduced in graph
theory (See Moon [1968]).
Definition 2.5.1
Suppose RX, RX e A. and rt-~x0,xl,...,xk~ is a path along RX
in X from x0 to xk.
2.5.1.1 The mass of rz is equal to ~{x0,xl,...,xk}~.
Notation: mass(n) :- ~{x0,xl,...,xk}~.
2.5.1.2 rz is a circuit iff x0 - xk and mass(n) - length (n).
2.5.1.3 rt is a Hamilton-circuit ( or spanning-circuit) along RX
iff rz is a circuit of length ~X~.
2.5.1.4 RX is reducíble iff there exists RA, RB e A, such that
A~ cp, B~ ~p, A fl B- cp and RA ~ RB - RX.
2.5.1.5 RX is irreducible iff RX is not reducible.
2.5.1.6 6(RX,RX) :- ~ ~~{ ~` RX~ :- ~i IíRX - RX) U(RX - RX)~.
2.5.1.7 RX is strongly connected iff for all x,y e X
there is a path n. along RX from x to y.
~
The mass of a path n is equal to the number of elements
along which rz leads. Hence, mass(r[) 5 length(rz). n. is a circuit,
iff n. is a cycle which visits only the starting point, which is
also the end of n, twice and all the intermediate points
precisely once. Hence, a Hamilton circuit visits all the elements
once except the starting-point which is also visited at the end.
Now we have the following well-known characterization,




(See also Moon [1968], theorem 2 pg. 5 and theorem 3 pg. 6).
Let RX e T(U). Then the following four statements are
equivalent: -
I for all x e X and for all k e{3,4,...,~X~} there exists a
circuit from x to x along RX of length k,
II there exists a Hamilton-circuit along RX,
III RX is strongly connected, and
IV RX is irreducible.
Proof of theorem 2.5.2
(I) -~ (II) Trivial
(II) -~ (III) Trivial
(III) -~ (IV) Suppose RX is reducible and RX - RA ~r RB.
Then for all a e A and b e B there is no path from b to a
along RX, since A~ B: RX. Hence, RX is not strongly
connected.
(IV) -~ (I) The proof of this step is left to the reader. It
can be found in Moon [1968], pg. 6 theorem 3.
Corollary 2.5.3
Let RX e T(U). Then there is a unique partition C1,C2,...Ck
of X, such that
RX - (RXIC ) M (RXIC ) M...., (RXIC ) and
1 2 k
RXI is irreducible for all i e{1,2,...,k}
C.i
Proof of corollarv 2.5.3
Let RX e T(U).
Since X is finite we can find RC , RC ,...,RC for some
1 2 k
k? 1 such that: RX - RC M RC M...b RC and RC is
1 2 k i
irreducible for every i e{1,2,...,k}.
Hence, C1,C2,...,Ck is a partition of X and RX - RC for
(Ci 1
all i e {1,2,...,k}.
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Hence, Ci ) Cj : RX for all 1 5 i t j 5 k.
C1,C2,...,Ck is a partition of X, for all i e{1,2,...,k}
RX is irreducible and RX - (RX ) M (RX ) ~..~ (RX ).I~i I~1 I~2 I~k
Suppose D1, D2,.. , Dn is a partition of X, such that
RX - (RX ) ~ (RX ) ~...~ (RX ) and (RX ) isID1 ID2 IDn IDi
irreducible for all i e{1,2,...n}.
Hence, for all 1 5 i t j S k Ci ~ Cj : RX and
1 5 t~ s 5 n Dt ~ Ds : RX.
Hence, C1 fl Dl ~ cp.
Suppose C1 ~ D1. Then C1 fl D1 ~ C1 - D1 ' RXI ~C
Hence, RXI is reducible.
C1
So C1 c D1. Similarly, D1 c C1.
Thus C1 - D1.
1
By induction it follows easily that k- n and Di - Ci for
all 1 5 i 5 k- n.
Hence, such a partition is unique.
Corollary 2.5.3 leads immediately to the following notion:
Definition 2.5.4 Irreducible partition
Let RX e T(U). CRC , RC ,., RC ~ is the (finest)
1 2 k
irreducible partitioning of RX iff RX - RC m RC m...m RC
1 2 k
and RC is irreducible for all i e{1,2,...k}.
i
~
The existence and uniqueness of such a finest irreducible
partition of a tournament RX e T(U) follows evidently from
corollary 2.5.3.
We will define some sets of tournaments and prove that these
sets can be classified as a set of orderings.
Let k? 3 and 1? 0.
Tk~l(U) :- { RX e T(U): the finest irreducible partition
~RC ,RC ,...,RC ~ of RX satisfies for all 1 5 i 5 t:
1 2 t
(i) ICiI 5 k, and
(ii) there is a R~ e L(U) with 6(R~ , RC ) 5 1}.
1 1 1
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Hence, Tk~l(U) is the set of tournaments RX, such that there
is no circuit along RX of length greater than k and the
b-distance between L(U) and every irreducible 'subrelation'
RY - RXI , where cp ~ Y c X, is less than or equal to 1~.
Y -
Notice that Tk~O(U) - L(U) for all k? 3.
Now T3(U) - T3 1(U) for all 1? 1 and if




then RA ~ RX e T5~3(U). Furthermore, note that if R~ e L(U),
RC e T(U) is irreducible and b(R~,RC) - 1, then
RC -(R~ -~{Ct,b~},C~) U t{~b,t~},C~, where t- best(R~) and
b - best(vR~) ( See 2.3.14).
t.-~-.-~-... .b . R' and t.-~-.-~-... .b . Ri ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~-
Theorem 2.5.5
Let k? 3, and 1? 0.
Tk 1(U) can be classified as a set of orderings.
Proof of theorem 2.5.5
Let k? 3 and 1? 0.
Since Tk~l(U) c T(U) it holds that: RX is reflexíve for all
RX e Tk 1(U).
Since L(U) c Tk~l(U), ( 2.2.23.1) holds for Tkll(U).
Obviously Tk~l(U) is closed under concatenation.
Since fl(Tk 1(U)) - Y1 ( See 2.2.20) and Tk~l(U) is closed
under permutation Tk~l(U) is closed under substitution.
Tk~l(U) is closed under conversion, since
(1) if RX e Tk~l(U) and ~RC ,RC ,..,RC ~ is an irreducible
1 2 t
partition of RX, then evidently ~ vRC ,.., vRC , vRC ~ is
t . 2 1
the finest irreducible partitioning of vRX, and
(2) for all RX, RX e A it holds: ó(RX, RX) - 6(vRX, vRX).
Tk 1(U) is closed under restriction, since
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b(RX, RX) ? b(RX , RX ) for all RX, RX e Á and all Y e lE,IY IY
such that Y c X.
Hence, we are done by theorem 2.2.23.
~
In the following theorem several inclusions between
classified sets of tournaments will be proved.
Theorem 2.5.6
Suppose {k,m,n} c {1,3,4,5,...}, {l,i,j} c {0,1,2,3,...},
m~ n and i~ j.
2.5.6.1 If 1~ 0, then Tn 1(U) c Tm~l(U).
2.5.6.2 If 1- 0, then L(U) - Tm 1(U) - Tn~l(U).
2.5.6.3 Tk~l(U) c T(U).
2.5.6.4 If k- 1, then Tk~i(U) - Tk~j(U) - L(U).
2.5.6.5 If k- 3 and j 5 i, then T3~i(U) - T3 j(U) - T3(U).
2.5.6.6 If k- 4 and j 5 i, then T4~i(U) - T4~j(U) -: T4(U).
2.5.6.7 If j?(Z), then Tk~i(U) - Tk~j(U) -: Tk(U).
2.5.6.8 If 1? 1 t E round(Z .(t-1)) and k? 3, then
55t5k
Tk~l(U) - Tk(U), where round(x) - t iff t e{0,1,...} and
t 5 x~ t t 1.
Proof of theorem 2.5.6
(2.5.6.1) Let X e 1E with ~X~ - m.
Take RX e L(U). Suppose xlx2...xm : RX.
Take RX - (RX - ~{~xl,xm~},X~) U ~{~xm,xl~},X~.
By definition of Tk 1(U) we have Tnll(U) c Tm~l(U).
Since b(RX,RX) - 1 and 1? 1 it follows that:
RX e Tm 1(U) and RX fí Tn~l(U).
Hence, Tn 1(U) c Tm~l(U).
(2.5.6.2) Trivial, since the set of irreducible tournaments in
L(U) is equal to Y1 (See 2.2.20).
(2.5.6.3) By definition Tk 1(U) c T(U).
By (2.5.6.1) we have Tk~l(U) c Tktl,l(U) c T(U) if 1~ 0.
By (2.5.6.2) it follows Tk~l(U) - L(U) c T(U) if 1- 0.
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(2.5.6.4) Trivial.
(2.5.6.5) By definition it follows
L(U) c T3 ~(U) c T3 i(U) c T3(U). Hence, by corollary 2.4.11
we are done.
(2.5.6.6) Notice that for all irreducible RX e T(U), such that
~X~ 5 4 the following holds:
there exists RX e L(U) such that ó(RX, RX) 5 1.
Hence, we are done by the definition of Tk~l(U).
(2.5.6.7) Note that for all relations RX, RX e T(U) the following
holds: ó(RX,RX) 5 (~2~).
Hence, by this and the definition of Tk 1(U) we are done.
(2.5.6.8) It is sufficient to prove by induction on k that:
for all RX e Tk 1(U), with 3 5 k- ~X~ and 1? 1,
there is a RX e L(U), with ó(RX,RX) S 1 t E round(}.(i-1)).
SSisk
Basis: k e{3,4} is evident.
Induction step: Take RY e Tktl 1(U), ~Y~ - ktl, 1? 1.
Take x e Y, X- Y-{x}, RX :- RYI and RX e L(U) such
X
that ó(RX,RX) 5 1 t E round(} .(t-1)).
55t5k
Without loss of generality suppose
~{a e Y: a~ x : RY}~ ? ~{a e Y : x~ a: RY}~.
Hence, round(Z . k) ?({a e Y: x~ a: RY}~.
Take RY - RX b Id{x}. Then RY e L(U) and
ó(Rl„R1,) - 6(RX,RX) t ~{a e Y: x~ a: RY} ~ 5
1 t E round(~ .(t-1)).
55t5kt1
~
In theorem 2.4.6 several classified sets of tournaments have
been discussed. It is at first sight odd that the number 2 is
excluded from the range of k, m and n, but since by the
antisymmetry of tournaments cycles of length 2 are excluded it is
evident that 2 is not in that range.
We introduce a third sequence of sets of tournaments. Let
k e{1,3,4,5,...}, m,n e{0,1,2,...} and m~ n,
Tk,m,n(U) :- { RX e T(U) :
the finest irreducible partition ~R , R , R ., R ~ ofC1 C2 C3'' Ct
RX, satisfies the following three conditions:
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(1) for all 1 5 i 5 t, ~ Ci ~ s k,
(2) for all 1 5 i S t, with (Ci~ t k, there is a R~ e L(U),
such that b(RC , R~ ) 5 m, and
i i
(3) for all 1 5 i 5 t, with ~C.~ - k, there is a R' e L(U),




a.~ ~.d : RA and y.~ ~.t : RX,
`t`.~~ ~a{~ ` ~v~
then RA ~ RX e T6,3,2(U) and RA M RX é T6~2(U).
Of course Tk,m,n(U) suggests the existence of more odd sequences
of sets of tournaments. The reason of introducing these sets is
given by the following theorem. We will not investigate
tournaments further, not because of their difficulty, oddness or
not being of sufficient interest, but because we will only
develop in this chapter a classification mechanism and show that
this mechanism is meaningful.
Theorem 2.5.7
For all k e{1,3,4,5,....}, l,m,n e{0,1,2,...}, such that
1~ m~ n it holds that:
2.5.7.1 Tk,m,n(U) can be classified as a set of orderings, and
2.5.7.2 Tk,l,l(U) is a minimal extension of Tk-1,1(U)'
Proof of theorem 2.5.7
(2.5.7.1) The proof of (2.5.7.1) is similar to the proof of
theorem 2.5.5. Therefore it is left to the reader.
(2.5.7.2) Note that 1~ 1 and Tk-1,1(U) c Tk,l,l(U)'
Let X e lE be such that ~X~ - k. Let RX e L(U).
Take t- best(RX) and b- best(vRX) (See 2.3.14).
t is the top element, it is most preferred, and
b is the bottom element, ít is least preferred.
Take RX -(RX - C{~t,b~},X~) U t{~b,t~},X~.
By (2.5.2) it follows that RX is irreducible, since there is
a Hamilton-circuit along RX.
Obviously RX is the only type of irreducible relations, such
that ~X~ -k and there is a relation RX e L(U), such that
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S(RX,RX) - 1. (If we do not converse the top and bottom
element of a linear ordering, it is reducible).
Hence, by the definition of Tk,l,l(U) it follows:
Tk,l,l(U) - ~4E1(Tk-1,1(U) U {RX,vRX}) -
- ~4E6(Tk-1,1(U) U {RX,vRX}).
Hence, by (2.4.5) we are done.
Let us make some final remarks on the sets of tournaments
which can be classified as sets of orderings:
t First of all we observe the following sequence of sets of
tournaments which can be classified as sets of orderings:
L(U) c T3(U) c T4(U) c T5(U).... c Tk(U) c Tktl(U)...c T(U),
where Tk(U) is the set of all tournaments in which circuits
of length 5 k are admitted. (For a more precise definition
of Tk(U) see (2.5.6.5), (2.5.6.6) and (2.5.6.7)). This
sequence is infinite. Furthermore Tktl(U) is an extension of
Tk(U) for all k? 3. Observe that admitting circuits of
length less than or equal to ktl in a relation is a
weakening of the "transitivity-property": admitting circuits
of length less than or equal to k, it is reasonable after
all that Tktl(U) is an extension of Tk(U).
t Consider the sequence described above. By corollary 2.4.6
T3(U) is a minimal extension of L(U). By theorem 2.5.7
Tk (k-1)~1(U) is a minimal extension of
2
Tk-1~(k-1)(U) - Tk-1(U). By theorem 5.6.2 we have
2
T4 (3) 1(U) - T4(U). Hence, T4(U) is a minimal extension of
2
T3(U). Furthermore it is easy to prove that
Tk (k-1)~1(U) c Tk(U). Denoting a minimal extension in an
2
inclusion by the symbol ~ it follows that:
L(U) ~ T3(U) ~ T4(u) ~ T5.(2),1(U) c T5(U) ~ T6.(z),1(U)....
... c Tk(U) ~ Tktl,(2)~1(U) c Tk(U) ~.... T(U).
Of course, there are a lot of other such sequences.
t Notice 6 is a distance function on Á. Hence, the requirement
that there is a RX e L(U), such that ó(RX, RX) 5 k, can be
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interpreted as to mean that the distance of RX to L(U) is
less than or equal to k.
Hence, comparing Tk (2)(U) with Tktl,(2),1(U), we observe
that the "transitivity property" for relations in the former
set is stronger than in the latter, since in the latter
relations circuits of length ktl are admitted. Actually,
this weakening of the "transitivity property" is minimal,
since circuits of length ktl resemble linear orderings very
much and in linear orderings the "transitivity" is "perfect"
(See theorem 2.3.15). Hence, after all, it is reasonable
that Tk~(2) 1(U) is a minimal extension of Tktl,(2)(U).
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5 2.6 Extensions of W(U)
Zn this section we will study extensions of W(U). We will
find interesting sets of relations, which can be classified as
sets of orderings, such as: the set of semi-orderings and the set
of interval orderings. Furthermore, we will try to find minimal
extensions of these sets. As in ~2.5, these minimal extensions
are based on a minimal weakening of the transitivity condition on
relations. At the end of this section an inclusíon diagram of
classified sets of orderings has been drawn. In this section the
bottom line of this diagram will be explored. So in this section
we are mainly concerned with subsets of Q(U) (See the beginning
of ~2.4) the set of reflexíve, complete and quasi-transitive
relations. In literature Q(U), Q(U)c ( the set of asymmetric and
quasi-transitive relations) and Q(U)qc (the set of reflexive,
antisymmetric and quasi-transitive relations) are called the set
of quasí-orderings. Since Q(U) - Q(U)c - Q(U)qc this fact, of
naming equally different sets, is natural in order theoretic
terms. We call Q(U) the set of quasi-orderings, because Q(U) is
used as such in chapter 4.
We start with the set of interval orderings.
Let I(U) :- {RX e á: RX is complete, reflexive and
PIP-transitive} (See 2.2.8.14).
Hence, I(U) :- {RX e Á: RX is complete, reflexive and
~á rs á, á~-transitive}.
I(U) is called the set of (total) interval orderings (See also
Roubens 6 Vincke [1985], Blair 6 Pollack [1979] and Blau [1979]).
I(U) can be classified as a set of orderings. This is easily
proved by lemma 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 and theorem 2.3.12 and 2.2.28.
Furthermore, I(U)c is often called the set of strict interval
orderings.
The reader who wants to have more background information on
interval orderings and semi-orderings is referred to Roberts
[1979], Fishburn [1973], Luce [1956] and many others which can be
found in Roberts [1979].
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It is evident that L(U) c W(U) c I(U) c Q(U).
Hence, I(U) is an extension of W(U).
Another well-known set of orderings is the set of (total)
semi-orderings, defined as follows (See Roubens k Vincke [1985],
Blair S Pollack [1979] and Blau [1979]):
S(U) :- {RX e A: RX is complete, reflexive,
~a rs a, a~-transitive and
~á á rs, á~-transitive}.
Since ~a á rs, a~-transitivity implies ~rs a a, a~-transitivity
it follows that:
S(U) :- {RX e A: RX is complete, reflexive,
~a rs a, a~-classifiable transitive and
~a a rs, a~-classifiable transítive}.
Hence, again applying lemma 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 and theorem 2.3.12
and 2.2.28 it follows that S(U) is a set of relations which can
be classified as a set of orderings. Furthermore, it follows
evidently that L(U) c W(U) c S(U) c I(U) c Q(U). S(U)c is often
called the set of strict semi-orderings. S(U) - S(U)c.
Let us examine the weakening of the transitivity conditions
going from W(U) to Q(U). Notice that:
for all RX e W(U) it holds that:
RX is ~á á, á~-transitive,
RX is ~rs rs, rs~-transitive,
RX is tá á rs, á~-transitive,
RX is ~a rs a, a~-transitive and
RX is ~rs á á, á~-transitive,
for all RX e S(U) ít holds that:
RX is ~á á, á~-transitive,
RX is tá á rs, á~-transitive,
RX is ~a rs a, a~-transitive and
Rx is Crs á á, á~-transitive,
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for all RX e I(U) it holds that:
RX is ~á á, á~-transitive and
RX is ~á rs á, á~-transitive, and, ,
for all RX e Q(U) it holds that:
RX is ~a a, a~-transitive.
Hence, by going from W(U) to 5(U) we drop the ~rs rs, rs~-
transitivity, by going from S(U) to I(U) we drop the ~a a rs, a~-
transitivity and by going from I(U) to Q(U) we drop the
~a rs a, a~-transitivity. We have shown above that S(U) is an
extension of W(U), I(U) is an extension of S(U) and Q(U) is an
extension of I(U). In the remaining part of this section we will
show that neither of these extensions is minimal, so that there
are other weakenings of the transitivity conditions which lead to
smaller extensions. In fact we will give minimal extensions of
these sets of relations and hope to bring more insight into the
structure of these sets.
We start with a minimal extension of W(U). In our research
of minimal extensions of W(U), S(U) and I(U) we restrict
ourselves to minimal extensions in Q(U). Before mentioning
several sets of relations which can be classified as sets of
orderings, we will develop some basic notions about relations in
I(U) and S(U). First we define the notion of maximal indífference
class.
Definition 2.6.1 Maximal indifference class
Let RX e A and Y c X.
Y is an indifference class of RX iff c~Y c sRX.
Y is a maximal indifference class of -RX iff Y is an
indifference class of RX and for all indifferent classes Y'
of RX, Y ~ Y'.
If Y is a maximal indifference class of RX, then all the
elements in Y are índifferent to each other with respect to RX,
and there is no Y' in X such that Y c Y' and all the elements in
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Y' are indifferent to each other. This explains the name maximal
indifference class. Such a set is also called "maximal clique"
(See Roubens 6 Vincke (1985]), a name which is related to
graph-theory.
Example 2.6.2
If RX e L(U), then its maximal indifference classes are
singletons which can be ordered linearly.
If RX E W(U), then its maximal indifference classes are not
necessarily singletons, but they are still disjoint and can
be ordered linearly.
These two facts are well-known in literature (See the
preceding sections). We will show that maximal indifference
classes lose properties when going from w(U) via S(U) to
I(U).
Take the following relations:
RX : a~-I--~b RY : x~.~-iTy
RX e S(U) Ry E I(U) - S(IJ).
The maximal indifference classes of RX are:
{a,c}, {c,b} and {b,d}.
Note that these classes are not disjoint, but can be ordered
(this is shown in the next lemma). Furthermore, the
intersection of three of such classes is empty.
The maximal indifference classes of Ry are:
{x,t}, {y,t} and {z,t}.
Again the classes are not disjoint, and can be ordered.
But the intersection of three of such classes is not empty.
~
In the example above we showed that the formal weakening of
the transitivity conditions for relations going from L(U) via
W(U) and S(U) to I(U) has an intuitive foundation, which can be
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expressed by conditions on the maximal indifference classes. We
will state a formal result on this subject:
Lemma 2.6.3
Let RX e á.
2.6.3.1 RX e I(U) iff (2.6.3.5) (a),(b) and (c) hold
iff (2.6.3.5) ( a) and (b) hold.
2.6.3.2 RX e S(U) iff (2.6.3.5) (a),(b),(c) and (d) hold.
2.6.3.3 RX e W(U) iff (2.6.3.5) ( a),(b),(c) and (e) hold.
2.6.3.4 RX e L(U) iff (2.6.3.5) ( a),(b),(c),(e) and (f) hold.
2.6.3.5 There exists a set of maximal indifference classes of RX,
say {C1, C2,...Ct} such that:
(a) U{Ci : 1 5 i 5 t} - X,
(b) for all 1 5 i~ j 5 t :(Ci - Cj) ~(Cj - Ci) : RX,
( c) for all 1 5 i t j S t : Ci n Cj - n{Ct : i 5 t S j},
(d) for all 1~ itl ~ j 5 t: Ci fl Cj - ~p,
( e) for all 1 5 i~ j 5 t : Ci n Cj - ~p, and
( f) for all 1 5 i 5 t : ~ Ci ~- 1.
~
Although lemma 2.6.3 is partly well-known in literature
especially 2.6.3.1, 2.6.3.3 and 2.6.3.4, we will prove 2.6.3.1
and 2.6.3.2 to make the reader familiar with these orderings.
Proof of lemma 2.6.3
(2.6.3.1) (if) The strong completeness of RX follows evidently
from (2.6.3.5) (a) and (b).
Suppose: a~ b: RX, (bc) : RX and c~ d: RX.
It is sufficient to prove that a~ d: RX.
By (2.6.3.5) (a) there are Ci , Ci , Ci e{C1, C2,... , Ck}
1 2 3
such that: a e C. , b,c e C. , d e C. , b é C. and d é C. .11 12 13 il 12
Clearly by (2.6.3.5 b) il ~ i2 ~ i3.
Hence, a~ d: RX, since a e Ci - Ci and d e Ci - Ci .
1 3 3 1
(only if) (2.6.3.5 a) is trivial.
(2.6.3.5 b) First we prove that for all D1,D2 e{C1,C2,..Ck}
(D1 - D2) ~ (D2 - D1) : RX or (D2 - D1) ~ (D1 - D2) ' RX
(2.6.3.6).
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Suppose: a,b e D1 and c,d e D2, such that a~ c: RX and
d ~ b : RX . ~a' ~-~c -i
I
By the ~a rs á, á~-transitivity ~ Ii i i
it follows that a~ b: RX. ~-b. ~--E~`.dJ
This contradicts our assumption. D1 D2
Hence, (2.6.3.6) holds.
Suppose D1, D2, D3 e{C1,...,Ck} such that
(D1 - Dz) ~ (D2 - D1) : Rx and (D2 - D3) ~ (D3 - D2) : RX.
It is sufficient to prove that (D1 - D3) ~(D3 - D1) : Rx.
By the definítion of indifference class it follows that
there are a e D1 - D2, b e D2 - D1, c e D2 - D3 and
d e D3 - D2 such that a~ b: RX, (bc) : RX and c~ d: RX.
By the ~a rs a, á~-transitivity it follows that a~ d: RX.
Hence, by (2.6.3.6) (D1 - D3) ~ (D3 - D1) : RX.
(2.6.3.5 c) Suppose 1 5 i~ j 5 k. It is sufficient to prove that
Ci (1 Cj c Ct for all i 5 t 5 j.
For i- t or t- j this is trivial.
Suppose: x e Ci fl Cj and x~ Ct for i ~ t~ j.
We deduce a contradiction and are done.
Ct ~ Cj, since Ct is a maximal indifference class.
Hence, there exists a y e Ct - Cj.
Since t~ j and x e Cj - Ct, it follows by (2.6.3.5 b) that
y ~ x : RX.
Since i ~ t and x e Ci - Ct, it follows again by (2.6.3.5 b)
that y~ Ct - Ci. Hence, y e Ci. This contradicts the fact
that Ci is an indifference class of RX.
(2.6.3.2) (only if) Since S(U) c I(U), it is sufficient to prove
(2.6.3.5 d).
Suppose Ci f1 Cit2 ~ ~p for some 1 5 i 5 k- 2.
It is straightforward to prove that Citl ~ Ci U Cit2.
Hence, there exist x~ e Ci - Citl' xl e Citl -(Ci U Cit2)'
x2 e Cit2 - Citl and x3 e Ci ~ Cit2'
~x~, xl, x2, x3~ is a path of type a2 rs, which cannot be
cut short by a path of type á. This contradicts the
~á2 rs, á~-transitivity of RX. Hence, Ci fl Cit2 - cp.
(if) Evident and therefore left to the reader.
(2.6.3.3) and (2.6.3.4) are well-known.
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we will define a sequence of extensions of W(U).
For all k ? 1:
Let rsk .- rs rs rs....rs ,
i ~
k times
a path of type rs~ a path of length zero and
Sk(U) :- {RX e Á: RX is reflexive, complete,
~rs á á rs, á~-classifiable transitive,
~á rs á, á~-classifiable transitive and
trsk, scak-l~-classifiable transitive}.
Notice that trs a a rs, a~-classifiable transitivity implies
~a á rs, á~-classifiable transitivity and trsk, scak-l~-classifi-
able transitivity implies ~rsktl, scak~-classifiable
transitivity.
Hence: S1(U) - L(U) c 52(U) - W(U) c S3(U) c S4(U) c....c S(U).
Evidently Sk(U) is a set of relations, which can be classified as
a set of orderings. we will now state a characteristíc property
for the relations in Sk(U).
Theorem 2.6.4
Let k ? 1. Then ( 2.6.4.1) and ( 2.6.4.2) are equivalent.
2.6.4.1 RX e Sk(U).
2.6.4.2 There exist maximal índifference classes C1, C2,...Ct of
RX such that:
(a) X - U {Ci : i e {1,2,...,t}},
(b) for all 1 5 i t j 5 t : Ci - Cj ~ Cj - Ci : RX,
(c) for all 1 5 i ~ itl ~ j 5 t: Ci n Cj - cp, and
(d) for all 1 5 i ~ j 5 t and all i S 1~ ltl 5 j, with
cl n cltl ~ `~ '
j- i 5 k- 1 and C1 c Cltl U C1-1 for all i~ 1~ j.
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Proof of theorem 2.6.4
(2.6.4.1) -~ (2.6.4.2) By (2.6.3.2) and Sk(U) c S(U), it follows
that (2.6.4.2)(a),(b) and (c) hold.
we wíll prove (2.4.6.2 d)
Suppose: 1 S i~ j 5 t and C1 fl Cltl ~ cy for all i 5 1~ j.
Take x~ e Ci - Citl' xl-i e C1 ~ Cltl for all i ~ 1 ~ j and
xj-i e Cj - Cj-1'
Evidently, rt- ~xj-1, xj-2...,xl,x~~ is a path of type rs~-1
By (2.6.4 b) and (2.6.4 c) it follows that rc cannot be
cut short by a path of type sán, such that m ~ j- i.
Hence, j- i 5 k- 1.
Suppose: i t 1 ~ j and C1 ~ C1-1 U Cltl'
Take x~ e C1-1 f1 C1, xl e C1-1 - C1'
x2 e C1 -(C1-1 U Cltl)' x3 e Cltl - C1 and x4 e Cltl fl C1.
Then ~x~, xl, x2, x3, x4~ is a path of type rs á2 rs which
cannot be cut short by a path of type a.
Hence, C1 c C1-1 U Cltl'
(2.6.4.1) E- (2.4.6.2) By (2.6.3.2) (a), (b) and (c) it follows
that RX e S(U).
It is sufficient to prove that RX is:
~rsk, scak-l~-transitive and ~rs á á rs, á~-transitive.
~rsk, scak-l~-transitivity Let rz-~xl, x2,...,xkt1~ be a path
along RX of type rsk.
Then there are D1,D2,...,Dk e{C1,C2,...,Ct}, such that
xl,x2 e D1, x2,x3 e D2....xk'xktl e Dk.
By (2.6.4.2) (d) and (c) there is a Di - Dj where i~ j.
Hence, txl, x2,..., xi, xjtl,....,xktl~ is a short cut of
type rs of R for some m t k, since Ry is complete it is a
short cut of type sán.
Hence, RX is Crsk, scak-l~-transitive.
~rs a2 rs, a~-transitivity Let r[ -~xl,x2,x3,x4,x5~ be a path
along RX of type rs á2 rs. Since RX e S(U) it is sufficient
to prove ~xl,x5~ e áRX for the case ~{xl,x2,x3,x4,x5}~ - 5.
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Note that ~x2,x4~ e áRX.
Hence, ~x5,x1~ ~ aRX, since otherwise by the
~a rs á, á~-transitivity of RX it would follow that
~x2,x1~ e áRX.
Suppose txl,x5~ e rsRX.
By the ~a a rs, a~-classifiable transitivity of RX it
follows that ~xl,x4~ e áRX and ~x2,x5~ e áRX.
RX: x2~~ ~ i ~x5
Now there exist D1,D2,D3,D4 e{C1,C2,...,Ct}.
such that xl,x2 e D1 - Ci ,
1
xl,x5 e D2 - Ci ,
2
x4,x5 e D3 - Ci , and
3
x3 e D4 - Ci .
4
Since tx2,x5~ e áR and xl e D1 fl D2 it follows by (2.6.4.2)
(b) and (c) i2 - il t 1. Similarly it follows i3 - i2 t 1.
By (2.6.4.2 b) it follows i3 ~ i4 ~ il. Hence, i4 - i2.
But Ci ~ Ci U Ci , since x3 ~ Ci U Ci .
2 1 3 1 3
Hence, (2.6.4.2 d) is violated. So ~xl,x5~ e áRX.
Theorem 2.6.4 leads to the following corollary:
Corollary 2.6.5
Let W c,4 be classifiable as a set of orderings.
Then (2.6.5.1) and (2.6.5.2) are equivalent.
2.6.5.1 Sk(U) c W.
2.6.5.2 There is a RX e W, such that
(a) ~X~ - k and X-{xl,x2,...,xk}, and
(b) RX -({~xi,x~~ e X x X: i t j or jtl - i}, X~.
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Before proving this theorem we make a few remarks:
t Corollary 2.6.5 is a generalization of theorem 2.3.14 and
corollary 2.4.7.
t Notice that sRX -~{~xi,x~~ e X x X: ~i - j~ 5 1}, X~.
: RkX
xl~ "~ ~
Hence, there exists a unique path rt-~xl,x2,x3,...,xk~ of
length k-1 and of type rsk-1 from xl to xk along RX which
cannot be cut short by a path of type rsm where m ~ k-1.
Furthermore, it is evident that RX e Sk(U).
f By corollary 2.6.5 it follows that RX carries all the
information necessary to build Sk(U).
Proof of corollary 2.6.5
(2.6.5.1) -~ (2.6.5.2) Is trivial, since RX e Sk(U).
(2.6.5.2) -j (2.5.6.1) Suppose RX e W.
By (2.4.3) we have S4E6(L(U) U{RX,vRX}) c W.
It suffices to prove that Sk(U) - E4E6(L(U) U{RX,vRX}),
It is straightforward, although cumbersome, to show that
this follows from (2.6.4).
~
Obviously by corollary 2.6.5 it follows that Sktl(U) is an
extension of Sk(U) for all k? 1. We will now prove that Sk~l(U)
is a minimal extension of Sk(U). Hence, S3(U) is a minimal
extensíon of W(U).
Theorem 2.6.6
For all k? 1, Sk}1(U) is a minimal extension of Sk(U).
Proof of theorem 2.6.6
Notice that for all k? 2:
RX ~ Sk-1(U) and for all cp ~ Y c X it holds that
RX e Sk-1(U). Hence, we are ready by (2.4.5), sinceIY
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evidently it holds that:
Sk(U) - E4E6(Sk-1(U) U {vRX,RX})
- E4E6(L(U) U {vRX,RX}).
~
Theorem 2.6.6 is a generalization of theorem 2.4.6.
Furthermore, we observe that the infinite sequence
L(U) ~ W(U) ~ S3(U) ~ S4(U) ~... is a sequence of extensions
such that for all k? 1 the transitivity property is slightly
weakened, when going from Sk(U) to Sk}1(U). Since Sk~l(U) is a
minimal extension one might say that this weakening is minimal.
Before examining minimal extension of S(U) and I(U), we will
try to solve the following interesting problem:
Find a collection C of minimal extensions of W(U), such that
for all minimal extensions of W(U) it holds that it is isomorphic
to precisely one of the members of the collection. (~)
Theorem 2.6.7
Let W c A be classified as a set of orderings.
If W is an extension of W(U), then there exists a set W'
isomorphic to W such that W(U) c W'.
Proof of Theorem 2.6.7
Suppose W is an extension of W(U).
Then there exists a set W" c W, such that W(U) ~ W".
By corollary 2.2.27 W" e{W(U), W(U)c~, W(U)q, W(U)qcv}.
So W(U) c W, W(U) c Wc~, W(U) c Wq or W(U) c Wqcv
Hence, there exists a set W' in {W, Wcv~ Wq Wqcv} such that
W(U) c W'. Furthermore by (2.2.27), W~ W'.
So, in order to solve ("), by theorem 2.6.7 it is sufficient
to find extensions W of W(U) such that W(U) c W. Let us first
define A3(U),C3(U) and B2(U), and then prove that these are
minimal extensions of W(U) and moreover that they form a
collection we are looking for.
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Of course S3(U) is a minimal extension of W(U).
Let:
A3(U) :- {RX e A: RX is strongly complete,
RX is trs rs,sca~-classifiable transitive and
RX is ~á rs á rs á,á~-classifiable transitive},
C3(U) :- {RX e A: RX is strongly complete,
RX is trs rs,sca~-classifiable transitive and
RX is trs a rs a rs a rs,cáv~-classífiable
transitive}, and
B2(U) :- {RX e A: RX is reflexive ~
RX is ~cav cáv,cáv~-classifiable transitive}.
Of course B2(U) c V1(U).
we are going to establish the following picture:
B2(U)
~ A3(U) c A(U)
W(U)
~ C3(U) c C(U)
S3(U).
Evidently S3(U), A3(U), C3(U) and B2(U) are extensions of
W(U). We will now prove that A3(U), C3(U) and B2(U) are minimal
extensions of W(U).
We start with proving that Bz(U) is a minimal extension of
W(U).
Theorem 2.6.8
B2(U) is a minimal extension of W(U).
Proof of theorem 2.6.8
It suffices to prove that B2(U) - S4E6(w(U) U{vRX,RX}),
where vRX - RX - IdX and X e~ and ~X~ - 2.
Note that RX e B2(U). Hence, it follows that
E4~6(W(U) U {vRX,RX}) c B2(U).
We will prove that B2(U) c E4B6(W(U) U{vRX,RX}) and we are
done.
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Let RY e B2(U). We have to show that
RY e E4E6(W(U) U {vRX,RX}).
Let Y1,Y2,...,Yn be a partition of Y such that Yi is a
maximal reversible class of RY, where D is a reveYsible
class of RY iff RY - vRY , and D is a maximal reversibleID ID
class of RY iff D is a reversible class of RY and for all
reversible classes D' of RY : D~ D'.
It is straightforward to prove that these classes exist
because of the ~cav cav,cav~-transitivity of RY.
Furthermore, by this transitivity it follows that
R1, - RY1 ~ R1,2 ~... M RYk. ( for some enumeration of these
classes).
Since by the definition of S6 it holds that
RY e E6(W(U) U{RX}) for all i e{1,...,k}, we are done.
i
~
We will now prove that A3(U) and C3(U) are minimal
extensions of W(U).
Let C(U) -{RX e A: RX is strongly complete and
RX is ~rs rs,sca~-transitive}.
Of course C(U) can be classífied as a set of orderings. A3(U),
W(U) and C3(U) are all subsets of C(U). Going from W(U) to Q(U)
the ~rs rs,rs~-transitivity is dropped and going from W(U) to
C(U) the ~a á,a~-transitivity is dropped.
We have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.6.9
Let RX e C(U).
Then there exists a partition C1,C2...,Ct of X such that for
all i, Ci is a maximal indifference class of RX.
Proof of lemma 2.6.9
Evident, since because of the ~rs rs,sca~-transitivity rsRX
is an equivalence relation.
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We will now characterize the relations in A3(U). By the
ta rs a rs a,a~-classifiable transitivity it follows that every
relation in A3(U) is acyclic. Hence, A3(U) is a subset of the set
of acyclical relations defined as follows:
A(U) :- {RX e á: RX is strongly complete and for all t? 3,
RX is tát,n~-classifiable transitive}.
Note that RX is ~át,n~-classifiable transitive, iff there is
no cycle along RX of type át. A(U) is the set of strongly
complete and acyclic relations. In literature -Aq(U) and Ac~(U)
are sometimes called the set of acyclic relations. Corollary
2.2.27 clarifies again why these disjoint sets have the same
name.
Furthermore, notice that A(U) can be classified as a set of
orderings, because of theorem 2.2.28 and theorem 2.3.12. Of
course A3(U) c A(U).
Lemma 2.6.10
Let RX e A. Then (2.6.10.1) and (2.6.10.2) are equivalent.
2.6.10.1 RX e A3(U).
2.6.10.2 There are maximal indifference classes C1,C2...C2t of RX
and Xi - C2i U C2i-1 for all t? i? 1, such that
(a) X1,X2...Xt is a partition of X,
(b) for all i ~ j, Xi ~ Xj : RX, and
(c) for all Xi, with Xi ~ C2i, there is a partition Di, Ei
of C2i-1, such that Di ~ C2i : RX and C2i ~ Ei : RX.
So RX e A3(U) iff we can make the following picture of RX:
a~o~~~o~~ ,~ ~ ~ ........ ~ ~
X1 X2 D3 C6 X4 D5 C10 D6 C12 X7 Xt
~~ ~~ U ~~ U U ~~ ~~
C1 C3 E3 C7 ES E6 C13 C2t-1
~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~ ~~
C2 C4 C5 C8 C9 C11 C14 C2t
123
Hence, RX e A3(U) if and only if we can order its maximal
indifference classes linearly except some local disjoint
distortions, which are expressed by II(c).
Proof of lemma 2.6.10
(2.6.10.1) -~ (2.6.10.2) Suppose RX e A3(U).
By lemma 2.6.9 there are maximal índifference classes
C1,C2,...,Ck of RX, which is a partition of X. Let C,C' be
different maximal indifference classes of RX.
2.6.10.1.1 There exist B, B' such that {B, B'} -{C, C'} and
either B~ B' : RX or there exist D, E c B such that
D U E- B, D fl E- ~p, D~ B' : RX and B' ) E: RX.
Proof of (2.6.10.1.1)
It is sufficient to prove that the following assumption
leads to a contradiction: there are a,b,c e C and
a',b',c' e C', with {ta',c~,~a,c'~,~c,b'~,tc',b~} c áRX.
Since c' Q C it follows by lemma 2.6.9 that ~c,c'~ e áRX or
~c',c~ e áRX. Because of reasons of symmetry suppose without





Now ~c, b', c', b, a, c'~ is a path of type á rs á rs á.
Hence, by the ta rs á rs a, a~-transitivity of RX it holds
that ~c,c'~ e áRX, which contradicts tc',c~ e áRX.
Using again the tá rs a rs a, á~-transitivity of RX it
follows immediately that there are no circuits along RX of
type a rs a rs a rs. From this and (2.6.10.1.1) it follows
that the maximal indifference classes of RX can be ordered
as indicated in (2.6.10.2).
(2.6.10.2) -~ (2.6.10.1) Is straightforward and therefore
omitted.
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Now we have as a consequence of (2,6,10) and (2.4.5)
Corollary 2.6.11
A3(U) - E4E6(W(U) U{vRY, RY}) is a minimal extension of
W(U), where Y-{a,b,c}, ~Y~ - 3 and
RY - cav~{tb,a~,tc,b~},Y~.
We will now prove that C3(U) is a minimal extension of W(U).
First we will characterize the relations C3(U).
Lemma 2.6.12
Let RX e A. Then (2.6.12.1) and (2.6.12.2) are equivalent.
2.6.12.1 RX e C3(U).
2.6.12.2 There is a partion C1, C2....Ct of X, which members are
maximal indifference classes of RX, and there are di e Ci,
for all i e{1,2...t}, such that:
(a) Ci ~ Cj : RX iff di ~ dj : RX, for all i,j e{1,2...t},
and
(b) RXI e T3(U), where D:- {dl,d2...dt}.
D
Lemma 2.6.12 states that RX e C3(U) iff its maximal
indifference classes can be ordered as a tournament of T3(U).
Proof of lemma 2.6.12 ~
(2.6.12.1) -~ (2.6.12.2) Let C1, C2....Ct be the maximal
indifference classes of RX.
By lemma 2.6.9 C1, C2....Ct is a partition of X.
Take dl e C1, d2 e C2.....dt e Ct arbitrarily.
Let D - {dl, d2.....dt},
(2.6.12.2 a) Let {C, C'} c{C1, C2....Ct}. It is sufficient to
prove that the following assumption leads to a






Note that ~b, a, c, d, b, a, c, d~ is a path along RX of
type rs a rs a rs a rs. Now by ~rs a rs a rs a rs, cáv~-
transitivity of RX, it follows that tb,d~ e cavRX.
This contradicts td,b~ e aRX.
(2.6.12.2 b) Note that RXI e T(U) by (2.6.12.2 a).
D
Furthermore, by the ~rs a rs a rs á rs, cav~-transitivity of
RX it follows that there are no circuits of length 4 along
--XID'
Using the theory developed in ~ 2.5, it follows that
RXI e T3(U).
D
(2.6.12.2) -~ (2.6.12.1) is straightforward and therefore
omitted.
By Lemma 2.6.12 and theorem 2.4.5 we have
Corollry 2.6.13
C3(U) - E4E6(W(U) U{RY}) is a minimal extension of W(U),
where Y-{a,b,c}, ~y~ - 3 and
RY - cav~{~a,c~,~c,b~,tb,a~},y~,
~
Now we are ready to prove that B2(U), S3(U), C3(U) and A3(U)
are the minimal extensions of W(U), disregarding sets of
relations, which are isomorphic to one of them.
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Theorem 2.6.14
Let W c A be classified as a set of orderings.
Then the following holds:
if W is a minimal extension of W(U), then W is isomorphic to
either B2(U) or S3(U) or C3(U) or A3(U).
Proof of theorem 2.6.14
Suppose W is a minimal extension of W(U) and W is classified
as a set of orderings.
By theorem 2.6.7 there exists a W' - W, such that
W(U) c W' c R..
Since W is-a minimal extension of W(U) it follows evidently
that W' is a minimal extensíon of W(U).
By (2.4.5) it follows that W' - E4E6(W(U) U{RB,vRB}) for
some RB e W' - W(U), such that for all C c B, with C~ cp,
RBI e W(U).
C
It is straightforward to calculate that: RB e{RX,Ry,Ry,RY},
where Y-{a,b,c}, ~X~ - 2, ~Y~ - 3,
RX - rNX'
RY - cav~{tb,a~},Y),
RY - cáv~{~b,a~,~c,b~},Y~, and
RY - cáv~{~b,a~,~c,b~,~a,c~},Y~.
By theorem 2.6.8 B2(U) - E4E6(W(U) U{RX}).
By corollary 2.6.13 C3(U) - E4E6(W(U) U{RY ,vR,Y }),
By corollary 2.6.11 A3(U) - S4E6(W(U) U{Ri, vRY }),
By theorem 2.6.4 S3(U) - E4E6(W(U) U{RY ,vRY }).
We are done if we can prove that none of the sets S3(U),
A3(U), C3(U) and B2(U) are isomorphic to each other. This
follows immediately from corollary 2.2.27 and the
definitions of these sets.
~
In the preceding pages we have investigated the minimal
extensions of W(U). We found four ways to extend the set of weak
orderings:
(A) by dropping the completeness condition, we found B2(U),
(B) by weakening the transitivity condition on the symmetric
part of the relation we found S3(U),
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(C) by weakening the transitivity condition on the asymmetric
part to a condition of acyclicity we found A3(U), and
(D) by weakening the transitivity condition of the asymmetric
part by admitting circuits of type á3 we found C37U).
(B), (C) and (D) appear to be three minimal weakenings of the
transitivity condition.
Notice that the minimality of the extension W(U) of L(U) and
of the extensions B2(U), S3(U), A3(U) and C3(U) of W(U) has been
shown by the following type of characterization of the extension
W: if V can be classified as a set of orderings, then W c V iff a
certain RX is in V. -
So, that particular relation RX has all the information to
build all the relations in W. Hence, it is evident that ~X~-2 for
the case where W e{W(U), B2(U)} and ~X~-3 for the case where
W e{S3(U), A3(U), C3(U)}, since in the latter case there is a
weakening of the transitivity conditions (hence at least three
elements should be involved) and in the former case there is a
weakening of the completeness and antisymmetry.
Next we will investigate minimal extensions of S(U) and
I(U) (See the picture at the end of this section). This
investigation is restricted to extensions, which are subsets of
Q(U), since we want to preserve the transitivity of the
antisymmetric part of the relations.
To begin with we define two sequences of extensions of S(U).
Definition 2.6.15 Seguences of extensions of S(U)
Let k ? 1.
Zk(U) :- {RX e Á: There exists a set of maximal
indifference classes of RX, say {C1,C2...Ct} such
that (2.6.15.1), (2.6.15.2) and (2.6.15.3) hold},
Ik(U) :- {RX e á: There exists a set of maximal
indifference classes of RX, say {C1,C2...Ct} such
that (2.6.15.1), (2.6.15.2), (2.6.15.3) and
(2.6.15.4) hold}, where:
2.6.15.1 U{Ci : i e{1,2...t}} - X,
2.6.15.2 for all 1 5 i~ j 5 t:(Ci - Cj) ~(Cj - Ci) : RX,
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2.6.15.3 for all 1 5 i 5 t-k : Ci n Citk -~, and
2.6.15.4 for all 1 5 i 5 t-ktl, with Ci ~ Citk ~ cp, it holds:
(a) for all 1 5 n 5 i: Ci f1 Cn - cp,
(b) for all itk-1~ n 5 t: Citk-1 ~ Cn - cp, and
(c) for all i5n~m5itk-1 : Cn fl Cm - Ci fl Citk-1' ~
It is straightforward, although cumbersome, to prove that
Ik(U) and Ik(U) can be classified as sets of orderings for all
k? 1. Furthermore, the following holds evidently:
I1(U) - Ii(U) - W(U) c 12(U) - 53(U) c IZ(U) - S(U) c I3(U)....
.... c Ik(U) c Iktl(U) c Iktl(U).... c I(U).
In the following theorems it will be proved that Iktl(U) is
a minimal extension of Ik(U), in a similar way as was shown that
W(U) is a mínimal extension of L(U) and S3(U), A3(U), B2(U) and
C3(U) are minimal extensions of W(U).
Theorem 2.6.16
Let k? 1. Let W c,4 be classified as a set of orderings,
such that Ik(U) c W c I(U) and furthermore let RX e A be
- k
defined as follows: ~Xk~ - k, Xk -{xl, xZ,...,xk} and
RX .- ~{~xi, xj) :(15i5j5k) v(i-k S 15j5k)},Xk~.
k
Then the following holds:
RX e W iff Ik(U) c W.
k
Before proving theorem 2.6.16, notice that
RX ~ e L(U) and xk is indifferent to all the other
k {xl, x2,...,xk}
elements of Xk in RX . Hence, the set of maximal indifference
- k
classes of RX is as follows: {{xl,xk},{x2,xk},...,{xk-l,xk}}.
k
Let Ci -{xi,xk}. Observe that U{Ci: 15i5t} - Xk and
(Ci - Cj) ~(Cj - Ci) : RX for all 1 5 i~ j 5 k. Hence obviously
- k
RX e Ik(U) - Ik-1(U). In the proof of theorem 2.6.16 will be
k -
shown that RX "carries" all the information to build every
k
element of Ik(U) - Ik-1(U) for k? 2. To give the reader a little
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It is straightforward but cumbersome to prove that:
Ik(U) - S9S6(W(U) U {vRX ,RX })
k k
- E4~6(Ik-1(U) U {vRX ,RX }),- k k
(only if) Suppose RX e W. We have to prove that Ik(U) c W.
- k
Since RX e W, W(U) c W and since W can be classified as a
k -
set of orderings, we have E4E6(W(U) U{vRX ,RX }) c W.
k k -
Hence, Ik(U) c W.
(if) Suppose Ik(U) c W. We have prove that RX e W.
- k
This is evident since RX e Ik(U).
k
Corollary 2.6.17
Let k? 1. Let W e.4 be classified as a set of orderings,
such that W c I(U). Then the following holds:
W is a minimal extension of Ik(U) iff Iktl(U) - W'
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Proof of corollary 2.6.17
Notice that for all ~p ~ Y c Xk, RX I e Ik(U).
k Y
Hence, since E4E6(Ik(U) U{RX ,vRX }) - Iktl(U) by (2.4.5)
k k
it follows that Iktl(U) is a minimal extension of Ik(U).
Hence, it suffices to prove: if Ik(U) c W, then RX e W.
ktl
Suppose Ik(U) c w. Then there exists a RY e w- Ik(U) such
that RY e I(U). Let D1,DZ,...,Dm be the maximal indifference
classes of RY. According to (2.6.3.1) (after a renumbering)
it holds that:
(a) U{Dt : 1 5 t 5 m} - y,
(b) for all 1 5 i ~ j 5 m : Di - Dj ~ Dj - Di : RY, and
( c) for all 1 5 i~ j 5 m: Di fl Dj - fl {Dt : i 5 t 5 j}.
Since RY ~í Ik(U) it follows that there is a n e {1,...,m},
such that Dn D Dntk ~~'
Take di e Dnti - Z and dktl e Z, where
Z- 11 {Dt : n 5 t 5 ntk} .
Obviously RYI e E1 ({RX ,vRX }).
{dl,...,dktl} ktl ktl
Hence, R e W.
Xktl
~
We end this section with investiqating a minimal extension
of I(U). This extension will be defined by means of conditions of
a restrictive nature on the maximal indifferent classes of the
relations in that extension:
J(U) :- {RX e A: there exists a partion of X, say Y1'Y2'" 'Yt'
such that: RX - (RX ) r (RX ) ~ ... . (RX ) and
IY1 IY2 IYt
for all i e{1,...,t}, with RXI ~ I(U), there is a
Yi
partition of Yi say, D1,DZ,D3,D4, such that
RXI - c~{~x,y~ : [x e DZ ~ y e D1] v
Y.i
[x e Di S y e Di]},Yi~ }.
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Let RA :- cC{~b,a~,Cd,c~},A~, where A-{a,b,c,d} and ~A~ - 4.
Hence, RA: a.,--,~ .b
cl~~ld
Then it is obvious that RA ~ I(U), but for all cp - B c A
RAI e I(U).
B
Moreover, it is straightforward to prove that:
~4~6(I(U) U{vRA,RA}) - J(U). Hence, by (2.4.5), J(U) is a
minimal extension of I(U).
We will prove that J(U) is the "only" mínimal extension of
I(U) which is in Q(U). To prove this we make use of the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.6.18
Let W c ,4 be classified as a set of orderings, such that
I(U) c W c Q(U). Then the following holds:
RA e W iff J(U) c W.
Proof of theorem 2.6.18
(if) Trivial, since RA e J(U).
(only if) Suppose RA e W. ,
Obviously it holds that: J(U) - E4E6(I(U) U{RA,vRA}) c W.
Next we will prove that J(U) is the "only" minimal extension
of I(U), which is in Q(U). The idea underlying the proof is from
Fishburn ( 1970], who has shown that RX e I(U) iff RA ~ a(RXI )
Y
for all Y c X and a e SU.
Corollary 2.6.19
Let W c.á be classified as a set of orderings.
Then the following holds: J(U)-W iff
I(U) c W c Q(U) and W is a minimal extension of I(U).
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Proof of corollary 2.6.19
We have already shown that (if) holds.
(only if) It suffices to prove: if I(U) c W c Q(U), and W is a
minimal estension of I(U), then RA e W.
Suppose: I(U) c W c Q(U) and RA ~ W. Then it follows for all
RX e W and xl,x2,x3,x4 e X:
[~xl,x2~ e áRX ~ ~x3,x4~ e áRXj -~
[~xl,x4~ e áRX v~x3,x2~ e áRX).
Hence, RX is ~a rs a, a~-classifiable transitive and
RX e I(U). So W c I(U). This contradicts the assumption
I(U) c W, which completes the proof.
we conclude this section wíth an inclusion diagram of the
sets of relations, which were found earlier and which can be
classified as sets of orderings.
~ T(U) T(U) T ..(U) c T (U) c T(U)......3 ~ 4 ~ 5,1,1 5,2 - 5
..Tk~l(U) ~ Tk~l~l(U) c . . T(U).
L(U) B2(U)
~ A3(U) c A(U)
W(U) ~ C3(U) c C(U)
S3(U) ~ S4(U)...c Sk(U) ~ Sktl(U)...c S(U) ~ I3(U)
~~ ~~
I2(U) I2(U)
c...c Ik(U) ~ Iktl(U)...c I(U) ~ J(U) c Q(U)
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~ 2.7 Some remarks on sets of orderings
In this section we will try to recover some intuitive
ideas concerning the sets of relations which can be classified as
sets of orderings according to definition 2.2.22 and hope to give
more insight into this classificatíon system.
Observe that by theorem 2.3.14 it follows that, whenever W
is a classifiable set of orderings, then W contains all those
relations which order the elements in a non-branching chain from
better to worse. So in those relations the elements can be put on
a line starting with the best and ending with the worst element.
Therefore the orderings are called linear orderings. L(U) is by
definition the set of all linear orderings. Furthermore, by
(2.3.14) it follows that there is no classifiable set of
orderings which is a non-trivial subset of L(U). Hence, L(U) is
the smallest classifiable set of orderings. A natural question is
now whether there is a largest classifiable set. Of course, the
answer is posítive: take V1(U) :- { RX e Á: RX is reflexive}.
By theorem 2.2.23 it is easy to prove that for all W c A,
which can be classified as a set of orderings, the following
holds: W c V1(U) or W c V1(U)q. Hence, it follows that V1(U) and
V1(U)q are the largest classifiable sets of orderings. Since by
(2.2.26) V1(U) - V1(U)q, we can speak of the largest classifiable
set of orderings. -
Various minimal extensions introduced in ~2.4, ~2.5 and ~2.6
corresponded with a minimal weakeníng of the transitivity
condition of orderings. An interesting problem is the following:
Does there exist a set W c Á, which is classifiable as a set
of orderings such that W~ V1(U). Since by theorem 2.2.23 either
all relations in a set which can be classífied as a set of
orderings, are reflexive or all these relations are irreflexive,
it follows that the relations in V1(U) do not satisfy any
transitivity condition. Hence, the problem stated above can be
reformulated as the following question: Does a "minimal"




Let V c V1(U) be a classífiable set of orderings. Then there
exists a classifiable set of orderings w with V c w c V1(U).
Proof of theorem 2.7.1
Suppose V c V1(U).
Since V c V1(U) there exists a relation RX e V1(U), such
that RX ~ V. By the finiteness of X and simple induction
reasonings we may assume without loss of generality that:
for all Y c X, with Y~ cp, RXI e V. (2.7.1.1)
Y
By theorem 2.4.5, ~(V U{RX}) - E4E6(V U{RX,vRX}) is a
minimal extension of V. (2.7.1.2)
It is sufficient to prove that W ~ V1(U), where
W - 4'(V U {RX}),
Let A- X U{a}, where a fE X and a e U.
Now let X- {xl,x2,x3,...,xk} such that for all
i,j e{1,2,...,k} it holds that:
i? j iff ~{x e X: Cxi,x~ e áRX}~ 5 ~{x e X: ~x~,x~ e áRX}~.
Define RA :- ~{~X,y~ e A x A:[~x,y~ e RX] v
[x - xi k y- a 6 í e{2,3,..,k}} v
( x- a 6 y- xl]},A~.
It is sufficient to prove that RA ~ W.
Suppose RA e W.
If RA is reducible (i.e., RA - RB ~ RC) then RX is
reducible. So RX - RY ~ RZ and by (2.7.1.1) it follows
RX e W, whích is not the case.
Therefore, by (2.7.1.2) we have that RA e E6(V U{RX, vRX}).
Hence, there is a partion B1,B2,...,Bm of A and there are
relations RB , RB ,..,RB e i2(W) (See 2.2.20) and
1 2 m
RC e V U{RX, vRX}), with C-{cl, c2,...,cm} and
RA - t{tx,y~ e A x A: there are i,j e{1,...,k} such that
either i~ j, ~x,y~ e Bi x Bj and ~ci,cj~ e RC,
or i- j and ~x,y~ e RB },A~.
i
If ~Bi~ ? 2 for some i e{1,...,k}, then a~ Bi and
R e V for a b e B. by (2.7.1.1). So R- R e V,
A~X-{b} i X A~X
which is not the case. Hence, RA e S1({RC}),
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By the closedness under restriction of V it follows RA é V.
Hence, RA e E1({RX,vRX}) which cannot be the case since
~A~ ~ ~X~.
Hence, RA ~ W. ~
~
By theorem 2.7.1 it follows that every transitivity
condition can be weakened. One might expect that minimal
weakenings of the transitivity yield an empty transitivity
condition in the limit. That this is not the case is illustrated
by the sequence L(U) ~ W(U) ~ S3(U) ~ S4(U)... C S(U), where the
limit situation S(U) is not equal to V1(U), and hence in the
limit situation we do not have an empty transitivity condition.
Let as focus now on the criteria 1 up to 6 imposed on sets
of relations which can be classified as sets of orderings.
First we will prove their independence by the following 6
examples.
Example 2.7.2 Not closed under permutation
Let x e U and W:- { RA e,4: there is a RB e L(U), such
that RA :- RB - Id{x} }'
Obviously W is closed under restriction, conversion,
substitution and concatenation. Furthermore, W is
non-trivial. Hence, criterion 2,3,4,5 and 6 together do not
imply criterion 1.
Example 7.3 Not closed under conversion
Let W:- {RX e A: RX is reflexive and
Rx is ~á rs, á) - transitive}.
It is straightforward to prove that W is non-trivial, and
closed under permutation, concatenation, restriction and
substitution.
Let RY :- r~{~x,Y~.~Y.z~,~z,y~},Y~, where Y-{x,Y,z} e W.
RY is not ~á rs, á~ - transitive. RY : x.-----.z
i ~ iy
vRY is ~á rs, á~ - transitive.
So vRY e, but RY ~ W.
Hence, w is not closed under conversion.
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Example 2.7.4 Not closed under restriction
Let W:- {RX e á: RX e W(U), such that if Y c X is a
maximal indifference class of RX, then
~Y~ ~ 2}.
Evidently W is non-trivial and is closed under permutation,
conversion, concatenation and substitution.
Furthermore, L(U) c W c w(U).
Since W(U) is a minimal extension of L(U), W is not close
under restriction.
Example 2.7.5 Trivial
A itself is not non-trivial, but á is closed under
permutation, concatenation, restriction, substitution and
conversion.
Example 2.7.6 Not closed under concatenation
Y1 is not closed under concatenation.
Y1 is closed under permutation, restriction, substitution
and conversion, and is non-trivial.
Example 2.7.7 Not closed under substitution
Let W-{RX e W(U): If Y is a maximal indifference class of
RX, then ~Y~ 5 2}.
Obviously W is non-trivial and is closed under permutation,
restriction, concatenation and conversion. W is not closed
under substitution, sínce L(U) c W c W(U) and W(U) is a
minimal extension of L(U).
By the examples stated above the independence of the
criteria 1 up to 6 follows immediately. Furthermore, we notice
that the closedness under restriction as well as the closedness
under substitution are essential to prove that W(U) is a minimal
extension of L(U). Dropping one of these criteria introduces
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classifiable sets of orderings between L(U) and W(U), as shown in
the examples 2.7.4 and 2.7.7. It is left to the reader to prove
that the other four criteria are not essential to prove that W(U)
is a minimal extension of L(U). However, by example 2.7.6 it
becomes clear that dropping the closure under concation
introduces sets smaller than L(U).
Let us end this section with a reflection on the criteria
introduced in ~2.2. The reader should be aware that these
indicated properties do not have any absolute truth-value and
moreover can probably be formalized in different ways. Hence, we
do not argue on the validity of these criteria, whatever that may
be. To emphasize this point of view we encourage every reader to
find other críteria, which lead perhaps to other classifiable
sets of orderings. We end this section with the examination of
several slight changes of these criteria.
In this examination we pose two questions:
A. Do there exist weakenings of the criteria 1 up to 6,
which lead to a classification system, with acceptable
classifiable sets of orderings?
B. Do there exist strengthenings of the criteria 1 up to
6, which lead to another classification system with
acceptable sets of orderings?
We start with question A. Notice that a weakening of the
criteria will lead to more sets of relations, which can be
classified as sets of orderings and that almost all well-known
and even less-well-known sets of orderings can be classified as
such by the criteria introduced in ~2.2. We come to the
conclusion that weakening the criteria 1 up to 6 is not of
interest to us. Such weakeníng leads to more fading notions about
the phenomenon of ordering. Therefore we will not try to answer
questíon A explicitly.
Now we will try to answer question B. In particular we like
to indicate that it is far from easy to introduce strengthenings
of the criteria, such that it leads to a satisfactory
classification system.
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First of all it is noticeable that such a strengthening
could be helpful to study the notion of ordering, since according
to the classification system introduced in ~2.2 there exist many
unexpected sets of orderings and several of them are not
described by explicit transitivity critería (e.g. Ik(U)).
There will be no discussion of additional new criteria
because we could not find other relevant ones. Of course, to
overcome the problem about the description of orderings stated
above one could demand explicitly that a classifiable set of
orderings should satisfy in addition some transitivity
conditions. This approach, however, is rejected since because of
the variety of these transitivity conditions we finally cannot
interpret them.
Hence, we will only discuss strengthenings of the criteria 1
up to 6 themselves. Only strengthenings of criteria 4 and 6 will
be discussed since we could not find any relevant strengthenings
of criteria 1, 2, 3 and 5.
We start with strengthenings of the closure under
concatenation. By criterion 4, RA ~ RB is in the classified set
of orderings whenever RA and RB are in it and A and B are
disjoint. To strengthen criterion 4 the disjointness of A and B
ís weakened. To do this we introduce some notions slightly
different from equally named notions in literature.
Definition 2.7.8 Better and Maximal elements
Let RA e A and a e A
Better (RA,a) :- {x e A:~x,a~ e aRA} is the set of better
(or preferred) elements to a with respect to RA.
Max(RA) :- {x e A: Better(RA,x) - ~p and there is a y e A
such that x e Better(RA,y)} is the set
of maximal elements of RA.
Min(RA) :- Max(vRA) is the set of minimal elements of RA.
~
In literature MaxIRA) is defined as the set of elements x
such that Better(RA,x) is empty. According to our definition
Max(cpA) - w, while in literature the set of maximal elements of
cpA is equal to A.
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we will now introduce some variations of the concatenation
operator:
Definition 2.7.9 Variatíons of the concatenation operator
Let RA, RB e A.
2.7.9.1 Let Max(RB) - Min(RA) - C- A fl B~~ and RA - RB
~C (C.
Then RA ~1 RB :- ~{~x,y~ : tx,y~ e RA v~x,y~ e RB v
~x,y~ e(A - C)x(B - C)},A U B~.
2.7.9.2 Let Max(RB) - Min(RA) - C- A fl B and ~C~ - 1.
Then RA M2 RB :- t{~x,y~ :~x,y~ e RA v~x,y~ e RB v
~x,y~ e(A - C)x(B - C)},A U B~.
2.7.9.3 Let Max(RB) fl Min(RA) - C- A f1 B and IC~ - 1.
Then RA ~3 RB :- ~{~x,y~ :~x,y~ e RA v tx,y~ e RB v
~x,y~ e(A - C)x(B - C)},A U B~.
2.7.9.4 Let Max(RB) f1 Min(RA) - C- A fl B and ~C~ - 1,
D- Max(RB) U Min(RA), RD e A such that RD - vRD,
RA~A fl D- RD~A Il D
and RB~B (1 D- ~~B ~ D
Then m4 (RA,RB,RD) :- ~{~x,y~ :~x,y~ e(A - C)x(B - C) v
~x,y~ e RA v~x,y~ e RB v
~x,y~ e RD}, A U B~.
~
Although all of these variations at first sight seem to
induce reasonable conditions for a set to be classifiable as a
set of orderings, they all confront us with odd consequences when
doing so. For i e{1,2,3} we define V c.4 to be .í-closed iff
RA ~i RB e V for all RA, RB e V for which si can be defined.
Furthermore, V is H4-closed iff M4 (RA, RB, RD) e V for all RA,
RB and RD for which ~4 can be defined.
Suppose V is a classified set of orderinqs. Then the
following holds obviously:
if V is ~i-closed, then V is ~r2-closed for all i e {3,4,1}.
In the following example we will show that several well-known
sets of orderings are not Mj-closed for some j e{1,2,3,4} and




Let RA, RB, RX, RY, R~, RD, RE e Á such that the relations
have the following graphical representation:
RA. ~ RB. i
~~ ~ ~
a~ ~c c. .e





RD : b . -~-~. e
Note that RX, RY, R~, RD, RE e S(U) and RA, RB e A3(U).
Furthermore, RX, RY e S3(U) and R~, RD e S4(U).
RA MZ RB : c
a ~ e
Note that RA m2 RB ~ A3(U).
~{a,c,e}
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RX ~ 1 RY - R}{ ~ 2 RY - RX ~ 3 R7C - ~ 4 í RX' ~' Id {Y}):
Y
RX ~2' RY é S3(U)
RC "1 RE-
RC ~1 RE~{c,b,d,f}-
RC '1 RE É S3lU)
~{c,b,d,f}
~-d-~~~ f
~ R - r R Id ):( , .C 3 E~{c,b,d,f} 4 C RD {b}




From example 2.7.10 it follows that S(U) is not ~1-closed,
nor ~3-closed, nor ~4-closed. Furthermore, from example 2.7.10 it
follows that A3(U) is not .2-closed. Since we want to classify at
least all well-known sets of orderings, M1-closure,
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~3-closure and ~4-closure cannot be imposed as an criterion on a
classifiable set of orderings, otherwise S(U) would not be
classifiable anymore. Note that S3(U) and S4(U) are not
M2-closed. Hence, a~2-closure condition would eliminate some
classified sets of orderings. Unfortunately ~2-closure implies
some odd-results, which we will discuss now.
Observe definition 2.7.9.2. Suppose: RA, RB e A are such
that ~2 is well-defined. Then the following holds:
Max(RB) - Min(RA) -{c} - A ~ B for some c e U.
Suppose: àRB is transitive. Or stated otherwise, RB is
tà à, à~-classifiable transitive.
Then the following equivalence is easy to prove for all x e B:
~c,x~ ~ àRB, iff for all y e B: ~x,y~ é cscaRB.
Hence, if Max(RB) -{c} and RB is ~à à, à~-transitive then
B- B1 U B2, such that B1 ~ B2 -~, c e B1, B1 -{c} ~~, for all
bl e B1 -{c} : Cc,bl~ e àRB, and for all b2 e B2 and all b e B:
~b2,b~ e scaRB. Hence, if RB is, e.g. a quasi-ordering, and has
precisely one maximal element, then the elements which are
neither strictly dominated by c(B-Better(vRB,c)) nor equal to c
are disconnected with àRB in àRB. Since similar results can be
deduced for RA, it is obvious that M2 is only well-defined for a
'small' subset of Q(A), while ~ is defined for every 'type' of
relation in A. To illustrate this let RA, RB e A. Take a e SU
such that a(A) ~ B-~. Then aRA ~ RB is well-defined.
Hence, ~2 is less generally applicable than ~. Due to this
fact we can observe some odd results. First of all, T3(U) is
M2-closed, since RA M2 RB is well-defined for all RA, RB e T3(U)
iff Max(RB) - Min(RA) -{c} - A ~ B and {c} ~(B -{c}) : RB and
(A -{c}) ~{c} : RA. Hence, this r2-closure follows immediately
from the closure under concatenation of T3(U). Similarly C3(U) is
M2-closed. But A3(U) and 53(U) are not M2-closed. Since RA ~2 RB
need to be Crs3, sca2~-transitive or ~rs2, sca~-transitive
whenever RA and RB are ~rs3, sca2~-transitive or respectivily
~rs2, sca~-transitive.
This is shown by example 2.7.10.
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Secondly it is easy to prove that the only non-m2-closed
subsets of Q(U), which are classified as sets of orderings and
discussed here, are S3(U) and S4(U). Hence, ~2-closure is not
very helpful in eliminating several sets of relations,~classified
as sets of orderings. Furthermore, we observe a strange
discontinuity in the non-eliminated sequence:
S1(U), S2(U), S5(U), S6(U)... Hence, ~2-closure appears to be a
rather ad hoc críterion.
Due to these two observations the author decided to
incorporate criterion 4 instead of .2-closure in the
classification mechanism.
Now, having discussed strengthenings of the closure under
concatenation, we will discuss strengthenings of the closedness
under substitution. First we define two substitution operators.
Definition 2.7.11
Let RA, RB e,4 and x e A.
2.7.11.1 Suppose A fl B- c~ and Z- A U B-{x}.
Then Subl(RA, x, RB) :- ~{~a,b~ :[~a, x~ e RA S a e B] v
[~a,b~ e RA k a~ x k b~ x] v
[~x,b~ e RA 6 b e B] v
[~a,b~ e RB]},Z~.
2.7.11.2 Suppose B is a maximal indifference class of RA and
RB e L(U).
Then Sub2(RA, B, RB) :- ~{Ca,b~ : [~a,b~ e RB] v
[~a,b~ e RA s ~a, b~ e(B x B)]},A~.
In a similar way as in ~2.2 we define subi-closure for
i e{1,2}. Now by the following example it is easy to see that
S(U) is not subl-closed and Q(U) is not sub2-closed. Hence, as in
the introduction to the substitution-operations has been pointed
out, allowing non-reversible relations as substitution arguments
leads to violations of various transitivity properties. Because
of this fact S(U) and Q(U) are not subl-closed and not
sub2-closed respectivily. Hence, in the classification system
these operations are not admissible.
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Example 2.7.12





Then Subl(RA, b, RB):
a
and Sub2(R~, {b,c}, RD):
RD : b . -~- .c
a~
Hence, Subl(RA, b, RB) é S(U) and
Sub2(R~, {b,c}, RD) ~ Q(U).
.c
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A more subtle substitution operation than the one introduced
in 2.2.19, in which the substitutes are either a total
indifference class or a total incomparability class, is left out
of the discussion here. As mentioned before, with ~this more
subtle substitution mechanism the theorems stated in this chapter
remain almost the same, but their proofs become much more
complicated. (See earlier versions of this monograph).
Summarizing we conclude that by the classification system
introduced in ~2.2 all well-known sets of orderings can be
classified. Unfortunately, several (in fact infinitely many)
'new' sets of relations can be classified as sets of orderings.
At first sight all attempts to reduce this number of new sets,
which can be classified as sets of orderings, failed. To our
intuition this is due to the fact that the attempts affect
transitivity properties of orderings. Furthermore, a systematic
analysis of the monadic operations based on local information has
been worked out. This analysis made possible a formulation of a
general transitivity condition. Also there has been explored a
characterization of minimal extensions of a given set of
orderings and along with this extension a minimal weakening of
the transitivity condition of these orderings. So we have
developed a(preliminary) classification system, which gives us
insight in the phenomenon of ordering. Thís insight is of vital
importance in the following chapters, but to the author's opinion
it is not yet satisfactorily explored, since we have the
following open question:
Is the set of criteria 1 up to 6 replaceable by another set
1' up to n', such that all the new criteria can be interpreted
very easily in a meaningful manner and such that classifying sets
of relations according to these new criteria leads to the
following results:
(1) All well-known sets of orderings can be classified as a
set of orderings according to the new criteria, and
(2) The number of sets which can be classified is much
smaller than the number of sets classified above.
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CHAPTER 3 DISCRETE METRIC SPACES
~ 3.1 Metric spaces
In the previous chapter an investigation into the notion of
ordering is made to establish the important concepts of the model
of constitutional decision rules: individual preferences and
preferences of society. In chapter 4 the found classification
system gives rise to a framework, in which new impossibility
theorems can be derived and almost all known impossibility
theorems involving social welfare functions are incorporated.
These welfare functions have the independence of irrelevant
alternatives property.
In this chapter continuity properties for welfare functions
are introduced. Several of these continuity properties turn out
to be weaker conditions for welfare functions than the
independence of irrelevant alternatives condition. In the next
chapter impossibilities for continuous welfare functions are
deduced also.
Continuity is often related to functions with a domain and a
range which are not discrete. However, here the domain and
codomain of the studied functions are even finite, hence
discrete. For this reason a more careful introduction of the
continuity conditions is established here.
Continuity is a topological property: A function f is
continuous (with respect to the topologies tdomain and
icodomain)~ iff for every open set O(according to icodomain)
it
holds that the set of originals, whose images under f are in O,
is open (according to idomain)' Clearly the continuity property
depends strongly on the topologies zdomain and zcodomain' In this
chapter new topologies are generated by means of distance
functions. Let V be a set of elements and d a distance function
on V. Then a well known topology is based on the set of balls. A
ball with centre v e V and radius a(where a is a positive real
number) is a set B(v,a) .- {x e V: d(x,v) ~ a}. If V is finite
this leads to a topology, where every singleton subset of V is
open. Consequently it follows that every subset of V is open.
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So, if the domain and codomain are finite metric spaces and
Tdomain and icodomain are topologies based on the set of balls,
then every function from this domain to that codomain ís
continuous. Continuity introduced in this way does not~in any way
ímpose constraints on a function (for the finite case of course).
To make use of inetric spaces in connection with meaningful
continuity properties, the topologies based on these distance
functions are deduced more subtly. The information of points
which have, according to the metric space, the smallest possible
distance, will also determine whether or not a set ís open. In
this way non-standard topologies are obtained. Of course we have
to pay a price for this: the Hausdorff property does not hold in
general for these new topologies. In this chapter distance
functions are extended to the information as mentioned above.
Then the new topologies are defined by means of these extended
distance functions. Furthermore, a special type of inetric spaces,
named full metric spaces, are studied and it is shown how to
fill a metric space. Finally, continuity with respect to these
new topologies is characterized and a preparation of the
impossibilíties for continuous constitutional decision rules is
developed. This preparation concerns properties of inetric spaces.
This is why a whole chapter is devoted to metric spaces.
In this section some basic notions are introduced.
Definition 3.1.1 Distance function
Let V be an arbitrary set and R the set of real numbers.
A distance function d on V is a function from V x V to the
set R, such that for all x,y,z e V:
3.1.1.1 d(x,y) ? 0 (no negative distances),
3.1.1.2 d(x,y) - 0, iff x- y (equal elements have a zero
distance),
3.1.1.3 d(x,y) - d(y,x) (symmetry),
3.1.1.4 d(x,z) t d(z,y) ? d(x,y) (triangle inequality).
~
Since this standard definition is given in many handbooks
about topology or analysis no further comment is given here.




Let V be an arbitrary set and d a distance function on V.
3.1.2.1. For arbitrary x e V and u e R, u~ 0, the ball with
centre x and radius u(in V with respect to d) is equal to
{a e V: d(x,a) t u}.
Notation: B(x,u,V,d), or whenever V and d are known B(x,u).
3.1.2.2. The diameter of V with respect to d is equal to
sup {d(x,y) : x,y e V}.
Notation: diam(V,d).
3.1.2.3. The meshwidth of V with respect to d is equal to
inf {d(x,y) : x,y e V, x~ y},
Notation: mesh(V,d).
~
The ball with centre x and radius u is also called
u-neighbourhood of x. This notion as well as the notion diameter
are standard notions. The meshwidth is perhaps not generally
used, because in the frequently used metric spaces it is zero. If
V is finite, then mesh(V,d) - min{d(x,y) : x,y e V, x~ y} ~ 0.
mesh(V,d) is the smallest positive distance between two elements
of V. The meshwidth is illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.1.3 Meshwídth, Diameter, Neighbourhood
Let the Euclidian distanee, d, on Rn, the n-fold cartesian
product of R, be defined as follows:




Let Z be the set of integers, i.e., Z-{,.-2,-1,0,1,2,3..}.
It is easy to prove that mesh(Z x Z, d) - 1,
B((0,0~,2,Z x Z,d) - {~0,0~,~-1,0),~0,-1~,~1,0~,~0,1~,
~-1,1~,~1,1~,~1,-1~,~-1,-1~},
and diam(Z x Z,d) é R.
The diameter is not in R, since Z x Z is not bounded. If the
díameter is not in R it is infinite: notation ~. Hence,
diam(Z x Z,d) -~. If V-{x e R: x? 0 k x 5 k}, where k
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is a fixed positive number in Z, then mesh(V,d) - 0 and
diam(V,d) - k.
If V-{x e R : there is a n e N or Z`{0}, such that
x- n-(l~n)}, then mesh(V,d) - 1. But d(x,y) ~~1 for all
x,y e V, with x~ y.
~
In the previous example the following well known obvious
fact is used: the restriction of a distance function is a
distance function.
To be complete let us recall the notion of the metric space.
A metric space M is an ordered pair ~V,d~, where d is a distance
function on the set V. Notation: M- ~V,d~.
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~ 3.2 Topologíes based on distance functions
In this section information deduced from a distance function
is used to construct non-standard topologies. This information is
described by graphs and is essentially richer than the
information about distance functions which is standardly used.
The standard information is whether an element y is or is not in
a u-neighbourhood of another element x. In finite metric spaces
~V,d~ (~V~ e Z) this information is not subtle enough to
construct meaningful topologies. As stated before, since this
information leads to the topology based on the set of balls, the
topology generated by this information states that every subset
of V is open. Therefore, it is trivial. On the other hand, the
topologies constructed here have not the Aausdorff property.
The extra information which is used to build these
topologies is described by a betweenness-relation based on a
distance function d. An element z is between the elements x and
y, iff d(x,z) f d(z,y) - d(x,y) and z é{x,y}. This betweenness
information is incorporated in the set on which a topology is
defined. For instance, if V is finite and x e V, then a basic
open surrounding of x is the set of x togeth2r with the
information about the elements y e V, which are as near as
possible to x(i.e. elements y, with d(x,y) - mesh(V,d)). This
information can be formalized as a set of edges in a graph. So, a
basic open set is a vertex together with several edges ending in
that vertex.
To make these rough notions clear let some formalization be
started. First the notions graph and topology are recalled. Since
these are standard mathematical attributes no special attention
is paid to them.
151
Definition 3.2.1 Topology
Let V be a set.
A topology on V is a collection i of subsets of V, such
that: -
3.2.1.1 V,cp e t,
3.2.1.2 every union of elements of z is in z,
i.e. , U{X : X e{3} e z for all p c t, and
3.2.1.3 the intersection of finitely many elements of t is in z,
i.e., n{x : x e R} E L for all p c z, with ~p~ e Z.
The pair ~V,t~ is a topological space, an element X of z is
called open and an element Y e 2V is closed, iff (V - Y) is
open.
Definition 3.2.2 Graph
A(simple) graph G is an ordered pair tV,E~, such that:
E c{{x,y} e 2V : x~ y}.
V is the set of vertices and E is the set of edges. If
{x,y} e E, then x and y are the end-points of {x,y}.
~
The following notion is used to link distance functions with
graphs.
Definition 3.2.3 Between
Let d be a distance function on V and x,y e V. Then an
element z of V is between x and y(with respect to d), iff
d(x,z) t d(z,y) - d(x,y) and z é{x,y}.
~
An element z is between x and y, iff z is not equal to x or
y and there is a shortest path from x to y via z. For such
elements z the triangle inequality (3.1.1.4) is an equality.
Example 3.2.4
Let d be the Euclidian distance on R x R.
The circle C around ~0,0~, with radius 1, equals
{~x,y~ e R x R: d(~x,y~,~0,0~) - 1}.
For all x,y e C and for all z e C, z is not between x and y.
Take I-{~x,y~ e R x R: y- 0~ 0 5 x 5 1}.
Then ~~,0~ is between ~0,0~ and ~1,0).
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This betweenness relation is a notion frequently used in
geometry. In an Euclidean space the points between two other
points determine the open line segment bounded by those two
points. Since it is such a natural relation no further
explanation is spent to it.
This betweenness relation gives rise to the neighbouring
information used in the topologies introduced hereafter. The
first step in utilizing this betweenness information is to
formalize this knowledge about the metric space in a graph. The
second step incorporates this formal information in the given
distance function of the metríc space. In other words, the
distance function is extended to the formal betweenness
information. Then, according to this extended distance function,
a topology is defined.
Definition 3.2.5 Neighbourhood graph
Let M-~V,d~ be a metric space.
The neighbourhood ra h GM of M is the graph cV,EM~, where
EM :- {{x,y} c V: x~ y and there is not an element z e V,
- such that z is between x and y}.
~
If {x,y} e EM, then there is no shortest path from x to y
via any other element z in cV,d~. So x and y are true neighbours
of each other.
Example 3.2.6
Let d be the Euclidean distance on R x R and C as in example
3.2.4. Then the neighbourhood graph GM of M- cC,d~ equals
cC,{{x,y} : x,y e C 6 x~ y}~.
The neighbourhood graph GM, of M' - cZ,d'~ equals
cZ,{{n,ntl} : n e Z}~, where d'(x,y) -(x - y~ for all
x,y e R.
Furthermore, the neighbourhood graph GM „ of M" -~R,d'~
equals cR,cp~. GM „ is totally unconnected.
~
It is obvious that for every metric space M- cV,d~ we have:
if x,y e V, x~ y and d(x,y) - mesh(V,d), then {x,y} e EM. So
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{x,y} is an edge of GM, if the distance of x and y equals the
mesh. Note that the converse does not hold. For instance, take
~1,0~ and t-1,0) in C and M- tC,d~. Then {x,y} e EM, but
diam(C,d) - d(~1,O~,t-1,0~) ~ mesh(C,d). ~
Now a distance function is defíned between the edges of a
graph, whose vertices are already endowed with a distance
function.
Definition 3.2.7 Extended distance function
Let M - CV,d~ be a metric space and let G- ~V,E~ be a
graph. The extended distance function dG of d is a function
from ( V U E) x ( V U E) defined as follows:
0 if {x,y} - {a,b}
dG({x,y},{a,b}) :
- ~[d(x,a) t d(x,b) t d(y,a) t d(y,b)]
otherwise.
For convenience an element v e V is identified with {v,v}
here.
~
Although dG is obviously a well-defined function, it is
still open whether or not dG is a distance function, and if so
whether or not it is an extension of d. In the following
proposition these questions are answered. The proof of the
following proposition follows easily from the fact that d is a
distance function, therefore it is left to the reader.
Proposition 3.2.8 dG is an extension of d
Let M- CV,d~ be a metric space, let G- CV,E~ be a graph
and let dG be the extended distance function of d. Then for
all x,y and z in V U E:
3.2.8.1 dG(x,Y) ? 0,
3.2.8.2 dG(x,y) - 0, iff x- y,
3.2.8.3 dG(x,Y) - dG(Y.x).
3.2.8.4 dG(x,y) t dG(y,z) ? dG(x,z), and
3.2.8.5 dGl - d.
V
Hence, dG is a distance function on V U E and it is an
extension of d.
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Before introducing a base for a topology some examples will
illustrate d~.
Example 3.2.9
Let x,y e C, m,n e Z and let d and d" be as in example
3.2.6.
d ({x,x},{x,y}) -~[d(x,x) t d(x,y) t d(x,x) t d(x,y)l
G~C,d~
- ~d(x,Y).
d ({x,y},{x,z}) -}[d(x,z) t d(x,y) t d(y,z)].
G~C,d~
d ({n,n},{n,ntl}) - ~.
G~Z,d'~
d ({n,n},{m,mtl}) - ;'[~n-m~ t ~n-(mtl)~ t
GtZ,d'~
~n-m~ t ~n-(mtl)~]
- ?In-m~ t }~n-m-ll-
d ({n,ntl},{n,n-1}) -~[~n-ntl~ t ~ntl-n~ t ~ntl-ntl~].
G~Z,d'~
~
Next an assumption, which is often used later on, is stated.
Assumption 3.2.10
Suppose M-~V,d~ is a metric space and mesh - mesh(V,d).
Furthermore let GM -~V,EM~ be the neighbourhood graph of M,
and let d~ be the extended distance function of d.
M
~
The following type of balls is used to define a base of the
topology, in which we are interested.
Defínition 3.2.11 Mesh-edged-balls
Assume 3.2.10.
W c V U EM is a mesh-edged-ball, iff
there is an {x,y} e W and u~ 0, such that:
3.2.10.1 W- B({x,y}, u, V U EM, d~ ), and
M
3.2.10.2 for all {a,a} e V U EM:
if u ~ ~[d(x,a) t d(a,y)],
then u~;[d(x,a) t d(a,y) t mesh].
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W c V U EM is a mesh-edged-ball, iff it is a ball with
centre {x,y} and radius u, where u has property (3.2.10.2).
If diam(V,d) ~~, then B({x,y}, u, V U EM, dG ) is a mesh-edged-
M
ball for all {x,y} e V U EM and u~ diam(V, d) t~mesh. In fact
this ball is equal to V U EM. The prefix 'mesh-edged' suggests
that the ball is bordered by mesh-edges (i.e., edges with length
equal to the meshwidth). The next proposition illustrates that
this suggestion is correct. In this proposition it ís stated that
if a vertex of GM is in a mesh-edged-ball, then all its adjacent
edges of length meshwidth are also in that ball.
Proposition 3.2.12
Assume 3.2.10.
Let W- B({x,y}, u, V U EM, dG ) be a mesh-edged-ball and
M
{a,a} e W. Then {a,b} e W for all b e V, with d(a,b) - mesh.
Proof of proposition 3.2.12
Let all the variables be as above. Suppose {a,a} e W, b e V
and d(a,b) - mesh. Then we have to prove that
dG ({a,b},{x,y}) ~ u. Now by the triangle inequality and
M
the symmetry property of distance functions it follows:
dG ({a,b},{x,y}) - z[d(a,x) t d(a,y) t d(b,y) t d(b,x)]
M
5~[2d(a,x) t 2d(a,y) t 2d(a,b)]
- }[d(a,x) t d(a,y) t mesh].
Since {a,a} e W it follows that
u ~ dG ({a,a},{x,y}) - ~[d(a,x) t d(a,y)].
M
Now by the mesh-edgedness of W, it follows that
u ~ dG ({a,b},{x,y}).
M
~
Note that if Mesh(V,d) - 0, then every ball is a
mesh-edged-ball. Let mesh(V,d) :- mesh ~ 0 and a e V.
If B({a,a}, u, V U EM, dG ):- W is a mesh-edged-ball, then
M
{a,a} e W. Since u~~[d(a,a) t d(a,a)] - 0 it then follows that
u~ Z[d(a,a) t d(a,a) t mesh] -~,mesh. On the other hand, it is
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obvious that B({a,a}, mesh, V U EM, d~ ) is a mesh-edged-ball
M
around {a,a}. This ball is called the mesh-ball around {a,a}. Let
{x,y} e EM. Then B({x,y}, Zmesh, V U EM, d~ )-{{x,y}} is also a
M
mesh-edged-ball. It is also called the mesh-ball around {x,y}.
The collection of these mesh-balls forms a subbase for the
following topology, whenever mesh ~ 0.
Definition 3.2.13 d-induced topology
Assume 3.2.10.
Then the d-inducedtopology on EM U V, td is the collection
of subsets, X, of EM U V, such that X is the union of a
collection of inesh-edged-balls.
~
Before discussing this topology, it is necessary to prove
that zd is indeed a topology.
Proposition 3.2.14
Assume 3.2.10 and furthermore, let td be the d-induced
topology on V U EM.
Then zd is a topology on V U EM.
Proof of proposition 3.2.14
Two cases are distinguished.
Case 1 mesh(V, d) - 0.
In this case every ball is mesh-edged and it is well known
that id is a topology.
Case 2 mesh(V, d) -: mesh ~ 0.
It is sufficient to prove that (3.2.1.1) up to (3.2.1.3)
hold for zd.
(3.2.1.1) cp e id by the assumption that the union over an empty
collection yields the empty set.
V U EM e zd since V U EM is equal to the union of inesh-balls
around the elements of V U EM.
(3.2.1.2) obviously holds.
(3.2.1.3) It is sufficient to prove that the intersection of two
mesh-balls is a mesh-ball or empty. This however is evident.
~
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The topology id depends on the distance function d and its
induced betweenness-relation. For instance, if V is finite, then
a metric space M- ~V,d~ will correspond with a topology tid,
which is different from the standard topology based on the set of
balls. On the other hand, if M is nowhere discrete (i.e., for all
distinct x,y e V, there is a z e V such that z is between x and
y), then zd is equal to the topology based on the set of balls.
Let these facts be illustrated by the following example.
Example 3.2.15
Let M- tV,d~ a metric space. The topology ti on VM standard
is defined as follows:
X is in ZM standard' iff X is the union of a collection of
balls.
Take M1 - ~Z, dl~, M2 - ~RxR, d2~ and M3 - ~RxR, d3~, where
dl(zl,z2) :- ~zl - z2~ for all zl, z2 e Z,
d2(tx,y~,~a,b~) :- ((x-a) t (Y-b)
for all ta,b~,~x,y~ e R x R,
d4(x,a) :- ~{x,a}~ - 1 for all x,a e R,
d5(b,y) :- b- ~~ for all b,y e R,
~b y~ t 1
d6(x,a) :- ~x - a~ for all x,a e R, and
d3(~x,y~,~a,b~) :- d4(x,a) t d5(b.Y) t d6(x,a)
for all ~a,b~,tx,y~ e R x R.
It is straightforward to prove that dl, d2, d4, d5 and d6
are distance functions. Furthermore, since d4, d5 and d6 are
distance functions it follows that d3 is also a distance
function.
Obviously, ZMlstandard - 2Z and zM2standard is the topology,
which we are all familiar with. zM2standard is based on the
daily-life geometrical experience of the plane: the points
in a circular disk are closer to the centre of that disk,
than the points outside that disk. If we think of the plane
to be arranged otherwise and base the topology on this other
arrangement, then less familiar topologies are obtained,
even in the case of standard topology approach.
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For instance, let the points of the plane R x R, be arranged
according to a lexicographical ordering, which results in
the following property: a point ~x,y~ is closer to a point
tx,z~ on the same vertical line through ~x,y~ than to any
other point not on that line.
As the reader might have guessed, d3 establishes this
arrangement. d3(~x,y~,~a,b~) ? d4(x,a) and d4(x,a) - 1, if
and only if x~ a.
On the other hand d3(~x,y~,Cx,z~) - d4(x,x)td5(y,z)td6(x,x)
- d5(Y,z)
z ~ 1.
- y - z t 1
This illustrates that d3 has the above mentioned property.
Note that B(~x,y~, 1, R x R, d3) -{~x,b~ e R x R: b e R}.
Hence, B(~x,y~, 1, R x R, d3) is open in TM3standard' but
B(~x,y~, 1, R x R, d3) is closed in rM2standard'
Obviously GM2 - GM3 -~R x R, ~~ and therefore
~d3 - TM3standard and zd2 - SM2standard'
The zd topologies do not always give rise to new topologies.
Now consider M1, then EM1 -{{n,ntl} : n e Z}. Hence,
td -{W c Z U EM1 : if {n,n} e W, then {n,ntl},{n,n-1} e W}.
1 -
Clearly tdl ~~Mlstandard' Notice that every w e zMlstandard
is closed in id .
1
~
This section is concluded by some statements about zd
topologies. These statements are discussed in the following
remarks.
Remark 3.2.16 Separability
Assume 3.2.10 and furthermore, let id be the topology on
V U EM based on d.
id is weakly separable (i.e., for every twó elements in
V U EM it holds: there is as open set in td containing
precisely one of these elements). Hence, zd is a so called
TO-topology (see e.g., Kelley [1955] and Császár [1978]).
The proof of this follows immediately from the facts that:
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(1) if inesh(V,d) - 0, then it is standard.
(2) if inesh(V,d) ~ 0, then the mesh-ball around an
edge is equal to the singleton of that edge and
the mesh-ball around a vertex does not contain any
other vertex.
In general zd is not separable (Separable means that for
every pair of distinct elements a,b in V U EM, there are
open sets A, B in td, such that a e A, b~E A, a é B and
b e B). Take for instance M1 -~Z, dl~ (as in the previous
example). Then {1,1} and {1,2} are not separable, since
every open surrounding in td of {1,1} contains {1,2}.
1
However, the following equivalence holds:
zd is separable, iff d(x,y) ~ mesh(V,d) for all x,y e V,
with x ~ y.
The proof of this assertion is as follows.
It is obvious that:
zd is separable, iff for all {x,y} e EM, there is a u e R,
with ;mesh(V,d) ~ u ~ Zd(x,y).
Hence, id is separable, iff d(x,y) ~ mesh(V,d) for all
x,y e V, with x~ y.
In general id is not strongly separable (i.e., for distinct
elements a,b in V U EM there are open sets A, B in td, such
that a e A, b e B and A f1 B- cp) .
Take M1 (see example 3.2.15). td is not even separable.
1
However the following equivalence holds:
zd is strongly separable, hence a Hausdorff-space, iff id is
separable.
The proof of this equivalence is similar to that of the
foregoing one.
td is a weakly separable space and it is a Hausdorff-space,
iff inesh(V,d) is a real infimum (i.e., it is not a minimum).
Edges of length meshwidth can not topologically be separated
in td from their endpoints. Or intuitively stated, the
information of a minimal distance can not be separated from
either of the points, which have this distance. This
inseparability induces 'strong' properties on continuous
functions.
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Remark 3.2.17 When is z~ equal to z ~-~, ~~I standard'
In this remark this question will be answered.
Assume 3.2.10.
Since EM e zd and EM ~ tM standard~if EM ~ ~p, it holds:
if zd - SM standard' then EM - cp.
Now the converse is proved (i.e., if EM - cp then
Td - SM standard)'
Two cases are distinguished.
Case 1 mesh(V,d) - 0.
Then obviously td - TM standard' by
definition of both
topologies.
Case 2 mesh(V,d) - mesh ~ 0.
It is proved that this can not be the case.
Take x,y e V, with x~ y. Then d(x,y) 5 k.mesh for some
k e Z.
Since EM - cp, there is a z between x and y.
Hence, d(x,z) t(k-1).mesh or d(y,z) t(k-1).mesh.
By induction it follows evidently that there are a,b e V,
such that 0~ d(a,b) ~ mesh.
This contradicts the definition of inesh(V,d).
Therefore, td - TM standard iff EM - cp.
In the last part of this remark it is proved that
iM standard is in the induced topoloqy of td. This is
clearly established by the following equivalence:
X e iM standard iff for all x e X there is a
mesh-edged-ball Wx c V U EM and U{Wx : x e X} fl V- X.
Proof of the equivalence:
(Only if) Suppose X e TM standard'
Then for all x e X there is a real number ux ~ 0, such that
B(x,a,V,d) c X.
mesh(V,d) iff inesh(V,d) ~ 0
Let wx :-
ux iff inesh(V,d) - 0
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Take Wx :- B({x,x}, wx, V U EM, d~ )
M
Obviously Wx is a mesh-edged-ball for every x e X.
It is sufficient to prove that (U{Wx : x e X}) fl V- X.
Since x e Wx and x e V, for all x e X it follows that
X c(U{Wx : x e X}) fl V.
Suppose y e V and y e U{Wx : x e X}.
Then y e V and for some x e X, y e Wx.
Hence, mesh(V,d) - 0 and evidently y e X, or mesh(V,d) ~ 0,
x- y, and y e X.
So U{Wx : x e X} ) ~ V c X.
Thus U{Wx : x e X} ) fl V- X.
(if) Suppose X-(U{Wx . x e X}) f1 V, where Wx ís a
mesh-edged-ball in V U EM for all x e X.
Without loss of generality suppose
Wx - B({x,x}, wx, V U EM, dG ).
M
Take WX :- B(x, wx, V, d).
Since WX - Wx fl V it is obvious that
~- U Wx : x e X} e zM standard'
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~ 3.3 Full metric spaces.
Although the subject of full metric spaces could have been
treated, along with the results and definitions about metric
spaces in ~ 3.1, it is developed here in order to acquaint the
reader more carefully with this property. A metric space is full
if for every distance t in the range of the distance function and
segment between x and y, with length greater or equal to t, there
is a z on that segment such that the distance between x and z is
equal to t.
This is more or less equivalent to a construction principle
in geometry, which makes it possible to transfer a distance of a
segment by a pair of compasses to another segment. Because of
this resemblance the terms used to introduce the fulness property
have a geometrical nature.
The content of this section is as follows: first the notion
of segment along with some of its properties is discussed. By
virtue of this notion the fulness property can be defined. After
this definition some characterizations of full metric spaces are
studied. Finally, a procedure is developed to construct a full
metric space from special metric spaces.
The discrete full metric spaces, enriched with topologies as
discussed in ~ 3.2, lead to continuity properties, which have a
simple character. This is shown in y 3.4. Since these continuity
properties play an important róle in the following chapter, they
are studied extensively in this chapter.
Let us start with the introduction of the fulness property.
As noted before the notion of segment has to be developed fírst.
Definition 3.3.1 Segment
Let M - tV,d~ be a metric space and a,b e V.
The segment [a,b]M :- {z e V: d(a,z) } d(z,b) - d(a,b))} is
the set of elements in V, which are in {a,b} or between a
and b.
Let d be the Euclidean distance on R(see 3.1.3) and
M- ~R, d~. Then [0,1]M is the closed interval [0,1] of real
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numbers between 0 and 1. Let M3 -~R x R, d3~ as defined in
example 3.2.15. Then it is straightforward to calculate
[~0,0~,~1,0~]M3 - {~O,O~,C1,0~}.
This demonstrates that although intervals are Yelated to
segments, they are not the same. Let the following proposition
bring more light on the notion of segment.
Proposition 3.3.2 Properties of sernnents.
Let M-~V,d~ be a metric space and x,y e V. Then the
following holds:
3.3.2.1 x,y e [x,y]M,
3.3.2.2 [x,YIM - [Y,x]M,
3.3.2.3 if z e[x,y]M, then [x,z]M c [x,y]M, and
3.3.2.4 if [x,y]M - [x,z]M, then z- y.
Proof of proposition 3.3.2
(3.3.2.1) and (3.3.2.2) are trivial.
(3.3.2.3) Let z e[x,y]M and t e[x,z]M.
It is sufficient to prove: d(x,y) ? d(x,t) t d(t,y).
Since z e[x,y]M it follows that:
d(x,z) t d(z,y) - d(x,y).
Since t e[x,z]M it follows that:
d(x,t) t d(t,z) - d(x,z).
Hence, d(x,t) t d(t,z) t d(z,y) - d(x,y),
so d(x,t) t d(t,y) S d(x,y).
(3.3.2.4) Let [x,Y]M - [x,zlM.
We have to prove that z- y.
Since z e[x,y]M and y e[x,z]M we have
d(x,z) t d(z,y) - d(x,y) and d(x,y) t d(y,z) - d(x,z).
Hence, 2- d(y,z) - 0, and y- z.
In general the following does not hold:
if x,y e[a,b]M, then [x,y]M c[a,b]M, and
if [a,b]M - [x,yJM, then {a,b} - {x,y}.
The reader is invited to construct counter examples.
Before stating the fulness condition a notational convention
is introduced. Let R be a relation from V to w and V' c V, then
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R(V') :- {w e w: there is a v' e V', such that ~v',w~ e R} is
the ima e of V' under R. Often this notation is used when R is a
function. For instance, if M- tV,d~ is a metric space, then
d(VxV) is the set of all achievable distances on V.
Now the notion full metric space can be defined.
Definition 3.3.3 Full metric space
Let M-~V,d~ be a metric space.
Then M is full, iff for all t e d(V,V), and all x,y e V,
with d(x,y) ? t, there is a z e[x,y]M, such that
d(x,z) - t.
~
The metric space M- ~V,d~ is full, iff for distances
t e d(VxV) and segments [x,y]M, with t 5 d(x,y), there is an
element z in [x,y]M at distance t from x. Although the reader
might curiously look for full metric spaces and spaces without
this property, he is asked to postpone this activity, since the
following theorems simplify this investigation.
Since our interest is focussed on discrete metric spaces, we
first characterize discrete full metric spaces.
Theorem 3.3.4 Character of discrete full metric spaces.
Assume 3.2.10, with mesh ~ 0.
Then (3.3.4.1), (3.3.4.2) and (3.3.4.3) are equivalent,
where
3.3.4.1 M is full,
3.3.4.2 for all x,y e V: if d(x,y) ~ mesh, then (x,y]M ~{x,y},
3.3.4.3 for all x,y e V, there is a 1 e Z, such that
d({x} x[x,y]M) -{k-mesh : k e Z k 0 S k 5 1}.
Proof of theorem 3.3.4
(3.3.4.1) -~ (3.3.4.2) This implication follows evidently by
definition 3.3.1 and 3.3.3.
(3.3.4.2) -~ (3.3.4.3) It is sufficient to prove (3.3.4.4). This
will be done by induction on 1.
3.3.4.4 For all x,y e V and all 1 e Z, with 1? 0 and




- 1- 0 This is a trivial case.
- Suppose the induction hypothesis holds for 1.
Let 1-mesh ~ d(a,b) 5(ltl)-mesh. -
It is sufficient to prove that d(a,b) -(ltl)-mesh.
There are two cases
Case 1 1 - 0.
Then by the assumption that mesh ~ 0 and the definition of
meshwidth it follows that d(a,b) - mesh.
Case 2 1 ~ 0.
By (3.3.4.2) there is a z e[a,b]M, such that z é{a,b}.
Hence, d(a,z) t d(z,b) - d(a,b), d(a,z) ~ 0 and d(z,b) ~ 0.
Since d(a,b) 5(ltl)-mesh it follows that d(a,z) 5 1-mesh or
d(z,b) S 1-mesh. Suppose without loss of generality that:
0 t d(a,z) 5 1-mesh.
By the induction hypothesis it follows that
0~ d(a,z) - kl-mesh and kl 5 1.
Hence, d(b,z) 5 1-mesh.
Again by the induction hypothesis it follows that
0~ d(z,b) - k2-mesh and k2 S 1.
Hence, 1-mesh t d(a,z) t d(z,b) -(kl t k2)-mesh
- d(a,b) 5 (1 t 1)-mesh.
Hence, d(a,b) - (1 t 1)-mesh.
(3.3.4.3) -~ (3.3.4.1) This implication is trivial.
In general we have the following characterization:
Theorem 3.3.5 Character of full metric spaces
Let M-~V,d~ be a metric space.
Then M is full, iff for all tl,t2 e d(VxV), and all x,y e V:
if ~tl - t2~ 5 d(x,Y), then ~tl - t2~ e d({x} x[x,Y]M).
Proof of theorem 3.3.5
(Only if) Suppose M is full, tl,t2 e d(VxV), x,y e V
and ~tl - t2~ 5 d(x,Y).
Then we have to prove that there is a z e(x,y]M, such that
(tl - t2~ - d(x,z).
Since M is full, it is sufficient to prove that there are
a,b e V, such that d(a,b) - ~tl - t2~.
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Without loss of generality suppose that tl ? t2.
Since t1,t2 e d(VxV) there are a1,b1,a2,b2 e V, such that
d(al,bl) - tl and d(a2,b2) - t2.
Hence, there is an element c in [al,bl]M, such that
d(c,bl) - t2.
Hence, d(al,c) - tl - t2 -(tl - t2~ and we are done.
(if) This implication is simple to prove.
From (3.3.5) as an immediate consequence we obtain:
Theorem 3.3.6
Let M - tV,d~ be a full metric space.
Then for all t1,t2 e d(VxV): ~tl - t2~ e d(VxV).
~
Theorem 3.3.4 shows that discrete full metric spaces have a
simple nature. Furthermore, by theorem 3.3.5 one can check
whether or not a metric space is full. The reader may check this
fulness property for the metric spaces introduced before. Since
the real topic in this chapter is in the field of discrete spaces
no further attention is paid to the character of full metric
spaces with meshwidth zero.
The next step in this section is to construct a full metric
space from an arbitrary one. This cannot be done in a simple way.
When the arbitrary chosen metric space does not have some metric
properties, it may be difficult to construct a full metric space
embedding the first one. The following example clarifies the
troubles indicated above.
Example 3.3.7
Let M- CZ x Z, d~ be the metric space, where d is the
Euclidean distance function.
Clearly M is not full, since 1- mesh(Z x Z, d) and
d(~0,0~,~1,1~) - J2 Q{l.k : k e{0,1,2....}}.
Let M' -~V',d'~ be a full metric space, such that
(Z x Z) c V' and d'IZ x Z- d'
Is M' desirable as an extension of M, which is full?
Suppose mesh(V',d') -: mesh ~ 0. By theorem 3.3.4 there are
kl,k2 e{0,1,2....}, such that 1- kl.mesh and ~2 - k2.mesh.
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Hence, J2 - k2~k1 e Q. But this contradicts our knowledge
about numbers. Hence, mesh(V',d') - 0.
So d'(V'xV') ~ d((ZxZ)x(ZxZ)) and in M' the ~fulness
condition is stronger than in M.
Furthermore, iM'standard - td, is a Hausdorff topology,
where id ~ tMstandard and id is not a Hausdorff space.
~
For reasons of simplicity the problem indicated above is
avoided. The construction of a full metric space is only
completed in those cases where the image of the distance function
of the full space is equal to that of the space to be filled. To
be more precise: the filling construction is only applied on a
metric space with the following property.
Definítion 3.3.8 Full image
Let M-~V,d~ be a metric space. Furthermore, let
ME :- ~d(VxV), dE~ be a metric space, where dE is the
Euclidean distance on R.
M has a full image, iff ME is full.
The following theorem characterizes full image spaces.
Theorem 3.3.9 Character of full imaQe spaces
Let M- ~V,d~ be a metric space and ME -~d(VxV),dE~ the
metric space with Euclidean distance funetion dE.
Then (3.3.9.1), (3.3.9.2) and (3.3.9.3) are equivalent,
where
3.3.9.1 M has a full image,
3.3.9.2 dE(d(VxV)xd(VxV)) - d(VxV), and
3.3.9.3 for all tl,t2 e d(VxV): ~tl - t2~ e d(VxV).
Proof of theorem 3.3.9
(3.3.9.1) - ~ (3.3.9.2) Suppose M has a full image.
Then ME is full.
Since 0 e d(VxV) it holds for every t e d(VxV), that
t- ~t - 0~ - dE(t,0) e dE(WxW), where w- d(VxV).
Hence, d(VxV) c dE(WxW).
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Suppose tl,t2 e W, such that tl ? t2.
It is to prove that dE(tl,t2) - ~tl - t2~ e W.
Now tl,t2 e d(VxV) c dE(WxW) and ~tl - t2~ 5 dE(O,tl).
Hence, by theorems 3.3.4 and the fulness of ME it follows
that ~tl - t2~ e dE({0} x[O,tl]M )'E
Evidently (by our notion about numbers) we have
~tl - t2~ e[O,tl]M c d(VxV) - W.
E
(3.3.9.2) -~ (3.3.9.3) This implication is simple to prove.
(3.3.9.3) - ~ (3.3.9.1) Suppose for all tl,t2 e d(VxV):
~tl - t2~ e d(VxV), let t3,t4 e dE(VxV) and x,y e W, such
that ~t3 - t4~ 5 dE(x,y) and x 5 y, t3 5 t4.
We have to prove that ~t3 - t4~ e dE({x}x[x,y]M ).
E
Hence it is sufficient to prove that x t ~t3 - t4~ e d(VxV).
Since t3,t4 e dE(WxW), there are t3,t3,t4 and
t4 e W- d(VxV), such that t3 - dE(t3,t3) -(t3 - t3~ and
t4 - dE(t4,t4) - ~t4 - t4~.
Hence, by our assumption t3,t4 e d(VxV) - W.
Note that x t ~t3 - t4~ - y-[(y - x) -(t3 - t4)]
- ~Y - ~~Y - x~ - ~tg - t4~~~-
But then, again using the assumption, it follows that
x t ~t3 - t4~ e d(VxV).
~
In the following example it is shown that the topological
properties of the space may change in another way, when filling
it.
Example 3.3.10
Let M - tV,d~ be a metric space, such that V- {a} U W,
where a~ W and W- {x e Q: x~ 0 6 -; 5 x 5;} and d is
defined as follows:
d(a,a) - 0
d(x,a) - d(a,x) - 1 t x~ for all x e W.
d(x,y) - ~x - y~ for all x,y e W.
Clearly d is a distance function.
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M can be pictured as follows:
.a
-} }
M is not full, since there is no point on the segment [-},~]9
at a distance } from } on the segment, where such a point ís
on segment [},~].
To fill M we have at least to plug in a point zero in w.
Consider the segment [a,x]M for x e W.
If y e[a,x]M and y~{a,x}, then d(a,y) t(y,x) - d(a,x).
Hence, 1 t y2 t ~y - x~ - 1 t x'. So ~y - x~ - x2 - y2.
But then x t y- 1 or x t y--1. This is impossible.
Hence, [a,x]M -{a,x} for all x e W.
Therefore, if we would define the distance between a and
zero, say d'(a,0), equal to 1, then by the same arguments as
above we would introduce a totally new segment between a
and 0. This of course may not happen, since this would
change the segment structure of the metric space.
On the other hand it is not difficult to prove that d'(a,0)
should be equal to 1. This will be shown now, hence we have
a contradiction.
For all n e{2,3,....} we have d'(a,0) t d(O,l~n) ? d(a,l~n)
and d'(a,0) 5 d(O,l~n) t d(a,l~n).
Hence, for all n e{2,3,....} :
d'(a,0) ? 1 t l~nz - l~n and d'(a,0) 5 1 t l~n' t l~n'
Hence, d'(a,0) - 1.
~
As indicated in the previous example we may ruin the
structure of a metric space by filling it. This can occur because
of creating intersections of disjunct segments or by introducing
new ones. To be able to be more precise about the structure of a
metric space a new notion is introduced.
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Definition 3.3.11 Simple segments
Let M- ~V,d~ be a metric space, a,b e V and [a,b]M a
segment of M.
(a,b]M is a simple segment, iff for all c e[a,b]M:
[a,blM c [a,c]M U [c,b]M.
~
A segment [a,b]M is simple, iff for all its elements it
holds that they subdivide this segment in two segments which
cover [a,b]M. These segments play an important róle when filling
a metric space. If they characterize the structure of a metric
space, then it is possible to fill this space such that the
filled space has the same structure as the original one. Before
any further insight in this approach is revealed, it is necessary
to develop more insight in the notion of simple segment. The
following theorem gives this insight.
Theorem 3.3.12 Properties of simple segments
Let M- ~V,d~ be a metric space, let a,b,c e V and let
c e [a,b]M.
3.3.12.1 [a,b]M c [a,c]M U [c,b]M, iff
[a,c]M -{x e[a,b]M : d(a,x) 5 d(a,c)} and
(c,b]M - {x e [a,b]M : d(a,x) ? d(a,c)},
3.3.12.2 [a,b]M is a simple segment, iff for all c e[a,b]M:
[a,c]M -{x e(a,b]M : d(a,x) 5 d(a,c)} and
[c,b]M - {x e [a,b]M : d(a,x) ? d(a,c)}.
3.3.12.3 If [a,b]M is a simple segment and c,e e[a,b]M , such
that d(a,c) 5 d(a,e), then
[c,e]M -{x e[a,b]M : d(a,c) 5 d(a,x) 5 d(a,d)}.
3.3.12.4 If a,b,c,e e V, [a,b]M and [c,e]M are simple segment
and x,y e[a,b]M fl [c,eJM , then segment [x,yjM is simple
and [x,y]M c [a,b]M n [c,e]M.
3.3.12.5 If [a,b]M is a simple segment, then for all c e[a,b]M:
{c} - {z e (a,b]M : d(a,z) - d(a,c)}.
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Proof of theorem 3.3.12
3.3.12.1 (only if) Suppose [a,b]M c[a,c]M U[c,b]M.
The [a,c]M U [c,b]M - [a,b]M.
Let x e [a,c]M.
Then d(a,x) t d(x,c) - d(a,c) and [a,c]M c[a,b]M.
Since d(x,c) ? 0, it follows that d(a,x) 5 d(a,c).
So [a,c]M c{x e[a,b]M: d(a,x) S d(a,c)}.
Let x e[a,b]M, with d(a,x) 5 d(a,c).
Then x e[a,c]M or x e[c,b]M.
Suppose x e [c,b]M.
Then d(x,c) t d(x,b) - d(c,b).
Since d(a,x) 5 d(a,c) we have
d(x,b) - d(a,b) - d(x,a)
? d(a,b) - d(a,c)
- d(b,c)
- d(x,b) t d(x,c).
So x - c.
Then {x e[a,b]M: d(a,x) 5 d(a,c)} c[a,c]M.
Hence, [a,c]M -{x e[a,b]M: d(a,x) 5 d(a,c)}.
Similarly it follows that
[b,c]M - {x e [a,b]M: d(a,x) ? d(a,c)}.
This completes the proof of this implication.
(if) This implication is simple to prove.
(3.3.12.2) is simple to prove.
(3.3.12.3) Let [a,b]M be a simple segment and e e[a,b]M.
First it is to prove that [a,e]M is a simple segment.
Let x e [a,e]M.
It is sufficient to prove that
[a,x]M -{z e[a,e]M : d(a,z) 5 d(a,x)} and
[e,x]M - {z e [a,e]M : d(a,z) ? d(a,x)}.
Note that x e[a,e]M c[a,b]M.
Since [a,b]M is simple, it follows that
[a,x]M - {z e [a,b]M : d(a,z) ~ d(a,x)}
-{z e[a,b]M : d(a,z) 5 d(a,x) and d(a,z) 5 d(a,e)}
-{z e[a,b]M : d(a,z) S d(a,x) and z e[a,e]M}
- {2 e [a,e]M : d(a,z) 5 d(a,x)}.
Suppose z e [x,e]M.
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we have to prove that d(a,z) ? d(a,x).
Now d(a,x) t d(x,e) - d(a,e),
d(a,z) t d(z,e) - d(a,e) and
d(x,z) t d(z,e) - d(x,e).
Hence, d(a,x) t d(x,z) t d(z,e) - d(a,z) t d(z,e).
Since d(x,z) ? 0 we obtain d(a,x) 5 d(a,z).
Hence, [x,e]M c{ z e[a,e]M: d(a,z) ? d(a,x)}.
Suppose d(a,z) ? d(a,x) and z e(a,e]M.
We have to prove that d(e,z) t d(z,x) - d(e,x).
Now z e[a,b]M , which is simple.
Therefore [a,z]M - {t e [a,b]M : d(a,z) ? d(a,t)}.
So x e(a,z]M and d(a,x) t d(x,z) - d(a,z).
Now d(a,e) 5 d(a,x) t d(x,e)
5 d(a,x) t d(x,z) t d(z,e)
- d(a,z) t d(z,e)
- d(a,e).
But then d(x,z) t d(z,e) - d(x,e) and
{z e [a,e]M: d(a,z) ? d(a,x)} c [x,e]M.
It is proved that [a,e]M is simple.
Similarly we have [a,c]M is simple.
Hence, c e[a,e]M and (c,e]M is simple.
Furthermore, it follows that
[c,e]M - {x e (a,e]M : d(a,x) ? d(a,c)}
-{x e[a,b]M : d(a,x) ? d(a,c) and d(a,x) 5 d(a,e)}
-{x e[a,b]M : d(a,c) 5 d(a,x) 5 d(a,e)}.
(3.3.12.4) is simple to prove.
(3.3.12.5) Suppose [a,b]M is simple and let c e[a,b]M.
Suppose d(a,z) - d(a,c).
Then by (3.3.12.2), we have z e[a,c]M.
Hence, d(a,z) t d(z,c) - d(a,c) - d(a,z).
So z- c and consequently {c} equals
{z e [a,b]M : d(a,z) - d(a,c)}.
~
Now we are able to develop the construction mechanism, which
fills metric spaces. First of all we will define the range of
this mechanism, that is what kind of properties the full space
should have, whenever it is constructed by the mechanism. These
properties guarantee that the metric structure of the old space
173
as well as the topological one is preserved. Such a full space
will be called a regular full extension. We will prove that there
is at most one regular full extension for each metric space.
Hence, if the mechanism is applicable, then it yields a unique
result.
Having this result we will indicate a domain for the
mechanism and describe it. Finally we will prove that the
proposed construction yields a regular full metric space for any
metríc space in the indicated domain.
Definition 3.3.13 Regular full extension
Let M- tV,d~ and M' -~V',d'~ be two metric spaces.
M' is a regular full extension of M, iff (3.3.13.1),
(3.3.13.2), (3.3.13.3) and (3.3.13.4) hold, where
3.3.13.1 there is an injective function h from V to V', such
that d(x,y) - d'(h(x),h(y)) for all x,y e V, and M' ís full,
3.3.13.2 for all x e V' there are a,b e h(V), such that
x e[a,b]M and [a,b]M is simple,
3.3.13.3 for all a,b e V: [a,b]M is simple, iff [h(a),h(b)]M,is
simple, and
3.3.13.4 for all x,y e V' and all a,b e h(V), with [a,b]M, is
simple, x e[a,b]M, and y~[a,b]M „ it holds that
h(V) ~ [a,bJM, D [x,Y]M, ~ ~.
~
(3.3.13.1) preserves the structure of M in M'. Hence, by
(3.3.13.1) we may speak of an extension of M. By (3.3.13.2) it
follows that a point x e V' - V is not added to V unnecessarily.
Hence, each point in x e V' - V is essential. By (3.3.13.3) and
(3.3.13.4) M' has the same structural properties as M, that is no
new simple segments are introduced in M'.
Theorem 3.3.14 Uniqueness of regular full extensions
Let M- ~V,d~, M' - ~V',d'~, and M" - CV",d"~ be metric
spaces.
If M' and M" are both regular full extensions of M, then
there is a bijective function g from V' to V", such that for
all x,y e V' : d'(x,y) - d"(g(x),g(y)).
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The uniqueness of a regular full extension is to be
interpreted as uniqueness modulo isomorphism: if M' and M" are
both regular full extensions of M, then M' and M" have the same
metric properties.
Proof of theorem 3.3.14
Suppose M' and M" are both regular full extension of M.
Let h' be the injection from V to V' and h" the injection
from V to V" according to (3.3.13.1) up to (3.3.13.4).
First we discuss two steps.
Step 1 Let a,b,c,e e V, x e V' and y e V", such that
x e[h'(a),h'(b)]M „ which is simple,
y e[h"(a),h"(b)]M,,, which is simple,
x e[h'(c),h'(e)]M „ which is simple, and
d'(x,h'(a)) - d"(y,h"(a)).
Then y e[h"(c),h"(e)]M„ and d"(h"(c),y) - d'(h'(c),x).
Proof of step 1
Suppose a,b,c,e,x and y satisfy the above condition.
It is proved that y e Ih"(c),h"(e)]M„ and
d"(h"(c),y) - d'(h'(c),x).
Since x e[h'(a),h'(b)]M, and y e[h"(a),h"(b)]M„
it follows that
d'(h'(a),x) t d'(h'(b),x) - d'(h'(a),h'(b)) - d(a,b)
d"(h"(a),y) t d"(h"(b),y) - d"(h"(a),h"(b)) - d(a,b)
Hence, d'(h'(b),x) - d"(h"(b),y).
Claim 1.1 There are p,q e V, such that
x e [h'(P).h~(q)lM, c [h'(a),h'(b)lM,~ [h'(c),h'(e)]M,
Proof of claim 1.1 Take p- c, if h'(c) e[h'(a),h'(b)]M,;
otherwise by (3.3.13.4) there is a p e V, such that
h'(P) e [h'(a),h'(b)]M, ~ [x,h'(c)]M~-
Hence, [x,h'(p)]M, c [h'(a),h'(b)]M, fl [x,h'(c)]M,.
Take q- e, if h'(e) e[h'(a),h'(b)]M,; otherwise by
(3.3.13.4) there is a q e V, such that
h'(4) e [h'(a),h'(b)]M, fl [x,h'(e)lM,.
Hence, [x,h'(q)]M, c [h'(a),h'(b)]M, f1 [x,h'(e)]M,.
By theorem 3.3.12 it follows that
x e [h'(P),h'(q)]M,c [h'(a),h'(b)lM, ~ [h'(c),h'(e)lM,-
This proves claim 1.1.
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Hence, such p,q e V exist.
Furthermore, by (3.3.12) [h'(p),h'(q)]M, is simple.
Now the following two assertions hold by (3.3.12):
(1) h'(p) e[h'(a),x]M, or h'(p) e[h'(b),x]M „ and
(2) h'(p) e[h'(c),x]M, or h'(p) e[h'(e),xJM,.
Without loss of generality suppose h'(p) e[h'(a),x]M, and
h'(P) e [h'(c),xlM~-
Hence, d'(h'(c),x) - d'(h'(c),h'(p)) t d'(h'(p),x) and
d'(h'(a),x) - d'(h'(a),h'(p)) t d'(h'(p),x).
Hence, d'(h'(a),h'(p)) 5 d'(h'(a),x),
d(a,p) 5 d'(h'(a),x),
d"(h"(a),h~~(P)) '- d"(h"(a).Y).
Since p e[a,b]M it follows that h"(p) e[h"(a),h"(b)]M and
by (3.3.12), it holds that h"(p) e[h"(a),y]M,,.
Hence, d"(h"(a),y) 5 d"(h"(a),h"(pl) t d"(h"(p),y),
d'(h'(a),Y) '- d(a.P) t d"(h"(P),Y).
d'(h'(a).Y) ~ d'(h'(a).h'(P)) t d"(h"(P),Y)-
Hence, d"(h"(p),y) - d'(h'(p),x).
Since d'(h'(b),x) - d"(h"(b),y) and obviously
h'(q) e[x,h'(b)]M, fl [x,h'(e)]M „ it follows similarly that
d"(h'(q),Y) - d'(h'(q),x).
Hence, y e [h"(p),h"(q)]M,,.
Since q,p e[c,e]M, which is simple by (3.3.13.3) and the
fact that (h'(c),h'(e)]M, is simple, it follows by (3.3.12)
that [p,q]M c [c,e]M.
Hence, y e [h"(P),h"(q)]M„ ~ [h"(c),h"(e)]M,,.
So y e [h"(c),h"(e)]M,,.
This proves one part of step 1.
The following holds:
d'(h'(c),h'(p)) 5 d'(h'(c),x) 5 d'(h'(c),h'(q)) Sd'(h'(c),h'(e)).
So:
d"(h"(c).h"(P)) ~ d"(h"(c).Y) 5 d"(h"(c),h~~(q)) Sd"(h"(c),h"(e)).
Since [h'(c),h'(e)]M, is simple, it follows by (3.3.13.3)
that [h"(c),h"(e)]M„ is simple.
Therefore since h'(p) e[h'(c),h'(e)]M, , by (3.3.13.1) it
follows that h"(p) e[h"(c),h"(e)]M„ and by (3.3.12)
it follows that h"(p) e[h"(c),y]M,,.
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Hence, d"(h"(c),y) - d"(h"(c),h"(p)) } d"(y,h"(p))
- d'(h'(c),h'(p)) t d'(x,h'(p))
- d'(h'(c),x).
This proves step 1.
Step 2 Let a,b,c,e e V, x e V' and y e V", such that
x e[h'(a),h'(b)]M „ which is simple,
y e[h"(a),h"(b)]M,,, which is simple,
y e[h"(c),h"(e)]M,,, which is simple, and
d'(x,h'(a)) - d"(y,h"(a)).
Then x e[h'(c),h'(e)]M, and d"(h"(c),y) - d'(h'(c),x).
Proof of Step 2 This proof is similar to the proof of step 1.
Now g will be defined.
Let x e V'. Then there are a,b e V, such that
x e[h'(a),h'(b)]M, , which is simple.
Hence, [h"(a),h"(b)]M„ is simple and since M" is full, there
is a y e(h"(a),h"(b)]M,,, with d'(h'(a),x) - d"(h"(a),y).
Take g(x) - y.
g is well defined by step 1.
g is injective by step 2.
g is surjective by the fulness of M' and M".
Hence, g is a bijection from V' to V".
Take x,y e V'.
For reasons of symmetry it is sufficient to prove that:
d'(x,Y) ? d"(g(x),9(Y)).
There are a,b,c,e e V, such that x e[h'(a),h'(b)]M, and
y e[h'(c),h'(e)]M, and both segments are simple.
Hence, g(x) e[h"(a),h"(b)]M„ , which is simple,
d'(x,h'(a)) - d"(g(x),h"(a)),
g(y) e[h"(c),h"(e)]M„ , which is simple, and
d"(Y,h,~(c)) - d'(x,h'(c)).
There are two cases:
Case 1 y e [h'(a),h'(b)]M,
Then obviously g(y) e[h"(a),h"(b)]M„ and
d'(x,Y) - ~d'(h'(a),x) - d'(h'(a),Y)~ -
- ~d"(h"(a),g(x)) - d"(h"(a),9(Y))~ -
- d,~(9(x),g(Y)).
177
Case 2 y ~ [h'(a),h'(b)]M,
Then there is a p e V by (3.3.13.4), such that
h'(P) e [h'(a),h'(b)lM~ ~ [x,YIM,-
Without loss of generality suppose h'(p) e[x,h'(b)]M,.
Now there are again two subcases:
Case 2A h'(p) e [h'(c),h'(e)]M,
Without loss of generality suppose h'(p) e[h'(c),y]M,.
Then d'(x,h'(p)) t d'(h'(p),y) - d'(x,y) and
d"(4(x),h~~(P)) t d"(h"(P).9(Y)) ? d"(g(x),g(Y))
Case 2B h'(p) é [h'(c),h'(e)]M,
Then there is a q e V, such that
h'(q) e [h'(c).h'(e)]M~ ~ [h'(P),Y]M~-
But then we have:
d'(x,Y) - d'(x,h'(P) t d'(h'(P),Y)
- d"(9(x),h~~(P)) } d'(h'(P),h'(q)) t d'(h'(q),Y)
- d~~(9(x),h~~(P)) } d"(h"(P),h~,(q)) t d"(h"(q).g(Y))
~ d~~(9(x) .g(Y) ) -
This completes the proof.
Before giving the construction mechanism we will indicate a
domain of this mechanism. Possibly it may be taken somewhat
larger but this is to the author's opinion only a marginal
extension of the domain chosen here.
Definition 3.3.15 Weakly full
Let M-~V,d~ be a metric space
M is weakly full, iff (3.3.15.1) and (3.3.15.2) hold, where
3.3.15.1 for all x,y e M and all t e d(VxV), with t 5 d(x,y),
there are p,g e[x,y]M, such that d(p,x) 5 t 5 d(q,x) and
[P,q]M - {P,q}
3.3.15.2 for all tl,t2 e d(VxV): ~tl - t2~ e d(VxV)
(M has a full image).
~
First of all let the name be explaíned. If a metric space M
is weakly full, then by (3.3.15.1) we can locate this not yet
full parts as discrete simple segments. Of course M is then
almost full hence weakly filled.
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By example (3.3.7) it is shown that (3.3.15.2) is essential
and by (3.3.10) it is shown that (3.3.15.1) is essential. The
essentiallity of (3.3.15.2) is clear by theorem 3.3.9, that of
(3.3.15.1) follows because there are not such p and q in V for
x--á, y-} and t-} in the metric space of example (3.3.10).
Finally we are able to give the construction mechanism.
Theorem 3.3.16 Constructable regular full extension
Let M- tV,d~ be a weakly full metric space.
Then there is a regular full extension M' - ~V',d'~ of M.
Proof of theorem 3.3.16
Let W-{~a,b,t~ e V x V x d(VxV) :
[a,b]M is simple and d(a,b) ? t}.
~a,b,t~ can be interpreted as the point on [a,b]M at
distance t from a. It is clear that W would fill V, but
there can be more notations for the same point, e.g.,
~a,a,0~ and ~b,a,d(a,b)~. Therefore, an equivalence relation
is defíned, such that an equivalence class coincides with
one point in V' and the different notations for that point
are in the same equivalence class.
Let ~a,b,t~ e W. By the weakly fulness of M there are
p,q e[a,b]M, such that [p,q]M - {p,q} and
d(a,p) 5 t 5 d(a,q). Since [a,b]M is simple by assumption,
from (3.3.12.5) it follows that p and q are unique.
Therefore, we can define the following function
h: W-~ V x V,
h(ta,b,t~) - ~p,q~, iff {p,q} -[p,q]M c[a,b]M and
d(a,b) 5 t 5 d(a,q).
Without loss of generality let h(~a,a,t~) -~a,a~.
If h(~a,b,t~) - ~p,q~, then (p,q]M is the smallest simple
segment on [a,b]M, which will contain that point in V' on
[a,b]M, at distance t from a. Of course this point should be
at distance t- d(a,p) from p.
This is achieved by the following equivalence relation:
Let ~a,b,t~,~c,e,u~ e W
~a,b,t~ Eq ~c,e,u~, iff there are p,q e V, such that either:
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~ h(~a,b,t~) - tp,q~, h(~c,e,u~) - ~p,q~ and
t- d(a,p) - u- d(c,p), or
~ h(~a,b,t~) - ~p,q~, h(~c,e,u)) - ~q,p~ and
t - d(a,p) - d(c,p) - u.
Evidently Eq is reflexíve and symmetric by definition.
The transitivity of Eq is straightforward to prove and
purely depends on the transitivity of -. Since it is just
cumbersome the proof is not performed.
Eq is an equivalence relation.
The equivalence class of ~a,b,t~ e W is indicated by
[~a,b,t~].
Note that [~a,b,t~] - [tp,q,t-d(a,p)~] - [~q,p,d(a,q)-t~J,
where h(~a,b,t~) - tp,q~.
Let V' - {[ta,b,t~] : ~a,b,t) e W}.
We will now define the distance function d'.
Let x-[~a,b,t~], y -[~c,e,u~] e V', such that
h(~a,b,t~) - tp,q~ and h(tc,e,u~) - ~p',q'~.
~t - u t d(c,P) - d(a,P)~ iff ~P.4~ - ~P',q'~
d'(x,y) -
~t t u- d(c,p) - d(c,p)~ iff ~p,q~ -~q',p'~
min {d(p,p') t t- d(a,p) t u- d(c,p'),
d(P,q~) t t- d(a,P) t d(c,q~) - u,
d(q,P') t d(a.q) - t t u- d(c.P'),
d(q,q') t d(a,q) - t t d(c,q') - u},
iff {p,q} ~ {p',q'}.
First we have to prove that d' is well defined.
Let x - [ta,b,t~] - [~a',b',t'~] and
y - [tc,e,u~] - [~c',e',u'~], such that
h(~a,b,t~) - ~P,q~, h(~a',b',t'~) - ~P~,q'~
h(~c,e,u~) - ~m,n~, h(~c',e',u'~) - ~m',n'~.






Hence, the definition of d' does not depend on the
representation of an equivalence class and d' is well
defined.
We continue by proving that d' is a distance function.
Clearly d'(x,x) - 0 and d'(x,y) - d'(y,x) ? 0 for all
x,y e V'.
Let x,y,z e V'. It is sufficient to prove that
~ if d(x,y) - 0, then x- y, and
~ d(x,y) t d(z,y) ? d(x,z).
Let x - [~a,b,t~], h(~a,b,t~) - ~a,b~,
y - [~c,e,u~], h(tc,e,u~) - ~c,e~,
z - [~P,q,v~l and h(~P,4,v~) - ~P,q~.
If d(x,y) - 0, then either:
~ ~a,b~ -~c,e~ and ~t - u~ - 0, or
~~a,b~ -~e,c~ and ~t t u~ - d(a,b), or
~ 0- min { d(a,c) t t t u,
d(a,e) t t- u t d(c,e),
d(b,c) t d(a,b) - t t u,
d(b,e) t d(a,b) - t t d(c,e) - u} and
{a,b} ~ {c,e}.
This evidently leads to x- y.
We will now prove the triangle inequality for x,y and z.
There are nine cases.
Case I d'(x,y) - ~t - u~ and ta,b~ -~c,e~, and
d'(y,z) - ~u - v~ and ~c,e~ - ~p,q~.
Evidently ~a,b~ - Cp,q~ and d'(x,z) - ~t - v~
Hence, d'(x,z) 5 d'(x,y) t d'(y,z).
Case II d'(x,y) - ~t - u~ and ta,b~ -~c,e~, and
d'(Y,z) - ~v t u- d(q,c)~ and ~c,e) -~q,P~.
Evidently ~a,b~ - ~q,p~ and
d'(x,z) - ~t t v- d(q,p)~
5 ~t - u~ t ~ v t u- d(q,P)~ - d'(x.Y) t d'(Y.z)-
Case III d'(x,y) - ~t t u- d(c,e)~ and ~a,b~ - ~e,c~, and
d'(y,z) - ~u - v~ and ~c,e~ - tp,q~.
Clearly ~a,b~ - ~q,p~ and
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d'(x,z) - ~t t v- d(q.P)~
- ~t t v - d(c,e)~
5 ~t t u- d(q,P)~ t ~u - v~
- d'(x,y) t d'(y,z).
Case IV d'(x,y) - ~t t u- d(a,b)~ and ca,b~ - ce,c~, and
d'(y,z) - ~u t v- d(c,e)~ and cc,e~ - cq,p~.
Clearly ca,b~ - cp,q~ and
d'(x,z) - ~t - v~
5 ~t -(d(a,b) - u)~ t ~d(a,b) - u- v~
- ~t t u- d(a,b)~ t ~v t u- d(c,e)~
- d'(x,y) t d'(y,z).
Case V d'(x,y) - ~t - u~, ca,b~ - cc,e~ and {p,q} ~{c,e}.
Hence, {p,q} ~ {a,b},
Without loss of generality suppose
d'(y,z) - d(c,p) t u t v. Then
d'(x,y) t d'(y,z) - ~t - u~ t d(c,p) t u t v
? d(a,p) t t t v
? d'(x,z).
Case VI {a,b} ~{c,e}, d'(y,z) - ~u - v~ and cc,e~ - cp,q~.
Hence, {p,q} ~ {a,b}.
Without loss of generality suppose
d'(x,y) - d(a,c) t t t u. Then
d'(x,y) t d'(y,z) - d(a,c) t t t u t ~u - v~
? d(a,p) t t t v
? d'(x,z).
Case VII {a,b} ~{c,e}, d'(y,z) - ~u t v- d(c,e)~ and
ce,c~ - cP.q~.
Hence, {a,b} ~ {p,q},
Without loss of generality suppose
d'(x,y) - d(a,c) t t t u. Then
d'(x,y) t d'(y,z) - d(a,c) t t t u t ~u t v- d(c,e)~
? d(a,c) t t t d(p,q) - v
? d(a,p) t t t d(p,q) - v
? d'(x,z).
Case VIII d'(x,z) - ~t t u- d(c,e)~, ca,b~ - ce,c~ and
{c,e} ~ {p,q}.
Hence, {a,b} ~ {p,q},
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Without loss of generality suppose
d'(y,z) - d(c,p) t u t v. Then
d'(x,y) t d'(y,z) - ~t t u- d(c,e)~ t d(c,p) t u t v
? d(c,p) t ~t - d(c,e)~ t v
- d(c,p) t d(c,e) - t t v
- d(b,p) t d(a,b) - t t v
- d(p,b) t d(a,b) - t t v
? d'(x,z).
Case IX {a,b} ~ {c,e} and {p,q} ~ {c,e}.
without loss of generality suppose
d'(x,y) - d(a,c) t t t u and d'(y,z) - d(c,p) t u t v.
Then d'(x,y) t d'(y,z) - d(a,c) t d(a,p) t t t 2u t v
? d(a,p) t t t v.
Since t t v? ~ t- v ~.
It follows that d(a,p) t t t v? d'(x,z).
Hence, d'(x,y) t d'(y,z) ? d'(x,z).
By this it is proved that M' -~V',d'~ is a metric space.
To finish this proof it is necessary and sufficient to prove
that (3.3.13.1) up to (3.3.13.4) hold for M' and M.
Proof of (3.3.13.1)
First the injective function g is constructed.
g: V-~ V' defined by
c -~ [tc,c,0~]
g is clearly a function.
g is injective. Let g(c) - g(e). Then [~c,c,0~] -[~e,e,0~].
Hence, ~c,c,0~ Eq ~e,e,0~. This leads to the existence of
p,q e V, such that either h(~c,c,0~) -~p,q~ - h(te,e,0~)
and d(c,p) - d(e,p) - 0, or h(~c,c,0~) -~p,q~ and
h(~e,e,0)) - ~q,p~ and d(c,p) - d(e,p) - 0.
From the definition of h it follows that {p,q} -{c} -{e}.
Hence, c- e, which proves the injectívity.
g preserves the distance d. Let a,b e V.
Then d'(g(a),g(b)) - d'([~a,a,0~],(tb,b,0~]~
- d(a,b).
To complete (3.3.13.1) it is to proved that M' is a full
metric space.
Let t e d'(V'xV'), x,y e V' and d'(x,y) ? t.
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It is sufficient to prove that there is a z e[x,y]M, such
that d'(x,z) - t.
Let x-[ta,b,u~], y- [~c,e,s~] and furthermore, let
h(~a,b,u~) - ~p,q~ and h(~c,e,s)) - ~p',q'~.
There are two cases:
Case 1 {p,q} - {p',q'}.
Without loss of generality suppose p- p' and q- q'.
Then x - [~p,q,u'~] and y - [~p',g',s'~] and
d(x,Y) - ~u' - s'~ ? t.
Again without loss of generality suppose u' S s'.
Then s' - u' - t e d(VxV).
Hence, by (3.3.15.2), ~~s' - u' - t~ - s'~ e d(VxV).
So u' t t e d(VxV). Take z e[~p,q,u' t t~].
Then d(y,z) - ~s' - u' - t~ - s' - u' - t and
d'(z,x) - ~u' t t- u'~ - t.
Hence, z e[x,y]M, and d'(x,z) - t.
Case 2 {p,q} ~{p',q'}. Without loss of generality suppose
d~(x.Y) - d(P,P') t u' t s'.
we have three subcases.
Case 2A t 5 u'. Take z-[tp,q,u' - t~j.
Then d'(x,z) - ~(u' - t) - u'~ - t and
d'(z,Y) 5 d(P,P~) t(u' - t) t s'.
From the triangle inequatility it follows:
z e[x,y]M, and d'(x,z) - t.
Case 2B t? d(p,p') t u'. Take z-[~p',q',t - d(p,p') - u'~].
Then d(y,z) -(s' t u' t d(p,p') - t) and
d(z,x) 5 d(p,p') t t- d(p,p') - u' t u' - t.
From the triangle inequality it follows:
z e[x,y]M, and d'(x,z) - t.
Case 2C 0 t t- u ~ d(p,pn). Hence, there are p, q e[p,p']M ,
such that [p,q]M -{p,q} and d(p,p) 5 t- u' S d(q,p).
Take z - [~p,q,t - u' - d(p,p)~].
Then d'(x,z) 5 d(p,p) t u' t t- u' - d(p,p) - t and
d'(Y,z) 5 d(P,q) t d(P,q) - t t u' t d(P.P) t s'
5 d(p,p) t u' t s' - t.
Again by the triangle inequality we have:
z e[x,y]M and d'(x,z) - t.
This completes the proof of (3.3.13.1).
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Proof of (3.3.13.2) Let x e V, x-[~a,b,t~]. Without loss of
generality suppose h(~a,b,t~) - ~a,b~.
Obviously x E [[~a,a,0~],[~b,b,0~]]M,.
Hence, by (3.3.13.3), which we are going to prove next
[ta,a,O~J,[~b,b,0~]]M, is simple and we are done.
Proof of (3.3.13.3) Let a,b e V, such that g(a) -[~a,a,0~] and
g(b) - [~b,b,0~].
It is sufficient to prove:
[a,b]M is simple, iff [g(a),g(b)]M, is simple.
By the preservation of the distance d in M' of (3.3.12.1)
the proof of "if" is obvious.
(only if) Suppose [a,b]M is simple. Let x e Lg(a),g(b)]M „ such
that x-[~p,q,t~] and without loss of generality let
h(~P,q,t~) - ~P,q~.
Zt is sufficient to prove:
{z e [g(a).g(b)lM~ - d'(9(a),z) '- d'(9(a),x)} c (g(a),x]M~
Without loss of generality suppose d'(x,g(a)) - d(p,a) t t.
There are two cases.
Case 1 d'(x,g(b)) - d(p,b) t t.
Hence, d(a,b) - d'(g(a),x) t d'(x,g(b))
- 2t t d(a,p) t d(b,p)
? 2t t d(a,p).
So p e La,b]M and t- 0.
Take without loss of generality p- q and t- 0.
Case 2 d'(x,g(b)) - d(q,b) t d(p,q) - t.
Hence, p,q e (a,b]M.
So p,q e[a,b]M, d'(g(a),x) - d(p,a) t t, and
d'(9(b),x) - d(4.b) t d(P,q) - t.
Hence, d(a,p) S d(a,q).
Let z e (g(a),g(b)]M,. . -
Then similarly there are p,q e[a,b]M.
So d'(g(a),z) - d(p,a) t t,
d'(g(b),z) - d(q,b) t d(P~q) - t,
d(a,p) 5 d(a,q) and z-[~p,q,t~].
Suppose d'(g(a),z) 5 d'(g(a),x).
It is proved that d'(x,z) t d'(z,g(a)) - d'(x,g(a)).
Note that either d(a,q) 5 d(a,p) or p- p and q- q.
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If p- p and q- q, then d'(x,z) - ~t - t~ - t- t.
So d'(z,g(a)) - t t d(a,p) and
d'(x,z) t d'(z,g(a)) - d'(x,g(a)).
If d(a,q) 5 d(a,p), then d'(x,z) 5 d(p,q,) t d(p,q) - t t t.
d'(z,g(a)) - d(p,a) t t.
Hence, d'(x,g(a)) 5 d'(x,z) t d'(z,g(a))
5 d(p,q,) t d(p,q) t d(p,a) t t
- d(a,p) t t.
This completes the proof of (3.3.13.3).
Proof of (3.3.13.4) Let a,b e V and let [g(a),g(b)]M, be simple.
Let x,y e V', such that x e[g(a),g(b)]M, and
Y é [9(a),9(b)]~,.
Then there are p,q,p,q e V, such that x-[cp,q,t~],
y-[cp,q,t~], for some t and t, h(cp,q,t~) -~p,q~, and
h(cP.q.t)) - cP.q~.
Obviously {p,q} ~ {p,q}.
Without loss of generality it holds, that
d'(x,y) - d(p,p) t t t t.
So d'(x,g(p)) 5 d(p,p) t t and
d'(Y,g(P)) 5 d(P,P) t t.
Thus d'(x,y) 5 d'(x,g(p)) t d'(y,g(p))
~ d(P,P) t t t t
- d(x,y).
Therefore g(p) e [x,y]M,.
Obviously g(p) e [a,b]M,.
This completes the proof.
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~ 3.4 Continuity and discrete metric spaces.
In this section continuous functions from a discrete metric
space to another are studied. Because of the non-standard
approach of topologies on discrete metric spaces of the foregoing
sections this study becomes non trivial. On the other hand, such
continuous functions are more or less characterized by a mesh
perturbationally robustness condition. This means that a
deviation of size meshwidth in the originals causes a deviation
in their corresponding images not greater than the meshwidth. For
a full discrete original metric space this property is equivalent
to a non-expansiveness property.
This last property which gives rise to a new and stronger
class of impossibility theorems, which will be an issue of
chapter 4. Therefore they are studied here extensively in
connection with the standard topological property of continuity,
because continuity is a more natural and better interpretable
condition than is non-expansiveness.
First some properties for a function between metric space
are defined. Then it is shown that continuity implies mesh
perturbationally robustness and conversely a mesh
perturbationally robust function guarantees the existence of a
continuous function, whenever its domain and codomain are
discrete metric spaces. After this, mesh perturbationally
robustness and continuity are compared with non-expansiveness.
Let us begin with continuity. Since it is defined in a
standard way, only the definition is recalled, without any
further comment.
Definition 3.4.1 Continuous
Let F be a function from the set V to the set W, let til be a
topology on V and i2 a topology on W.
F is a continuous function with respect to the topologies zl
iz (notation (t1,t2)-continuous), iff for all O e z2:
F-1(O) e zl.
~
The following property for functions between metric spaces
is called mesh perturbationally robustness. It is defined as
follows:
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Definition 3.4.2 Mesh PerturbationallV Robust
Let F be a function from set V1 to set V2 and let
M1 - ~Vl,dl~ and M2 - ~V2,d2~ be two metric spaces.
Furthermore, let meshl :- mesh(Vl,dl) and
mesh2 :- mesh(VZ,d2).
F is mesh perturbationallv robust, iff for all x,y e V1 : if
dl(x,y) - meshl, then d2(F(x),F(y)) 5 mesh2.
~
A function F is mesh perturbationally robust, iff a
deviation in the original space V1 of size meshl causes a
perturbation in the image space of a size less than or equal to
mesh2. Hence, a smallest possible deviation in the original space
does not cause a perturbation in the image space, which is
greater than the smallest possible deviation in the image space.
Note, if ineshl - 0, then F is mesh perturbationally robust.
If inesh2 - 0 and meshl ~ 0, then F is mesh perturbationally
robust, iff for all x,y F(x) - F(y), if x- y. Here x- y, iff
there are z0,zl,.....,zk, such that z0 - x, zk - y and
dl(zi,zi}1) 5 meshl for all 0 5 i~ k. Hence, mesh
perturbationally robustness is an interesting property only if
meshl ~ 0, mesh2 ~ 0 and meshl e dl(VxV).
Example 3.4.3
Let MI - (ZxZ,dI~ and M2 - ~ZxZ,d2~,
where for all ~a,b~,~x,y~ e Z x Z,
dl(~a,b~,tx,Y~) :- (a - x)z f(b - y)2 , and
d2(~a,b~,~x,y~) :- ~a - x~ t ~b - y~.
Let F: Z x Z-~ Z x Z
~a,b~ -9 ~a,b~.
Clearly F is mesh perturbationally robust, although
d2(F(C1,1~),F(~0,0~)) - 2 ~ J2 - dl(C1,1~,C0,0~).
Hence, although F does not expand mesh-distant points, it
may expand pairs of points with larger distances.
Example 3.4.3 leads to the following notion.
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Definition 3.4.4 non-expansiveness
Let F be a function from VI to V2 and let MI - tVI,dI~ and
MZ - ~VZ,dZ~ be two metric spaces.
F is non-expansive with respect to dI and dZ (notation
(d1,d2)-non expansive), iff for all x,y e V1:
dl(x,Y) ? dZ(F(x).F(Y)).
~
The notion of non-expansiveness is trivially explained by
the formula above. It is evident that non-expansiveness implies
mesh perturbationally robustness, whenever the meshwidth,
corresponding with the space of originals, is equal to or smaller
than the meshwidth, corresponding with the space of images. The
reverse is not true as we see in example 3.4.3.
Now we are ready for the first step in the characterization
of continuous functions.
Theorem 3.4.5
Let MI - tVl,dl~ and Mz -~V2,d2~ be metric spaces.
Furthermore, let F be a(t z)-continuous function from
dl~ d2
V1 U EM to VZ U EM , such that F(VI) c V2.
1 2 -
Then FIV is mesh perturbationally robust.
1
Proof of theorem 3.4.5
Let x,y e VI. By assumption F(x),F(y) e VZ.
Suppose dl(x,y) - meshl :- mesh(VI,dI).
It is sufficient to show that dZ(F(x),F(y)) 5 mesh2, where
mesh2 - mesh(V2,d2).
Let Ox - B(F(x), meshz, Vz U EM , d2) and
2
Oy - B(F(y), meshz, VZ U EM , d2)
2
Clearly Ox e id and O e td .
-1 Z y -12Hence, F(Ox) e td and F(O ) e td ,
1 y 1
since F is (z , t )-continuous.dl d2
But because x e F-1(Ox) and y e F-1(Oy) there are
mesh-edged-balls around x and y contained in F-1(Ox) and
F-1(Oy).
So {x,y} e F-1(Ox) rl F-1(Oy), since d(x,y) - meshl.
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Hence, F({x,y}) e Ox f1 Oy.
Then Ox fl Oy ~ cp.
Hence, either F(x) - F(y) ór d2(F(x),F(y)) - mesh2.
~
Now we will prove the following. If F is a mesh
perturbationally robust function from V1 to Vz, then we can
construct a(zd ,id )-continuous function F from V1 U EM to
1 2 1
V2 U EM , which is an extension of F.
2
Theorem 3.4.6
Let M1 -~Vl,dl~ and Mz -~VZ,d2~ be metric spaces, such
that meshl :- mesh(Vl,dl) ~ 0. Furthermore, let F be a mesh
perturbationally robust function from V1 to V2.
Then
F from V1 U EM to VZ U EM is (td , id )-continuous, where
1 2 1 2
r {F(x),F(y)} iff {F(x)(F(y)} e EM
F({x,y}) :- i 2
L z iff {F(x),F(y)} ~ EM, where z is
an arbitrary chosen fixed
element in (F(x),F(y)]M .
2
Again {x,x} is identified with x for all x e V1.
Proof of theorem 3.4.6
Let a e VZ and Oa :- B(a,meshZ,EM U VZ,d2)
2
Suppose x e V1, such that F(x) - a, and y e V1, such that
dl(x,y) - meshl. -
It is sufficient to show that F({x,y}) e Oa.
By the mesh perturbationally robustness of F we have
d2(F(y),F(x)) 5 mesh2.
Case 1 d2(F(y),F(x)) - 0. -
Then F(y) - F(x) - a e Oa and F({x,y}) - a.
Case 2 d2(F(y),F(x)) - mesh2 ~ 0.
Obviously {F(x)(F(y)} e EM fl Oa and
~ 2
F({x,y}) - {F(x)(F(y)} e Oa.
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Let us give an example how to use the foregoing theorems.
Example 3.4.7
Let d: R x R-~ R be the Euclidean distance on R qiven by:
~x,y~ -~ ~x - y~.
Let M1 - ~N,d~ and M2 - ~R,d~.
Clearly there is no non-constant mesh perturbationally
robust function from N to R. It follows then from theorem
3.4.5 that there is no non-constant ( td,id)-continuous
function F from N U E to R U E , such that F(N) c R.M1 M2 -
Let M3 - tV,d~, where V-{n - l~n : n e{1,2,3,4.....}}.
EM -{{n - l~n, n t 1- ll(ntl)} - n e{1,2,3,4.....}}.3
mesh3 :- mesh(V,d) - 1 é d(VxV).
Hence, there is no non-constant mesh perturbationally robust
function from N to V.
Hence, there is no non-constant ( td,zd)-continuous function
F from N U EM to V U EM , such that F(N) c V.
1 3 -
~
In example 3.4.3 it is shown that in general
non-expansiveness is not equivalent to mesh perturbationally
robustness even if the meshes are the same. The following theorem
deals with this comparison.
Theorem 3.4.8
Let M1 -~Vl,dl~ be a full metric space, such that
mesh(Vl,dl) ~ 0, and M2 - CV2,d2~ be a metric space, such
that mesh(V2,d1) - mesh(Vl,dl). Let F be a function from V1
to V2
Then F is mesh perturbationally robust, iff F is
(dl,d2)-non-expansive.
Proof of theorem 3.4.8
(if) This is simple to prove.
(only if) Let x,y e V1, and let meshl :- mesh(Vl,dl) ~ 0.
By theorem 3.3.4 there are z~,zl,z2,....,zk e[x,y]M ,
1
such that z~ - x, zk - y and for all i e{0,1,2,...,k-1}
dl(zi,zi~l) - meshl.
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It is sufficient to prove that d2(F(x),F(y)) S k. mesh2.
By the mesh perturbationally robustness it follows that
d2(F(zi),F(zitl)) 5 mesh2 for all i e{0,1,2,...,k-1}.
Hence, by the triangle inequality it is obvious that
k.mesh2 ? d2(F(x),F(zl))td2(F(zl),F(z2))t...fd2(F(zk-1).F(Y))
? d2(F(x),F(y)).
This completes the proof.
Using the foregoing theorem we obtain:
Corollary 3.4.9
Let M1 -~Vl,dl~ and M2 -~V2,d2~ be a metric space, such
that M1 is full, mesh(Vl,dl) ~ 0 and
mesh(V2,d2) - mesh(Vl,dl).
Then
3.4.9.1 if F is a(td ,id )-continuous function from V1 U EM
1 2 1
V2 U EM , such that F(V1) c V2, then F is (dl,d2)-non-
2
expansive from V1 to V2,
3.9.9.2 if F is a(dl,d2)-non-expansive function from V1 to V2,
then there is an (t i)-continuous function F fromdl' d2 -
V1 U EM to V2 U EM , such that F(V1) c V2, for all
1 2
{x,y} e V1 U EM .
1
Proof of corollary 3.4.9
(3.4.9.1) is an immediate consequence of theorem 3.4.5 and
theorem 3.4.8.
(3.4.9.2) By theorem 3.4.6 and theorem 3.4.8 it is sufficient to
prove that F is well defined.
Let {x,y} e EM U V1.
1
It is sufficient to prove that {F(x),F(y)} e V2 U EM .
2
This is obviously true if F(x) - F(y).
Suppose F(x) ~ F(y).
Then x~ y and {x,y} e EM .
1
Since M1 is full dl(x,y) - meshl :- mesh(Vl,dl).
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Hence, by the non-expansiveness of F, it holds that
0~ d2(F(x),F(y)) 5 dl(x,y) - meshl 5 meshz :- mesh(VZ,d2).
So dz(F(x),F(y)) - mesh2 and therefore {F(x),F(y)} e EM .
2
Corollary 3.4.9 shows that continuity on discrete domains
can have a restricted form, that is, a continuous function is
equivalent to a non-expansive one, if the meshwidth of the domain
and the range are equal. Although in general non-expansive
functions are often continuous, the reverse is seldomly true.
However, with this non-standard approach of topologies it follows
by corollary 3.4.9 that only non-expansive functions are
continuous, whenever the domain and codomain have some special
properties.
Note that F is a natural extension of F from V1 to V1 U EM .
1
The non-expansiveness property appears to be very
operational and continuity is a property, which is more or less
interpretable. The first fact will be shown later on. Let us
dwell upon the latter. Let M1 -~Vl,dl~ and MZ - ~VZ,d2~ be
metric spaces. Then EM consists of those pair {x,y}, such that
1
there is no z e V1 -{x,y}, with z e[x,y]M . So, {x,y} e EM
1 1
means that y is a neighbour of x. EM contains all this
1
information of points being each others neighbours. Now
O e zd , iff for all x e V1: if x e O, then {x,y} e O for all
1
{x,y} e EM , such that dl(x,y) - meshl :- mesh(Vl,dl). Hence,
1
O e td , iff for each point x e V1 all the information of its
1
closest neighbours is in O.
Now a function F from V1 U EM to Vz U EM , such that
1 2
F(Vl) c V2, is continuous, iff every open set O e td has an open
- Z
inverse, that is F-1(O) e id . Hence, F is continuous, iff
1
the informatíon of closest neighbours of each point
x e V1 U F-1(O) in M1 is mapped onto the information of closest
neighbours of F(x) e V2 in M2. Hence, F preserves the nearby
structure of M1 in MZ.
193
In general as is mentioned before continuity does not imply
non-expansiveness. The following example clarifies this fact.
Example 3.4.10 Continuous expansive functions
Let M1 - ~Vl,dl~ and M2 -~V2,d2~ be metric spaces, with
neighbourhood graphs (see 3.2.5) G1 -~V1,EM ~ and G2 - ~V2,EM ~.
1 2
Let G1 and G2 have the following pictures:
1
2 3
Here the numbers at the edges indicate their length.
These pictures determine M1 and M2 completely.
Take: F: V1 U EM -~ V1 U EM , such that
1 2
F(x) - a, F(y) - b, F(z) - c, F(t) - d, F(u) - e and
F({p,q}) -{F(p),F(q)} for all {p,q) e EM .
1
Obviously F is continuous, but not non-expansive.
~
Since we often use metric spaces, which are not full, we
have to do some investigations about non-expansive functions with
respect to continuity. ~3.3 is now useful.
The following theorem shows the continuity property, which
implies non-expansiveness.
Theorem 3.9.11
Let M1 - ~Vl,dl~ and M2 - CV2,d2~ be metric spaces, such
that 0 ~ meshl :- mesh(Vl,dl) - mesh2 :- mesh(V2,d2) and M1 has a
full image. Then there exists a regular full extension of M1, say
M1 - tVl,al~, such that V1 c V1. Let furthermore, F be a
(~d '~d )-continuous function from V U E- to V U E , such that-1 2 M1 2 M2
F(V1) c V2.
Then F :- F~V is ( dl,d2)-non-expansive.
1
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Proof of theorem 3.4.11
It is obvious that M1 is weakly full because of the fact
tha: meshl ~ 0 and M1 has a full image. By theorem 3.3.16
there is a regular full extension of M1, say Mi - tVl,dl~.
Without loss of generality suppose that V1 c V1.
From the construction in theorem 3.3.16 it follows
immediately that mesh(Vl,dl) - meshl.
Hence, by corollary 3.4.9 the conclusion of the theorem
follows.
~
Theorem 3.4.11 shows that continuity on regular full
extensions implies non-expansiveness, if the meshes are equal and
positive. Let us end this section by an explanation of this
implication. In general the continuity property does not take the
length of edges into account. The non-expansíveness is strongly
related to these lengths. Hence, in general continuity does not
imply non-expansiveness. In a full metric space, however, the
length of an edge is equal to the meshwidth of the space,
therefore continuity implies non-expansiveness in these spaces,
whenever the meshes are equal and positive. If we demand
continuity on a regular full extension, then we add this
information about the length of an edge in the original space to
our system. In that case continuity is able to distinguish the
length of the original edge and non-expansiveness can therefore
be deduced from the continuity property.
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~ 3.5 Background for impossibility theorems
This section is devoted to a development of mathematical
theorems by which several new impossibility theorems based on
non-expansiveness are proved in the next chapter. The tools,
which are introduced here, may be useful in other parts of
scíence, but the author has only searched for applications in the
theory of social choice. Since a considerable amount of
applications are found there, the theory of this section became
important enough to develop it seperately here.
In this section metric spaces and non-expansive functions
are studied. It appears that under these functions some
structural properties of the metric spaces become invariant. To
be more specific. Let F be a non-expansive function from metric
space M1 -~Vl,dl~ to M2 -~V2,d2~. Suppose that certain
conditions concerning F, M1 and M2 are fulfilled (which of their
technical description are not mentioned here). Then: if x e V1
lies on the neighbourhood of a special type of division of M1,
then F(x) e V2 is on the neighbourhood of a similar type of
division of M2. The usefulness of this result may be clear, when
the reader is told, that there is a correspondence between sets
of points in Vi and sets of divisions of Mi. Hence only a few
possible points can be assigned by F to a specific point x e V1.
It is this restriction of the possibilities for F(x), which
enables us to prove impossibility theorems for non-expansive
welfare functions.
First some new notions are introduced.
Defition 3.5.1
Let M- tV,d~ be a metric space, with meshwidth mesh.
Furthermore, let x e V, u e R, u? 0 and let X,Y,L and R be
subsets of V.
Then
3.5.1.1 (a) x covers X within radius u, iff X c B(x,u,V,d).
(b) CoverM(X,u) :- {x e V: x covers X within radius u}.
(c) Y covers X within radius u, iff Y c CoverM(X,u).
3.5.1.2 x is in the neighbourhood of L, iff for all t~ mesh
there is a y e L, such that y e B(x,t,V,d).
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3.5.1.3 x is in the neighbourhood of ~L,R~, iff for all t~ mesh
there are yL e L and yR e R, such that yL,yR e B(x,t,V,d).
3.5.1.4 NHM(L) :- {x e V: x is in the neighbourhood of L} is the
neighbourhood of L.
3.5.1.5 NHM(L,R) :- {x e V: x is in the neighbourhood of tL,R~}
is the neighbourhood of ~L,R~.
~
x covers X within radius u iff every point y in X can be
reached from x within distance u. CoverM(X,u) is the set of all
those points x. Y covers X within radius u, whenever for all
y e Y, y covers X within radius u.
x is in the neighbourhood of L, iff the distance between x
and L is as small as possible in M. NHM(L,u) is the set of points
which have such a small distance from L.
x is in the neighbourhood of ~L,R~, iff the distance between
x and L as well as the distance between x and R is as small as
possible in M. NHM(L,R,u) is the set of points whit these
properties.
For examples of these notions as well as other notions
introduced in this section the reader is referred to g4.4. There
also useful applications of these notions as well as the
following theorems can be found.
We have the following result.
Theorem 3.5.2
Let M- CV,d~ be a metric space, u? 0, R,L c V, and
mesh :- mesh(V,d).
Then NHM(L,R) - NHM(L) f1 NHM(R).
Proof of theorem 3.5.2
x e NHM(L,R),
iff
for all t~ mesh there are yL e L and yR e R, such that
yR' yL e B(x,t,V,d),
iff
for all t~ mesh: L fl B(x,t,V,d) ~ cp and R fl B(x,t,V,d) ~ cp,
iff
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for all t~ mesh: L ~ B(x,t,V,d) ~~ and for all t~ mesh
R ~ B(x,t,V,d) ~ ~,
iff
x e NHM(L) ~ NHM(R).
~
By theorem 3.5.2 it follows that the neighbourhood of the
neighbourhood of two regions is equal to the intersection of two
neighbourhoods of those regions.
Although there are many neighbourhoods, only a few (compared
to their total number) are used here.
Definition 3.5.3 Standard Neighbourhood
Let M- tV,d~ be a metric space, let ul and u2 be
non-negative real numbers, let X and Y be subsets of V and
let y e V.
3.5.3.1 (a) y is in the standard neighbourhood based on ~X,ul~,
iff y e NHM(CoverM(X,ul)).
(b) SNHM(X,ul) :- {x e V: x e NHM(CoverM(X,ul))},
3.5.3.2 (a) y is in the standard neighbourhood based on ~X,ul~
and CY,u2~, iff y e NHM(CoverM(X,ul),COVer(Y,u2)).
(b) SNHM(tX,u1~,~Y,u2~) :- SNHM(~X,ul~) ~ SNHM(~Y,u2~).
~
Now since the cover of a set may be important another
description of such sets is introduced.
Definition 3.5.4 Circularly enclosedness
Let M-~V,d~ be a metric space, u a non-negative real
number, and X and Y subsets of V.
X circularly encloses Y with diameter u, iff
3.5.4.1 for all x e V- X there is an y e Y, such that:
d(x,y) ? u, and
3.5.4.2 for all x e X and all y e Y d(x,y) ~ u.
~




Let M-~V,d~ be a metric space, u a non-negative real
number, and X,Y c V.
Then (I) and (IZ) are equivalent, where
(I) X - CoverM(Y,u),
(II) X circularly encloses Y with diameter u.
Proof of theorem 3.5.5
Note that X c CoverM(Y,u) is equivalent to (3.5.4.2) and
CoverM(Y,u) c X is equivalent to (3.5.4.1)
~
All the notions introduced above are used to study a special
type of non-expansive functions. Now these functions are
described.
In the rest of this section the following assumptíon is
often quoted.
Assumptions 3.5.6
3.5.6.1 Let V and W be sets, such that V c W.
3.5.6.2 For i e{0,1,2} let Mi :- ~Vi,di~ be a metric space, such
that meshi :- mesh(Vi,di) and furthermore, suppose:
V~ - V, Vl - W and V2 - V x V,
mesh~ - mesh2 5 meshl and
for all ~a,b~,~x,y~ e VxV d2(~a,b~,~x,y~) - d~(a,x)td~(y,b).
3.5.6.3 Let F be a function from VxV to W, such that:
(i) F is (d2,d1)-non-expansive and
(ii) F leaves the diagonal invariant, i.e., for all
~a,a~ e VxV : F(ta,a~) - a.
~
Functions for which assumption 3.5.6.3 holds play an
important róle in the next chapter. There it is shown, that the
non-expansiveness is a weaker condition than the independence of
irrelevant alternatives and the diagonal invariance is equivalent
to Pareto-optimality. Hence, we will often consider functions
with assumption 3.5.6.3.
Now the following holds:
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Lemma 3.5.7
Assume 3.5.6, let X c V and let u be a non-negative real
number.
Then F(CoverM (d(XxX),u) c CoverM (X,u).
2 - 1
Proof of lemma 3.5.7
Let 2 e X and tzl,z2~ e CoverM (d(XxX),u).
2
It is sufficient to prove that dl(z,F(tzl,z2~)) t u.




The following theorem shows that standard neighbourhoods are
mapped in standard neighbourhoods by F.
Theorem 3.5.8
Assume 3.5.6, let X,Y c V and let ul and u2 be non-negative
real numbers. Then
3.5.8.1 F(SNHM ( d(XxX),uI) c SNHM (X,ul),
2 1




Proof of theorem 3.5.8
(3.3.8.1) Let tx,y~ e SNHM ( d(XxX),ul) and e~ meshl ? mesh2.
2
Hence, there is a tz1,z2~ e CoverM ( d(XxX),ul) and
2
d2(tzl,z2~,tx,y~) t e.
It is sufficient to prove that dl(F(tzl,z2~),F(tx,y~)) t e
and F(tzl,z2~) e CoverM ( X,ul).
1
The first follows by the non-expansiveness of F and the
second by 3.5.7.
(3.5.8.2) Note that F(SNHM ( td(XxX),ul~,td(YxY),u2~)) -
2
F(SNHM ( d(XxX),ul) fl SNHM ( d(YxY),u2)) c
2 2 -
F(SNHM ( d(XxX),uI)) fl F(SNHM ( d(YxY),u2)) c
2 2




Theorem 3.5.8 reveals an invariance property of
non-expansive functions, which leave the diagonal invariant. This
property however is not operational because, we have no regular
way how we can deal with standard neighbourhoods. In fact these
neighbourhoods may be very difficult to describe. Fortunately we
can state sufficient conditions, such that a point cx,y~ e VxV is
in a standard neighbourhood of a region in VxV. To state these
conditions we need another notion.
Example 3.5.9 Approximation by ellipses
Let M- cV,d~ be a metric space, let u be a non-negative
real number, let x,y e V and let X c V.
X can be approximated by interiors of ellipses from x and
y and radius u, iff for all e) mesh(V,d) there are
x',y' e V, such that d(x,x') t d(y,y') c e, and for all
z e X: d(x',z) t d(z,y') c u.
~
The notion of definition 3.5.9 is still a technical one, at
least to the author. He has not (yet) been able to enrich this
notion with more interpretations than those which are pointed out
in the name of this notion. Therefore no further discussion is
spent on it.
The following theorem indicates the relation between
standard neighbourhoods and approximations by interiors of
ellipses.
Theorem 3.5.10
Assume 3.5.6, let X c V, let cx,y~ e V x V and let u be a
non-negative real number.
Then cx,y~ e SNHM (d(XxX),u), iff X can be approximated by
2
interiors of ellipses from x and y and radius u.
Proof of theorem 3.5.10
cx,y~ e SNHM (d(XxX),u),
2
iff cx,y~ e NH (Cover (d(XxX),u)),M2 M2
iff for all e~ mesh2 there is an ca,b~ e CoverM (d(XxX),u),
2
such that d2(cx,y~,ca,b~) c e,
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iff for all e~ mesh2 - mesh0 there is an ~a,b~ e V x V,
such that for all ~z,z~ e d(XxX) it holds that:
d2~a,b~,tz,z~) ~ u and d2~x,y~,ta,b~) ~ e,
iff for all e~ mesh0 there are a,b e V, such that for all
z e X it holds that:
d0(a,z) t d0(z,b) ~ u and d0(x,a) t d0(y,b) ~ e,
iff X can be approximated by interiors of ellipses from x
and y and radius u.
We now have as a final result of this chapter.
Corollary 3.5.11
Assume 3.5.6, let x, y e V, let L,R c V, let L',R' c W and
let uL, uR be non-negative real numbers.
Suppose furthermore:
3.5.11.1 L can be approximated by interiors of ellipses from x
and y and radius uL,
3.5.11.2 R can be approximated by interiors of ellipses from x
and y and radius uR,
3.5.11.3 L' circularly encloses L with diameter uL, and
3.5.11.4 R' circularly encloses R with diameter uR.
Then F(x,y) e NHM(L',R').
2
Proof of corollary 3.5.11
By theorem 3.5.10, definition 3.5.3.2 and (3.5.11.1) and
(3.5.11.2) it follows: (x,y) e SNHM (~L,uL~,~R,uR~).
2
Hence by (3.5.8) we have:




By theorem 3.5.5 and (3.5.11.3) and (3.5.11.4) it follows:
F(~x,y~) e NHM (L',R').
2
The results of this section are important for several
ímpossibility theorems discussed in the following chapter.
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Chapter 4 WELFARE FUNCTIONS
In this chapter social choice problems in a strict sense are
studied. In literature Pareto-optimality, neutrality and
independence of irrelevant alternatives are often explicitly or
implicitly imposed on welfare functions, decision rules that
model these problems. In section 4.1 it is shown that welfare
functions, satisfying these three conditions, correspond in a
specific unique way with order morphisms. To be more precise, the
domain and the range of the welfare function is extended and this
extended welfare function is an order morphism.
Moreover, it is shown in section 4.2 that choice
correpondences, satisfying specific (often explicitly or
implicitly imposed) conditions, are reconstructable by orderings.
So, we have modeled the social choice problems in terms of order
morphisms that is in terms of order preserving mappings.
Since the models in social choice theory can often be
described by order morphisms, we can study social choice problems
by order morphisms in the framework of the classification system
of orderings. In section 4.3, it is shown that the Arrow-paradox
occurs, whenever the range of an order morphism (welfare
function) satisfies some transitivity conditions. These
conditions are very weak; much more weaker than the usually
imposed ones. Therefore, this result generalizes many well-known
results. Moreover, by the classification mechanism we are no
longer obliged to describe the orderings in the range by
transitivity conditions. So we are able to describe meaningful
sets of orderings, which do not satisfy transitivity or
acyclicity conditions, conditions which are often referred to as
being the ~rationality' of society. Zn spite of this weakening of
the conditions of the range of an order morphism (welfare
function), the Arrow-paradox does not disappear. The result is
that the Arrow-paradox does not disappear by meaningfully
weakenings of the range conditions of an order morphism (welfare
function).
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In section 4.4 a weakening of the independence of irrelevant
alternatives, called continuity, is discussed. It is clear that
replacing continuity, instead of the independence conditions,
does not garantee that the welfare function is an order morphism.
So we have to leave the framework of order morphisms and the
classification system, when substituting the independence of
irrelevant alternatives by the weaker continuity condition.
Although continuity is a weaker condtion than the
independence condition, the Arrow-paradox does not disappear when
the latter is replaced by the former.
In the last section it is shown that by restricting the
domain of a welare function, it is possible that the
Arrow-paradox disappears. Such restrictions can be interpreted as
(inter)dependencies between~of the individual preferences.
204
g 4.1 welfare Functions and Order Morphism's
In this section an equivalence is proved between the notion
of an order morphism and a welfare function. That is
Pareto-optimal, neutral and independent of irrelevant
alternatives. This equivalence enables us to study impossibility
theorems in the framework of classified sets of orderings, which
is done in section 4.3. Before stating the equivalence two
problems have to be solved. The first problem is concerned with
the domain and range of a welfare function. These two are fixed
on finite sets of alternatives, whereas the domain and range of
an order morphism vary over any finite subset of the universe U.
Hence, we have to extend the notion of welfare functíon, such
that all those subsets are in its domain and its range.
The second problem is concerned with the domain of an order
morphism. This is a set of relations, whereas the domain of a
welfare function ís a set of profiles. Hence, we have to extend
the notion of a classifiable set of orderings to a set of
profiles. Along with this extension, the domain of an order
morphism becomes a set of profiles.
First we cope with the second problem. Before being able to
define a classifícation system for sets of profiles it is
inevitable to define several operations on profiles as well as on
sets of profiles.
Let ~, á and U be, as in chapter 2, the set of possible
domains, the set of possible relations and the set of elements,
which we are interested in, respectively. Furthermore, let n be a
positive integer, then
An :- {cRÁ,RÁ,RÁ,....,RÁ~ : RÁ e á for all k e{1,2,3...,n}}
is the set of possible profiles. Notice that A1 - A, when cRÁ~ is
identified with R1.
Instead of cRÁ,RÁ,RÁ,....,RÁ~ a profile in án, we also write
rA.
Next the operations permutation, conversion, restriction,
concatenation and substitution are extended componentwise to án.
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Defintion 4.1.1 Operations on profiles
Let n ? 1.
4.1.1 For all profiles ~RÁ,RÁ,RÁ,....,RÁ~ - rA in A and
permutations a is SU: arA :- CaRÁ,aRÁ,aRÁ,....,aRÁ~ is the
permutation of rA according to a.
4.1.2 For all profiles ~RÁ,RÁ,RÁ,....,RÁ~ - rA in A:
vrA :- tvRÁ,vRÁ,vRÁ,....,vRÁ~ is the converse of rA.
4.1.3 For all profiles ~RÁ,RÁ,RÁ,....,RÁ~ - rA in A and X e~,
such that X c A: r :- ~R1 ,R2 .. Rn ~ is the- A~X A~X A~X~. .. A~X
restriction of rA to X.
4.1.4 For all profiles (RÁ,RÁ,RÁ,....,RÁ~ - rA and
~RB,RB,RB,....,RB~ - rB in án, such that A D B-~:
rA ~ rB :- ~RÁ ~ RB, RÁ ~ RB,....., RÁ ~ RB~ is the
concatenation of rA with rB.
4.1.5 For all profiles tRÁ,RÁ,RÁ,....,RÁ~ - rA and
tRB,RB,RB,....,RB~ - rB in An, such that A D B-~ and for
all x e A:
Sub(rA,x,rB) :- ~Sub(RÁ,x,RB),Sub(RÁ,x,RB)...,Sub(RÁ,x,RB)~
is the substitution of rB in rA instead of x.
~
Clearly all these operations are extensions of the
operations defined in chapter 2 with the same names. Therefore no
further comment is spent on these operations.
By virtue of these operations it is possible to extend the
notion "classified as set of orderings" to "classified as set of
profiles".
Definition 4.1.2 Classification of profiles on orderings
Let V be a set of profiles, i.e. V c án for some
n e{1,2,3,4,..}, then V is classified as a set of
profiles, iff V is non-trivial, and is closed under




4.1.2.1 closed under permutation, iff arA e V, for all rA e V and
all a e SU,
4.1.2.2 closed under conversion, iff vrA e V, for all rA e V,
4.1.2.3 closed under restriction, iff rAI e V, for all rA e V
X
and all X c A, with X~~,
4.1.2.4 non-trivial, iff for all A e A there are rA' rA E án'
such that rA e V and rA é V,
4.1.2.5 closed under concatenation, iff rA ~ rB e V, for all rA
and rA in V, such that A ~ B-~, and
4.1.2.6 closed under substitution, iff Sub(rA,x,rB) e V, for all
rA and rB in V, with A ~ B-~ and rB - vrB, and all x e A.
~
The introduced notions of definition 4.1.2 are extensions of
definitions in chapter 2 with the same name. Note in particular
that V is classified as set of orderings, iff V is classified as
set of profiles on orderings, whenever V c A1.
Furthermore, if V c A is classified as set of orderings,
then Vn :- {~RÁ,RÁ,RÁ,....,RÁ):RÁ e V for all k e{1,....,n}} can
be classified as sets of profiles. Vn is called the set of
profiles on V. The proof is simple and left to the reader. Let
X e~. Then the set of profiles on V and X is
Vn(X) :- {rA e Vn : A- X}. Instead of V1(X), V(X) is often
written. In literature only sets of type Vn(X) and V(X) are used.
Now we extend the domain and the range of an order morphism.
Definition 4.1.3 Order morphism
Let V, and W be two subsets of Á, such that V c An and
W c Am (m and n are positive integers). Furthermore, suppose
that V is classified as a set of profiles.
F is an order morphism from V to W, iff F satisfies
(4.1.3.1) up to (4.1.3.6).
Here:
4.1.3.1 F(rA) e W(A), for all A e~ and rA e V,
4.1.3.2 F(arA) - aF(rA), for all a e Su and rA e V,
4.1.3.3 F(vrA) - vF(rA), for all rA e V,
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4.1.3.4 F(rA )- F(rA) , for all rA e V and all B c A, with
~B ~B -
B ~ cp,
4.1.3.5 F(rA N rB) - F(rA) ~ F(rB), for all rA,rB e V, with
A fl B- cp, and
4.1.3.6 F(Sub(rA,x,rB)) : Sub(F(rA),x,F(rB)), for all rA,rB e V,
with A fl B- cp and rB - vrB, and all x e A.
~
The following theorem holds similarly to theorem 2.2.25.
Theorem 4.1.4
Suppose V c án and W c ám (m and n are positive integers), V
is classified as a set of profiles and F is an order morphism
from V to W. Then F(V) c W is classified as a set of profiles.
~
Up to here only definitions and notions about sets of
orderings have been extended to sets of profiles. Now the same
remains to be done for welfare functions.
Let P- tA,N~ be a society ( ~A~ ? 2 and ~N~ - n? 1).
Remember that a welfare function F on P is a function from a set
of profiles on A to a set of orderings on A. If V and W are two
sets which are classified as sets of orderings, then a function F
from Vn(A) to W(A) is a welfare function on P from Vn(A) to
W(A). The next definition extends this notion.
Definition 4.1.5 Complete extension
Suppose P- ~A,N~ is a society, with (A~ ? 2 and
~N~ - n? 1, and V and w are two sets of relations, where V
is classified as set of orderings.
4.1.5.1 A complete welfare function F(on N) from Vn to W is a
function from Vn to W, such that for all X e lE : F is
~Vn(x)
a welfare function on tX,N~ from Vn(X) to w(X).
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4.1.5:2 Let F be a welfare function on P from Vn(A) to W(A).
F is a complete extension of F, iff F is a complete welfare
function on N from Vn to w and F - F.
~Vn(A)
~
After these extension definitions of welfare functions
several (social) conditions for welfare functions have to be
reformulated for complete welfare functions.
Definition 4.1.6
Let N- {1,2,3,....,n}, V c.4 be classified as a set of
ordering and F a complete welfare function on N from Vn to
Á. Then F is:
4.1.6.1 Pareto-optimal, iff áRX c áF(rX), for all rX e Vn, with
RX - RX, for all i,j e N, -
4.1.6.2 indepedent of irrelevant alternatives, iff
F(rX )- F(rX) , for all rX e Vn and all Y c X, wíthly ly
Y~c~,
4.1.6.3 neutral, iff F(arX) - oF(rX), for all rX e Vn and all
a e SU,
4.1.6.4 symmetric, iff F(vrX) - vF(rX), for all rX e Vn.
~
The following theorem proves that the properties for
complete welfare functions defined as in (4.1.6) are strong
enough to imply the equally named properties for welfare
functions.
Theorem 4.1.7
Suppose N- {1,2,...,n}, V c Á is classified as a set of
orderings, A e 1E and F is a complete welfare function from
Vn to Á. Define F from Vn(A) to ,4(A) on ~A,N) by
F :- F .
~Vn(A)
4.1.7.1 If F is Pareto-optimal, then F is Pareto-optimal.
4.1.7.2 If F is indepedent of irrelevant alternatives, then F is
indepedent of irrelevant alternatives.
4.1.7.3 If F is neutral, then F is neutral.
4.1.7.4 If F is symmetric, then F is symmetric.
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Proof of theorem 4.1.7
(4.1.7.1), (4.1.7.3) and (4.1.7.4) are trivial.
(4.1.7.2) Let rA, rA e Vn(A) and B c A, with B~ cp
and r - r -
AIB AIB. - - -It is sufficient to prove F(r ) - F(r )
- .. - - A IB - - A
~B.
Since F(rAI )- F(rA)I , F(rAI )- F(rA) and
- B B B ~B
r - r , this follows evidently.A~B A~B
~
By theorem 4.1.7 it follows that every Pareto-optimal,
independent of irrelevant alternatives, neutral or symmetric
complete welfare function is a complete extension of a welfare
function on a arbitrary chosen society ~A,N~, with A e lE, which
is Pareto-optimal, independent of irrelevant alternatives,
neutral or symmetric respectively. The properties introduced for
complete welfare functions are stronger than those for welfare
functions. In the latter no constraints are imposed on profiles
which do not belong to the domain of a welfare function but still
to its complete extension. In the following theorem we show that
independent of irrelevant alternatives and neutral welfare
functions, can be extended in an unique way to complete
independent of irrelevant alternatives and neutral welfare
functions.
Theorem 4.1.8 Unigue complete extension
Suppose P- ~A,N~ is a society, with ~A~ ? 2 and ~N~ - n, V
is classified as a set of orderings and F: Vn(A) -~ A a
neutral and independent of irrelevant alternatives welfare
function on P from Vn(A) to ,4.
Then there is a unique complete extension F of F, which is
neutral and independent of irrelevant alternatives.
Proof of theorem 4.1.8
For arbítrary rX e Vn and x,y e X define F as follows:
~x,y~ e F(rX), iff there is a permutation a e SU and a
profile rA e Vn(A), such that a(rX )- rA
~{x,y} ~{a(x),a(Y)}
and ~a(x),o(y)~ e F(rA).
By this definítion F is a complete welfare function, which
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is independent of irrelevant alternatives and neutral.
To prove that F is a complete extension of F take a,b e A
and rA e Vn(A).
Taking the identity permutation yields:
if ~a,b~ e F(rA), then ~a,b~ e F(rA).
Suppose ~a,b~ e F(rA). Then there is a a e SU and
r e V(A), such that a(r )- r andA n A~{a,b} A~{o(a),c(b)}
~a(a),a(b)~ e F(rA).
Take a' e SA, such that c' - a .
~{a,b} ~{a,b}
Then a'(r ) e V(A) and c'(r ) - r .A n A ~{a,b} A~{o(a),a(b)}
Now we have ~a'(a),a'(b)~ - ~c(a),c(b)~ e F(rA). By the
independence of irrelevant alternatives of F this yields
~a'(a),a'(b)~ e F(a'(rA)). .
By the neutrality of F we have ~a,b~ e F(rA).
Hence, ta,b~ e F(rA) iff ta,b~ e F(rA).
Hence, F is a complete extension of F.
Remains to prove the uníqueness of F.
Suppose H is a neutral and independent of irrelevant
alternatives complete exter.sion of F, rX e Vn and x,y e X.
~x,y~ e F(rx), iff there is a permutation a e SU and a
profile rA e Vn(A), such that
a(r ) - r and
I{x,y} A~{c(x),o(Y)}
Ca(x),a(y)~ - F(rA) and
Ca(x),a(Y)~ - H(rA),
iff ~x,y~ e H(rX).
~




Let F: Vn(A) -~ Á be a welfare function on society
P- ~A,N~, where ~A~ ? 2 and ~N~ ? n.
Then (4.1.9.1) up to (4.1.9.4) are equivalent.
4.1.9.1 F is symmetric and independent of irrelevant
alternatives.
4.1.9.2 F is neutral and independent of irrelevant alternatives.
4.1.9.3 There exists an unique complete extension F of F, which
is neutral anà independent of irrelevant alternatives.
4.1.9.4 There exists an unique complete extension F of F, which
is symmetric and independent of irrelevant alternatives.
Proof of theorem 4.1.9
(4.1.9.4) -~ (4.1.9.1) and (4.1.9.3) -~ (4.1.9.2) follow by
theorem 4.1.7.
(4.1.9.2) -~ (4.1.9.3) follows by theorem 4.1.8.
(4.1.9.2) E~ (4.1.9.1) and (4.1.9.4) -~ (4.1.9.3) follow
immediately from the following facts:
(i) every permutation is the composition of permutations of
the form: axy e SU, such that axy(x) - y, axy(y) - x and
axy(z) - z for z e U-{x,y}, and
(ii) axy(rX)~ - vrXl for X e~ and x,y e X.
{x,y} {x,y}
~
The following theorem is the main result of this section.
Theorem 4.1.10
4.1.10.1 Let F: Vn -j A be a complete welfare function on N,
such that ~N~ - n and V is classified as set of orderings.
Then (4.1.10.1.1) and (4.1.10.1.2) are equivalent.
4.1.10.1.1 F is Pareto-optimal, independent of irrelevant
alternatives and neutral.
4.1.10.1.2 F is an order morphism from Vn to A.
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4.1.10.2 Let F: Vn(A) -~ A be a welfare function on P-~A,N~,
such that ~A~ ? 2, ~N~ - n and V is classified as set of
orderings. Then (4.1.10.2.1) and (4.1.10.2.2) are
equivalent.
4.1.10.2.1 F is Pareto-optimal, independent of irrelevant
alternatives and neutral.
4.1.10.2.2 There is a unique complete extension F of F, which is
an order morphism from Vn to ,4.
4.1.10.3 Moreover, if ~A~ ? ktl wl,w2 e Nt (See (2.2.4.8),
(2.3.5) and (2.3.8)), such that ~wl~ S k, then (4.1.10.3.1)
and (4.1.10.3.2) are equivalent.
4.1.10.3.1 F(Vn(A)) c{RA : RA is twl,w2~-transitive}.
4.1.10.3.2 F(Vn) c{RX e á, : RA is Cwl,w2~-transitive}.
Proof of theorem 4.1.10
(4.1.10.1.2) -~ (4.1.10.1.1) Suppose F is an order morphism
form Vn to Á. We have to prove that F is Pareto-optimal,
independent of irrelevant alternatives and neutral. The fact
that F is neutral and independent of irrelevant alternatives
follows from the definition of an order morphism.
To prove that F is Pareto-optimal it suffices to prove that
~a,b~ e aF(rA), if ~a,b~ e aRÁ for all i e N, all
rA - ~RÁ,...,Rn~ e Vn and all a,b e A.
Let rA e Vn, with a,b e A and ~a,b~ e àRÁ for all i e N.
Then r M r - r .
A~{a} A~{b} - A~{a,b}
Hence, F(r ) - F(r ~ r )
A~{a,b} A~{a} A~{b}
- F(r ) ~ F(r ) .
A ({a} A ~{b}
So ~a,b~ e àF(rA).
(4.1.10.1.1) -~ (4.1.10.1.2) Suppose F is an independent of
irrelevant alternatives, neutral and Pareto-optimal complete
welfare function.
Clearly F is a complete extension of F , where ~A~ ? 2.
~Vn(A)
By (4.1.9) it suffices to prove that




Let rA,rB e Vn, such that A ~ B-~.
for suitable
It is sufficient to prove that (A x B)A U B c áF(rA M rB)'
Take a e A and b e B. Since F is Pareto-optimal we have
a(R1 ~ R'1 ) c aF(r M r') .
A~{a} B ~{b} A B ~{a,b}
So ~a,b~ e áF(rA ~ rB).
Let rX,rY e Vn and a e X, such that X ~ Y-~ and vrY - rY.
It issufficient to prove that for all x,y e X U Y-{a}
Sub(F(rX),a,F(rY)) - F(Sub(rX,a,rY)) .
~ {x,y} ~ {x,y}
We distinguish four cases.
Case 1 x,y e X-{a} Sub(F(rX),a,F(rY)) - F(rX) and
- - ~{x,y} ~{x,y}
F(Sub(rX,a,rY)) - F(SUb(rX,a,rY) ) - F(rX )
~{x.Y) ~{x,Y) ~{x,Y}
- F(rX)I . Hence, this case is done.
{x,y}
Case 2 x,y e Y. It is similar to case 1.
Case 3 x e X-{a} and y e Y Let oay e SU be with aay(a) - y,
cay(y) - a and cay(z) - z, for all z e U-{y,a}.
Then Sub(rX,a,rY) - aa (rX) .
~{x,Y} Y ~{x.Y}
Hence, F(SUb(rX,a,rY)) - F(aa rX)
~{x,Y} Y ~{x,Y)
- a (F(r )) - a (F(r )) - Sub(F(r ),a,F(r')).
ay X ~{x.Y} ay X ~{x,Y} X Y
Case 4 x e Y and y e X-{a}.It is similar to case 3.
(4.1.10.2.1) E~ (4.1.10.2.2) follows evidently.
(4.1.10.3.2) -~ (4.1.10.3.1) is trivial.
(4.1.10.3.1) -~ (4.1.10.3.2)
Suppose RX e F(Vn) is not twl,w2~-transitive. Then there is
a path of length ktl and type wl which cannot be cut short
by a path of type w3 e N} embedded in w2. Let tx0,...xk~ be
that path. Take a e SU with a({x0,...xk}) c A.
Then (aRX)I e F(Vn(A)) and ~a(x0),...a(xk)~ is a path along
A
(aRX)I of type wl which cannot be cut short by a path of
A




If we are willing to accept that an order homomorphism is a
transformation between sets of profiles or relations, (which
preserves the essential aspects of orderings,) then by theorem
4.1.10 it follows that the constraints Pareto-optimality,
neutrality and independence of irrelevant alternatives,
(constraints which stem from formalizations of "social"
conditions,) are necessary and sufficient to preserve the
orderings aspects of profiles. Moreover, by the same theorem
4.1.10 it follows that a Pareto-optimal, independent of
irrelevant alternatives and neutral welfare function corresponds
with an order morphism in an unique way.
This last fact applies that the study of welfare functions
can for a great deal be done in the "framework" of order
morphism, since the three conditions are frequently
imposed (sometimes implicit) on welfare functions. This study
will be done in section 4.3. Furthermore, it is mentioned that,
although these three conditions are very strong and therefore
often critized, they imply at least theoretically desirable
properties as is shown in theorem 4.1.10 and corollary 4.1.11.
Corollary 4.1.11
Let F : Vn(A) -~ A, be a welfare function on P-~A,N~, such
that ~A~ ? 2 and ~N~ - n. Furthermore, let F be
Pareto-optimal, independent of irrelevant alternatives and
neutral.
Then there is an unique complete extension F of F, such that
F is an order morphism, F(Vn) can be classified as a set of
orderings and F(Vn(A)) - F(Vn)(A).
Proof of corollary 4.1.11
follows from the foregoing theorems.
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~ 4.2 Revealed Rationality and Choice Correspondences
In Social Choice Theory, decision rules are studied by both
welfare functions and choice correspondences. In relation to
choice correspondences one sometimes treated welfare functions as
the underlying "rational behaviour" of the society by which its
choice is determined. To be more precize: One often supposes that
collective choices of a group (the outcomes of a choice
correspondence at a specific profile) are based on collective
orderings (the outcomes of a welfare function).
Moreover, one often supposes that these choices correspond
with the best elements according to a collective ordering. (See
e.g. Gibbard [1973], Satterthwaite [1975], Kelly [1978], Arrow
[1978], Kalai 6 Muller [1977], Richter [1966], Plott [1976] and
Ritz [1985]).
This idea of "rational behaviour" will be generalized to the
notion of reconstructability by orderings. This is done by means
of a recently developed notion of "rationality" in Revealed
Preference theory (See Ruys k Storcken [1988]). It appears, that
a choice correspondence can be reconstructed by orderings, iff it
is unanimity respecting, neutral, independent of irrelevant
alternatives and uniform extendable from the binary choices.
These properties are often implicitly or explicitly imposed on
the choice correspondences. These results make it possible to
study choice correspondences by studying order morphisms.
Let us develop these results in a formal way. In the first
chapter the notion of a choice correspondence C on a society
P- tA,N~ has been defined as a function from a set of profiles
on A to the powerset of A, with the constraint that the empty set
is not in the range of C. Let V be a set of relations which is
classified as set of orderings. In the terminology of chapter 2
and section 4.1, C becomes a function from Vn(A) to 2A, such that
for all rA e Vn(A), C(rA) ~~, and ~N~ - n. Although a choice
correspondence carries a lot of essential information, this model
will be extended here to a richer one, in order to make the
reconstructability property more approriate to collective
decision rules. This extended form has been introduced earlier in
literature (See e.g. Kelly [1978] and Fishburn [1973]).
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Definition 4.2.1 Collective choice rule
Suppose P- ~A,N~ ís a society, with ~N~ - n, and V is a set
of relations, such that V is classified as a set of
orderings. A function K from (2A -{~}) x Vn(A) to 2A, such
that ~~ K(X,rA) c X, for all X e 2A -{~} and all
r e V(A), is a collective choice rule on P from
(2A - {~}) x Vn(A) to 2A - {~}.
~
In chapter 1 we have introduced some conditions for choice
correspondences. Now we add some new conditions and several
conditions for collective choice rules.
Definition 4.2.2
Let P- tA,N~ be a society, such that ~A~ - p and ~N~ - n.
Furthermore, let V be a classified set of orderings, C a
choice correspondence from Vn(A) to 2A on P and K a
collective choice rule on P from (2A -{~}) x Vn(A) to 2A.
4.2.2.1 K is neutral, iff aK(X,rA) - K(a(X),arA), for all c e SA
and all (X,rA) e(2A -{~}) x Vn(A).
4.2.2.2 C is independent of irrelavant alternatives, iff
for all rB m rD, rB r rD in Vn(A) : C(rB ~ rD) - C(rB ~ rD).
4.2.2.3 K is inde~endent of irrelevant alternatives, iff
for all rA, rA e Vn(A) and ~~ X c A:
if rA - rA~ , then K(X,rA) - K(X,rA).
~X 'X
4.2.2.4 K is unanimity respecting, iff K(X, rB m rD) c B,
for all rB ~ rD e Vn(A) and all ~~ X c A, with B c X.
~
Let us comment on definition 4.2.2. Neutrality is a standard
defínition. The independence of irrelevant alternatives condition
is well-known for welfare functions and collective choice rules
(See Kelly (1973]). As defined here it is new for choice
correspondences. This condition as defined in (4.2.2.2) resembles
the equally named condition for welfare functions at the
interpretative level, that is the collective choice only depends
on elements among which society has to determine its choice. This
explaines its name. The respect of unanimity can be interpreted
as follows: if the individuals strictly prefer all elements in B
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above all elements in D, that is the profile is of the form rB n
rD, then the collective choice of society is in B. Clearly, in
that case all individuals order unanimously all elements in B
above all elements in D and the collective decision respects this
unanimity. This explaines the name.
Next we prove that every neutral, independent of irrelevant
alternatives and unanimity respecting choice correspondence can
be extended to a collective choice rule.
Theorem 4.2.3 Extension of choice correspondences
Let P- CA,N~ be a society, with ~N~ - n, V c Á being
classified as a set of orderings and C a neutral independent
of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto-optimal choice
correspondence from Vn(A) to 2A on P. Then there exists an
unique collective choice rule K from (2A -{cp}) x Vn(A) to
2A on P, such that:
4.2.3.1 K is neutral, independent of irrelevant alternatives and
unanimity respecting,
4.2.3.2 for all rA e Vn(A) : K(A,rA) - C(rA), and
4.2.3.3 for all X,Y e 2A -{cp}, with X c Y, and all
rA e Vn(A) : K(X, rA M rA )- K(Y, rA , rA ).
~X ~A-X ~X ~A-X
Proof of theorem 4.2.3
Suppose P, V and C as above.
Define K(X,rA) :- C(rA . rA ).
IX ~A-X
Clearly K is a collective choice rule from
(2A -{cp}) x Vn(A) to 2A on I', which satisfies (4.2.3.2).
Since aC(r H r )- C(a(r N r ))
A~X A~A-X A~X A~A-X
- C(ar M or ) for all
A~a(X) Ala(A-X)
permutations a e SA it follows that K is neutral. The
independence of irrelevant alternatives of K follows from
the independence of irrelevant alternatives of C.
Suppose cp ~ B c X c A and rB ~ rD e Vn(A).
K(X,rB x rD) - C((rB ~ rD) ~(rB ~ rD) )
~X ~A-X
- C( rB ~ rD x rD ) c B.
~X ~D-X
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Hence, (4.2.3.1) holds for K.
(4.2.3.3) suppose ~~ X c Y c A and rA e Vn(A).




rA~A-X)~Y~ (rA~X „ rA~A-X)~A-Y).
Since C is independent of irrelevant alternatives this is
obvious.
Remains to prove the uniqueness of K.
Suppose K' is a collective choice rule on r from
(2A -{~}) x Vn(A) to 2A which satisfies (4.2.3.1),
(4.2.3.2) and (4.2.3.3).
Let X c 2A -{~} and rA e Vn(A). It is sufficient to prove
that K'(X,rA) - K(X,rA).
K'(X,rA) - K'(X,rA M rA )(by the independence)
~X IA-X
- K'(A,r ~ r ) (by (4.2.3.3))
A~X A~A-X
- C(r ~ r ) (by (4.2.3.2))
A~X A~A-X
- K(X,rA) (by definition of K).
Theorem 4.2.3 states that a Pareto-optimal, neutral and
independence of irrelevant alternatives choice correspondence
determines a unique type of collective choice rules. By this
property of choice correspondences it is sufficient to study only
collective choice rules.
This study is continued by a formulation of the notion of
reconstructability by orderings borrowed from the theory of
Revealed Preference. This theory is usually concerned with the
revelation of a preference relation of a decision maker. In our
approach this decision maker is the society. The revealed
preference is just as in Revealed Preference Theory, a model
variable. By this variable and some others the choice behaviour
of the decision maker, the society, can be reconstructed within
the model. That is, all the independent variables of the model
can have a value which lead to an unique value of all model
variables (and so for the model) such that the choice behaviour
coincides with this value of the model. The knowledge of this
preference relation is not sufficient for reconstructing choice
behaviour of that decision maker. One also has to know the
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procedure used by the society to arrive at a decision, such as
choosing a best ordered element, a maximal element, a conflict
minimizing element, or any other decision criterion. This
procedure should be revealed from the choice behaviour, together
with the preference relation (For more information see Ruys ~
Storcken [1988]). So such a procedure is a variable of the model.
These ideas are formulated as follows.
Definition 4.2.4 Decision procedure
Let W c Á be a classified set of orderings. A decision
procedure H on W is a function from
a(W) :- {~X,Ry~ : X c Y, X~ cp and RY e W} to lE, such that
4.2.4.1 H(X,RY) c X, for all ~X,RY~ e a(W),
4.2.4.2 aH(X,RY) - H(a(X),aRY), for all tX,RY~ e a(W) and all
a e SU (neutrality),
4.2.4.3 H(X,RY) - H(X,RY) , for all ~X,RY~, ~X,RY~ e a(W), with
- R' (independence of irrelevant alternatives),
~X Y~X
4.2.4.4 H(X,RB ~ RD) c X, for all tX,RB ~ RD~ e a(W), with
B c X (preference consistent).
~
A decision procedure is an extended neutral, independent of
irrelevant alternatives and unanimity respecting collective
choice rule for a society with one single individual.
Now the notion of reconstructability by orderings is
defined.
Definition 4.2.5 Reconstructability by orderin4s
Suppose I' -~A,N~ is a society, with ~N~ - n, V c,4 is a
classified set of orderíngs and K is a collective choice
rule on P from (2A -{~p}) x Vn(A) to 2A.
K is reconstructable by orderincxs, iff there exist an order
morphism F from Vn to ,4 and a decision procedure H from
a(4'(F(Vn(A)))) to lE, such that for all
~X,rA~ e(2A -{~p}) x Vn(A) : K(X,rA) - H(X,F(rA)).
In that case we say K is reconstructed by F and H.
(~(W) is the smallest possible set containing W, which can
be classified as a set of orderings (See also (2.4.4))).
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A collective choice rule is reconstructed by orderings, iff
at every profile rA and agenda X c A, it is possible to describe
the choice of K by the choice of a decision procedure H at that
agenda X and by F(rA), the outcome of order morphism F under rA.
The following theorem characterizes by orderings reconstructable
collective choice correpondences. The results of ~4.1 the
correpondence between those correspondences and special welfare
functions become apparent.
In Kalai ~ Muller [1977], and Ritz [1985] also
correspondences between collective choice rules and welfare
functions are proved. However, because of the differences between
(social) conditions imposed on those functions, these results and
those of the next theorem are not easily comparable.
Theorem 4.2.6
Suppose P-~A,N~ is a society, with ~N~ - n and
~A~ - p? 2, V c A is a classified set of orderings and K is
a collective choice rule from (2A -{~}) x Vn(A) to
2A -{~}, Then (4.2.6.1) and (4.2.6.2) are equivalent.
4.2.6.1 K is reconstructed by orderings.
4.2.6.2 K is neutral, independent of irrelevant alternatives,
unanimity respecting and uniform extended from the binary
choices, i.e., for all X c A, with ~X~ ? 3, and all
rA,rÁ e Vn(A): if for all Y c X, with Y ~ ~,
K(Y,rA) - K(Y,rÁ), then K(X,rA) - K(X,rÁ).
4.2.6.3 Furthermore, if K is reconstructed by orderinqs, then
there are unique F and H, such that F(Vn) is a set of
complete relations and K is reconstructed by F and H.
Proof of theorem 4.2.6
(4.2.6.1) -j (4.2.6.2). Suppose (4.2.6.1). Then by definition
there is a decision procedure H from a(~(F(Vn(A)))) to ~ and
an order morphism F from Vn to A, such that
K(X,rA) - H(X,F(rÁ)) for all X c A, with X~ ~, and all
rA e Vn(A).
(neutrality) Take a e SA, ~~ X c A and rA e Vn(A).
aK(X,rA) - aH(X,F(rA))
- H(a(X),aF(rA))
- H(a(X),F(arÁ)) - K(a(X),arA).
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(independence of irrelevant alternatives) Take rA,rÁ e Vn(A),
~p ~ X c A, with r - r'AIX AIX.
Then F(rA)I - F(rÁ)I and H(X,F(rA)) - H(X,F(rÁ))
X X
K(X,rA) - H(X,F(rA))
- H(X,F(rÁ)) - K(X,rÁ).
(unanimity respect) Take rB M rD e Vn(A) and B c X c A,
K(X, rB ~ rD) - H(X,F(rB b rD))
- H(X,F(rB) . F(rD))
c B.
(uniform extension) Take X c A, ~X~ ? 3 and rA,rÁ e Vn(A), such
that for all Y c X: K(Y,rA) - K(Y,rÁ).
Then for all x,y e X: K({x,y},rA) - K(x,y},rÁ).
Now by the neutrality, the preference consistent and the
independence of irrelevant alternatives of H it follows:
(i) not x~ y F(rA) iff x e K({x,y},rA),
(ii) not x~ y F(rÁ) iff x e K({x,y},rÁ), and
(iii) F(rA) is either complete or antisymmetric.
Hence, F(r ) - F(r') and thereforeA ~X A (X
K(X,rA) - H(X,F(rA))
- H(X,F(rÁ)) - K(X,rÁ).
(4.2.6.2) -~ (4.2.6.1) Suppose (4.2.6.2).
First we define a welfare function F from Vn(A) to A for all
x,y e A and rA e Vn(A) as follows:
x? y: F(rA) iff x e K({x,y},rA).
Evidently F is a welfare function.
By the independence of írrelevant alternatives, the
neutrality and the unanimity respect of K it follows
straightforward that F is independent of irrelevant
alternatives, neutral and Pareto-optimal.
Hence, there is an unique complete extension F of F from Vn
to F(Vn), which is an order morphism by (4.1.10).
Note that the correspondence of F and K is unique. (4.2.6.4)
BY (2.4.3) and (2.4.4) ~(F(Vn(A))) - E4E6E3ElE2(F(Vn(A))).
From the proof of (4.1.9) ít follows that F is symmetric.
So, since {vrA : rA e Vn(A)} - Vn(A), it follows that
E2(F(Vn(A))) - F(Vn(A)) and consequently we have
4'(F(Vn(A))) - E4E6E3E1(F(Vn(A))).
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Notice that F(Vn(A)) is a set of strongly complete
relations. Therefore ~(F(Vn(A))) is a set of strongly
complete relations.
For all x,y e X and RX e á define the equivalence relation
E(RX) as follows: x- y: E(RX), iff
x? z: RX, iff y? z: RX for all z e X.
Now for an arbitrary ~Y,RX~ e a(~(F(Vn(A)))) define
H(~Y,RX~) :- U{Bi : di e a(K(a-1(D),rA))}, where
(i) RX - RZ „ RX and RZ is irreducible,
~Y ~Y - Z
(ii) B1,B2,....Bt are the equivalence classes of E(RZ)
D-{dl,d2,...dt} and di e Bi for all i e{l,..t}, and
(iii) RZ - a(F(rA) -1 ) for a rA e Vn(A) and a a e SU.
~D ~c (D)
Note that RZ, E(RZ), a and rA exist.
Moreover, RZ and E(RZ) are unique.
(well-definedness of H(~Y,RX~)) Suppose D' -{di,d2,...dt} and
d: e B. for all i e{l,..t}, R - o(F(r') ) wherei i Z~D, A ~o,-1(D)
rÁ e Vn(A) and a a' e SU.
It is sufficient to prove that
a'(K(a'-1lD').rÁ)) - o(K(o-1(D),rÁ)).
Let z e SU be such that t(di) - di and z(di) - di for all
i e{1,...,t} and z(x) - x for all x e U-(D U D').
Now z(RZID )- RZID and z(RZID) - RZID .
Hence, a(F(r ) ) - R - ia'(F(r') ).
A ~a-1(D) Z~D A ~o,-1(D')
So F(r ) - a-lza'(F(r') ).
A ~a-1(D) A ~o,-lt-1(D)
Now a-lza'(A) - A so
F(rA) -1 -
F(Q-1TO,(rÁ)) -1 .
~a (D) ~a (D)
Hence, for all x,y e a-1(D):
K({x,Y},rA) - K({x,y},a-1~o~rÁ)).
By the uniform extension of the binary choices property of K
and a simple induction reasoning it follows:




(neutrality, independentness and preference consistency) follow
straightforwardly.
Note that the correspondence of H and F and K is unique.
(4.2.6.5)
(4.2.6.3) Follows immediately from the equivalence and (4.2.6.3)
and (4.2.6.5).
~
It may be clear to the reader that the definition of F(rA)
in theorem 4.2.6 is standard in social choice theory. Often it is
referred to as base relation (See Kelly [1978]).
Characterizations of, by orderings reconstructable,
collective choice rules are found in literature only for the case
where the decision procedure, H, chooses the best elements of
F(rA), i.e., best(F(rA)I )- H(X,F(rA)), (See Kelly [1978],
X
Bordes [1979], Blair ~ Bordes k Kelly k Suzumura [1976] and
Satterthwaite [1975]). Since in our approach H is not specified
in such a specific way theorem 4.2.6 is a small extension to the
results in literature.
This section concludes by showing that reconstructability by
orderings, independence of irrelevant alternatives, neutrality,
unanimity respect and uniform extendability from the binary
choices are implied by well-known social constraints for
collective choice rules and choice correspondences. Furthermore,
it is shown that impossibility results for welfare functions can
be translated to impossibility results for choice
correspondences.
In chapter 1 the strong positive association has been
introduced for choice correspondences. This condition is
frequently imposed on correspondences (See e.g. Muller ~
Satterthwaite [1977], Moulin [1983] and Peleg [1984]) along with
another condition for choice correspondences, namely,
single-valuedness, i.e., the outcomes of a choice correspondence
are singletons. The former is implied by the well-known
non-manipulability condition. (For this result see e.g. Muller k
Satterthwaite [1977]). Now the two conditions non-manipulability
and single-valuedness appear in many impossibilíty theorems
starting with Gibbard (1973] and Satterthwaite [1975]. Both have
proven firstly, independently from each other, an impossibility
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theorem in the sense of Arrow for choice correspondences.
Now we will prove that a single-valued, Pareto-optimal and
strongly positively associated choice correspondence C has a
by orderings reconstructable extension K, i.e., a collective
choice rule as defined in (4.2.3).
Theorem 4.2.7
Suppose P- ~A,N~, with ~N~ - n and ~A~ - p? 3, is a
society, C is a Pareto-optimal, single-valued and strongly
positively associated choice correspondence from Ln(A) to
(2A - {W}).
Then K:(2A -{~}) x Ln(A) -~ 2A, defined by
K(X,r ):- C(r r r ) for all X e 2A -{~} and allA A~X A~A-X
rA e Ln(A), can be reconstructed by orderings.
Proof of theorem 4.2.7
For all x,y e A and rA e Vn(A) define
rÁy :- rA M rA
~{x,y} ~A-{x,Y}~
By theorem 4.2.3 and 4.2.6 it is sufficient to prove that C
is independent of irrelevant alternatives, neutral and K is
uniform extended from the binaire choices.
First we prove an assertion:
Assertion 4.2.7.1 For all rp e Vr(A) :
{x} - C(rA) iff for all y e A:{x} - C(rÁs).
Proof of assertion 4.2.7.1
(only if) follows immediately from the strong positive
association.
(if) Suppose {x} - C(rÁY) for all y e A. Then from the (only if)
C(rA) ~{z} for every z e A-{x}. So C(rA) -{x}.
From this assertíon and the Pareto-optimality of C it
follows straightforwardly that C is independent of
irrelevant alternatives.
Next we prove that K is uniformly extended from the binary
choices.
Suppose K({x,y},rA) - K({x,y},rÁ) for all x,y e D c A.
It suffices to prove that
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C(rAID
~ rA~A-D) - C(rA~D M rA~A-D).
From the assumption it follows: C(rÁy) - C(rÁxy) for all
x,y e D.
Hence, from the independence of irrelevant alternatives of C
it follows C((r H r )xy) - C((r' M r' )xy) for
A~D `~~A-D A~D A~A-D
all x,y e D.
By the Pareto-optimality of C and assertion 4.2.7.1 it
follows C(rA~D
~ rA~A-D) - C(rA~D N rA~A-D).
So K is uniform extended from the binary choices.
To prove that C is neutral it is sufficient to prove that if
S c N decides x against y, then S decides x against z and S
decides z against y for all z e A-{x,y}.
Here S decides x against y, iff
S-{i e N: x~ y: RÁ} and {x} - C(rÁy).
Suppose S decides x against y and let z e A-{x,y}.
Take rA : x~ y~ z~ t: RÁ, for all i e S and all
t e A - {x,y,z}, and
y~ z~ x~ t: RÁ, for all i e N-S and all
t e A - {x,y,z}.
C(rA)~{y}, since C is strongly positively associated and
C(rÁ ) - {x}.
C(rA) ~{t}, for all t e A-{x,y}, since C is
Pareto-optimal.
Hence, {x} - C(rA) and by the strong positive association of
C we have C(rÁy) - {x}.
Hence, S decides x against z.
Similarly it follows that S decides z against y.
It is clear that the last part of the proof of (4.2.7) is
inspired by Arrow's proof of his impossibility theorem (See Arrow
[1978]). Now we prove that C is dictatorial, a result first
proved by Muller k Satterhwaite [1977].
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Theorem 4.2.8
Suppose P- tA,N~, with ~N~ - n and (A~ - p? 3, is a
society and C is a Pareto-optimal, single-valued and
strongly positively associated choice correspondence from
Ln(A) to (2A - {~}).
Then C is dictatorial, i.e., there is an individual i e N
with C(rA) - best(RÁ) :- {x e A: x? y: RÁ for all y e A}.
Proof of theorem 4.2.8
Let K:(2A -{~}) x Ln(A) -~ (2A -{~}) be defined by
K(X,rA) :- C(rA ~ rA ) for all X e 2A -{~} and
~X ~A-X
rA e Ln(A). By theorem 4.2.6 and 4.2.7 K is reconstructed by
say F and H, where F is the complete extension of F.
Note that x~ y: F(rA) iff {x} - C(rÁy). (4.2.8.1)
So F(Ln(A)) c T(A).
We prove that F(rA) e L(A), Let x~ y. F(rA) and
y ~ z : F(rA).
It suffices to prove x ~ z: F(rA).
Suppose z ~ x : F(rA).
Take rÁ :- rAI ~ rAI .
{x,y,z} A-{x,y,z}
Now by the positive association of C it follows that
C(rÁ) ~{x,y,z} -~. So C is not Pareto-optimal.
This car.not be the case, therefore x~ z: F(rA).
Hence, by (4.1.10.3) F(Ln(U)) - L(U).
Now we use some knowledge developed in ~4.3. So F is
dictatorial and consequently F is dictatorial. It follows
that there is an i e N such that RÁ - F(rA) for all rA e
Ln(U). By (4.2.8.1) and (4.2.7.1), it follows that i is a
dictator of C.
~
In this sectíon it is shown that special choice
correpondences and collective choice rules can be translated to
order morphisms. This translation is unique and makes it possible
to derive impossibility theorems for choice correspondences from
impossibility theorems for welfare functions.
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~ 4.3 Impossibility Theorems Based on the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives.
This section deals with the Arrow-Paradox. The theorems
discussed here have the following nature: Several conditions
imposed on welfare functions jointly yield a contradiction. Or
stated otherwise, welfare functions cannot satisfy jointly those
conditions, or there do not exist welfare functions which satisfy
all those conditions simultaneously. The set of conditions varies
from theorem to theorem, but in all those sets each of the
following conditions or types of conditions are present (maybe
along with others not stated here):
A. the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition,
B. conditions which state that the outcome of a welfare
function is not dictated by a (small) set of
individuals,
C. conditions, which guarantee that the domain of the
welfare contains enough profiles, such that the other
conditions are meaningful and interfere with each
other, and
D. conditions on the range of the welfare functions. These
conditions require that the image of a welfare function
is in some specific way related to its domain, e.g.,
transitivity or acyclicity.
In this section these conditions are studied in terms of
order morphisms. It is pointed out how these contradictions are
brought about and this knowledge is used to deduce stronger
results than those in literature. Furthermore, by virtue of the
classification system for orderings we are able to formulate
theorems, which are completely new.
We start of with order morphisms on classified sets of
profiles. Hence, by theorem 4.1.10 we are studying
Pareto-optimal, neutral and independent of irrelevant
alternatives welfare functions on a classified set of profiles
restricted to a domain A(a set of alternatives). The first
property, Pareto-optimality, is in all those impossibility
theorems at least implicit, the second is nearly always
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implicitly proven and the third is standardly imposed.
Although in many impossíbility theorems the domain is a
restriction of a classified set of profiles, this is not always
the case, (see Barthélémy [1983] and Storcken (1984]). Those
restrictions on the domain can take place, because of the fact
that the rest of the set of profiles restricted to A is not used
in the proof of the impossibility theorems. Here we simplify our
model and do consider all unused profiles as well. Furthermore,
although impossibility theorems on restricted domains give an
indication on the frequency by which they may occur in general
and are perhaps weaker in a logical sense, these restrictions are
not essential. We have some results of the following kind. If
there exists a"nice" welfare function on the restricted domains
as in Storcken [1984], then there exists an extension to Ln(A) of
this welfare function.
Recall that Pareto-optimality, independence of irrelevant
alternatives and neutrality can be formulated in terms of
decisiveness, whenever the domain of the welfare function is a
subset of T(U), the set of tournaments. This is demonstrated in
section 1.6. This decisiveness language enables comparisons of
various conditions imposed on a welfare function. Hence, it is
not surprising that one of the conditions is of a non-dictatorial
type. Furthermore, this language enables several non-cooperative
game theoretical aspects to be formulated in Social Choice Theory
(See e.g. Moulin [1983], Peleg [1984] and Gibbard [1973]).
We start to investigate order morphisms. Once we have enough
results on this subject, we investigate (a) by what conditions on
the range neutrality is implied by the independence of irrelevant
alternatives and Pareto-optimality and (b) by what conditions on
the range the order morphisms can be extended to, e.g., Wn(U).
The following standard assumptions are made.
Assumption 4.3.1
Suppose N is a set of individuals, with ~N~ - n, V c T(U) is
a classified set of orderings and F is an order morphism
from Vn to V2(U).
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By theorem 4.1.10 F is a Pareto-optimal, neutral and
independent of irrelevant alternatives complete welfare function
from Vn to V2(U), the set of strongly complete relations.
If one is perfectly precize one should redefine all the
decisiveness condition of ~1.6 for complete welfare functions.
Furthermore, in that case one should to reprove all the theorems
proven in that section. As the reader might have already
understood the definitions and theorems in ~1.6 will be referred
to as if they were also defined or proven for complete welfare
functions. Obviously they only need a slight modification, e.g. F
becomes F and Vn(A) becomes Vn, in order to be appropriate for
complete welfare functions. To save space we leave these
modification to the reader's imagination.
Let us start by proving the final steps which yield
dictatorship. By this approach the goal is clear.
Theorem 4.3.2
Assume (4.3.1).
Then F is weakly dictatorial, if for all S, T e 2N, such
that qD(F,S) - U2 and qD(F,T) - U2, it holds that
qD(F,S ~ T) -U2, where U2 :- {tx,y~ e U x U: ~{x,y}~ - 2}.
Proof of theorem 4.3.2
Suppose F is not weakly dictatorial and satisfies the above
mentioned property.
Then for all i e N B(F,{i}) ~ U2.
Hence, by the independence of irrelevant alternatives and
the neutrality of F it follows that:
For all i e N, there is a Si e 2N, such that i é Si and
qD(F,Si) - U2.
Hence, ~- D{Si : i e N}.
Since qD(F,Si) -U2 for all i e N it follows qD(F,~) - U2.
Hence, F is not Pareto-optimal, which contradicts our
assumptions. Therefore F is weakly dictatorial.
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Hence, if F is not weakly dictatorial, then there are
S,T e 2N such that qD(F,S) - U2 - qD(F,T) and qD(F,S ~ T) ~ U2.
In that case it follows from the neutrality and independence of




If F is not weakly dictatoríal, then there are S,T e 2N,
such that qD(F,S) - qD(F,T) - qB(F,N -(S ~ T)) - U2.
~
Theorem 4.3.3 will be used extensively. How this is done, is
explained after the following two theorems, which have the same




Then F is strongly dictatorial, if for all S,T e 2N, such
that qD(F,S) - U2 and qB(F,T) - U2, it holds that
qD(F,S ~ T) - U2.
Theorem 4.3.5
Assume (4.3.1).
If F is not strongly dictatorial, then there are S,T e
such that: qD(F,S) - qB(F,T) - qB(F,N -(S ~ T)) - U2.
2N
~
Especially theorem 4.3.5 and 4.3.3 are used in the proofs of
impossibility theorems. The conclusions of having S, T and
N-(S ~ T) which have decisiveness properties as pointed out
in theorem 4.3.3 and 4.3.5 lead to the construction of relations
in F(Ln(U)), which do not belong to the range of F. Hence, those
decisiveness assumptions about S, T and N-(S ~ T) lead to
contradictions concerning the range of F. Therefore in a
backwards reasoning F appears to be dictatorial.
In order to construct relations in F(Ln(U)) on the basis of
the decisiveness properties of S, T and N-(S ~ T) it is
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necessary to know the interaction between decisive coalitions and
F(Ln(U)). Theorem 4.3.6 clarifies this interaction and makes it
possible to deduce contradictions from decisiveness properties of
S, T and N-(S ~ T) as pointed out above.
Theorem 4.3.6
Let F from Ln(U) to V2(U) be an independent of irrelevant
alternatives complete welfare function on N, with ~N~ - n.
Furthermore, let RA e V2(U). Then RA e F(Ln(U)), iff
there is a labeling 1: n(A x A)A -~ 2N such that:
4.3.6.1 for all ~a,b~ e áRA : ~a,b~ e qD(F,1(~a,b~)),
4.3.6.2 for all ~a,b~ e nsRA : ta,b~ e qB(F,1(~a,b~)),
4.3.6.3 for all ~a,b~ e n(A x A)A : 1(~a,b~) U 1(~b,a)) - N and
1(~a,b)) ~ 1(~b,a~) - ~, and
4.3.6.4 for all ~a,b~,~b,c~,~a,c~ e n(A x A)A :
1(~a,b~) ~ 1(~b,c~) c 1(~a,c~).
Proof of theorem 4.3.6
(only if) Let RA e F(Ln(U)). Then such a labeling should be
constructed.
Obviously there is a rA e Ln(U), with F(rA) - RA.
For all ~a,b~ e n(A x A)A, define
1(~a,b~) :- {i e N: a~ b: RÁ}.
Then (4.3.6.3) follows from the fact that rA e Ln(U) and the
definition of F. (4.3.6.4) follows from the fact that the
components of rA are transitive. (4.3.6.1) and (4.3.6.2)
follow from the fact that F is independent of irrelevant
alternatives and the definitions of qD, qB and 1.
Hence, evidently we have such a labeling.
(if) Let 1 be such a labeling.
Take RÁ e V2(U), for all i e N, defined as follows:
RÁ :- r~{~a,b~ e A x A: i e 1(~a,b~)},A~.
By (4.3.6.4) RÁ e T(U). By (4.3.6.4) it is transitive.
Hence, RÁ e L(U) for all i e N and rA e Ln(U). Moreover, by
the definition of qD and qB it is evident that F(rA) - RA.
~ . ~
Theorem 4.3.6 states that RA e F(Ln(U)), iff we can label
the pairs of RA with decisive coalitions according to (4.3.6.1),
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(4.3.6.2), (4.3.6.3) and (4.3.6.4). Furthermore, the proof
indicates how a profile is constructed when the labeling is known
and vica versa.
By virtue of theorem 4.3.6 and the decisiveness properties
of S, T and N- (S fl T) we are able to construct elements in
F(Ln(U)) which, for instance, are not ~i2,i~-classifiably
transitive.
Theorem 4.3.6 supplies us with a pictorial support in the
construction of images of F, a support that is demonstrated
below.
First a convention is introduced.
By . ~ . the following situation is represented:
x I,,I Y
1(~x,y~) - N- M and 1(~y,x~) - M.
Hence, x.-~S .y-~T .z corresponds with the following~ ~ ~
M
labeling: 1(~x,y~) - S, 1(~y,x~) - N- S, 1(~y,z~) - T,
1(~z,y~) - N- T, 1(~z,x~) - M, 1(Cx,z~) - N- M.
Suppose for instance that S U T U M- N and S fl T fl M- cp then
the following Condorcet-profile corresponds with this picture:
x~ y ~ z . R{x,y,z} i e S fl T,
y~ z~ x . R{x,y,z} i e
T fl M, and
z~ x~ y . R1 i e M fl S.
{x,Y,z}
After this short pictorial explanation we will prove the
following lemma, which states that various decisiveness
properties lead to various intransitivities of F(Ln(U)).
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Lemma 4.3.7
Assume (4.3.1). Furthermore, suppose M,S,T e 2N, such that
N- M U S U T and M fl S fl T- cp, and k is an integer, with
k ? 2.
4.3.7.1 If qD(F,S) - qD(F,T) - qD(F,M) - U2, then there is a
RA e F(Ln(U)), which is not ~ák, ik-l~-classifiably
transitive.
4.3.7.2 If qD(F,S) - qD(F,T) - qB(F,M) - U2, then there is an
RA e F(Ln(U)), which is not ták, rak-l~-classifiably
transitive.
4.3.7.3 If qB(F,S) - qB(F,T) - qD(F,M) - U2, then there is a
relation RA e F(Ln(U)), which is not tik,ik-l~-classifíably
transitive.
4.3.7.4 If qD(F,S) - qD(F,T) - qB(F,M) - U2, then there is an
RA e F(Ln(U)), which is not ~áliám,rá2~-
classifiably transitive, where 1? 1 and m? 1.
4.3.7.5 If qD(F,S) - qD(F,T) - qB(F,M) - U2, then there is an
RA e F(Ln(U)), which is not ~áliám,i~-classifiably
transitive, where 1 t m? 1.
Proof of lemma 4.3.7
(4.3.7.1),(4.3.7.2) and (4.3.7.3) Let A - {a~,a1,a2,...,ak}.
- N
1(~ai,aj~) .-
A)A -9 2 as follows:
~ S, iff j- i t 1 and i is even,
T, iff j- i t 1 and i is odd,
M, iff i~ j t 1,
N- S, iff j t 1- i and j is even,
N- T, iff j t 1- i and j is odd, and




Then 1 is a labeling for which obviously (4.3.6.2) and
(4.3.6.4) hold. Applying theorem 4.3.6 to:
the premise of (4.3.7.1) it follows that RA e F(Ln(U)),
the premise of (4.3.7.2) it follows that RÁ e F(Ln(U)), and
the premise of (4.3.7.3) it follows that R~ e F(Ln(U)),
where RA :- r~{tai,a~~ e A x A: 1(~ai,a~~) e{S,T,M}},A~,
r~{~ai,a~~ e A x A: 1(Cai,a~~) - M},A~ c RÁ,
~{~ai,a~~ e A x A: 1(~ai,a~~) e{S,T}},A~ c áRÁ,
RA c R~ and C{~ai,a~~ e A x A: 1(~ai,a~~) - M},A~ c áR~.
So the relation indicated by the diagram is equal to RA and
is contained in RÁ as well as in R~. Now note that
~k~,al,a~,...,ak~ is a path along RA, RÁ and R~ of type ák,
a and i respectively, which cannot be cut short along RA,
aRÁ and R~
respectively. Hence, RA is not ~ák,ik~-transitive, RÁ is
not ~ák,rak-l~-transitive and R~ is not ~ik ik-1~-
transitive.
(4.3.7.4) Since táliám,ra2~-classifiable transitivity implies
~áltmtl ra2~-transitivity we are done by (4.3.7.2).
(4.3.7.5) The labeling 1 establishes again such an
intransitivity.
This completes the proof.
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Before deducing some immediate consequences of the foregoing
theorem it is ointed out that ták -k-1p ,i ~-transitivity is a very
weak transitivity condition. It means that a path n of type ak
can be cut short by a path of type it for any t 5 k-1. Hence,
such a short cut is established, whenever there are two
alternative a,b on rz which are not succeeding each other on n and
~a,b~ is in
the relation. Note that this transitivity does not exclude
circuits. ~ák,rak-l~-transitivity is stronger than ~ák ik-1~-
transitivity, but still weak when compared to frequently used
transitivity conditions for the range of a welfare function. Of
course ~ik,ik-l~-transitivity is again stronger.
It is perhaps useful to mention that RA is a tournament on
ktl alternatives with a maximum number of 3-cycles. (The proof of
this fact is standard in Graph Theory).
This results in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.8
Assume (4.3.1).
4.3.8.1 If there is an integer k? 2, such that all RA e F(Vn)
are ~ák,rak-l~-classifiably transitive, then F is weakly
dictatorial.
4.3.8.2 If there is an integer k? 2, such that all RA e F(Vn)
are ~ik -k-1,i ~-classifiably transitive, then F is strongly
dictatorial.
Proof of theorem 4.3.8
(4.3.8.1) Suppose F is not weakly dictatorial.
By theorem 4.3.3 there are S,T e 2N such that
qD(F,S) - qD(F,T) - qB(F,M) - II2, with M:- N-(S ~ T).
Hence, by (4.3.7.2) it is easy to deduce a contradiction.
Therefore F is weakly dictatorial.
(4.3.8.2) Suppose F is not strongly dictatorial.
Then by theorem 4.3.5 and (4.3.7.3j we can similarly deduce
a contradiction.
Hence, F is strongly dictatorial.
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It is clear that the proposed transitivities are not the
only ones which lead to dictatorship. Of course, besides the new
results of theorem 4.3.8 one is able to prove other new
impossibility theorems. To give the reader an idea it is
similarly provable that if the range F(Vn) c T(U) and is càk,ik~-
transitive, then F is strongly dictatorial. If the range F(Vn)
is tàsàs......,rak-l~-transitive, then F is strongly dictatorial.
k-symbols -
If the range F(Vn) is tàsà......,'ik-l~-transitive, then F is
k-symbols
weakly dictatorial. And so on and so on.
All these impossibilities can be deduced by using theorem
4.3.3 or 4.3.5 and constructing relations in F(Ln(U)), whích have
not the required transitivity properties. Of course these
relations are constructed by virtue of theorem 4.3.6. Since these
constructions are simular to those of the previous theorems this
work is not done here.
The neutrality condition imposed on the welfare functions in
theorem 4.3.8 is not frequently used in other impossibility
theorems. Therefore, it is proven that various transitivity
conditions imposed on the range of a welfare function along wíth
the Pareto-optimality and the independence of irrelevant
alternatives, imply the neutrality property. Hence, the
neutrality property ïs oiten implicitiy irnposed or. welfare
functions. The fact is not a new result in Social Choice Theory.
(See Barthélémy [1983]). We will show that several standard
results in Social Choice Theory can be deduced in this context.
Theorem 4.3.9
Let F be a complete welfare function from Ln(U) to V2(U)
which is Pareto-optimal and independent of irrelevant
alternatives.
4.3.9.1 If for all RA e F(Ln(U)), RA is ~àl'iàm,ra2~-classifiably
transitive, then F is neutral, where 1? 1 and m? 1.
4.3.9.2 If for all RA e F(Ln(U)), RA is tàliàm,i~-classifiably
transitive, then F is neutral, where 1 t m? 1.
4.3.9.3 If for all RA e F(Ln(U)), RA is tàk,à~-classifiably
transitive, then F is neutral, where k? 2.
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Proof of theorem 4.3.9
(4.3.9.1) Suppose F is as in (4.3.9.1).
There are three steps.
Step 1 If ~a,b~ e qD(F,S), then ~a,x~ e qD(F,S), for all S e 2N
and all a,b,x, such that ~{a,b,x}~ - 3.
Suppose ~a,b~ e qD(F,S), x e A-{a,b} and ta,x~ ~ qD(F,S).
Then by the independence of irrelevant alternatives it
follows that tx,a~ e qB(F,N-S).
Take the following profile rA e Ln(A):
a b c2 c3 ..... cm cmtl .. "' cmtltl x: RÁ for i e S, and
b c2 c3 ""' cm cmtl ""' cmtltl x a: RÁ for i e N-S,
where A - {a,b,x,c2,c3' " 'cmtltl}'




j.~~~ ~ . C m ~ !
Then ~cmtl' " "''c tltl'x,a,b,c2,c3,...,cm~ is a path along-1--i~F(rA) of type a ia . Since it can be cut short by a path of
type ra2, we have cmt} ~ a: F(rA) and a~ cm : F(rA).
Now ~cmtl,a~ e qD(F,N-S) and ~a,cm~ e qD(F,S) by the
independence of irrelevant alternatives of F. But similarly
it is deducible that ~a,emtl~ e qD(F,S). Hence, we have a
contradiction.
Step 2 If ~a,b~ e qD(F,S), then ~x,a~ e qD(F,S), for all S e 2N
and all a,b,x, such that ~{a,b,x}~ - 3.
The proof is similar to step 1.
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Step 3 qD(F,S) - U2, iff there are a,b e U, a~ b, such that
~a,b~ E qD(F,S), for all S e 2N.
The proof is standard in literature (See e.g. Barthélémy
[1983]). Step 1 and step 2 and ~U~ ? 3 establish that
r(qD(F,S)) is an equívalence relation, which is complete if
qD(F,S) has any non diagonal pair.
Now by step 3 and theorem 1.6.2.5 we are done.
(4.3.9.2) and (4.3.9.3) are similar to (4.3.9.1).
~
Note that many transitivity conditions imposed on the range
of a welfare function in literature are stronger than those of
theorem 4.3.9. Hence, in literature often implicitly neutrality
is imposed on welfare functions. Furthermore, the steps as
pointed out in (4.3.9.1) occur as intermediate results in many
impossibility results.
We will now deduce some results which are well-known.
Theorem 4.3.10
Suppose F is a Pareto-optimal and independent of irrelevant
alternatives welfare function from Vn to V2(U), with n? 1,
and V c V2(U) is a classified set of orderings.
4.3.10.1 If F(Vn) is contained in the set of ~àlsàm,rat~-
transitive and ~àlààm,rat~-transitive relations, where
1 t m? t? 1 and t 5 2, then F is strongly dictatorial.
4.3.10.2 If F(Vn) is contained in the set of ~àk,à~-transitive
relations, where k? 2, then F is oliga~chic, i.e., there is
a S c N, such that D(F,S) - U2 and B(F,{i}) - U2 fcr all
1 E S.
Proof of theorem 4.3.10
(4.3.10.1) Suppose (4.3.10.1).
Since ~àlsàm,rat~-transitivity and tàlààm,rat~-transitivity
y, it follows bis equivalent to , ~àliàm,rat~-transitivit y
(4.3.9.1) and (4.3.9.2) that F is neutral, with F:- F .
- ~Ln(U)
By theorem 4.3.7.4, 4.3.7.5 and 4.3.3 F is weakly
dictatorial.
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Hence, there is an individual i e N, such that
qB(F,{3}) - U2.
The following two steps complete the proof of (4.3.10.1).
Step 1 For all S e 2N : if qB(F,S) - U2, then qD(F,S) - U2.
Proof of step 1 By the neutrality of F it is sufficient to deduce
a contradiction from the following assumption:
Suppose qB(F,S) - qB(F,N-S).
Take the following profile rA e Ln(A):
a0 al a2....a1 b0 bl....bm : RÁ for i e S, and
b0 bl....bm a0 al a2....a1 : RÁ for i e N-S, where
{a0,....,a1,b0,... ,bm} - A.
We have the following diagram:
a~ ~ -~~~~ ~
N ao 3 B~,
Hence, ~a0,....,a1,b0,....,bm~ is a path of type álsám that
cannot be cut short by a path of type rat.
This contradicts our transitivity assumptions.
Step 2 For all S e 2N : if qD(F,S) - U2, then D(F,S) - U2.
Proof of step 2 Let S e 2N be such that qD(F,S) - U2.
Let a,b e U such that a~ b.
Suppose rA e Vn with a~ b: RÁ, for i e T1, a- b: RÁ for
i e T2 and b~ a: RÁ for i e T3, where Tl U T2 U T3 - N and
S c T1.
It suffices to prove that a~ b: F(rA).
Suppose not a~ b: F(rA). Then b? a: F(rA).
Take the following profile rA, which by our knowledge of
minimal extensions of L(U) is in-Vn:
a cl cZ...cm d0 dl...dl-1 b : RÁ i e S,
cl c2...cm d0 dl...dl-1 a b : RÁ i e T1 -S,
cl cz...cm d0 dl...dl-1 (a b) : RÁ i e T2, and
cl c2...cm d0 dl...d1-1 b a : RÁ i e T3.
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From the Pareto-optimality, the independence of irrelevant
alternatives and the fact that qD(F,S) - U2, it follows that
~d0,dl...dm-l,b,a,cl,c2...c1~ is a path along F(rA) of type
áliám that cannot be cutted short by a path of type rat.
This completes the prove of step 1 and 2.
(4.3.10.2) Suppose (4.3.10.2).
By theorem 4.3.9.3, 4.3.7.2 and 4.3.3 it follows that F is
weakly dictatorial, where F:- F . So there are i e N
~Ln(U)
with qB(F,{i}) - U2.
Let S:- {i e N: qB(F,{i}) - U2}.
Again the proof is completed by the following step.
Step 3 For all S e 2N : if qB(F,S) - U2, then B(F,S) - U2.
Proof of step 3 Suppose B(F,S) ~ U2.
Then there is a profile rA and a pair a,b e U, a~ b, such
that: a~ b: RÁ for i e T1,
a- b : RÁ for i e T2 ,
a C b: RÁ for i e T3, S c T1 and a t b: F(rA).
Take rA in Vn(A) as follows:
b a c2 c3...ck : RÁ for i e T3,
(a b) c2 c3...ck : RÁ for i e T2,
a b c2 c3...ck : RÁ for i e T1 - S, and
a c2 c3...ck b : RÁ for i e S.
Again using the independence of irrelevant alternatives, the
Pareto-optimality of F and the fact that
qB(F,S) - qB(F,S) - U2 it follows from b~ a: F(rA) that
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~b,a,c2,c3,....ck~ is a path of type ák along F(rA) and
ck ? b: F(rA). Hence, this path cannot be cutted short by a
path of type á and therefore F(rA) is not
~ák,á~-classifiably transitive.
This contradicts our assumptions and proves step 3.
By step 3 it follows that S-{i e N: B(F,{i}) - U2} and
therefore B(F,S) - U2.
From the definition of S it follows that for all i e N- S
qB(F,{i}) ~ U2. Hence, for all i e N- S there are a,b e U,
a~ b, such that ~a,b~ e qD(F,N-{i}). By the neutrality of F
it follows that for all i e N- S, qD(F,N-{i}) - U2.
Take X c N, such that S c X c N, qD(F,X) - U2 and X is
minimal with those properties,
Suppose S c X.
Then there is an i e X- S c N- S.
Hence, qD(F,N-{i}) - qD(F,X) - U2.
Now by (4.3.7.2) and the neutrality of F we have
qB(F,N - ( (N-{i} ) fl X) ) - cp.
Therefore qD(F, X-{i}) - gD(F,(N-{i}) f1 X) - U2.
This contradicts our assumptions about X.
Hence, X - S and qD(F,S) - U2.
Similar to step 2 one can prove that D(F,S) - U2 is implied
by D(F,S) - U2.
So F is oligarchic.
~
Let us compare the results of this section with several
well-known impossibility results. As stated before, theorem 4.3.8
is new because of the new transitivity concept, introduced in
chapter two. However, for special choices of k, (4.3.8) one has
well-known similar results in literature, which even look
stronger, because neutrality is not used in those impossibility
theorems. We will discusse these facts somewhat further.
For instance, if k- 2 in (4.3.8.2) by (4.1.10), it follows
for every welfare function F from Vn(A) to W(A), with (A~ ? 3:
if F is neutral, independent of irrelevant alternatives and
Pareto-optimal, then F is strongly dictatorial. The fact ~A~ ? 3
should be introduced since only for ~A~ ? 3 ~i2,i~-transitivity
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is a meaningful property. Furthermore, V is any classified set of
orderings and w(U) is of course the set in V2(U) of ~i2,i~-
transitive relations. Now similar results are known in literature
with two differences. In literature V(A) is often chosen from
{L(A), W(A), Q(A)} and neutrality is not imposed on F. If done so
we get what is often referred to as Arrow's impossibility theorem
(See: Moulin [1983], Kelly [1978]).
Note that for relations in V2(U), ~iZ,i~-transitivity is
equivalent to tàià,à~-transitivity together with
tàà,à~-transitivity. So by (4.3.10.1) it follows that for all F
from Vn(A) to W(A), with ~A~ ? 3: if F is independent of
irrelevant alternatives and Pareto-optimal, then F is strongly
dictatorial.
Hence, (4.3.10.1) implies the well-known Arrow-theorem.
Similarly (4.3.10.1) and (4.1.10) imply that for all
independent of irrelevant alternatives and Pareto-optimal F from
Vn(A) to V2(A), with ~A~ ? 1 t m t 2,
F(Vn(A)) c{RA e V2(A) : RA is tàl s àm, rat~-transitive and
tàltmtl, rat~-transitive}, 1 t m? t? 1 and t 5 2, F is strongly
dictatorial.
This result is a generalization of impossibility theorems in
Wilson [1972] (1 - m- t- 1), in Blau [1979] (1 - 2 and t- 1)
and in Blair 6 Pollack [1979] (t - 1).
Similarly we can deduce another theorem as in Blair ~
Pollack [1979] from (4.3.10.2).
From these observations it will be clear that in our
framework a lot of results in literature can be generalized.
Many theorems are left undiscussed, especially those concerning
acyclic collective preferences (See e.g., Ferejohn 6 Grether
[1974] and Blair 6 Pollack [1982]). But we will end this type of
research because we are convinced that these results can be
treated in a similar way. They would only lead to more cases
with specific transitivity or acyclicity conditions, together
with some extra assumptions, that lead to dictatorship. No new
insight would be gained, nor would new methods be revealed to
prove these impossibility theorems.
Now other relations between domain and range of an order
morphism are deduced. Since an order morphism is equivvalent to a
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welfare function with "nice" properties (corollary 4.1.11), these
relations give us more insíght in Social Choice Theory. It will
be proven that either the range is very complex compared to the
domain or the order morphism is simply (dictatorial). In order to
explain this, consider (4.3.8.1). It is not dífficult to prove,
similarly to (4.3.10.2), that if
F: Ln(U) -~ {RA e V2(U) : RA is ~ák,rak-l~-transitive} is an
order morphism, then F is oligarchíc.
Here S:- {i e N: B(F,{i}) - U2} is the oligarchy.
So F: Ln(U) -j {RA e V2(U) : RA is Cak,rak-l~-transitive} has
the following form for all rA e Ln(U) : F(rA) - ~{RÁ : i e S},
F is not very complicated. (Consequently it cannot describe
decision rules used in "real life"). To avoid this simplicity of
F one has to choose another relationship, between domain and
range of F, as e.g., ~a2, á)-transitivity or
~ák, ák-l~-transitivity.
Note that all the impossibility theorems deduced above, as
well as those in literature, have the same interpretation.
Furthermore, in all those theorems transitivity or acyclicity
conditions are imposed on the range. An interesting question is
now: Is there any (meaningful) transitivity condition on the
image F(Ln(U)) such that F has not such a simple structure?
Although all the foregoing theorems suggest that such a
transitivity condition does not exist, the question is at least
yet for us too difficult to answer. On the other hand, the
conjecture is negative, because by theorem 4.3.8 ~ák,rak-1~-
transitivity is too strong. If ~ák, ik-l~-transitivity were also
too strong one could argue that the answer is negative, since the
transitivity is very weak. For a small number of individuals,
i.e., ~N~ - 3, there is such an impossibility.
Theorem 4.3.11
Assume (4.3.1), such that n- 3.
If F(Ln(U)) c{RA e V2(U) : RA is ~ak, ik-l~-transitive} for
some k? 2, then F is weakly dictatorial.
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Proof of theorem 4.3.11
Suppose F is not weakly dictatorial.
Then for all i e N qD(F, N-{i}) ~~.
By the neutrality and the independence of irrelevant
alternatives of F it follows now that for all i e N:
qD(F, N - {i}) - U2.
Since ~N~ - 3, there are precisely three such coalitíons,
whose intersection is empty and whose union is N. Hence, by
(4.3.7.1) we have a contradiction.
Therefore, F is weakly dictatorial.
~
Again emphasizing the fact that ták,ik-l~-transitivity is a
very weak condition, since if this does not hold one cannot lay
any meaningful transitivity condition on the asymmetric part of a
(complete) relation, and waiting for generalizations of (4.3.11)
we come to the following more general question:
Note that F(Ln(U)) is a classified set of orderings, how
'big', compared to L(U) should F(Ln(U)) be, such that F is not a
simple dictatorship?
We will deduce some new impossibility results, i.e. this
'bigness' is very great in a specíal context.
First the following theorem is proven.
Theorem 4.3.12
4.3.12.1 Assume (4.3.1), such that there are WO'W1'W2'" Wk c T(U)
and WO - V, Wk - F(Vn) and Wi - Witl or Wi ~ Witl, for all
1 E {1,2, ,k}.
4.3.12.2 Then F is strongly dictatorial.
~
Before proving theorem 4.3.12 we have the following remarks:
t By the Pareto-optimality it follows that V c F(Vn). So
V c F(Vn) is not only implied by the assumptions about WO up
to Wk.
t It ís a symplification to assume that F(Vn) c T(U). We do
not know what happens if this is dropped.
t T(U) is the set of all complete and asymmetric relations.
F(Vn) c T(U) means that the classified set of relations
F(Vn) has some propably very weak extra properties.
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t V m W1 ~i "" ~S Wk-1 ~ F(Vn) means that only a finite number
of extra relations not in V is needed to construct an
abitrary relation in F(Vn), by the construction tools
substitution, concatenation, restriction, conversion and
permutation.
Hence, theorem 4.3.12 states that it is impossible to have
non-simple order morphisms from Vn to W, where V and W are
classified sets of tournaments, both strictly contained in T(U)
and W can be "constructed" from V in a finite way.
We will prove this theorem by some intermediate results.
Lemma 4.3.13
Assume (4.3.12.1).
If RX e Wk and Y c X, such that 0 C ~Y~ 5(X~ - k, and RX is
irreducible, then RXI e W0.
Y
Proof of lemma 4.3.13
Since Wt - E4Z6(Wt-1 U{RZ, vRZ}), such that
RZI ' ~RZI E Wt-1' for all 0~ ~A~ ~ ~Z~ and A c Z, (this
A A -
follows by theorem 2.4.5). This lemma follows by a simple
induction on t e {1,2,...,k}.
~
Essentially theorem 4.3.12 is proven by deducing a
contradiction from the following assumption:
Assumption 4.3.14
Assume ( 4.3.1).
Suppose furthermore there are WO'W1'W2' "' Wk c T(U), such
that WO - V, Wk - F(Vn(U)) and for all i e {1,2,...,k}
Wi - Witl or Wi ~fi Witl' and F is not strongly dictatorial.
By theorem 4.3.5 and F(Vn) c T(U) we have:
Lemma 4.3.15
Assume (4.3.14).
Then there are S, T, M e 2N, such that S ft T fl M- cp,
S U T U M- N, and qD(F,S) - qD(F,T) - qD(F,M) - U2.
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We can prove now the first astonishing result.
Lemma 4.3.16
Assume (4.3.14).
Then for all 1 e{0,1,2,...,k} : if Tm 1(U) c F(Vn) for all
m e{0,1,2,...}, then Tm 1(U) c V, for all m e{0,1,2,...}..
Proof of lemma 4.3.16
Take 1 e {0,1,2,...} and assume (4.3.14), Tm~l(U) c F(Vn)
for all m e {0,1,2,...}, there is a RX e Tt~l(U), with
RX ~ V and t e{0,1,2,...}.
It is sufficient to deduce a contradiction.
Without loss of generality suppose RX is irreducible.
Hence, since RX is a tournament there is a Hamilton circuit
along RX (See e.g. theorem 2.5.2). Let ~Y1'y2' "''yt'yl~ be
such a circuit:
J~ ~ -7 ~ Jy
J ~2 ~Y
~J~ ~-~-~!rr..
Since RX e Tt 1(U), there is a relation RX e L(U), such that
s(R;~,RX) s 1.
For some i e{1,2,...,t} it holds that ~yi,yitl~ e RX (where
t t 1-1), otherwise RX is cyclic.
Without loss of generality let tyl,y2~ e RX.
Since RX e F(Vn), there is a profile rX e V, with F(r) -
RX'
Take Y- X U{al,a2,a3,...,ak}, such that ~Y~ - t t k.
Take RY e L(U), such that
~c,d~ e RY iff tc,d~ e RY, or
~c,d~ -~ai,aj~ and i 5 j, or
~c,d~ - ~yl,ai~ for some í e{1,...k}, or
~c,d~ -~ai,yj~ and ~yl,yj~ e RY and
i e {1,...k}, or
tc,d~ -~yj,ai~ and tyj,yl~ e RY and
i e {1, ..k}
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(RY - Sub(RX, Y1, R~), where ylala2a3...ak : R~).
Furthermore, take Ry e T(U), such that
~c,d~ e Ry iff ~c,d~ e RX, or
~c,d~ - ~ai,aj~ and i 5 j, or
~c,d~ - ~aj,Yi~ and ~yl,yi~ e RX, and
i e {1,...k}, or
~c,d~ - tyi,aj~ and ~yi,yl~ e RX and
i e {1, ..k}
Then tylalaaa3.-.aky2y3 "" yt~ is a Hamilton circuit along
RY. Hence, Ry is irreducable.- Furthermore it is obvious by
the definition of Ry, that 6(Ry,RY) - b(RX,RX) - l.
Hence, Ry e Tttk,l(U) c F(Vn). -
Now by lemma 4.3.13 it follows that Ryl e V.
X
This contradicts our assumptions.
~
We have just proved that U{Tm~l(U) : m e{1,2...}} is not
obtainable from V by a finite number of minimal extension, unless
of course if it already is in V. The following lemma states that
U{Tmll(U) : m e{1,2,...}} for 1? 1 is in V.
Lemma 4.3.17
Assume (4.3.14).
Then for all 1 e{0,1,2,...} : if Tm~l(U) c V, for all
m e{0,1,2,...}, then Tm,ltl(U) c F(Vn), for all
m e {0,1,2,...}.
Proof of lemma 4.3.17
Take 1 e{0,1,2,...}, assume (4.3.14), suppose Tm~l(U) c V,
for all m e{0,1,2,...}, and RX e Tt,ltl(U) - Tt~l(U), -with
t e{0,1,2,...} and RX is irreducible.
It is sufficient to prove that RX e F(Vn).
Since RX ~ Tt 1(U) and 1? 0 there is a RX e L(U) such that
b(RX,RX) - 1 t 1? 1.
Hence, there are y,x e X, such that x~y : RX and y~x : RX.
Hence, b(R ' ) 5 1 and R e T (U) c V.
X~X-{x}~~~X-{x} X~X-{x} t,l -
Take X1:- {b e X: b ~ x: RX} and X2:- {w e X: w ~ x: RX}.
Obviously RX -(RX ) e Tt 1(U) c V, unless X1 - cp.
~X1 ~X-{x}
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Similarly RXI e V, unless X2 - cp.
X2
Since RX is irreducible, X1 ~ cp and X2 ~ cp.
The following Condorcet-like profile rX is in V:
(RXI )~ id{x} '(RX ): RX for all i e S fl T,
X1 IX2
Id{x} ~(RX ) : RX for all i e T fl M, and(X-{x}
(RX )~ Id{x} - RX for all i e M fl S.
~X-{x}
Now take xl,yl e X1, x2,y2 e X2 and A-{x,xl,x2,yl,y2}.
Let a,b e A and suppose ~a,b~ e áRX.
It suffices to show that {i e N : a~ b: RX} e{N,S,T,M},
because of the quasi-decisiveness of these coalition.
The table below shows {i e N: a~ b: RX} for ~a,b~ e áRX.
` b x x x2 yl y2a` l
x `~ `~ T `~ T
~` ~` ~`
x S `~ N N Nl
~`
x `~ M `~ M N
2 I1 i~
S N N `~ Nyl
~`
y2 `~ M N M `~
~` ~`
Note that xl - yl or
y2 - x2 does disturbe
the reasoning presented
here.
Hence, F(rX) - RX.
Proof of theorem 4.3.12
Assume (4.3.14).
Note that L(U) - Tm~~(U) c V for all m e{1,2,...}
By a simple induction on 1, and applying the lemmas 4.3.16
and 4.3.17 it follows that Tm~l(U) c V for all m and 1.
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Hence, V - T(U).
This contradicts our assumptions.
Hence, F is strongly dictatorial.
~
We conclude thís section with some theorems about F(Ln(U)),
when F is an order morphism, non-dictatorial and F(Ln(U)) c T(U).
Lemma 4.3.17 makes only use of the assumptions just stated. Since
L(U) c Tm 0(U) for all m e{1,2,3...} it follows that Tm 1(U) c
F(Ln(U)). Having theorem 4.3.12 in mind the following questíon is
natural: Is it deducible that T(U) c F(Ln(U))? The answer to this
question is negative, an argument is given in the following
example.
Example 4.3.18
For every function F: Ln(U) -~ Á, with F(Ln(A)) c A(A) for
all A e]E, it holds that T(U) ~ F(Ln(U)). -
It is sufficient to prove that ~Ln(A)~ ~ ~T(A)~ for some
A e 1E.
Note that if ~A~ - p, then ~L(A)n~ -(p!)n and
~T(A)~ - 2~P(P-1).
Suppose 2k-1 ~ p ~ 2k
Then ~Ln(A)~ -(P!)n 5(PP)n - Pnp ~(2k)n~2k - 2k~n~2k and
~T(A)~ ~ 2z2k-1 .(2k-1-1).
Since for fixed n but growing k k-n.2k ~~,2k-1.(2k-1-1) it
follows that ~Ln(A)~ ~ ~T(A)~ for some large ~A~.
Moreover, if we take n- 3, then for
- ~A~ - 18
~L3(A)~ - (18!)3 - (32.2.17.24-3.5.2.7.13-22.3.11~2~5-
.32~23.7.2.3~5~22~3.2)3
- 173.133.113 76,59.324~248
~ 212.221.216.220.236.248 - 2153
- 29.17 - 2~-18-(18-1)
- ~T(A)~.
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- ~A) - 19
~T(A)~ - 219-9 - 2171 and
~L3(A)~ - 193.173.133 113 76 59.324.248
~ 2171
So for n- 3, 19 is the smallest number of alternatives in A
with ~Ln(A)~ C ~T(A)~.
~
Since the answer of the question is negative it becomes even
more interesting to know what F(Ln(U)) looks like. It is pointed
out here that we did not succeed in finding an operational
description of F(Ln(U)). On the other hand, we have some nice
partial results, which will be discussed now. To avoid
repetitions in the assumptions of the following theorems a
general assumption is again formulated here.
Assumption 4.3.19
Let n? 1 be an integer and let F be an order morphism from
Ln(U) to T(U), which is not strongly dictatorial.
~
Note that lemma 4.3.15 also holds when assumption 4.3.14 is
substituted by assumption 4.3.19. The new lemma is referred to as
lemma 4.3.15'. First an operational result is deduced.
Lemma 4.3.20
Assume ( 4.3.19), RY e T(U) and RYI e L(U), with
X
Y - {a,b,xl,...,xk} and X - {xl,x2,...,xk}.
Then RY e F(Ln(U)).
Proof of lemma 4.3.20
Assume the premisse of (4.3.20).
Without loss of genrality suppose a~ b: RY.
Now there are four types of x-elements in X:
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type 00, xi e X such that ~x,a~,tx,b~ e RY,
a.-t-.x00 -~-.b,
(To indicate the type we denote its
corresponding number as subscript)
type O1, xi e X such that ~x,a),~b,x~ e RY,
a.-~-.x~l -~-.b,
type 10, xi e X such that ~a,x~,~x,b~ e RY,
a.-~-.xi0 -~-.b, and
type 11, xi e X such that ~a,x~,tb,x~ e RY
a.-~-.xil -~-.b.
Note that the superscriptions correspond with the in- and
outgoing arrows at xi to or from a and b.
By theorem 4.3.6 it is sufficient to find a labeling, which
satisfies (4.3.6.1) up to (4.3.6.4) with RY in the róle of
RA.
Take 1: n(Y x Y) -~ 2N as follows:
For ~x,y~ e nR~, let 1(~x,y~) be defined according to the
following tabel below:
` Y
x` a b O1 00 10 11
`~ `~ `~
a ~` S ~` ~` S S
b ~` ~` M ~` ~` S
`~
O1 T ~` N S S S
00 T T M N S S
`~
10 ~` T M M N S
`~ `~
11 ~` ~` M M M S
, and
for ~x,y~ e vnRY (- cRY) take 1(tx,y~) :- N- 1(~x,y~),
where S, T and M are the decisive coalition according to
lemma 4.3.15'. Obviously (4.3.6.1), (4.3.6.2) and (4.3.6.3)
hold for 1. Note that in order to prove (4.3.6.4) for L it
is sufficient to prove the following two:
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(I) if xi-~-.Y-~-~z - ~.
t
then 1(~x,y~) fl 1(~y,z~) fl 1(tz,x~) - cp, and
( II ) if x.-)-.y-~-. z: Rl„
~ ~ i
then 1(~x,y~) c 1(~z,y~) or 1(tz,x~) c 1(~z,y~).
Now take the following matrix A:
cp S ~ cp S S
cp ~p M cp cp S
T cp N S S S
T T M N S S
cp T M M N S
cp cp M M M N
The (i,j)th-cell of A indicates the individuals, who prefer
the elements with type i, in the collection of
{a,b,01,00,10,11}, to the elements with type j in the
collection of {a,b,01,00,10,11}. Or stated otherwise if x
has type i and y has type j, then the (i,j)th-cell of A
indicates the coalition which enables to go from x to y
along E~. Furthermore A, A can be calculated, where
multiplication means intersecting and summation means uniting.
Thc (i,j)th-ccll ef A o A is then the coalition which
enables to go from x to y along Ry by any intermidiate point
z~{x,y}, where x has type i and y has type j.
Hence, in order to prove (I) and (II) it is sufficient to
prove that all cells in (A , A- A) fl AT are empty, where AT
is A transposed.
A o A- r l
cp S fl T S fl M S fl M S S
M fl T tp M S fl M S fl M S
T S fl T N S S S
T T M N S S
M fl T T M M N S
M fl T M fl T M M M N
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Hence, it is evident that ( I) and (II) hold.
Now from (4.3.20) we can deduce the following result:
Theorem 4.3.21
Assume (4.3.19).
Then T5(U) c F(Ln(U)).
Proof of theorem 4.3.21
Let RX e T5(U) irreducible.
It is sufficient to prove that RX e F(Ln(U)).
If ~X~ 5 4, then RX e T511(U) c F(Ln(U)).
If ~X~ - 5, then there is a triple x,y,z e X such that
R ~~ e L(U). Otherwise every triple is a 3-circuit of
-xl{x,Y,z}
RX, which cannot hold since the number of 3-circuits of RX
is less than the number of triples in X. Now we are done by
lemma 4.3.20.
We have that Tm 0(U) c Tm~l(U) c F(Ln(U)) for all m. A
natural question therefore is Tm 2(U) c F(Ln(U))? The answer to
this question is positive. ~
Theorem 4.3.22
Assume (4.3.19).
Then Tm~3(U) c F(Ln(U)) for all m e{1,2,3,4..}.
Proof of theorem 4.3.22
Let RX e Tm 3(U) be irreducible.
It is sufficient to prove that RX e F(Ln(U)).
Since RX e Tm 3(U) is irreducible there is a relation
RX e L(U) such that ó(RX,RX) 5 3.
Let xlx2x3...xm : RX.
Now because b(RX,RX) 5 3 there are il,jl,i2,j2,i3 and j3 in
{1,2,3,...m} such that il t 1 ~ jl, i2 t 1~ j2, i3 t 1~ j3
and RX - ~(RX - {~x. ,x. ~, tx. ,x. ~, ~x. ,x. ~}) U
11 71 12 ~2 13 73
{Cx. ,x. ~, ~x. ,X. ~, fX. ,X. ~}),X~.
71 lI 72 i2 73 13
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~x. x. ~ for k e{1,2,3} are the arrows which should be
~k~ lk
reversed to obtain RX from RX.
without loss of generality suppose il 5 i2 5 i3.
Since RX is irreducible il - 1.
Now if ~{il, i2, i3' ~1' ~2' ~3}~ ~ 5, then there are
i,j e{il, i2, i3' ~1' ~2' ~3} such that i- j. Obviously
e Tm 1(U). Hence, there is a Y c X such that
~~X - {x. } -
~Y~ - ~X~1- 2 and RXI e L(U). But then we are done by
Y
lemma 4.3.20.
Suppose ~{il, i2, i3, jl, j2, j3}I - 6.
Then we are done by theorem 4.3.23, which we will prove
hereafter.
~
In theorem 4.3.22 it is proven that U{Tm~3(U) : m e{1,2..}}
is contained in F(Ln(U)), unless F is dictatorial. It is clear
that U{Tm 3(U) : m e{1,2..}} is an odd set, that is its basic
elements,~by which all the other elements can be constructed
using permutation, concatenation, convertation, restriction and
substitution as construction tools, are enumerous.
The following theorem, the last of this section, shows that
the basic elements of F(Ln(U)) cannot be described like those of
U{Tm~3(U) : m e{1,2..}}. And by this theorem it becomes
cn1estionable if it is possible at all to describe all those basic
elements of F(Ln(U)). Hence, we are settled with the problem:
What looks the set F(Ln(U)) like?
First we introduce a new set of orderings.
T~(U) :- {RX e T(U) : there is a RX e L(U), an integer
k? 0, a set {il,i2,...,ik'~1'~2' "''~k}' with
~{il,i2,...,ik,jl,j2,...,jk}~ - 2k, and a set
{xl,x2,...,xp} - X, such that xlx2...xk : RX and
RX - {RX U ~{~xj ,xi ~ : t e {1,...,k}},X~) -
t t
t{tx. ,x. ~ : t e {1,...,k}},X~ }.
lt ~t
T.,(U) is the set of tournaments, which can be obtained form
a linear ordering by switching around a finite number of
different and disjoint pairs of that ordering. It is, althouqh
cumbersome, straightforward to prove that T~(U) can be classified
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as a set of reflexive, antisymmetric and complete orderings.
Hence, T~(U) c T(U).
On the other hand, it is not easy, if at all, to describe
T~(U). It is not evident to decide whether an arbitrary chosen
tournament RX is in T~(U) or not. Therefore the set is subscribed
with a questionmark. Of course it is possible to check for each
linear ordering RX e L(U), whether or not RX and RX satisfy the
formulation. But this procedure can cost a lot of checkings (Note
that ~L(X)~ - ~X~!). Having these arguments in mind, by the
following theorem, it is clear that F(Ln(U)) is not easily
described.
Theorem 4.3.23
Assume (4.3.19). Then T~(U) c FiU).
Proof of theorem 4.3.23
By lemma 4.3.15' there are S, T and M in 2N, such that
qD(F,S) - qD(F,T) - qD(F,M) - U2.
It is sufficient to prove that:
For all k? 0 and RX e T(U), such that RX e L(U),
xlx2...xk : RX, {il,i2,--..ik,jl,j2....,jk} c {1,2,....P}.
~{il,i2,...,ik,jl.j2....,jk}~ - 2.k and
RX - (RX U C{~xj ,xi ~ : t e {1,...,k}},X~) -
t t
~{~x. ,x. ~ : t e {1,...,k}},X~
lt ~t
there is a rX e Ln(U), such that RX - RX for all i e S fl T,
and F(rX) - RX.
The proof is by induction on k.
Basis: k- 0 is trivial, since RX e L(U).
By the Pareto-optimality F(~RX,...,RX~) - RX.
Induction step: Suppose it holds for numbers less or equal to
k- 1 and RX -(RX - ~{~x. ,x. ~},X~) U ~{~x. ,x. ~},X~.
~1 11 11 ~1
Then by the induction hypothesis there is a profile
rX e Ln(U), with RX - RX for all i e S fl T and F(rX) - RX.
Take rX e Ln(U) as follows:
RX - RX for all i e S fl T,
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RX - ~ ~ ~~ {xj }~ ~~ {x. }
1 11
ror all i E ~ i i m, aiiu
RX - RX . RX ~ RX for all i e T fl M.
~{xj } ~{x. }
1 il
Since r - r it follows that
X~X-{x. ,x. } X~X-{x. ,x. }
il ~1 11 ~1
- F(r )
~~X-{x. ,x. } X ~X-{x. ,x. }~
11 ~1 11 ~1
By the decisiveness of M it follows that ~xjl,xil~ e àF(rX).
If xt ~ xi : RX and t ~ jl, then by the decisiveness of S
1 -
~xt,xi ~ e àF(rX).
1
Similarly Cxt x. ~ e àF(rX), if ~xt x. ~ e RX and t~ il.
~ ~1 ~ ~1
If xi ~ xt : RX and t~ jl, then by the decisiveness of T
1
it follows that ~xi ,xt~ e àF(rX).
1-
Similar txjl,xt~ e àF(rX), if ~xjixt~ e RX and t~ il.
Hence, F(rX) - RX and we are done.
~
We have just seen the set F(Ln(U)) contains the set T~(U).
Lookina back to theorem 4.3.8, 4.3.12, 4.3.22 and 4.3.23 one may
come to the conclusion that the price we have to pay in order to
avoid dicatorship in an order morphism, is that its range is not
easy to opeate within the classification system. For cases where
this operation is described in transitivity terms, it is theorem
4.3.8 which states that the range is not easy to operate. For
cases, where this operation is described in terms of finite
constructions with tools as permutation, concatenation,
substitution, conversion, and restriction, theorems 4.3.12 and
4.3.23 state that the range is not easy to operate.
In theorem 4.2.8 an impossibility theorem for choice
correspondences is proved by virtue of a correspondence between
by orderings reconstructable choice correspondences and order
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morphisms. Although, this is not new in literature (See e.g.
Gibbard (1973], Satterthwaite [1975] and Muller k Satterthwaite
[1977], Satterthwaite [1975] even implicitly defined
rationalizability), the approach followed in ~ 4.2 is more
general (decision procedures others than those choosing the best
elements are not excluded). We therefore expect that new
impossibilities for choice correspondences can be derived from,
e.g., theorem 4.3.23. For reasons of time and space this is not
done here.
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~ 4.4 Impossibility Theorems Based on Non-expansiveness
In this section the effect of a weakening of the
independence of irrelevant alternatives condition is
investigated by a kind of continuity condition, called
non-expansiveness. It will give a dieper insight in the
significance of the independence of irrelevant alternatives for
impossibility results, because it does not lead to a possible
construction of a non-trivial welfare function. Since we weaken
the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition, we cannot
substitute anymore an order morphism for a welfare function.
Therefore we will return to the original model as introduced in
section 1.1. Furthermore, the neutrality condition will be
dropped. The range of the welfare functions studied here is
restricted only to the set of quasi-orderings, Q(A), for a finite
set of alternatives A. (See Storcken [1989] for similar work but
with range of A(A) and neutrality). We will prove that there does
not exist a non-dictatorial, non-expansive and Pareto-optimal
welfare function from Ln(A) to Q(A).
Firstly some distance functions on sets of orderings are
introduced and compared with similar distance functions proposed
in literature. Then it is shown that independence of irrelevant
alternatives implies non-expansiveness of a welfare function, but
not the other way around. Finally several impossiblity theorems
are proved using non-expansiveness.
In this section it will be assumed that the set of
alternatives A is fixed. To simplify notations we therefore skip
the subscript "A" at every relation or profile in this entire
section.
Let us start with distance functions on the set of
quasi-orderings. In literature the following distance function on
orderings in relation with social choice functions is often used:
d(R1,R2) - ~(R1 - R2) U( R2 - R1)~ (See e.g. Kemeny S SnellA A A A A A
[1962], Bogart [1973], Monjardet [1981], Barthélemy S Flament S
Monjardet [1982], Bezembinder [1981] and Bogart [1982]). We will
íntroduce here other distance functions. Non-expansiveness based
on our distance functions, is implied by the independence of
irrelevant alternatives. The non-expansiveness based on d is a
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very restrictive condition for welfare functions; this is
demonstrated in example 4.4.1.
Example 4.4.1.
Suppose P- ~A,N~ is a society, wíth A-{a,b,c} and
N-{1,2,3,...,n}, and F is a strongly Pareto-optimal
welfare function on P from Wn(A) to W(A).
Define dn : wn(A) x Wn(A) -~ [0,~~, for all r,r e Wn(A) as
follows: dn(r,r) .- Ei-1 d(R1,R1). dn is a distance
function.
Then F is not tan,d~-non-expansive.
Suppose F is ~dn,d~-non-expansive.
Take the following profiles in W(A).- n
r: abc : R1, r: (ab)c : R1, r: abc : R1,
cba : R2, and cba : R2, and c(ba) : R2, and
(abc) : R1, (abc) : R1, (abc) : R1,
for i~ 2, for i~ 2, for i~ 2.
Then dn(r,r) - d(R1,R1) - 1 and dn(r,r) - d(R2,R2) - 1.
Hence, d(F(r),F(r)) 5 1 and d(F(r),F(r)) 5 1. (4.4.1.1.)
Note furthermore that a~ b: F(r) and b) a: F(r) since F
is strongly Pareto-optimal.
Hence, a' b: F(r), otherwise (4.4.1.1) is not satisfied.
Similarly it follows that b' c: F(r). Since F(r) e W(A) we
have (abc) : F(r). By (4.4.1.1) it then follows that:
(bc) : F(r). Hence, (bc)a : F(r), since F(r) e W(A). But
then d(F(r),F(r)) ~ 1, which contradicts (4.4.1.1).
~
In the previous example we have just seen that the strongly
Pareto-optimality and the ~an,d~-non-expansiveness exclude each
other, when we consider welfare functions from wn(A) to W(A). A
fact which is not true for the conditions strongly
Pareto-optimality and the independence of irrelevant
alternatives: Dictatorial welfare function can be strongly
Pareto-optimal and independent of irrelevant alternatives. By
these facts it is clear that ~an,dn~-non-expansiveness is not a
good substitute for the independence condition. Therefore other
distance functions will be introduced.
The distance functions introduced here are based on the
concept of elementary changes. Moreover, these elementary changes
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play an important róle in the impossibility theorems deduced
later on. The following notion is used in the explanation of
elementary change.
Definition 4.4.2 Succession
Let x,y be two different elements in A and let R be a
relation on A. x and y succeed each other in R, iff there
are no zl,z2,...zk e A-{x,y} such that cx,zl~, czl,z2~,...
czk-1'zk~, czk,Y~ e áR, or cy,zl~, czl,z2~,..., czk-1'zk~'
~zk,x~ e áR.
Notation: x- y: sucR, where sucR is the set of all pairs
which succeed each other in R.
~
If x succeeds y in R, then there is no path along áR going
from x to y or from y to x, which visits another element
z e A-{x,y}, For instance suppose R.- {cx,y~,cy,z~,tz,t~}.
Then x- y : sucR, y- z : sucR, z- t : sucR, but not:
x- t: sucR. If furthermore, A-{x,y,z,t,s} then x- s: sucR,
y- s: sucR, z- s : sucR and t- s : sucR. The relaton
"succeed" is symmetric, irreflexive and neither complete nor
transitive in general.
Although the notion of elementary changes can be introduced
appart from the notion of succesion, it is difficult to explain
r.he former without the last. Now the definition of elementary
changes is stated.
Definition 4.4.3 Elementary Change
Suppose Vn(A) is a classified set of profiles on A,
rl, r2 e Vn(A) and x,y e A.
4.4.3.1 r and r form an elementary change of each other in {x,y},
iff R1 ~ Exy --Rl ~ Exy, for all i e{1,2,3,...,n}.
Where Exy :- c({x,y} x {x,y}).
Notation: EC(Vn(A),{x,y}) -{cr,r~ : r,r e Vn(A) form an
elementary change of each other in {x,y}}.
4.4.3.2 r and r form an elementary change of each other, iff
there are a,b e A, such that r and r form an elementary
change of each other in {a,b},
Notation: EC(Vn(A)) :- U{EC(Vn(A),{x,y}) : x,y e A}.
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r and r in Vn(A) form an elementary change of each other in
{x,y}, iff each of the corresponding components of r and r only
differs on the pair x and y. EC(Vn(A),{x,y}) is an equivalence
relation on Vn(A) and EC(Vn(A)) is a reflexive and symmetric
relation on Vn(A). The notion of elementary change has already
been introduced (See e.g. Moulin [1983]).
The next theorem provides us with tools to understand the
formal notion.
Theorem 4.4.4
Suppose a,b,x,y e A and r,r e Qn(A).
4.4.4.1 If tr,r~ e EC(Qn(A),{x,y}), then for all i e{1,...,n} :
either R1 - R1, or (x - y: sucRl and x- y: sucRl).
4.4.4.2 EC(Qn(A),{x,y}) - IdQn(A), iff x- y.
4.4.4.3 EC(Qn(A),{a,b}) fl EC(Qn(A),{x,y}) ~ IdQn(A), iff
{x,y} - {a,b} and x ~ y.
Proof of theorem 4.4.4
(4.4.4.1) Let r,r e Qn(A) such that ~r,r~ e EC(Qn(A),{x,y}).
Furthermore, suppose R1 ~ Rl and not x- y: sucRl.
It suffices to deduce a contradiction.
The following holds without loss of generality:
R1 fl Exy- - R1 fl Exy and ~x,zl~, ~zl,z2~,... cz2 zk~,.
~zk,y~ e aRl, where zl,...z~ e A-{x,y}.
Hence, tx,y~ e áR1, since R e Q(A) and ~x,zl~' ~zl'z2~' "''
~zk,y~ e aRl. Hence, Rl - R1, which contradicts our
assumptions.
(4.4.4.2) Evident.
(9.4.4.3) (if) is trivial by (4.4.4.2).
(only if) Suppose {x,y} ~ {a,b}.
If either x- y or a- b we are again done by (4.4.4.2).
Suppose furthermore a~ b and x~ y.
Let ~r,r~ e EC(Qn(A),{x,y}) I1 EC(Qn(A),{a,b}). It suffices
to prove that r- r. But this is obvious since for all
i e{1,2,...,n}: R1 fl Exy - R1 rl Exy and
Rl fl Eab - Rl fl Eab, where Eab U Exy - A x A.
~
Note that (4.4.4) gives us further information about an
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elementary change. Two relations R1 and R2 in Q(A) form an
elementary change in {x,y}, iff R1 - R2 or x and y succeed each
other in R1 and R2 and they differ only on x and y.
In the rest of this section EC(Q(A)) and EC(Ln(A)) play an
ímportant róle. Therefore some pictorial information about these
relations is given. That is the neighbourhood graphs of distance
functions. First these distance functions are introduced.
Definition 4.4.5 qn distance based on elementary changes on Qn(A)
qn is a function from Qn(A) x Qn(A) to {0,1,2,3,4...}, such
that for all r,r e Qn(A):
qn(r,r) :- min {k : there are r~-r,rl,r2,..rk-r e Qn(A),
such that for all i e{O,l,...,k-1}:
~r1,r1}1~ e EC(Qn(A))}
qn(r,r) is the minimum number of elementary changes needed
to transform r into r, such that all these changes result in
intermediate profiles which are still in Qn(A). Before continuing
it is inevitable to proof:
Theorem 4.4.6
qn is a well-defined distance function on Qn(A).
Proof of theorem 4.4.6
It is sufficient to proof that for all R e Q(A) there are
RC - R, R1, R2...Rk - A x A, such that ~R1,R1}1~ e EC(Q(A))
for all i e {O,l,...,k-1}.
Let R be in Q(A). Because ~A~ is finite there is a pair
x,y e A such that x- y : sucR. If for all those pairs
x- y: R we are done since then àR -~. If x~ y: R, take
R' - R U {~y,x~}, Obviously tR,R'~ e EC(QlA)) and by a
simple induction reasoning on ~àR~ we are done.
~ -
To avoid indices, as notational convention we will write q
instead of ql.
The neighbourhood graph G~Q(A) q~ is obiously a graph which
visualizes EC(Q(A)). Let us draw this graph for ~A~ - 3, because




Let A - {x,y,z},
By the foregoing it is straightforward that the
neighbourhood graph of ~Q(A),q~ is as follows:
xiz uxz~ ~
~~XJ l ~ ` Jz





I~ ` j, I
` .





















Here the 19 relations in Q(A) are represented by their
representation how they order x,y and z. For instance
xyz : R means R- r{tx,y~,~x,z~,~y,z~} or graphically:
x.-~-.y-~-.z . R.
i ~ ~
(xy)z : R' means R' - R U{~y,x~} or graphícally:





L(xy)~ : R" means R" - R' U{tz,x~} or graphically:(xz)
x. . y-~-. z . R" .
i ~
The other relations have similar interpretations.
Furthermore, if R1 R2, then ~R',R2~ e EC(Q(A),{x,y}),
if R1 --- R2, then ~R',R2~ e EC(Q(A),{y,z}),
and if R1 --- R2, then ~R',R2~ e EC(Q(A),{x,z}).
Naturally there are only (2) - 3 types of elementary
changes.
~
Notice that ~Qn(A),qn~ is a full metric space, -which
evidently follows from the definition of the qn-distance. qn is
defined on the basis of elementary changes in Qn(A). Of course we
can also consider elementary changes in Ln(A) in that case we
get:
Definition 4.4.8 ln -distance based on elementary changes
on Ln(A)
ln is a function from Ln(A) x Ln(A) to {0,1,2,...}, such
that for all r,r e Ln(A):
ln(r,r) :- min{k : there are r~ -r,rl, ...rk-l,rk-r e Ln(A),
such that for all i e{0,1,2,...k-1}:
~ri~ritl~ e EC(Ln(A))}.
~
ln has a similar interpretation as qn, with the only
difference that the elementary steps are now restricted to Ln(A).
Formally it should be proven that ln is a distance function.
Again it is sufficient to prove that EC(Ln(A)) is connected. But
since this is straightforward to prove, we have:
Theorem 4.4.9
ln is a well-defined distance function on Ln(A).
~
Evidently for all r,r e Ln(A) it holds that
ln(r,r) ? qn(r,r). In general we do not know, whether or not this
inequality is strict.
Again by defínition ~Ln(A),ln~ is a full metric space and as
notational convention 1 is used instead of 11.
265
Next the neighbourhood graph of ~Ln(A),1~ is drawn for
~A~ - 4.
Example 4.4.10
Take A-{x,y,z,t}. It is cumbersome but straightforward to
prove that the neighbourhood graph of ~Ln(A),1~ is as
follows:
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Here again the relations are represented by their
representation of the ordering of the elements in A.
Furthermore: if R1 R2, then cR1,R2~ e EC(L(A),{x,y}),
if R1.--- R2, then cR1,RZ~ e EC(L(A),{y,z}),
if R1---- R2, then cR1,R2~ e EC(L(A),{x,z}),
if R1 ........ R2, then cR1,R2~ e EC(L(A),{y,t}),
if R1 ~nivv R2, then cR1,R2~ e EC(L(A),{z,t}),
and if R1 -o-o-o- R2, then cR1,R2~ e EC(L(A),{x,t}).
After introducing qn and ln distances it is a small step to
think of an introduction of a distance function based on
elementary steps for any classified set of orderings. But taking
the weak orderings for instance it follows from example 4.4.7
that there is no elementary change from the relation (xyz) to any
other weak ordering. Hence, EC(Wn(A)) is not connected in general
and therefore cWn(A),wn~ ís not a metric space. So we have to be
very careful, when defining a distance function based on
elementary changes in a classified set of profiles.
In this section only one further distance function will be
discussed.
Definition 4.4.11 cn-distance based on elementary changes
on Cn(A).
cn is a function from Cn(A) x Cn(A) to {0,1,2,...}, such
that for all r,r e Cn(A):
cn(r,r) :- min {k : There are r~-r,rl,r2, ..rk-r e Cn(A),
such that for all i e{0,1,2,...k-1}:
cri~ritl~ e EC(Cn(A))}.
~ -
Again -cn can be interpretated similar to qn and ln.
Moreover, cn is a distance function,- since EC(Cn(A)) is
connected. Again it follows that cCn(A),cn~ is a- full metric
space. Furthermore, as a notational convention c is written
instead of cl. Before we start with a comparison of the different
distance functions introduced here let us make a remark on the
distances compared with the dn-distance: The main difference
between cn, qn and ln on one side and dn on the other is the
difference in the betweenness relation. For instance (xy)z is
267
between xyz and yxz-according to the dl-distance. This is not the
case for c, q and 1. Noting that this betweenness property was
extensively used in example 4.4.1 it becomes hopeful that cn' qn
and ln are suitable distances. That is, perhaps they do not have
the draw-back of conflicting with the strong Pareto-optimality.
Let us now come to some properties of these distance
functions.
Theorem 4.4.12
Suppose A e~, N-{1,2,...,n} and r,r e Cn(A).
Then cn(r,r) -~~U{R1 ~` R1: i e N} U U{vRl ~` vRl: i e N}~,
where Rl ~` R1 .- (R1 - Rl) U(R1 - R1) is the symmetric
difference between Rl and R1.
Proof of theorem 4.4.12
Note that: ~x,y~ e R1 ~` R1, iff ~y,x~ e vRl ~` vRl.
Hence, ~~(R1 ~` R1) U(vRl ~` vRl)~ is equal to the number
of not ordered pairs {x,y} on which R1 and Rl differ. Hence,
~~U{R1 ~` R1 : i e N} U U{vRl ~` vRl : i e N}~ is equal to
the number of not ordered pairs on which r and r differ. So
cn(r,r) ? ~~U{R1 ~ R1 : i e N} U U{vRl ~` vRl : i e N}~.
Since R- (R' ~ Exy) U ( R" ~{x,y} x{x,y}) is strongly
complete if R' and R" are strongly complete it follows that
all these differences between r and r eause only as many
elementary steps as there are different ordered pairs
involved. Hence,
cn(r,r) 5}~U{R1 ~` R1 : í e N} U U{vRl ~` vR1 : i e N}~.
~
The following theorem uncovers some logical relationship
between the distances introduced here.
Theorem 4.4.13
Let A e ~.
4.4.13.1 For all r,r e Qn(A) : cn(r,r) 5 qn(r,r). -
4.4.13.2 For all r,r e Ln(A) : cn(r,r) 5-qn(r,r) 5 ln(r,r).
4.4.13.3 For all R,R e L(A) : c(R,R) - q(R,R) - 1(R,R).
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Proof of theorem 4.4.13
(4.4.13.1) and (4.4.13.2) are evident.
(4.4.13.3) it is sufficient to prove by induction on k? 0, that
for all R,R e L(A), with c(R,R) 5 k:
1(R,R) -~~(R ~` R) U(vR ~` vR)~.
Basis: k- 0 is trivial.
Induction step: Suppose R,R e L(A) are such that c(R,R) - k.
Obviously since A-{al,a2,...,ap} is finite there are ai
and aitl such that ala2a3...aiaitl...ap . R and
ai t aitl : R.
Take ala2a3 " ' ai-laitlaiait2...ap : R' in L(A).
Then ~R,R'~ e EC(L(A),{ai'aitl}) and c(R,R') - 1.
Moreover it is evident that c(R,R') -
~~(R ~` R') U ( vR ~` vR')~ ~;~(R ~` R) U(vR ~` vR)~ - k.
Hence, by the induction hypothesis it follows that:
c(R,R') - 1(R,R') and c(R',R) - 1(R',R) - 1.
Using the triangle inequality it follows:
1(R,R) 5 1(R',R) t 1(R,R')
-~I(R' ~ R) U(~R' ~` vR)~ t~I(R' ~` R) U(vR' ~` vR)~.
Note that ( R' ~` R) U(vR' ~ vR) -{tai,aitl~'~aitl'ai~}
and {~ai,aitl~,caitl,ai~} ~ L(R' ~` R) U(vR' ~` vR)l - ~p.
Hence, 1(R,R) 5~~(R ~` R) U(vR ~` vR)~.
In generai c (r,r) - q ír,r) for aïl
nlQn(A) x Qn(A) n
r,r e Qn(A). By 4.9.13 if follows that,if n- 1 and R,R e- L(A)
c(R,R) - q(R,R) - 1(R,R). Hence, q and c are extensions of 1. The
question is are they different on Q(A) x Q(A) the domain of q.
This wíll be answered in the following example.
Example 4.4.14
In general for all r,r e Qn(A) cn(r,r) 5 qn(r,r).
Moreover c((xz)y,y(xz)) - 2 and
q((xz)y,y(xz)) - 3 (See example 4.4.7).
Hence, in general for all n, cn ~ qn on Qn(A).
~
` It is still an open question whether or not qn differs from
cn on Ln(A) and whether or not qn differs from in on Ln(A).
For each introduced distance function we are now able to
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define non-expansiveness conditions according to definition
3.4.4. We will now deduce some relations between these non-
expansiveness conditions. Furthermore, it is shown that the
independence of irrelevant alternatives implies those
non-expansiveness conditions.
Theorem 4.4.15
Suppose V and W are classified sets of orderings,
N-{1,2,..,n}, A e 1E, and F is a welfare function on
P- cA,N) from Vn(A) to W(A).
4.4.15.1 Zf Vn(A) - Ln(A), W(A) c C(A) and F is independent of
irrelevant alternatives, then F is cln,c~-non-expansive.
4.4.15.2 If Vn(A) c Q(A), cVn(A),qn~ is a full metric space,
W(A) c C(A) and F is independent of irrelevant alternatives,
then F is cqn,c~-non-expansive.
4.4.15.3 If Vn(A) c Cn(A), cVn(A),cn~ is a full metric space,
W(A) c C(A) and F is independent of irrelevant alternatives,
then F is ccn,c~-non-expansive.
4.4.15.4 If cVn(A),dn~ is a metric space,-W(A) c Q(A) and F is
cdn,q~-non-expansive, then F is cdn,c~-non-expansive.
4.4.15.5 If cVn(A),dn~ is a metric space,-W(A) c L(A) and F is
cdn,l~-non-expansive, then F is cdn,q~-non-expansive.
4.4.15.6 If Vn(A) c Qn(A), cW(A),d~ is-a metric space and F is
cen,d~-non-expansive, then F is cqn,d~-non-expansive.
4.4.15.7 If Vn(A) - Ln(A), cW(A),d~ is-a metric space and F is
cqn,d~-non-expansive, then F is cln,d~-non-expansive.
Proof of theorem 4.4.15
(4.4.15.1),(4.4.15.2) and (4.4.15.3) It suffices by theorem 3.4.8
to prove that, if cr,r') e EC(Vn(A),{x,y}), then
~F(r),F(r')~ e EC(W(A),{xy}).
Suppose cr,r'~ e EC(Vn(A),{x,y}), Ax - A-{x} and
Ay - A - {y}.
Since cr,r') e EC(Vn(A),{x,y}) is equivalent to r - r'
~~ ~~
and rl - r'I . It follows from the independence of
Ay Ay
irrelevant alternatives condition of F, that
F(r) - F(r') and F(r) - F(r') . This is again
~Ax ~Ax ~AY IAY
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equivalent to cF(r),F(r')~ e EC(W(A),{xy}).
All the other theorems follow immediate from (4.4.13.1) and
(4.4.13.2).
If we take implicitly the appropriate domains and codomains
we can deduce the following implication structure from theorem
4.4.15.
Independence ~ cc ,c~-non- c cc ,q~-non-f-c-







cq ,c~-non- ~c~ cq ,q~-non- ~c~ cq ,1~-non-






~ cl ,c~-non- c cl ,q~-non-~c-~ cl ,1~-non-
e~pansive
The proof of theorem 4.4.15 clarifies the difference between
the non-expansiveness conditions and the independence condition.
The latter condition implies that for all x,y e A elementary
changes in {x,y} are mapped on elementary changes in {x,y}, a
concequence which is not only necessary but also sufficient (See
e.g. Blau [1971]). In the former condition however it is possible
that an elementary change in {x,y} is mapped on one in {a,b}.
By theorem 4.4.15 it follows that the independence condition
can be replaced by a non-expansiveness conditions in order to
weaken the assumptions about welfare functions. Since this
independence of irrelevant alternatives and strongly
Pareto-optimality do not exclude each other (e.g. take a suitable
dictatorship), it follows by theorem 4.4.15 that the non-
expansiveness conditions do not have the draw-backs exposed in
example 4.4.1. This is a reason to investigate whether or not
impossibilities, as deduced in ~4.3, can be avoided by
substituting non-expansiveness for the independence condition. We
already pointed out that this substitution does not help in
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avoiding dictatorship. The proofs of these new impossibility
theorems make use of the notions introduced in ~3.5. Before
deducing any impossibility result, some preparations involving
standard neighbourhoods are needed. We reconsider neighbourhood
graphs.
Recall example 4.4.7 and 4.4.10. We start with a notational
convention. Let x,y e A. Then Q(A,x~y) :- {R e Q(A) : x~ y: R}.
Q(A,x~y) is the set of quasi-ordering in which x is strictly
prefered to y. In the same way V(A,x~y) can be defined for any
classified set V of orderings. If A-{x,y,z}, then
rxy
Q(A,x~y) - {xyz, xzy, zxy, x(yz),I(xz)~, (xz)y}.
LLL( yz )
It is in the left most part of the graph in (4.4.7). L(A,x~y) is
in the right half of the graph in (4.4.10).
From the graphs of example 4.4.10 and 4.4.7 we learn that a
relation R is in the neighbourhood of tV(A,x~y),V(A,y~x)~, iff
there are Rxy e V(A,x~y) and Ryx e V(A,y~x), such that ~R,Rxy~,
tR,Ryx~ and ~Rxy, Ryx~ e EC(V(A), {x,y}). Hence, R, Rxy and Ryx
are elementary changes of each other.
Theorem 4.4.16
Suppose V is a classified set of orderings, A e lE, x and y
in A and M- tV(A),d~ a metric space, with meshwidth mesh,
such that for all R, R' e V(A):
d(R,R') - mesh, iff ~R,R'~ e nEC(V(A)).
Then the neighbourhood NHM(V(A,x~y),V(A,y~x)) -
{R e V(A): there is a Rxy e V(A,x~y) and a Ryx e V(A,y~x),
such that {~R,Rxy~,CR,Ryx~,~Rxy,Ryx~} c EC(V(A),{x,y}) }.
Proof of theorem 4.4.16
Let V,x,y,A and M be as above.
We only prove the inclusion "c", the other inclusion is
trivial by the definitions and properties of d.
If R e NHM(V(A,x~y),V(A,y~x)), then there are RX e V(A,x~y)Y
and Ryx e V(A,y~x), such that d(R,RXy) ~ e and d(R,Ryx) ~ e
for all e~ mesh. Since V(A) is finite there must be
Rxy e V(A,x~y) and Ryx e V(A,y~x), such that d(R,Rxy) 5 mesh
and d(R,Ryx) 5 mesh.
Since Rxy ~ Ryx let wíthout loss of generality R~ Rxy.
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Then obviously ~R,Rxy~ e EC(V(A)).
Now we have two cases:
Case 1 R- Ryx. Then ~Rxy,Ryx~ e nEC(V(A),{x,y}) and we are done.
Case 2 R~ Ryx. Then CRyx,R~ e EC(V(A),{a,b}) and
~R,Rxy~ e EC(V(A),{c,d}), for some a,b,c,d e A.
Subcase 2A {a,b} ~ {c,d}. Then {x,y} ~ {a,b} or {x,y} ~ {c,d}.
Without loss of qenerality suppose {x,y} ~{a,b}.
Then y ~ x: R e V(A,y~x), since Eab ~ R- Eab ~ Ryx.
So {c,d} -{x,y} and we are done by taking Rxy and R- Ryx.
Subcase 2B {a,b} -{c,d}. Since EC(V(a,b),{a,b}) is an
equivalence relation, we are done.
~
In the next theorem we prove that these neighbourhoods of
~V(A,x~y),V(A,y~x)~ almost determine a linear ordering. For every
R e L(A), such that x1x2...xp : R, there are Rx x e Q(A), such
itl i
~R,Rx x~ e nEC(Q(A),{xi'xitl})~ for all i e{1,2,...p-1}.
1}1 i
Hence, for each R e L(A) there are (p-1) different types of
non-trivial elementary change in which R is involved. Consider
the sets of elementary changes in which an ordering R' e Q(A) is
non-trivially involved. From the pictures of example 4.4.7 and
4.4.10 one can see, if we have (p-1) different elementary
changes, then there are precisely three relations
k1,RZ,R3 e Q(A), which are non-trivially involved in all those
changes. Furthermore, {R1,RZ,R3} has the form {R,vR,A x A}, with
R e L(A). This pictorial obtained result is formally verified in
the next theorem. The previous theorem together with theorem
4.4.18 and corollary 3.5.11 points out our goal.
Theorem 4.4.17
Suppose V is a classified set of ordeings, A e~, R e L(A),
R e V(A), A-{al,a2,...,ap}, alaZ....ap : R, V(A) c Q(A),
M- tV(A),d~ is a me}ric space, with meshwidth mesh, such
that for all R',R" e V(A) .
d(R",R') - mesh, iff ~R',R"~ e nEC(V(A)).
If R e NHM(V(A,ai~aitl),V(A,aitl~ai)) for all i e{l,..p-1},
then R e{R,vR,A x A}.
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Proof of theorem 4.4.17
Suppose all variables are as above and for all i e{l,..p-1}
R e NHM(V(A,ai~aitl)'V(A'aitl~ai))'
Hence, for all i e{1,2,3,...,p-1} it follows by theorem
4.4.16 that there are Ra a ~ V(A,ai~aitl) and
- i itl - - - -
Ra a e V(A,aitl~ai), such that
tR,Raiaitl,~ ~Raitlai~R~~itl i
~R ,R ~ e EC(V(A),{a.,a. }). Moreover, by (4.4.4)
aitlai aiaitl 1 ltl
it then follows for all i e{1,2,...,p-1} that
ai-aitl - sucR, ai'aitl ~ sucRaiaitl, ai-aitl : sucRaitlai'
Now we prove two claims.
Claim 4.4.17.1 For all i e{1,...p-1} and all x e A-{ai'aitl} '
4.4.17.1a ai ~ x: R, iff aitl ~ x: R, and
4.4.17.1b x C ai : R, iff x~ aitl ' R'
Proof of claim 4.4.17.1
(Only if of 4.4.17.1a) Suppose ai ~ x: R.
Since x é{aitl,ai} it follows from
~R,
Raitlai~
e EC(V(A),{ai,aitl}) that ai ~ x-
Raitlai
Hence, by the ~á2,á~-transitivity of R it follows:
- aitlai-
aitl ~ x: Ra a, which yields aitl ~ x: R, with- - itl i
~R,Ra, a.~ e EC(V(A),{ai'aitl})'itl i
All the other implications are similar.
Claim 4.4.17.2 For all i e{1,...p-2} :
4.4.17.2a ai ~ aitl ' R, iff aitl ~ ait2 : R, and
4.4.17.2b aitl ~ ai : R, iff ait2 ~ aitl ' R'
Proof of claim 4.4.17.2
(Only if of 4.4.17.2a) Suppose ai ~ aitl : R and aít2 ~ aitl ' R'
By (4.4.17.1) it follows ai ~ ait2 : R and ait2 ? ai : R.
This cannot be the case.
Similarly the other implications can be deduced.
We will now finish the proof of theorem 4.4.17.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 There is an index i with ai ~ aitl : R or aitl ~ ai : R.
By a successive use of claim 4.4.8.2 it follows:
R e{R, vR} and we are done.
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Case 2 For all i e{1,2,...,p} ai - aitl . R.
It is sufficient to prove that R- A x A.
Suppose ai ~ aj : R.
Without loss of generality suppose i ~ j.
Then j ~ i t 1 and by (4.4.17.1a) it follows aitl ~ aj'
Hence, j~ i t 2. Repetition of this reason leads obviously
to a contradiction, since ~A~ - p~~.
~
We will now prove some other prelimenary lemma's in order to
apply corollary 3.5.11.
Lemma 4.4.18
Suppose A e lE, with ~A~ - p, and x,y e A.
4.4.18.1 If R1 e L(A) and R2 e Q(A), then c(R1,R2) - ~R2 fl cRl~.
4.4.18.2 If R1 e L(A) and R2,R3 e Q(A), such that R2 c R3, then
c(R1,R3) ? c(R1,R2).
4.4.18.3 If R1 e L(A) and R2 e Q(A), such that áR2 c vRl, then
c(R1,R2) - (2).
-
4.4.18.4 If R1,R2,R3 e L(A,x~y), with ~R3,vR1~ e EC(L(A),{xy}),
then c(R1,R2) t c(R2,R3) - c(R1,R3)-- (2) -1.
4.4.18.5 For all R,R e L(A) and for all R e Q(A):
R e[R,R]~Q(A) ~~, iff R e L(A) 6 R fl R c R.
Proof of lemma 4.4.18
Let A e lE be such that ~A~ - p and let x,y e A.
(4.4.18.1.) Suppose R1 e L(A) and R2 e Q(A). Then
c(R1,R2) - ~~(R1-R2) U (R2-R1) U (vRl-vR2) U (vR2-vRl)~
-~ ~( R1f1éR2 ) U( R2f1cR1) U( vRlflcvR2 ) U( vR2f1cvR1 ) ~
-~ ~( nR1f1cR2 ) U( R2f1óR1 ) U( cRlflcvR2 ) U( vR2f1nR1) ~
-}~{nRl fl (cR2 U vR2)} U{cRl fl (R2 U cvR2)}~
-~ ~{ nRl fl vR2 } U{ vnRl fl R2 } ~
-(vnRl ~ R2~ - ~R2 fl cRl~.
(4.4.18.2) Suppose R1 e L(A) and R2,R3 e Q(A), such that R2 c R3.
Then c(R1,R3) - ~R3 fl cRl~ ? ~R2 fl cRl~ - c(R1,R2). -
(4.4.18.3) Suppose R1 e L(A) and R2 e Q(A), such that áR2 c vRl.
Then vRl c R2.
So c(R1,R2) ? c(R1,vR1) - ~vRl fl cRl~ - ~nRl~ -(z).
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But c(R1,R2) 5 ~{{x,y} : x~ y, x,y e A}~ -(p).
Hence, c(R1,R2) - (P).
(4.4.18.4) Suppose R1,R2,R3 e L(A,x~y), such that
~R3,vR1~ e EC(L(A),{x,y}).
Then c(R1,R3) - ~R3 f1 cR1~- ~R3 I1 vnRl~ ?(p) - 1.2
But by the triangle inequality we have:
c(R1,R3) 5 c(R1,R2) t c(R2,R3)
- ~ R2 fl cRl ~ t ~ R2 fl cR3 ~
- ~R2 f1 cRl~ t ~R2 fl c((vRl - {~y,x~}) U{~x,y~})~
- ~R2 fl cRl~ t ~R2 ft ((( nRl) -{~x,y~}) U{~y,x~})~
- ~R2 fl cRl~ t ~R2 fl ( nRl -{Cx,y~})~
- ~R2 f1 (n(A x A) - {~x,y~})~ - (2) - 1.
(4.4.18.5) Let R,R e L(A) and R e Q(A).
R e [R,R]~Q(A)~~~, iff
c(R,R) t c(R,R) - c(R,R), iff
(2) --~n(R fl R) ~-5 ~R fl c(R fl R) ~- ~R fl (cR U cR) ~
- 5 ~R (1 cR~ t ~R fl cR) ~- ~R fl cR) ~-(P) - ~n(R fl R) ~, iff
R is antisymmetric (because of the first inequality being an
equality), R e Q(A) and R fl R c R (because of the second
inequality being an equality).
~
Enough preparations have been made for the next
impossibility theorem. To avoid recapitulation of assumptions in
the sequence of theorems leading to the impossibility some
assumptions are stated here.
Assumption 4.4.19
Suppose P- ~A,N~ is a society , with ~A~ - p and
N-{1,2,...,n}, V is a classified set of orderings,
V(A) c Q(A), and F is a ~ln,c~-non-expansive and
Pareto-optimal welfare function on P from Ln(A) to V(A).
~
As a notational convention, we denote by tRS,RN-S~ the
profile ~R1,R2, ..,Rn~ e Wn(A), such that for all i e S R1 - R
and for all i e N- S R1 - R, where R and R are in W(A) a
classified set of orderings restricted to A.
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So if S-{1,2,.. ,s} c N, then CR,R,... ,R,R,R,.. ,R~.
s-times (n-s)-tímes
Let S c N and R e L(A) it is obvious that ~RS,vRN-S~ is a
profile in which the two coalitions S and N-S oppose each other
totally. Such profiles will be called maximal conflicts between S
and N-S. Now every person who has to arbitrate in such a maximal
conflict situation, will most probably come up with a
compromizing ordering R between R and vR, where the resemblance
of R and R would depend on the ratio (S~ ~ ~N~. The assumed
genelalized welfare function F in (4.4.19) is not consistent with
this procedure. See the following lemma. Hence, one may already
perceive the occurence of an impossibility.
Lemma 4.4.20
Assume (4.4.19), S c N and R e L(A).
Then F(~RS,vRN-S~) e{R, vR, A x A}.
Proof of lemma 4.4.20
Let ala2a3...ap : R. By theorem 4.4.17 it is sufficient to
prove that F(~RS,vRN-S~) e NHM(V(A,x~y),V(A,y~x)), where
{x,y} - {ai,aí~l} is arbitrary and M - ~V(A),c~.
This is proved by virtue of (3.5.11).
Define F(tR,R~) :- F(RS,RN-S~) for all R, R e L(A).
Obviously F satisfies assumption 3.5.6.
By (4.4.18.4), it follows that L(A,x~y) can be approximated
by interiors of ellipses from R and vR and radius (P).
The same holds for L(A,y~x).
Now for all R e L(A,x~y) and for all R e V(A,x~y), since
tx,y~ e áR f1 R, we have c(R,R) - ~R - èR~ 5(óR~ - 1~(p).
Furthermore, if R e V(A) - V(A,x~y), there is a linear
ordering R", with R" e L(A,y~x) and R" c R. So
c(vR",R") - c(vR",R) -(2) by (4.4.18.2) and vR" e-L(A,x~y).
Hence, V(A,x~y) circularly encloses L(A,x~y) with diameter
(p). Similar V(a,x~y) circularly encloses L(A,y~x) with
diameter (2).
This makes (3.5.11) applicable and yields the wanted result.
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So at a maximal conflict situation it is either that S is
decisive, or N-S is decisive, or there is no decision at all.
The rest of the proof towards the impossibilíty is just a
stepwise strenghtening of these decision powers.
Lemma 4.4.21
Assume (4.4.19), with ~A~ ? 3, and S c N. Then either
for all R e L(A) : F(~RS,vRN-S~) - R,- or
for all R e L(A) : F(~RS,vRN-S~) - vR, or
for all R e L(A) : F(~RS,vRN-S)) - AxA.
Proof of lemma 4.4.21
Let CR,R~ e EC(L(A),{x,y}),
Suppose F(~RS,vRN-S~) - R.
By (4.4.20) it is sufficient to prove that
vR ~ F(CRS,vRN-S~).
Suppose vR c F(~RS,vRN-S~)
Note,ln(~RS,vRN-S~~~RS~~RN-S~) - 1. -
But c(F(~RS,vRN-S~),F(~RS,vRN-S~)) ? c(R,vR) - (P) -1 ? 5.
(4.4.21.1)
Hence, F is not ~ln,c~-non-expansive, which contradicts our
assumptíon 4.4.19. We are done.
~
Lemma 4.4.21 does not hold for p- 2 since then the
inequality at (4.4.21.1) obviously is not true. Furthermore, this
lemma shows that at all maximal conflíct situations either S is
decisive, ór N-S is decisive, ór there is no decision at all,
which actually strengthens lemma 4.4.20. One might reason that
whenever S decides on all maximal conflict situations, where N-S
opposes most firmly, S is decisive at any profile, where the
opposition is not so strong. This reasoning is based on
monotonicity property, which although being natural, is not
imposed on F. Next this monotonicity is proved.
Lemma 4.4.22
Assume (4.4.19) and S c N.
Furthermore, suppose for all R e L(A) : F(~RS,vRN-S~) - R.
Then for all R,R e L(A) : F(~RS,vRN-S~) - R.
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Proof of lemma 4.4.22
By induction on k? 0 it suffices to prove for all
R,R e L(A) : if c(R,R) 5 k, then F(~RS,RN-S~) - R.
Basis: Is trivial by the Pareto-optimality.
Induction step: Let R,R e L(A), with c(R,R) - ktl.
Since tL(A),c~ is a full metric space there is a path of
elementary changes from vR to R via R.
Without loss of generality suppose the following picture:
vR R R R R ( If k-0, then
(Z)-k-1 1 k-1 1 - -
R - R - R.
If k-1, then
R - R)
Obviously it holds that:
(P)-k-1 1 k
wRS,RN-S~ 1 ~RSIRN-S~ ~RS RN-S~ ~RSIRN-S~
. ~RS RN-S~
By the induction hypothesis F(tRS~RN-S~)
F(CRS~RN-S~) - R.
By the assumptions F(~vRS,RN-S~) - vR.
R and
Using the non-expansiveness of F we have:
R :- F(~R~,RN-S~) e [vR,R] -
- ~Q(A),c~'- -
Hence, by ( 4.4.18.4) R e L(A) and vR fl R c R.
However since tR,R), ~R,R~, tF2,R~ e EC(L(A)) it follows by
(4.4.4.3) that R- R, since R~ R.
Lemma 4.4.23
Assume (4.4.19) and S c N.
Furthermore, suppose for R e L(A) : F(tRS,vRN-S~) - A x A.
Then for all R,R e L(A) : F(~RS,RN-S~) - R U R.
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Proof of lemma 4.4.23
It is sufficient to prove by induction on k? 0 that for all
R,R e L(A), with c(R,R) - k: F(~RS,RN-S~) - R U R.
Basis: ís trivial by the Pareto-optimality.
Induction step: let R,R e L(A), such that c(R,R) - k t 1.
We have the following pictorial information:
. ~RS RN-S~
(2)-k-1 I1 , 1 k
'~RS ~RN-S~ '~RS RN-S~ '~RS~RN-S~ .~RN~
F F F F F
(p)-k-1 R 1 k
.R U R .R
Where R-(R -{~a,b~}) U{~b,a~}, a~ b: R and b~ a: R
R- (R -{~x,y~}) U{~y,x~}, x~ y: R and y~ x: R.
There are two cases:
Case 1 {a,b} ~ {x,y}.
Obviously b~ a: R U R and x~ y: R U R and
a' b: R U R and y~ x: R U R.
Since c(R,R) - c(R,R) - 1 it follows that
a- b: R and x- y: R.
Hence, F(~RS,RN-S~) - R U R.
Case 2 {a,b} - {x,y}.
Obviously b~ a: R U R, a~ b : R U R,
~R U R, R U R~ e EC(Q(A)),
which again leads to F(~RS,RN-S~) - R U R.
Lemma 4.4.24
Assume (4.4.19), {n,n-l,n-2,...,n-stl} - S c N, and for all
R,R e L(A) : F(~RS RN-S~) - R. -
Then for all r e Ln(A) and R e L(A):
if for all i e S: R1 - R, then F(r) - R.
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Proof of lemma 4.4.25
Let r e L (A) and R e L(A). By the symbols ~r,RS~ wen-s
denote the profile r E Ln(A) such that R1 - R1 for all
i e N- S and Rl - R for all i e S.
Suppose ~r,r~ e EC(Ln-s(A),{x,y}) and for all R e L(A)
F(~r,RS~) - R.
It is sufficient to prove that F(~r,RS~) - R for all
R e L(A).
Take RI,R2 e L(A) such that ~R1,R2~ e EC(L(A),{x,y})
x~ y: RI and y~ x: R2.
Take a shortest path R1,R2,R3,...R(p) - vRI in L(A) of
2
elementary changes.
Denote F(cr,RiS~) - R~.
It suffices to prove Ri - Ri, for all í e{1,2,...,(2)}.
We have now the followíng picture of elementary changes:
R1 -,R2 - i3 - i4 -... - i(P)-1 - i(P)~ ~i2
- R3 - R4 - ... - R(2)-1 - R(2)
Here an arc means that its end points are elementary
changes.
We continue by first proving a claim.
Claim 4.4.24.1 Let X~,X1,X2,....,Xk be a shortest path of
elementaire changes in Q(A), such that Xp,Xk e L(A),
c(X~,Xk) - k.
Suppose ~X~,Y~,~Y,XI~ e EC(Q(A)) and Y e L(A).
Then X1 - Y.
Proof of claim 4.4.29.1
we have XQ - X1 - X~ -.....- Xk
` ~
Y
Since CX~,XI~, ~XI,Y~, ~Y,X~~ e EC(Q(A)) it follows that
tX~,Xl~, tX1,Y~, tY,X~~ e EC(Q(A),{a,b}) for some a,b e A.
without loss of generality let a~ b: X~ and b~ a: Y.
Now b? a: X1, otherwise c(XI,Xk) - c(X~,Xk), which would
contradict the shortest walk assumption.
If b~ a: XI, then Y- XI. ~
If b` a: XI, then it follows that c(Xk,Xl) ? c(Xk,XO),
since X~ c X1, which contradicts our distance assumption.
This completes the proof of claim 4.4.24.1.
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Obviously ~R1,R2~,~R2,RZ~,~R2,R1~ e EC(Q(A),{x,y}).
Hence, R2 e{R1, R2, R1 U R2} and similarly
R(p) e{vRl, vR2, vRl U vR2}. Now there are several
2




R p - `
(2) `
R1 R2 R1 U R2
vRl I II I
vR2 I I III
vRl U vR2 III I I
Case I c(R1,R(p)) -(P). But q(R2,R(p)) 5(P) - 1, this
2 2
contradicts (4.4.13.1).
Case II Since c(R2,R(p)) -(z)-1, R2,R3,...,R(p) is a shortest
2 2
path. Using claim 4.4.24.1 succesively we are done.
Case I I I Now R2 fl Exy - R2 fl Exy, R( p) fl Exy - R( p) fl Exy,
x? y: R2 and x? y: R(p) .
2
Hence, for ~a,b~ e Exy, a~ b, it is either ~a,b~ e R2 ór
~a,b~ e R(p).
2
Suppose y~ x: Ri, for some 2 ~ i~(2).
Then c(R2,Ri) -
-;~{~a,b~ e nExy :( ~a,b~ e R2 and ~a,b~ é Ri) or
(~a,b~ é R2 and ~a,b~ e Ri)}~ t 1
--~{~a,b~ e nExy :( ta,b~ e Ri and ta,b~ é R2)}~ t 1.
Similar c(Á(p),Ri) -
2
- ~{~a,b~ e nExy :( ~a,b~ e Ri and ~a,b~ ~ R(p)}~ f 1.
- - 2
Hence, c(R2,Ri) t c(Ri,R(p)) ?~~Exy~ t 2-(P) t 1.
2
This contradicts the fact that Ri is on a shortest path from
R2 to R(p) and therefor we have for all i e{2,3,...,(p)}
2
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that x ? y : Ri.
Note that y~ x: Ri for i e{2,3,...,(2)},
Since cRi,Ri) e EC(Q(A)) it follows that
cRi,Ri~ e EC(Q(A),{x,y}).
Suppose y~ a~ x: Ri for some i e{2,3,...,(P)}.
Then, since Ri fl Exy, it follows a~ x: Ri and y~ a: Ri
Hence, Ri is not cá2,á~-transitive.
So: not y~ a~ x. Ri for all a e A -{x,y} and
i e{2,3,...,(2)}, Since this obviously only holds when
~A~ 5 2 we have our final contradiction which includes this
case.
At the end of this epistle about consequences of
decisiveness, we only have to prove a theorem about the
interference between two such decisive coalitions. This theorem
is similar to (4.3.7).
Lemma 4.4.25
Assume (4.4.19), ~A~ ? 3, S,T,M e 2N, with S fl T fl M- cp and
S U T U M- N.
Then it cannot be the case that, for all X e{S,T,M} and
R e L(A): F(cRX,vRN-X~) - R.
Proof of lemma 4.4.25
Suppose for all X e{S,T,M} and for all R e L(A):
F(cRX~~RN-X~) - R.
Let A-{a,b,x,dl,d2,...,dk}, where k- p-3.
It will be proven that the profile r e Ln(A) has no image,
hence we have a contradiction. Here r is defined as follows:
abcdld2.....dk : Rl for all i e S fl T,
bcadld2.....dk : R1 for all i e T(1 M, and
cabdld2.....dk : R1 for all i e S fl M.
Let rl e Ln(A) be defined as follows:
abcdld2.....dk : Ri for all i e S fl T,
abcdld2.....dk : Ri for all i e T fl M, and
cabdld2.....dk : Ri for all i e S fl M.
Then by the foregoing lemma's and the decisiveness
assumption of T it follows that abcdld2.....dk : F(rl).
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Furthermore, 1(rl,r) - 2, hence c(F(rl),F(r)) 5 2.
Take r2: bacdld2.....dk : Rl for all i e S ~ T,
bacdld2.....dk : Rl for all i e T ~ M, and
cabdld2.....dk : R1 for all i e S ~ M.
Similarly it follows that bacdld2.....dk . F(r2) and
c(F(r2),F(r)) 5 2.
By similar reasonings using the decisiveness of S and M,
there are r3,r4,r5,r6 e Ln(A), with c(F(r),F(ri)) 5 2, for
all i e{3,4,5,6} and acbdld2.....dk : F(r3),
cabdld2.....dk : F(r4), bcadld2.....dk : F(r5), and
cbadld2.....dk : F(r6).
Take Ri - F(ri) for i e{1,..6} and R- F(r) .
~{a,b,c} ~{a,b,c}
Obviously {R1, R2,...R6} - L({a,b,c}), R e Q({a,b,c}), and
c(R,Ri) 5 2 for all i e{1,2,..6}. Since there evidently is
a R e L({a,b,c}), with aR c R this is impossible.
Now we can prove some impossibility results.
Theorem 4.4.26
Suppose P- tA,N~ is a society, with ~A~ ? 3 and
N-{1,2,..,.n}, V is a classified set of orderings and F is
a welfare function from Ln(A) to V(A) c Q(A) on P, with
{R U R: R,R e L(A)} ~ V(A). -
Then F is not simultaneously, Pareto-optimal, not strongly
dictatorial and ~ln,c~-non-expansive.
Proof of theorem 4.4.26
Let all the variables be as above and suppose F is
non-díctatorial, Pareto-optimal and ~ln,c~-non-expansive.
By the assumption that V(A) ~{R U R: R,R e L(A)} it
follows from lemma 4.4.23 that for all S c N there ís a
R e L(A), such that F(CRS,vRN-S~) ~ A x A. -
Using lemma 4.4.21, 4.4.22 and 4.4.24 we have that for all
S c N there is a X e {S, N-S}, such that for all r e Ln(A)
and all R e L(A):
if Rl - R, for all i e X, then F(r) - R. (4.4.26.1)
By the non-dictatorship of F it follows that for all i e N
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all Ni :- N-{i} and all R e L(A) : F(~R{i},vRN-{i}~) - vR.
Since N is finite there is a smallest S c N satisfying
(4.4.26.1).
If (S~ - 1, we have our dictator, and therefor a
contradiction.
If ~S~ ? 2. Take i e S. By (4.4.25) S- {i} has again
property (4.4.26.1) (use S,Ni). Hence, we have a
contradiction on the minimality of S.
This easily leads to the following result.
Corollary 4.4.27
Suppose P- tA,N~ is a society, with ~A~ - p and ~N~ - n, F
is a Pareto-optimal and ~ln,c~-non-expansive welfare
function from Ln(A) to V(A) c Q(A) on P, where V is
classified as a set of orderings.
Then F is strongly dictatorial if one of the following is
the case:
4.4.27.1 3 5 ~A~ - p 5 5 and V(A) c Q(A),
4.4.27.2 ~A~ - p? 3 and V(A) c W(A),
4.4.27.3 ~A~ - p? 3 and A x A~ V(A), or
4.4.27.4 ~A~ - p? 4 and V(A) c I(A).
Proof of corollary 4.4.27
(4.4.27.1) Note that if ~A~ - p, p e{3,4,5}, then
{R U R: R,R e L(A)} - Q(A). Hence, in that case we are
trivialy done by ( 4.4.26).
(4.4.27.2) If V(A) c W(A), then obviously
{R U R: R,R e L(A)} ~ V(A) and we can use (4.4.26)
straightforwardly.
(4.4.27.3) and (4.4.27.4) are similar to (4.4.27.2).
~
We finish this sequence of impossibilitíes with one in which
the domain is not restricted to Ln(A).
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Theorem 4.4.28
Let P-~A,N~ be a society, with ~A~ ? 3 and ~N~ - n. Let F
be a welfare function on P from Wn(A) to V(A), where V and W
are classified sets of orderings, with
{R U R: R,R e L(A)} ~ V(A), EC(Wn(A)) is connected and
W(A),V(A) c Q(A).
Then F is not simultaneously Pareto-optimal, ~qn,c~-non-
expansive and not strongly-semi-dictatorial. Where F is
strongly-semi-dictatorial, iff there is an i e N such that
for all r e Wn(A) : if R1 e L(A), then F(r) - R1.
Proof of theorem 4.4.28
Obviously F is dictatorial.
~Ln(A)
Observing that in (4.4.24) essentially only the
connectedness of Ln(A) is used, it becomes clear that the
dictator of F is a semi-dictator of F.
~Ln(A)
~
Evidently the other non-expansiveness criteria lead also to
impossibilities. However, one has to take care of the
correspondence between the domain of the distance functions and
the (co)domain of the welfare functions. The obvious idea that
non-expansiveness is a weaker condition than the independence of
irrelevant alternatives needs some formal proof. This is done by
the following example:
Example 4.4.29
In this example we will define a strongly Pareto-optimal,
neutral, strongly positively associated, anonymous,
~cn,q~-non-expansive and not weakly dictatoríal welfare
function F on P-~A,N~, where ~A~ ? 3 and ~N~ - n? 4, from
Ln(A) to Q(A). The proof that this F has all the properties
stated above is in Storcken [1988]. The reader may verify
this.
Let P-~A,N~, ~A~ ? 3 and ~N~ - n? 4. We will first define
some classes of profiles in Ln(A) on which coalítions have
some decisive power. These classes are far from each other
in the 1-distance sense. Hence, there is no interference of
286
these decisiveness powers. Let V~a b~ for a,b e A, a~ b, be
defined as follows:
V~a b~ :- {r e Ln(A): there is a numbering x3 up to xp of
A-{a,b}, there are R1,R2,R3,R4 e L(A) and four
coalitions S1,S2,S3,S4 c N which form a partition
of N, such that:
(1) ~52~ - ~53~ - ~54~ - 1.
(2) for all i e N: Rt - R1, iff i e St, where
abx3x4.......xp . R1,
xpxp-l...x4x3ab : R2,
ax3x5x7..bx4x6.. : R3, and
...x8x6x4b..xllx9x3x5a : R4}.
Define F: Ln(A) -~ Q(A) as follows
c{~b,a~}, iff r e V for some a,b e A.
F(r) : ~a,b~
- U{Rl : i e N}, iff r é V~a~b~ for all a,b e A.
Then it is straightforward, but cumbersome and technical, to
prove that F is a well-defined, strongly Pareto-optimal,
strongly positively associated, ~ln,q~-non-expansive,
neutral, anonymous and not weakly dictatorial.
This example makes two things clear:
(1) The independence condition is stronger than the
non-expansiveness condition, even under very strong other
assumption imposed on a welfare function.
(2) The conditions of (4.4.26), (4.4.27), ( 4.4.28) about the
range of F are necessary.
Because the independence of irrelevant alternatives
condition implies non-expansiveness and not the other way
arround, it is clear that the above stated theorems are stronger
than well-known impossibilities as discussed in ~ 4.3.
In literature this insight is already developing (See
Chichilnisky ~ Heal (1983], Chichilnisky [1969, 1980 and 1982],
Visser [1988], and Baigent [1985 and 1987]). However, the results
presented here are not comparable to those in literature, since
other conditions are imposed on the welfare function. Instead of
non-dictatorship, anonymity is imposed. Furthermore, in almost
all works (except for Baigent [1987] and Visser [1988]) ~A~ is
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not finite. Moreover, in Baigent [1987] as well as in the others
the independence of irrelevant alternatives is replaced by
continuity (when ~A~ is not finite) or proximity-preservation
(See (4.4.3.1.)). Although at first sight non-expansiveness seems
to be stronger than continuity, it is obvious from chapter 3 that
non-expansiveness as used here is in fact a continuity property.
However, it is not clear which property is the stronger one:
non-expansiveness for discrete metric spaces or continuity for
~infinite' spaces, because they are not comparable. Even their
topological spaces are not comparable. But we can compare
proximity-preservation and non-expansiveness.
In general it is still an open question whether a specific
interpretation of proximity-preservation implies a specific
non-expansiveness condition. On the other hand, the independence
condition does not imply it, which is shown by the following
example. Hence, several non-expansiveness conditions do not imply
this proximity conditon.
Example 4.4.30
Let F be a welfare function on society ~A,N~, such that
p- IAI '- 3, (N~ - n and A-{x,Y,a3,a4,...,ap}, from Wn(A)
to W(A), defined as follows:
RxY iff r e Wn(A, x~ y)
F(r)
RYx iff r e Wn(A) - Wn(A, x~ y),
where Wn(A, x~ y) -{r e Wn(A): for all i e N, x ~ y: R1},
xya3a4...ap : Rxy and yxa3a4...a : Rp yx'
Obviously F is ~qn,q~-non-expansive, independent of
irrelevant alternatives, anonymous, non-dictatorial. But F
is neither Pareto-optimal nor proximity-preserving for all
íts interpretations.
The former is trivial, the last is shown now.
Take rl - ~Rxy,RZ,R3,...,Rn~, r2 - ~RZ,R2,R3, ..,Rn~,
r3 - ~Ryx,R2,R3, ..,Rn~, such that RZ,R3, ..Rn e W(A, x~ y)
and a3xya4a5...ap : RZ.
Then dq(rl,r2) ~ dq(rl,r3).
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But q(F(rl),F(r2)) ~ q(F(rI),F(r3)). Hence, F is not
proximity-preserving.
~
Example 4.4.30 shows that proximity preservation is not a
weaker condition than the independence of irrelevant alternatives
or a non-expansiveness conditions. Since the F of (4.4.30) is
anonymous this holds even under anonymous functions. Clearly, if
F is Pareto-optimal we have dictatorship, which evidently
preserves proximity.
This is also done since we fail in giving a correct
interpretation of the proximity-preservation. At first sight, we
are willing, to interpret proximity-preservation as Baigent
[1987) by ~small errors in establishing the individual
preferences only lead to small errors in establishing the social
preference'. However, after rereading Baigent's illustration
(page 163 . the only place where proximity-preservation is
correctly formulated), we formulate this concept as follows: A
"greater" error in establishing individual preferences only leads
to a"greater" or equally "great" error in establishing the
social preference. This formulation reveals that a proximation
preservation is a globally universally quantified condition,
where continuity is a locally universally quantified condition.
It cannot be said, whether proximity-preservation is strongly
related to continuity. This can be said of non-expansiveness (See
chapter 3). There is doubt about the proximity-preservation being
a-weak' condition. This can be illustrated by the following
intermezzo, where under mild conditions proximity-preservation
and Pareto-optimality conflict with each other. Hence, appart
from any other social condition Pareto-optimality and proximity-
preservation lead already to a contradiction.
Intermezzo
Let P-~A,N~ be a society, such that ~A~ - p, ~N~ - n and
3 5 n S p! .
Furthermore, let V be classified as a set of orderings and 6
a distance function on V(A), such that ~V(A),6~ is a full
metric space.
Suppose F is a welfare function from Vn(A) to V(A) which is
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proximity-preservative with respect to 6.
Then F is constant, i.e. (F(Vn(A)))~ - 1.
Here proximity preserving is that for all rl,r2,r3 e Vn(A),
with ds(rl,r2) 5 ds(rl,r3): 6(F(rl),F(r2)) 5 S(F(rl),F(r3)).
n
(ds(rl,r2) :- E b(Ri,RZ)).
i-1
Proof of this assertion
Without loss os generality let mesh(V(A),b) - 1.
Hence, ~Vn(A),dó~ is full and has meshwidth 1.
Define tR1,R2~ e E:E~ R1,R2 e V(A) and 6(R1,R2) - 1
~rl,r2~ e En :E~ rl,r2 e Vn(A) and b(rl,rz) - 1.
Let k - ~F(Vn(A))~.
Suppose k~ 1. We deduce a contradiction.
Obviously k 5 ~V(A)~.
Let F(rl) - R1 and F(r2) - R2, such that ~rl,r2~ e En and
RI ~ R2.
Take r3 e F-1(R1).
If ds(r3,r1) ? 2, then ds(r3,r1) ~ db(r2,r1) but
0 - b(F(rl),F(r3)) ~ b(F(rl),F(r2)).
Hence, ~rl,r3~ e En.
Since ~Vn(A),dS~ is full, hence En is connected we have just
proven that:
For all R e F(Vn(A)) there is a r e Vn(A), such that for all
r e F-1(R) Cr,r~ e En.
Hence, for all R e F(Vn(A)), there is a r e Vn(A), such that
F-1(R) c B(r,1~,Vn(A),ds).
How many elements are there in such a ball B(r,1;,Vn(A),db)?
If r e B(r,1~,Vn(A),dS), it can only differ from r at
precisely 1 coordinate.
Hence,l~B(r,1~,Vn(A),db)~ 5 n. ~V(A)~. 2
So ~F (F(Vn(A)))~ C k. n. ~V(A)~ 5 ~V(A)~ - n.
Since Vn(A) - F-1(F(Vn(A))) and L(A) c V(A) it follows:
~V(A)~n - ~Vn(A)~ - ~F-1(F(Vn(A)))~ t n. ~V(A)~2.
Hence, n~ ~V(A)~ ? ~L(A)~ - p!
This contradicts our assumption.
~
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Let us show the use of the corollary 3.5.11 to other types
of impossibility theorems in social choice theory. This is done
by virtue of two examples. It is not our intention to give a full
proof of some impossibility results as is done in the deduction
of (4.4.26), (4.4.27) and (4.4.28). It is only pointed out here
that these other impossibility results exist, i.e. they are
proven up to the level of (4.4.21) in the proof of theorem
4.4.26, the rest is left to the reader.
Example 4.4.31 Impossiblities and intensities
One of the most important criticisms on the models presented
in this chapter about orderings is, that no intensity of a
preference between two alternatives ís taken ínto acount. We
will deal with these intensities here and will show that
they will not lead automatically to a possibility theorem.
So this criticism is not substantional for the
impossibilities, that is, if we interprete intensities in
the following way.
Let ~A~ - p, A- {al,a2,...,ap}, (2) - k t 1 and f a
bijection from {{ai,aj} , aiaj e A, i ~ j} to
{0,1,2, ...,k},
Let x -.~xp,xl,...,xk~ e Rktl.
x is interpreted as the complete relation on A, such that if
f({a~,aj}) - t and i~ j, then
if xt - 0, then ai and aj are indifferent,
if xt ~ 0, then ai ís strictly prefered to aj with intensity
xt, and
if xt ~ 0, then aj is strictly prefered to ai with intensity
xt.
Assumption 4.4.31.1 For all a~ 0: x and a. x interprete the
same complete relation on A.
This assumption means that only the ratio's of intensity
matter. In essence we therefore have that all relations are
in {t0,0,0,...,0~} U Sk, where Sk -{x e Rktl I Ilx~~ - 1}
P.ssumption 4.4.31.2 Total indifferences are excluded.
By these two assumptions all the essential information is in
Sk. Hence, Sk represents the set of complete relation on A
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wíth intensities except the total indifference. A welfare
function for a society ~A,{1,2}~ is now a function F from Sk
x Sk to Sk
Assumption 4.4.31.3 F is unanimity respecting, i.e. for all
x e Sk, F(~x,x~) - x.
Assumption 4.4.31.4 F is ~d2,d~-non-expansive, where
d(Y1.Y2).
Note that these assumptions are very mild. For instance
there is no assumption on the transtivity of x or its
intensity.
Now we will prove a result resembling (4.4.21).
Claim 4.4.31.5 Either for all x e Sk, F(~x,-x~) - x, or for all
x e Sk, F(~x,-x~) - -x.
Observe that x and -x interpret relations which are
conversions of each other. Hence, by claim 4.4.31.5 it
follows that either individual 1 wins completely in every
maximal conflict or individual 2 does.
Obviously by the non-expansiveness it is sufficient to
prove:
Claim 4.4.31.6 For all x e Sk : F(~x,-x~) e{x,-x},
Proof of claim 4.4.31.6
Without loss of generality suppose x- C0,0,0,...,0,1~.
Take for all 0 5 t t k
Lt -{Y e Sk : y- ~y0,...,yk~ and yt 5 0} and
Rt -{Y e Sk : y- ~y0,...,yk~ and yt ? 0},
Now NHM(Lt,Rt) -{y eSk : y-~y0,...,yk~ and yt - 0}, where
M - ~Sk,d~.
To prove (4.4.31.6) it is sufficient to prove
F(~x,-x~) e NHM(Lt,Rt), for all t? 0, t ~ k.
Without loss of generality it is sufficient to prove this
for t- 0. This is done by virtue of (3.5.11). Again because
of similarities it is sufficient to prove that (4.4.31.7)
and (4.4.31.8) hold. Where
4.4.31.7 Rp circularly encloses RO with diameter R, and
4.4.31.8 RO can be approximated by interiors of ellipses from x
and -x and radius n.
d(x,y) :- arccos(x.y) for x,y e Sk (it is the arc-distance
between x and y) and d2(~xl,yl~,~x2,y2~) .- d(xl,x2) t
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Here RO -{y e Sk : y- ~y0,...,yk~ and y0 ~ 0}.
(4.4.31.7) is evident.
(4.4.31.8) Take e~ 0 it is sufficient to prove that there are
xe, ye e Sk, wíth d(x,xe) t d(-x,ye) ~ e and, for all
z e L0, d(xe,z) t d(ye,z) ~ rz.
Take a ~ áe. xe - ~tsina,0,0,.. ,O,cosa~ and
ye - ~tsina,0,0,.. ,0,-cosa~.
Obviously we have the following picture for 1 t k- 3.
Now xe - x- cos a- ye .-x. Hence, d(xe,x) - d(ye,-x) - a.
Hence, d(xe,x) t d(-x,ye) ~ e.
Take z e R0. z-~z0,zl,...,zk~, where z0 ~ 0.
we have to prove that: d(xe,z) t d(ye,z) ~ n.
Hence, we have to prove that:
arccos(z0.sina t zk.cosa) t arccos(z0-sina - zk.cosa) t rz.
arccos is strictly decreasing z0 ~ 0, a is very small, so
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cosa ~ 0 and sina ~ 0. Moreover
arccos(z~.sina t zk.cosa) t arccos(z~-sina - zk.cosa) ~
arccos(zk-cosa) t arccos(-zk-cosa) - n.
Which completes the proof of claim 4.4.31.6. To complete the
impossibility ít would be necessary to extend this
decisiveness condition further. The author did not
investigate this fully but it is very likely that this is
the case, because of some results already deduced.
In the previous example an impossibility was deduced for
welfare functions on orderings with intensities. In our last
example, which should again demonstrate the value of (3.5.11) we
are deducing an impossibilíty theorem for choice correspondences
based on individual choices.
Example 4.4.32 Choice correspondences based on
individual choices.
Let tA,{1,2}~ be again a society such that ~A~ ? 3. A choice
correspondence C based on individual choices is a function
from 2A x 2A to 2A.
To every combination of individual choices
~B1,B2~ e 2A x 2A. C assings a collective choice
C(~B1,B2~) e 2A.
Assumption 4.4.32.1 C is unanimous, i.e., for all B e 2A .
C(CB,B~) - B.
Assumption 4.4.32.2 C is td2,d~-non-expansive, where
d2(tBi,Bi~,~B2,B2~) .- d(Bi,B2~ t d(Bi,B2) and
d(X,Y) - ~X ~` Y~.
Take M - t2A,d~,
Claím 4.4.32.3 For all B e 2A -{A,cp} ; C(B,A-B) e{B,A-B}.
If claim 4.4.32.3 is proved, we have again an impossibility.
Let Rxy -{B e 2A : x e B and y e B}.
Lxy -{B e 2A : x~ B and y é B} .
RXy -{B e 2A : x e B or y e B} .
LXy -{B e 2A : x~ B or y~ B}.
It is obvious that:
B e NHM(Lxy,Rxy) E ~ (x e B S~ y é B) v(x ~ B S y e B).
Moreover, RXy circularly encloses Rxy and LXy circularly
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encloses Rxy both with diameter p. This is again
straightforwardly to prove.
To prove, that e.g. Rxy (can be approximated by interiors of
ellipses from B and A-B and radius p, where x e B and













Similarly Lxy can be approximated from B and B-A and radius
P.
Hence, by (3.5.11) it obviously holds that:
For all x e B and y e A-B: F(~B,A-B~) e NfiM(Lxy,Rxy).
Now since for x e B and y e A-B:
x e F(tB,A-B~) and y é F(~B,A-B~) or
x~ F(~B,A-B~) and y e F(~B,A-B~).
Using ~A~ ? 3 it follows that F(~B,A-B~) e{B,A-B}.
Furthermore:
Claim 4.4.32.4 Either for all B e 2A -{A,cp}, F(~B,A-B~) - B, or
for all B e 2A -{A,cp} F(~B,A-B~) - A-B.
This makes the impossibility again cbvicus.
~
Although in the foregoing examples the collective
constitutional rules were not (yet) proved to be dictotorial and
the society only had two individuals, they still gave an insight
in the power of corollary 3.5.11. It is just a question of time
and paper to strengthen these results such that the rules
discussed above appear to be dictatorial. Because of the effort
which those proofs certainly would involve, compared to the small
increment of insight, we did not investigate this further.
In this section 4.4 we have seen that a meaningful
substitute for the independence of irrelevant alternatives in
order to avoid impossibilities is hard to find. The welfare
functions constructed in example 4.4.29 are hard to use in
practice, since it is not easy to determine the collective
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preference at a given profile. Furthermore, the rule does not
often yield a decision, mostly these occur on a unanimity basis.
Moreover, it has become apparant in the proofs of the
theorems of this sectíon, that the maximal conflict situation
between a coalition and its complement gives rise to an
ímpossibility. That is a consequence of Arrow's formal model, as
developed and designed until now. The results based on the
outcomes at maximal conflict situations could be interpreted as
follows: In those situations of maximal conflict there is no
resemblance between the conflicting parties; they act as if they
are completely independent from each other, therefore the central
decision maker F cannot act in these situations properly and
yields such strange results.
Anymore "realistic" result requires further elaboration and
improvements of the axioms on collective choice. For instance,
one might doubt the assumption that all such conflicts occur and
assume that the preferences between individuals influence each
other. So the domain is restricted. In the followinq section, we
investigate, what happens when the unrestricted domain condition
is dropped. Hence, not all those odd profiles initiating
íntuitively impossibilities are admítted.
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~ 4.5 Restricted Domains
In this section we study some effects on the existence of
welfare functions, caused by restrictíons on the set of possible
profiles. It is interesting to know whether or not a given
welfare functions, satisfying specific social properties, can be
constructed on a given subset of the set of profiles. This
general question is difficult to answer, even íf the type of
welfare functions is fixed. Therefore, we will take a fixed type
of welfare functions and also special types of subsets of the set
of profiles. For these special restrictions we will give
necessary and sufficient conditions for the restricted set of
profiles, such that on this domain there exists (in a
constructive way) a welfare function of that special chosen type.
In literature this is called the restricted domain approach.
A great amount of work in this field is devoted to an
investigation of necessary and sufficient conditions for the set
of profiles in order that there exists a welfare function, which
determines the preferences on the basis of a simple majority
decísion. First Condorcet [1785] studied such decision rules, May
[1952] characterized simple majority rules for 2-alternative
sets. Black (1948] and Arrow [1978] introduced a sufficient
condition named ~single peakness'. Several other authors, e.g.,
Inada [1964j, formuiated other sufficient conditions. Finaily
Pattanaik ~ Sen [1969] found necessary and sufficient conditions
for the set of profiles such that a simple majority rule exists.
After this, several weakenings of the majority principle are
studied see, e.g., Fishburn [1970], Chichilnisky and Heal [1983]
and Monjardet [1979]. For more information see also Sen [1986].
In all theorems introduced above, the necessary and
sufficient conditions for the existence of a majority rule,
typically exclude profiles. Hence, the individuals are not
supposed to choose their individual ordering independently from
each other. Here we will suppose that every individual has a set
of possible orderíngs, which can occur independently from those
of the other orderings of the other individuals. Moreover, not
the majority principle is imposed on a welfare function, but the
conditions positive association, non-dictatorship and strong
297
Pareto-optimality. Although the majority principle implies these
properties, the reverse is not true. Of course, welfare functions
imposed by the conditions as proposed here, resemble very much
those, which are imposed with the simple majoríty principle (See
e.g. May [1952] and Monjardet [1979]). In literature this type of
study can also be found in e.g. Kalai 6 Muller [1977], Kalai ~
Ritz [19807, Maskin [1976] and Ritz [1985].
Let us start with some notational conventions. Suppose A is
a set (finite) of alternatives, N a set of individuals
N-{1,2,...,n} and V a set of classified orderings. we will
suppose that each individual i e N has a set of possible
individual orderings on A: V(A)i c V(A). In that case the set of
possible combinations of indívidual orderings is the following
set of n-tuples: {~RI,R2, ..,Rn~ : for all i e N R1 e V(A)i}.
Again the subscripts of the domain of a relation is dropped. This
set will be indicated by V(A)N. Of course it is possible that
V(A)i - V(A) for all i e N and hence Vn(A) - V(A)N. Note that the
place of the indexation is essential. Again we have the notion
welfare function and its conditions. Formally it would be
necessary to redefine all these notions for the restricted case
here. Since it is evident how to do this, it is left to the
reader.
The first type of restrictions is the following. Only the
set of orderings of one individual is restricted. Hence, we are
investigating situations, in which V(A)i - V(A) for all i? 2 and
V(A)I c V(A). in some sense this type of restrictions is mimimal,
only 1 set of individual orderings is restricted, therefore the
domain is maximal in that sense. It is called the maximal-domain-
approach. Actually this maximal-domain-approach is a translation
of the results found there.
First the necessary and sufficient conditions for this
maximal-domain-approach are introduced.
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Definition 4.5.1 Inseparable pair - Inseparable set
Let A be a set of alternatives, x,y e A, B c A and
V(A) c L(A) a set of linear orderings on A. Then
4.5.1.1 ~x,y~ is an inseparable pair of V(A), iff V(A,x~y) ~ W
and for all R e V(A,x~y) , x- y: sucR, and
4.5.1.2 B is an inseparable set of V(A), iff for all R e V(A) and
all a,b e B and c e A: if a~ c~ b: R, then c e B.
~
Inseparable pairs have already been discussed in literature,
see e.g. Kalai S Ritz [1980] and Ritz [1985]. B is an inseparable
set of V(A), iff all the preferences between pairs in B cannot be
seperated by an element in A-B in any relation of V(A). Obviously
there are trivial separable sets B, such as A- B, ~B~ - 1, or cp.
Let B be a separable set of V(A) c L(A).
Let R e V(A). Take R, R , with b e B, a e SU,
~B ~((A-B) U {b})
with c(b) - x, Q(x) - b, x é A, and for all y e U-{x,b},
a(y) - y. Then aR e L((A-B) U{x}) and
~((A-B)U{b})
R- Sub(aR ,x,R ). If B is a separable set of V(A) then
~(A-B)U{b} ~B
the set B is ordered in every relation of V(A) in a cluster. See
also Blau [1957], who used this notion only intuitively.
We will prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5.2 Maximal domain characterization
Suppose P- CA,N~ is a society, i e N, ~N~ ? 2 and for all
j e N-{i} : L(A)j - L(A).
Then (4.5.2.1) and (4.5.2.2) are equivalent.
(4.5.2.1) There is a welfare function F on P from L(A)N to W(A),
which is simultaneously strongly Pareto-optimal, positively
associated and strongly non-dictatorial.
(4.5.2.2) There is an inseparable pair ~x,y~ of L(A)i or
there is an inseparable set B of L(A)i, with ~A~ ~ ~B~ ~ 1.
~
The proof of this theorem requires several lemmas. First we
prove (4.5.2.2) -~ (4.5.2.1) by the following two lemmas.
299
Lemma 4.5.3
Suppose P- CA,N~, ~A~ ? 3, N? 2, L(A)i - L(A) for all
i? 2 and x,y e A, such that ~x,y~ is inseparable for L(A)1.
Then (4.5.2.1).
Proof of lemma 4.5.3
Although the proof is known in literature (See e.g. Rítz
(1985]), we give a proof here to have a full ~stand-alone'
proof of theorem 4.5.2 and to demonstrate the advantage of
our notations.
For all r e L(A)N define
R1, iff R1 e L(A,y~x)
F(r)
- (R1 I1 Exy) U({x,y} x{x,y} f1 R2), iff
R1 e L(A,x~y).
Note that if R1 e L(A,x~y), then ~F(r),R1~ e EC(Q(A),{x,y})
because of the inseparability of ~x,y~ of L(A)1.
Hence, F : L(A)N -~ L(A).
All the social conditions can straightforwardly be proved.
Lemma 4.5.4
Suppose P -~A,N~, ~A~ ? 3, ~N~ ? 2, L(A)i - L(A) for all
i? 2 and B is an inseparable set of L(A)1, with
1 C ~B~ ~ ~A~. Then (4.5.2.1).
Proof of lemma 4.5.4
Again we will define an appropriate welfare function. Take
a e SU such that a(b) - x, a(x) - b, and a(z) - z for all
z ~{x,b}, where x~ A and b e B.
Define F for all r e L(A) as follows:N
F(r) :- Sub((aRl) , x, R2 ).
~(A U {x}) - B ~B
Since L(U) can be classified as a set of orderings, and is
substitutionally closed over itself it follows F(r) e L(U).
Furthermore, x is substituted by R2I . Hence, F(r) e L(A).
B
Hence, F is a welfare function from L(A)N to L(A).
The individuals in {1,3,....,n} are no weak dictators,
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since F(r) - R2 and ~B~ ? 2. Individual 2 is not a weak~g ~B
dictator, since F(r) - R1 for all a e A- B~~.
({a,b} ~{a,b}
All the other conditions follow similarly simple.
We will now prove theorem 4.5.2.
Proof of theorem 4.5.2
(4.5.2.2) -~ (4.5.2.1) Follows from lemma 4.5.3 and 4.5.4.
(4.5.2.1) -~ (4.5.2.2) Suppose F' : L(A)N -~ W(A) is a strongly
non-dictatorial, strongly Pareto-optimal and positively
associated welfare function on P.
Define F: L(A)N -~ L(A) as follows.-
F(r) :- aF'(r) U(R ~ F'(r)), where R e L(A) fixed. Clearly
F is weldefined, since F(r) changes only the indifference
classes of F'(r). Therefore F has obviously all the social
properties of F'.
Hence, F is a strongly non-dictatorial, strongly
Pareto-optimal and positívely associated welfare function
from L(A)N to L(A).
Suppose there is no x,y e A, such that ~x,y~ is an
inseparable pair of L(A)i.
Then for all x,y e A, with L(A)i ~ L(A,x~y) ~~: there is
~ ~ E A, and a R' c L(A)i such that xzy . R'. 4.5.2.1
The proof succeeds in steps:
Step 1 If for some R e L(A)i xyz:R, and ~x,y~ e D(F,{í}) or
~y,z~ e D(F,{i}), then ~x,z~ e D(F,{i}).
Suppose ~x,y~ e D(F,{i}) and xyz : R.
Take r e L(A)N as follows: xyz : R1, and
yzx : R~, for j e N-{i}.
By our assumption it follows that xyz : F(r). Using the
positive association of F it follows that ~x,z~ e D(F,{i}).
The other case: ~y,z~ e D(F,{i}) follows similarly.
Step 2 If for some R e L(A)i, xyz:R, and ~x,z~ ~ D(F,{i}),
then Cx,y~, ~y,z~ ~ D(F,{i}).
Follows immediate from step 1.
Step 3 If ~x,y~ ~ D(F,{i}), then ~y,x~ e D(F,N-{i}). Is evident.
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Step 4 If ~x,y~,~y,z~ e D(F,N-{i}), then ~x,z~ e D(F,N-{i}).
Follows similarly as step 1.
Step 5 There is a pair ~x,y~ e D(F,N-{i}), such that
~y,x~ e D(F,N-{i}),
Since F is non-dictatorial there is a pair ~y0,y~ e A x A,
such that ~y,y0) ~ D(F,{i}) and L(A)i N L(A,y~yQ) ~~. By
step 3 this yields ~y0,y~ e D(F,N-{i}),
Furthermore by (4.5.2.1) there is a R1 e L(A)i, such that
y yl y0 ' R1. Hence, by step 2 ~y,yl~'~yl'y0~ ~ D(F,{i}) and
by step 3 this implies tyl'y~'~y0'Y1~ e D(F,N-{i}).
Similarly there is a y y2 yl . R2 e L(A)i such that
~yl,y2~,~y2,y~ e D(F,N-{i}).
Succeeding this reasoning it follows that there are
ty0,yl~,~yl,y2~,~y2,y3~,...,~yp,y~ e D(F,N-{i}), where
p- ~A~. Hence, there are tl t t2, such that yt - Yt '
1 2
Obviously, since y Yt tl yt ' Rt ' t2 ? tl t 2'1 1 1
Moreover, by step 4 it follows that ~yt 'yt tl~ e D(F,N-{i})2 1
Take {x,y} -{yt 'yt t1} and we are done.2 1
Let BO -{x,y}, where x,y satisfies step 5.
Take Bk - Bk - 1 U{z e A: there are a,b e U{Bi : i t k}
and R e L(A), such that a~ z~ b: R}.
Since A is finite there is a B, such that B- Bk for all
k? p, where p- ~A~.
Step 6 By induction on k we will now prove that for all x,y e B,
with x~ y: ~x,y~ e D(F,N-{i}),
Basis- trivial.
Induction step: suppose for all x,y e Bk,x ~ y:
~x,y~ e D(F,N-{i}), Let a,b e Bktl,a ~ b. We have to prove
~a,b~ e D(F,N-{i}). Since a,b e Bk}1, there are
a0,a1,b0,b1 e U{Bi : i 5 k} and R1, R2 e L(A)i, such that
a0~a~a1 : R1 and b0~b~b1 : R2. By the induction hypotheses
it follows that ta1,a0~, ~b1,b0~, ~a0,a1~,
~b0,b1~ e D(F,N-{i}). (4.5.2.2)
Obviously ta0,a1~, ~b0,b1~ é D(F,{i}), Hence, by step 2
~al,a~, ~b,bl~ ~ D(F,{í}) and by step 3 ~a,al~,
~bl,b~ e D(F,N-{i}). If al - bl, we are done by step 4. If
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al ~ bl, we are done by the induction hypothesis and step 4.
Hence, for all x,y e B, x~ y : ~x,y~ e D(F,N-{i}). By
step 5 it follows that ~B~ ~ 1. By definition it follows
that B is a separable set of L(A)1. We are ready when B c A.
If B - A, then by step 6 it follows that
n(A x A) c D(F,N-{i}). But obviously by lemma 4.5.5, a lemma
which is still to prove, then there is a non-dictatorial and
Pareto-optimal welfare function from Ln-1(A) to L(A), where
~A~ ? 3. This cannot be by our knowledge according to ~ 4.3.
Hence, B c A and we are done.
~
Before stating and proving lemma 4.5.5, used in the proof of
theorem 4.5.2, we will make some remarks on this theorem. First
of all it appears that by restricting only one set of individual
orderings, we can create possibilities. On the other hand, this
restriction should separate a set (not trivial) or preference
between two alternatives from the rest. The names of inseparable
pair and set intuitive clarify how these possibilities can occur.
This separation allows disjoint coalitions to decide on the
disjoint (separated) parts of the domain. Hereby non-dictatorship
follows easily. The proof of theorem 4.5.2 is completed by
Lemma 4.5.5
Let P- ~A,N~ be a society and S c N, such that:
4.5.5.1 L(A)N is such that for all i,j e S there are a,b e A,
R1,R2 e L(A)i and R3,R4 e L(A)j, with a~b :R1, b~a : R2,
a~b : R3 and b~a : R4,
4.5.5.2 F is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly non-dictatorial,
and positively associated welfare function from L(A)N to
L(A), and
4.5.5.3 D(F,S) - K(L(A)N,S).
Then there is a welfare function H on tA,S~ from L(A)S to
L(A), which is strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial and positively associated.
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Proof of lemma 4.5.5
Without loss of generality suppose S;{1,2,....,s}.
For r e L(A)N-S and r e L(A)S let ~r,r~ be the profile r in
L(A)N, such that Rl - R1, for all i e S, and R1 - R1, for
all i e N-S.
Take r e L(A)N-S. Define HY : L(A)S -9 L(A) for all
r e L(A)S : HY(r) :- F(~r,r~).
By (4.5.5.3) Hr is strongly Pareto-optimal and positively
associated.
Hence, we are done if there is a profile r e L(A)N-S such
that Hr is strongly non-dictatorial.
Suppose for all r e L(A)N-S there is an individual ir in S,
which is a weak dictator of H'.- r -
Since F(Cr,r~) e L(A) it follows that for all r e L(AIN-S
and for all r e L(A)S: F(Cr,r~) - Ri-.
- r
It suffices to prove that, if r, r E L(A)N-S differ in at
most one coordinate, then 1r - lr. Since then F is
dictatorial which cannot be the case. Take r, r E L(A)N-S
such that they differ only in coordinate t, and suppose
ir, ~ ir.
We deduce a contradiction.
Without loss of generality suppose ir - 1 and ir - 2.
By assumption 4.5.5.1 there are a,b e A, R1,R2 e L(A)1,
R3,R4 e L(A)2, such that a~b : R1, b~a : R2, a~b : R3 and
b~a : R4.
Take r e L(A)S-{1,2} and the following four profiles:
1 " -r .- ~R1, R4, r, r~,
r2 .- ~R1, R4, r, r~,
3 "r.- ~R2, R3, r, r~, and
r4 :- ~R2, R3, r, r~.
Obviously a~b : R - F(rl), b~a : F(r2) - R
b~a : R2 - F(r3) and a~b : F(r4) 4 R3.
Now there are four cases with respect to the preference
between a and b in Rt and Rt.
Case 1 a~b : Rt and a~b : Rt
Then rl~ - r2 , but F(rl) ~ F(r2) .
{a,b} ~{a,b} ~{a,b} ~{a,b}
Hence, this cannot be the case since F is independent of
irrelevant alternatives.
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Case 2 b~a : Rt and b~a :~t is similar to case 1.
Case 3 a~b : Rt and b~a : Rt
Then the preference b above a is preserved when going from
r3 to r4, but b~a : F(r3) and a~b : F(r4). Hence, this can
either be the case, since it would imply that F is not
positively associated.
Case 4 b~a : Rt and a~b : Rt is similar to case 3.
This completes the proof.
~
We will now discusse another class of domain restrictions.
Let R be a quasi-order on A, that is R is càz,à~-transitive and
strongly complete. Let L(A,R) .- {R e L(A) : R c R}. Hence,
L(A,R) is the set of linear orderings, which are contained in R.
Equivalently, L(A,R) is the set of linear orderings that contain
àR. For every R e L(A,R) we know that àR c R. Hence, we could
interpret R as the a priori information, which we have about the
set L(A,R).
Now suppose for every i e N there is a quasi-order-Ri e Q(A)
such that L(A,Ri) - L(A)i, we can interpret ~R1,RZ,...,Rn~ as the
a priori information, which is known about the set of profiles.
In that case L(A,r)N .- L(A,RI) x L(A,RZ) x... L(A,Rn). Such
domains are called domains with a priori information. See also
Storcken [1986]). We know already that L(A,x~y) -{R e L(A) : x~y
: R}. L(A,x~y) - L(A, AxA -{cy,x~}), for x~ y, is a set with a
priori information. Furthermore, note that if R- A x A, then
L(A,R) - L(A), hence we have no information, and if R e L(A),
then L(A,R) -{R} and we are completely informed. By these two
examples it is evident that the information, known a priori,
varies between knowing nothing and knowíng everything. àR is also
the only information, which we have on the relations in L(A,R),
since it is the only invariant part of every relation in L(A,R).
First we deduce a characterizing property, which is used in
other theorems on this subject of domains with a priori
information.
Let P- cA,N~ be a society, r e Qn(A) and L(A,r)N a domain
with a priori information r. For all x,y e A, x~ y:
(1) C(r,xy) :- {i e N: tx,y~ e àRl} is the set of individuals,
who strictly prefer x to y in all profiles in L(A,r)N, and
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(2) L(r,xy) :- {i e N: cx,y~ ~ aRl v cy,x~ d aRl} -
N-(C(r,xy) v C(r,yx)) are those individuals who liberately
can prefer x to y or y to x.
Obviously C(r,xy), C(r,yx) and L(r,xy) is a partition of N
and L(r,xy) - L(r,yx). Moreover, for all S c N we have that
K(L(A,r)N,S) - K(r,S) :- {cx,y~ e AxA : C(r,xy) c S c N-C(r,yx)}.
K(r,5) consists of those pairs cx,y~, such that no constantly
prefering y to x individual is in S and all constantly prefering
x to y are in S.
Theorem 4.5.6
Let P- cA,N~ be a society, r e Qn(A) and L(A,r)N a domain
with a priori information. Adopt the following
abbreviations: Cxy :- C(r,xy), K(S) .- K(r,S) and
Lxy .- L(r.xY).
Then (4.5.6.1) and (4.5.6.2) are equivalent.
4.5.6.1 There is a positively associated, strongly
Pareto-optimal, and strongly non-dictatorial welfare
function F on P from L(A,r)N to L(A).
4.5.6.2 There is a(decisiveness) function D: 2N -~ 2n(AxA)
satisfying (4.5.6.2a) up to (4.5.6.2f).
4.5.6.2a For all S c N: D(S) c K(S).
4.5.6.2b D(N) - K(N).
4.5.6.2c For all i e N there is a T c N-{i}, such that D(T) ~~.
4.5.6.2d For all S c N: D(S) - K(S) ~ cvD(N-S).
4.5.6.2e For all S c T c N: D(S) ~ K(T) c D(T).
4.5.6.2f For all S,T c N, all cx,y~ e D(S) and all cy,z~ e D(T):
if S ~ T ~ CzX -~, then Cx,z~ e D(CXZ U(S ~ T)).
Proof of theorem 4.5.6
(4.5.6.1) -~ (4.5.6.2) Suppose (4.5.6.1).
Define D(S) :- D(F,S).
We will prove that D satisfies (4.5.6.1a) up to (4.5.6.1f).
(4.5.6.2a) follows by the definition of D.
(4.5.6.2b) follows from K(L(A,r)N,N) - K(N) and F is
Pareto-optimal.
(4.5.6.2c) Let i e N. Then there is a profile r e L(A,r)N, such
that x~ y: F(r) and y~ x : R1 for some x,y e A, since F
is strongly non-dictatorial and F(L(A,r)N) c L(A). Let
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T-{ j e N: x~ y: R3 }. Then i~ T, Cxy c T c N- Cyx and
cx,y) e D(F,T) by the possitive association of F. Hence,
cx,y~ e D(T) and T c N-{i}.
(4.5.6.2d) Notice that, since F(L(A,r)N) c L(A), for all S c N
and cx,y~ e K(S) :
cx,y~ e D(F,S) E~ cy,x~ ~ D(F,N-S), and
cx,y~ e K(S) E~ cy,x~ e K(N-S), the proof is obvious.
(4.5.6.2e) follows immediately from the positively association.
(4.5.6.2f) Let cx,y~ e D(S), cy,z~ e D(F) and CzX fl S fl T- cp.
Since cx,y~ e K(S) it follows Cxy c S c N- Cyx.
Símilarly we haveNCyz c T c N- Czy.
Now take r e L(A,r), such that:
z~x~y : R1, for all i e(S-T) fl (N-Cxz),
x~z~y : R1, for all i e(S-T) ~ Cxz'
y~z)x : R1, for all i e(T-S) fl (N-Cxz)'
y~x~z : R1, for all i e(T-S) ~ Cxz'
z~x : R1, for all i e(N-(SUT)) fl (N-Cxz)'
x~z : R1, for all i e(N-(SUT)) fl CXZ, and
x~y~z : Rl, for all i e(Sf1T).
Note that S tl T c N-[Cyx U Czy] and since S fl T fl CzX - cp,
such a profile exists.
Now by the positive association of F we have x~y : F(r).
Hence, x~z : F(r), since F(r) e L(A).
But then by the positive association of F we have
cx,z~ e D(F, (S fl T) U CXZ)'
Obviously cx,z~ e K(CXZ U(S fl T)).
Hence, by definition Cx,z~ e D(CXZ U(S fl T)).
(4.5.6.2) -~ (2.5.6.1) Suppose (4.5.6.2)
Define for all r e L(A,r)N and x,y e A:
cx,y~ e F(r), iff either x- y,
or x~ y and cx,y~ e D({i e N: x~y : R1}).
Claim 1 For all r e L(A,r)N : F(r) e L(A).
Let r e L(A,r)N. Zt is suffícient to prove that F(r) is
reflexive, antisymmetric, complete and transitive. F(r) ís
reflexive by definition.
Let cx,y~ e n(AxA). By 4.5.6.2d it follows:
cx,y~ e D(S) E~ cx,y) e K(S) k cy,x~ (E D(N-S)
Ej cy,x~ e K(N-S) k cy,x) ~ D(N-S).
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Obviously cx,y~ e K({i e N: x~ y: R1}),
Hence, cy,x~ ~ F(r) E~ cx,y~ e F(r).
This proofs both antisymmetry and completeness of F.
Suppose cx,y~ e F(r), cy,z~ e F(r) and ~{x,y,z}~ - 3.
To prove the transitivity of F(r) it suffices to prove that
cx,z) e F(r).
By definition it follows: Cx,y~ e D({i e N: x~ y: R1}) and
cy,z~ e D({i e N: y~ z: R1}).
Let S:- {i e N: x~ y: R1} and T:- {i e N: y~ z: Rl},
Obviously S fl T fl CzX - ~p and
(S fl T) U CXZ c{i e N: xz : Rl} c(N - Czx), since L(A) is
transitive.
Hence, cx,z~ e D(CXZ U(S f1 T)) (by 4.5.6.2f) and by
(4.5.6.2e) we are done.
Claim 2 F is strongly Pareto-optimal by (4.5.6.2b).
Claim 3 F is strongly non-dictatorial by (4.5.6.2c).
Claim 4 F is positively associated. Take r,r e L(A,r)N and
x,y e A, such that
S:- {i e N: x~ y: Rl} c{i e N: x ~ y: Rl} -: T.
Suppose x ~ y : F(r).
It suffices to prove that x~ y: F(r).
But this is obvious by (4.5.6.2e).
Claim 1 up to 4 prove (4.5.6.2) -~ (4.5.6.1).
~
After this characterizing theorem our first aim is to prove
that we can focus on social welfare functíons F on societies with
a priori information r, which satisfy the following condition
áRl c D(F,{i}). For such situations it holds that Cab is decisive
on his a priori information.
Theorem 4.5.7
Suppose P- cA,N~ is a society,-r e Qn(A), L(A,r)N is a
domain with a priori information r, F: L(A,r)N -~ L(A) is a
strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly non-dictatorial, and
positively associated welfare function on P.
Then there is a profile r e Qn(A), such that for all i e N
R1 c R1 and there is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial, and positively associated welfare function
H from L(A,r)N to L(A) on P, such that aRl c D(H,{i}).
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Proof of theorem 4.5.7
Let F be such a welfare function and D as in (4.5.6.2).
Take r e Qn(A), such that for all i e N and x,y e A:
~x,y~ e R1, iff ~x,y~ e R1 or ~y,x~ ~ D(C(r,xy)).
Define: CXy :- C(r,xy), Cxy :- C(r,xy), LXy :- L(r,xy),
Lxy .- L(r,xy), K'(S) :- K(r,S), and K(S) :- K(r,S).
Define D' : 2N -~ 2n(AxA) for all x,y e A and all S c N:
~x,y~ e D'(S), iff Cx,y~ e D((Cxy U S) - Cyx) and
~x,y~ e K'(S).
Denote: Sxy :- (Cxy U S) - Cyx for all S c N.
It is sufficient to prove that D' satisfies (4.5.6.2).
(4.5.6.2a) is obvious by definition.
(4.5.6.2b) Let ~x,y~ e K'(N). It satisfies to prove that
~x,y~ e D'(N) - D((Cxy U N) - Cyx) - D(N - Cyx). If Cyx - cp,
then ~x,y) e D(N - Cyx) since Cy,x~ é D(Cyx).
(4.5.6.2c) Let i e N. Then there is a T c N-{i} such that
cp ~ D(T). Hence, there is a~x,y~ e D(T) f1 K(T).
Since then Txy - T it follows that ~x,y~ e D(Txy) -D'(T).
(4.5.6.2d) Let ~x,y~ e n(AxA) and S c N. Then
~x,y~ e D'(S) E~ ~x,y~ e D(Sxy) 6 ~x,y~ e K'(S)
E~ ~x,y~ e K(Sxy) 6~x,y~ e K'(S)
~ tx,y~ e cvD(N - Sxy)
E~ ~x,y~ e K'(S)
k ~x,y~ e cvD((N - S)yx)
E~ ~x,y~ e K'(S)
S~ ty,x~ ~` D( (N - S)yx)
E9 ~x,y~ e K'(S) k~y,x~ é D(N-S)
E~ ~x,y~ e K'(S) f1 cvD'(N - S).
(4.5.6.2e) Let ~x,y~ e D'(S), S c T, ~x,y~ e K'(T).
It suffices to prove that ~x,y~ e D'(T). Now
~x,y~ e D(Sxy), Sxy c Txy, ~x,y~ e K(Txy) and
~x,y~ e K'(T). Hence, by (4.5.6.2e) we are done.
(4.5.6.2f) Suppose ~x,y~ e D'(S), ty,z~ e D'(T), and
CZx f1 S ft T- cp.
We have to prove ~x,z~ e D'(CXZ U(S f1 T)).
Since CZx fl S fl T- cp, it follows ~x, z~ e K' ( CXZ U( S fl T) ).
It suffices to prove ~x,z~ e D([CXZ U(S fl T)]XZ) 4.5.7.1
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There are five cases.
Case 1 CXZ ~ cp Then CXZ - Cxz and ~x,z~ e D(CXZ). By (4.5.6.2e)
(4.5.7.1) follows evidently.
Case 2 CZx ~ cp Then CZx - Czx and tz,x~ e D(Czx)'
Note that CZx ~ Sxy ~ Txz - Czx fl Sxy fl Tyz - cp.
Hence, ~x,z~ e D(CXZ U(Sxy fl Tyz)) and ~z,x~ ~ D(Czx).
This contradicts an earlier result.
Case 3 Cxz - Czx -~ and CXy ~ cp
Then CXy - Cxy and ~x,y~ e D(Cxy) and Cxy c S.
Now Cxy fl Tyz fl CzX c CZy fl Tyz - cp.
Hence, by (4.5.6.2f) it follows that
~x,z~ e D(CXZ U(Tyz ~ Cxy)).
Now CXZ U( Tyz fl Cxy )) - CXZ U[{( Lyz fl T) U Cyz } fl Cxy ]
- CXZ U[ Cxy fl Lyz fl T]
- Cxz U[ Cxy fl LXZ fl Lyz fl T]
c CXZ U[ S fl LXZ fl T].
Case 4 Cxz - Czx -~ and Cyz ~ cp is similar to case 3.
Case 5 Cxz - Czx -~ and Cyz - CXy - cp
Since D(Sxy) ~ cp and D(Txy) ~ cp it follows that
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~CXZ - Czx - Cyz - Cxy - Cyx - Czy - cp.
By lemma 4.5.8 there is an individual i e N such that for
all ~a,b~ e n({x,y,z} x{x,y,z}) and all M c N .
~a,b~ e D(M), iff i e M. Clearly we are done.
~
In the proof of theorem 4.5.7 we used the following lemma.
Lemma 4.5.8
Suppose P-~A,N~ is a society, L(A,r) a domain with a
priori information r e Qn(A), D a decisiveness function from
2N to 2n(AxA) which satisfies ( 4.5.6.2) and B c A, ~B~ - 3,
such that for all ~x,y~ e n(BxB) : ~x,y~ fE D(Cxy).
Then there is an individual i e N, such that for all S c N
and Cx,y~ e n(BxB) fl K(S) : ~x,y~ e D(S) ej i e S.
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Proof of lemma 4.5.8
X1 up to X27 is a partition of N, where
X1 .- Cxy n Cyz n Cxz , X15 :- Lxy n Lyz n CzX ,
X2 .- Cxy n Cyz n Lxz - W, X16 :- Lxy n Czy n Cxz - W,
X3 .- Cxy n Cyz n CzX -~, X17 :- Lxy n Czy n Lxz ,
X4 .- Cxy n Lyz n Cxz , X18 :- Lxy n Czy n CzX ,
X5 .- Cxy n Lyz n Lxz , X19 :- Cyx n Cyz n Cxz ,
X6 -- Cxy n Lyz n CzX -~, X20 :- Cyx n Cyz n LXZ ,
X7 .- Cxy n Czy n CXZ , X21 :- Cyx n Cyz n CzX ,
X8 .- Cxy n Czy n LXZ , X22 :- Cyx n Lyz n Cxz -~,
X9 .- Cxy n Czy n CzX , X23 :- Cyx n Lyz n Lxz ,
X10 :- Lxy n Cyz n CXZ , X24 :- Cyx n Lyz n CzX ,
X11 :- Lxy n Cyz n LXZ , X25 :- Cyx n Czy n CXZ -~.
X - L n C n C -~, X - C n C n L -~,12 ' xy yz zx 26 ' yx zy xz
X13 :- Lxy n Lyz n CXZ , X27 :- Cyx n Czy n CzX ,
X14 :- Lxy n Lyz n LXZ , and B-{x,y,z}.
Let now S1 :- Cxy U X10 U X13 U Xi4 U X17,
S2 :- Cyz U X4 U X13 U Xi4 U X23, and
3S3 :- CzX U X8 U X14 U X17 U X23.
Where X14' X14' X14 are subsets of X14'
Note that tx,y~ e K(S ), cy,z~ e K(S ) and cz,x~ e K(S ).
By (4.5.6.2d) for each choice of X14? X14' X14 precisely one
of the following 8 cases holds:
(al) cx,y~ e D(S1) , cy,z~ e D(S2) and cz,x~ e D(S3) , or
(a2) cx,y~ e D(S1) , cy,z~ e D(S2) and ~x,z~ e D(N-53), or
(a3) cx,y~ e D(S1) , cz,y~ e D(N-S2) and cz,x~ e D(S3) , or
(a4) cx,y~ e D(S1) , tz,y~ e D(N-S2) and cx,z~ e D(N-S3), or
(a5) cy,x~ e D(N-S1), cy,z~ e D(S2) and cz,x~ e D(S3) , or
(a6) cy,x~ e D(N-S1), cy,z~ e D(S2) and cx,z~ e D(N-S3), or
(a7) cy,x~ e D(N-S1), cz,y~ e D(N-52) and cz,x~ e D(S3) , or
(a8) ty,x~ e D(N-S1), cz,y~ e D(N-S2) and cx,z~ e D(N-S3).
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Note that:
sl n sz c cxZ U(xi4 n xi4),
S1 n S3 c Czy U(X14 n X14)'
S2 n S3 c Cyz U(X14 n Xi4),
(N-S1) n(N-52) c Czx U(X14 - Xi4) n(X14 - Xi4)),
(N-S1) n(N-S3) c Cyz U(X14 - Xi4) n(X14 - Xi4)), and
(N-S2) n(N-S3) c Cxy U(X14 - X14) n(X14 - Xi4)). 4.5.8.1.
Claim 1 There are a,b e B, a~ b, such that ~a,b~ e D(Cab U S)
for some S c X14'
Proof of claim 1 Take X14 - X14 - X14 - X14'
Then (al) and (a3) cannot be the case, since otherwise by
(4.5.8.1 and 4.5.6.2f) ~z,y~ e D(Czy U(S1 n S3)) - D(Czy),
which contradicts our assumptions.
Then (al) and (a5) cannot be the case, since similarly it
would follow that ty,x) e D(Cyx U(S2 n S3)) - D(Cyx), which
is again contradicting our assumptions.
Then (a6) and (a8) cannot be the case, since this would lead
to the contradicting result
~y,z~ e D(Cyz U((N-S1) n(N-S3))) - D(Cyz).
Then (a4) and (a8) cannot be the case, since this would
yield contradicting result
~x,y~ e D(Cxy U((N-S2) n(N-S3))) - D(Cxy).
Hence, either (a2) or (a7) holds.
From (a2) it follows by (4.5.8.1) and (4.5.6.2f) that
tx,z~ e D(Cxz U(S1 n S2)) - D(Cxz U X14)'
From (a7) it follows similarly that
~z,x~ e D(CzX U((N-S1) n(N-S2))) - D(Czx U X14).
Which proves our claim.
Claim 2 If T c X14 and ta,b~ e D(Cab U T), then
ta,c~ e D(Cac U T) and ~c,b~ e D(Ccb U T).
Proof of claim 2 without loss of generality suppose
~x,y~ - ~a,b~. Take T- X14 - X14 - x14 - X14'
Then similarly as in the proof of claim 1 it follows either
(a3) or (a6) is the case.
Obviously (a6) does not hold.
Hence, (a3) is the case and consequently ~z,y~ e D(Czy U T).
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Similarly it follows that ~x,z~ e D(CXZ U T), which proves
this claim.
Claim 3 If T c X14 and ta,b~ e D(Cab U T), then for all
~p,q) e n(B x B) : ~p,q~ e D(Cpq U T).
Proof of claim 3 is classical in social choice theory and
therefore regarded as obvious.
We have just proven the ~first' steps in the classical way
of proven Arrow's impossibility theorem, but now on special
restricted domains. we continue in the same classical way.
From the above it follows, that there is a T c X14 such that
for all ~a,b~ e n(B x B) ~a,b~ e D(Cab U T) and is minimal
with this property.
If ~T~ - 1 then we are done by (4.5.6.2d) and (4.5.6.2e).
Suppose ~T~ ? 2. We will deduce a contradiction and are
done.
Take i e T.
Then neither ~a,b~ e D(Cab U{i}) nor
~a,b~ e D(Cab U X14 -(T -{i})), for every ~a,b~ e n(BxB).
Hence, ~x,y~ e D(Cxy U (N - (X14 - (T - {i})))) and
~y,z~ e D(Cyz U T).
Now T ~ (N - (X14 - (T - {i}))) ~ CzX - ~'
Hence, ~x,z~ e D(Cxz U (T ~ (N - (X14 - (T - {i})))) -
D(CXZ U(T -{i})), which contradicts the minimality of T.
~
We will now classify a special type of a priori restricted
domains, which admit a strongly Pareto-optimal,
strongly non-dictatorial, positively associated and symmetric
decisive welfare function.
First we have to define symmetric decisiveness.
Definition 4.5.9
A welfare function F on a society P- ~A,N~ from the domain
L(A,r)N, with a priorí information r e Qn(A) is symmetric
decisive, iff for all ~x,y~ e A x A and S c N:
if ~x,y~ e D(F,S) and Cx,y~ É D(F,Cxy), then
Cy,x~ e D(F,(S U Cyx) - Cxy).
~
Obviously symmetric decisiveness coincides more or less with
the symmetry property of ~4.3. Because of the restricted
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domain approach it has such a strange appearance. A welfare
function is symmetric decísive, iff a coalition S decídes about
~x,y~ and ~x,y~ ~ D(F,Cxy), then S- Cxy is decisive about ty,x~.
We have now the following characterizing theorem of domains
with a príori information admitting symmetric decisive, strongly
Pareto-optimal, strongly non-dictatorial, and positively
associated welfare functions.
Theorem 4.5.10
Let P-~A,N~ be a society and let L(A,r)N be a domain with
a priori information r e Qn(A).
Then (4.5.10.1), (4.5.10.2) and (4.5.10.3) are equivalent.
4.5.10.1 There is a symmetric decisive, strongly Pareto-optimal,
strongly non-dictatorial, and positively associated welfare
function F on P from L(A,r)N to L(A).
4.5.10.2 There is a r e Qn(A) such that for all i e N
R1 c R1, and a symmetric decisive, strongly Pareto-optimal,
strongly non-dictatorial, and posítively associated welfare
function F on P from L(A,r) to L(A), such that for all i e N
áRl c D(F,{i}).
4.5.10.3 There is a relation R e Q(A), such that for all i e N:
áR c áR.Furthermore, there is a coalition labeling
N
1: nR -~ (22 -{~})-{~}), satisfying (4.5.10.3a) up to
(4.5.10.3g).
4.5.10.3a The labeling is simple, that is for all ta,b~ e nR and
all S c T c N: 1(~a,b~) ~~ and
if S e 1(~a,b~), then T e 1(~a,b~).
4.5.10.3b The labelin4 is non-dictatorial, that is for all i e N,
there is a pair ~a,b~ e nR and a coalition S e 1(~a,b~),
such that i é S.
4.5.10.3c The labeling is pure, that is for all ~a,b~ e nR and
all S e 1(~a,b~): N- S~ 1(~a,b~).
4.5.10.3d The labeling is strong, that ís for all ta,b~ e nR and
all S é 1(ta,b~): N- S e 1(~a,b~).
4.5.10.3e The labeling is constant on connected symmetric parts
of nR, that is for all ~a,b~,~b,c~ e nsR:
1(~a,b~) - 1(~b,c~).
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4.5.10.3f The labelincx reflects the a priori ínformation, that
is for all ~a,b~ e àR: C(r, ab) e 1(ta,b~).
4.5.10.3g The labeling is transitive, that is for all
~a,b~,tb,c~,~a,c~ e R: if S e 1(~a,b~) and T e 1(~a,b~),
then S n T e 1(~a,c~).
Proof of theorem 4.5.10
(4.5.10.1) -~ (4.5.10.2).
Note that such a F exists, iff (4.5.6.2) holds and D
satisfies the property: if ~x,y~ e D(S) and ~x,y~ ~ D(Cxy),
then ~y,x~ e D(Syx).
Now this property is invariant under the construction of
(4.5.7).
Hence, (4.5.10.2) follows evidently.
(4.5.10.2) -~ (4.5.10.3).
Take R-{~x,y~ e A x A: tx,y~ e R1 for all i e N}.
Evidently we have àR c àRl, for all i e N.
N
Let 1: nR -~ 22 be defined as follows:
1(~x,y~) :- {S :~x,y~ e D(S)}, where D is the decisiveness
function according to (4.5.6.2).
Note that, if ~x,y~ e nsR then ~x,y~ e D(S) E~ (y,x~ e D(S)
because of the symmetric decisiveness of F, and 4.5.10.4
if ~x,y~ E àR, then tx,y~ e D(Cxy), sínce
àRl c D(F,{i}) and U{àR1 : i e N} - àR. 4.5.10.5
1 is simple because of (4.5.6.2e).
1 is non-dictatorial because of (4.5.6.2c).
1 is pure and strong because of (4.5.6.2d).
1 is transitive because of (4.5.6.2f).
1 reflects the a príori information because of (4.5.10.5).
Remains to prove that 1 is constant on connected parts in
nsR.
Let ~a,b~,~b,c~ e nsR.
Let S e 1(~a,b~) it is sufficient to prove that
S e 1(tb,c~). There are four cases.
Case 1 c- a We are done by (4.5.10.4).
Case 2 a~ c and ~a,c~ e àR. a. S .b .ci ~ ~
CaC
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Note that S e 1(~b,a~) and Cac e 1(~a,c~).
Hence, by the transitivity of 1 it follows that
S ~ Cac e 1(~b,c~).
Hence, S e 1(~b,c~), because 1 is simple.
Case 3 a~ c and ~c,a~ e áR is similar to case 2.
Case 4 a~ c and ~a,c~ e nsR.
There holds T e 1(~a,c~), for some T e 2N.
Hence, T ~ S e 1(~b,c~) and S e 1(tb,c~).
This completes the implication.
(4.5.10.3) -~ (4.5.10.2) is straightforwardly to prove similar to
the proof of (4.5.6.2) -j (4.5.6.1).
~
Theorem 4.5.10 characterizes those domains with a priori
information, which admit symmetric decisive, Pareto-optimal,
non-dictatorial and positively assocíated welfare functions. This
is the case, iff it can assign to every pair in a quasi-order R,
contained in all the individual a priori information, a simple
strong and pure game. Furthermore, this assignment should be
constant on connected symmetrical parts of R, transitive,
non-dictatorial and a priori information respecting. Because of
all these strong properties of the labelling it is rather easy to
check whether or not such a`nice' welfare function exists.
Although we have many other results on this type of domaín
restriction the discussion is ended here since the deduction of
these results is rather thechnical and very long. As a last
remark it is pointed out that the results in Storcken [1986] can
also be deduced by virtue of (4.5.6), which reduces the proofs
there remarkably.
In the final part of this section domain restrictions will
be discussed, that resemble investigated domain restríctions in
literature. In Kalai à Muller [1977], Maskin [1976], Ritz [1984]
and Ritz [1985] domain restrictions are discussed, where all the
individuals have the same set of possible individual orderings.
Hence, e.g., L(A)i - L(A)j for all i,j e N. Here we will discusse
the case where the equality may be changed in an inclusion. So
cases where L(A)1 c L(A)2 c... c L(A)n are discussed here. On
the other hand, while making the structure of the domain more
complicated we simplify the welfare function by imposing the
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positive association on it instead of the independence of
irrelevant altenatives.
In Ritz [1985] (e.g.) the domain for a society, with two
individual precisely, is charaterized in order to admit a
strongly Pareto-optimal and strongly non-dictatorial welfare
function. In Kalai 6 Muller (1977] and Ritz [1983] it is shown
for societies, with n individuals, and domains in which the sets
of possible individual orderings are equal, admit such welfare
function, iff in that domain there are two individuals whose
~subdomain' (i.e. the domain and the society restricted to these
two individuals) admit such welfare functions. Hereby the general
case for this type of domains is characterized.
In principal we will show the same. In lemma 4.5.5 it is
shown that if a subgroup S c N is completely decisive on all of
its feasible unanimous preferences, then the welfare function
restricted to S is 'nice', whenever that on N is 'nice'. The
technique shown there is to 'freeze' all preferences in N-S, like
it is done by e.g. Ritz (1983]. This is possible because of the
decisiveness of S by this ~freezening' the obtained welfare
function remains strongly Pareto-optimal. Here, however, we will
use another thechnique, introduced by Kalai 6 Muller [1977]. They
try to decrease the number of individuals admitting 'nice'
welfare functions on their domain, by forcing to act two
individuals as one. The prove of Kalai ~ Muller [1977] is
different from that exposed, here because the difference in the
domain. In their paper the set of individual orderings is in
L(U). Here it is in W(U). That is also the reason, why the
stronger positive association is chosen here instead of the
independence property.
We will first prove that for two individuals the
independence condition is equivalent to the positive association.
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Theorem 4.5.11
Let P- ~A,N~ be a society, with N-{1,2}. Furthermore, let
V and w be classified sets of strongly complete orderings,
and let F be a strongly Pareto-optimal welfare function on P
from V(A)N to W(A). Then (4.5.11.1) and (4.5.11.2) are
equivalent.
4.5.11.1 F is independent of irrelevant alternatives.
4.5.11.2 F is positively associated.
Proof of theorem 4.5.11
(4.5.11.2) -~ (4.5.11.1) The positive association is just
stronger than the independence condition (See (1.4.7)).
(4.5.11.1) -~ (4.5.11.2) Let x,y e A r,r e V(A)N such that for
all i e N:
if ~x,y~ e R1, then ~x,y~ e R1 and
if tx,y~ e àR1, then ~x,y~ e aRl.
It is sufficient to prove that
if x ~ y: F(r), then x~ y: F(r).
Suppose x ~ y : F(r).
There are two cases.
Case 1 x? y: Rl for all i e N and x~ y: R~ for some j e N.
Then by our assumptíons: x? y: R1 and x~ y: R~. Hence,
we are done by the strong Pareto-optimality:
Case 2{i,j} -{1,2}, x? y: R1 and y~ x: R~. Then x~ y: R1.
If x~ y: R~, then we are done by the Pareto-optimality.
If y~ x: R~, then we are done by the independence of
irrelevant alternatives.
Case 3 x- y : Rl for all i e N. Then x? y : Rl for all i e N.
If x~ y. R~ for some j e N we are done by the
Pareto-optimality. If x- y: R~ for all j e N, we are done
with the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
~
The next theorem states that a welfare function with range




Let P- ~A,N~ be a society and V(A)i c V(A), for all i e N,
where V is classified as a set of complete orderings.
Then (4.5.12.1) and (4.5.12.2) are equivalent.
4.5.12.1 There is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly non-
dictatorial and positívely associated welfare function
F on P from V(A)N to W(A).
4.5.12.2 There is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly non-
dictatorial and positively associated welfare function H on
P from V(A)N to L(A).
Proof of theorem 4.5.12
(4.5.12.2) -~ (4.5.12.1) Evident since L(A) c w(A).
(4.5.12.1) -~ (4.5.12.2) Let F as in (4.5.12.1). Take R e L(A).
Define H(r) :- aF(r) U(sF(r) ~ R).
H changes only symmetric parts of F on a constant way.
It is therefore strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial, and positively associated.
~
Now we will prove that welfare functions on a domain with
n-1 individuals can be extended to a domain with n individuals,
such that several social conditions are invariant.
Theorem 4.5.13
Suppose P-~A,N~ is a society, with n- ~N~ ~ 2,
P' -~A,N-{n}~, V(A)i c V(A) for all i e N, V is a
classified set of complete orderings and there is a welfare
function F from V(A)N-{n} to L(A) on P', which is
simultaniously strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial and positively associated.
Then there is a welfare function H from V(A)N to L(A) on P,
which is strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly non-dictatorial
and positively associated.
Proof of theorem 4.5.13
Suppose F as above. By (4.5.12) suppose without loss of
generality that F: V(A) -~ L(A).N-{n}
Take H: V(A)N -~ L(A), with ~R1,R2..Rn~ -~ F(~R1~ Rn-1~)
Clearly H is strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
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non-dictatorial and possitively associated, since n is just
a dummy addition to F.
~
Because of this dummy addition H is not so appreciable,
although in very large societies one might think that the
addition of 1 individual has no effect.
We will now consider the reverse of theorem 4.15.3. That is
having a~nice' H does there exist a~nice' F, where F and H are
as in (4.5.13)? The general case of this question is difficult to
answer. Therefore, we concentrate on a special type of domain
restrictions. (See theorem 4.5.14).
As a notational convention let {RAI : RA e V(A)i} -: V(B)i
B
for all cp ~ B c A.
Theorem 4.5.14
Suppose P -(A,N~ is a society, with ~N~ - n? 4, V is a
classified set of complete orderings, V(A)N is a restricted
domain, and il,i2,jl,j2 are four different individuals in N.
Suppose furthermore that
4.5.14.1 for all B c A, with ~B~ - 3: V(B). c V(B). and- 11 - ~1
V(B). c V(B). , and
12 72
4.5.14.2 for all tl,t2 e N: There are x,y e A, such that x~ y:
L({x,y}) c V({x,y}) and L({x,y}) c V({x,y})- tl - t2'
Then ( 4.5.14.3) and (4.5.14.4) are equivalent.
4.5.14.3 There is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial and positively associated welfare
function H on P from V(A)N to W(A).
4.5.14.4 There is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial and positively associated welfare
function F on P1 -~A,Ni~ from V(A)N to W(A), for some
i
i e N, where Ni :- N-{i},
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Proof of theorem 4.5.14
(4.5.14.4) -j (4.5.14.3) is trivial by theorem 4.5.13 and 4.5.12.
(4.5.14.3) -~ (4.5.14.4)
we will prove that F exists for i- jl or i- j2.
We will first define F~k, such that jk and ik play the same
róle in H for k-{1,2}, and then prove that one of them is
non-dictatorial.
To avoid unnecessary variables suppose without loss of
generality that il - 1, jl - 2, i2 - 3 and j2 - 4.
Furthermore, by (4.5.12) suppose without loss of generality
that H: V(A)N -j L(A). Define F2 for all r e V(A)N and all
2
x,y e A:~x,y~ e F2(r), iff there is a profile r e V(A)N,
with for all i? 3, R1 - Rl
~{x,y} ~{x,y}
and R1 - R2 - R1 and({x,y} ~{x,y} ~{x,y}
~x,y~ e H(r).
Since H is independent of irrelevant alternatives F2 is
well-defined. Furthermore, it follows evidently that F2(r)
is reflexive, antisymmetric and complete, since H(r) is so
for all r e V(A)N.
Claim 1 F2 : V(A)N -~ L(A).
2 2.-.It suffices to prove that r lrl is transitive for all
r E L(A) . Take r e L(A) . Let a~ b: F2(r) andN2 N2
b~ c: F2(r). It suffices to prove that a~ c: F2(r).
Take r e L(A) , such that R1 - R1 for all i e N-{2} andN
R2 - R1 . Because of (4.5.14.1) such a
~{a,b,c} ~{a,b,c}
profile exists. Using the definition of F2 and H it follows
that: a ~ c : F2(r).
Claim 2 F2 is strongly Pareto-optimal and positively associated .
This follows from the assumptions of H and the definition of
F2 in an evident way.
Similarly F4 can be defined. F4 has the same properties as
F2.
We will now prove that not both F2 and F4 can be
dictatorial. Let t be a weak dictator of F2. Since
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F2(V(A)N ) c L(A) t is a strong dictator of F2. Obviously
2
since H is non-dictatorial using ( 4.5.14.2) it follows that
t - 1.
Similarly only 3 can be strong dictator of F4.
Again using ( 4.5.14.2) it cannot be the case that 1 and 3
are both dictators of F2 and F4 respectively.
Hence, F2 or F4 satisfies ( 4.5.14.4).
As an immediate result we have the following theorem:
Theorem 4.5.16
Suppose I' - CA,N~ is a society, with (N~ - n? 3, V is a
classified set of complete orderings, V(A)N is a restricted
domain, such that
4.5.16.1 for all B c A, with ~B~ - 3:
V(B)1 c v(B)2 c V(B)3 c.... c V(B)n, and
4.5.16.2 there are x,y e A, x~ y, with L({x,y}) c V({x,y})1,
Then (4.5.16.3) and (4.5.16.4) are equivalent.
4.5.16.3 There is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial, and positively associated welfare function
H on P from V(A)N to W(A).
4.5.16.4 There is a subset M c N, such that (M~ - 3, and a
strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly non-dictatorial, and
positively associated welfare function F on P' from V(A)M to
W(A), where P' - ~A,M~.
Proof of theorem 4.5.16
(4.5.16.4) -~ (4.5.16.3) follows from (4.5.13) and (4.5.12).
(4.5.16.3) -~ (4.5.16.4) follows from repeatedly application of
(4.5.14).
~
In general in theorem 4.5.16 we can choose W(A)N for V(A)N
and allow the individual orderings to have symmetric parts, i.e.,
indifference classes. On the otherhand, if this condition is




Suppose P-~A,N~ is a society, with ~N~ ? 2 and i,j e N,
and L(A)N is a restricted domain, such that
4.5.18.1 for all k e N:
for all B c A, with ~B~ - 3, L(B)i c L(B)k, or
for all B c A, with ~B~ - 3, L(B)~ c L(B)k, and
4.5.18.2 there are x,y e A, x~ y, such that
L({x.Y}) - L({x,y})i - L({x,y})~.
Then (4.5.18.3) and (4.5.18.4) are equivalent.
4.5.18.3 There is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial, and positively associated welfare function
F from L(A)N to W(A) on P.
4.5.18.4 There is a strongly Pareto-optimal, strongly
non-dictatorial, and positively assocíated welfare function
H from L(A)T to W(A), on ~A,T~, where ~T~ - 2 and T c N.
Proof of theorem 4.5.18
(4.5.18.4) -~ ( 4.5.18.3) is evident by (4.5.13)
(4.5.18.3) - ~ (4.5.18.4)
Without loss of generality suppose F: L(A)N -~ L(A).
It is sufficient to prove that there exists a strongly
Pareto-optimal, strongly non-dictatorial, and positively
associated welfare function H from L(A)M to L(A), on ~A,M~,
such that M c N, and if ~bi~ ? 3, then i,j e Aí.
Take k e N. Without loss of generality let L(B)i c L(B)k for
all B c A, ~B~ - 3.
Define Fk similarly to F2 in the proof of (4.5.14).
Obviously Fk : L(A)N -?. L(A) is strongly Pareto-optimal and
k
positively associated.
If Fk is non-dictatorial we are done.
If Fk ís dictatorial by (4.5.18.2) it is obvious that í is
the dictator of Fk.
Hence, D(H,{i,k}) - K(L(A)N,{i,k}).
Moreover, by (4.5.18.2), ( 4.5.5.1) follows.
Hence, by (4.5.5) we are done.
~
Theorem 4.5.18 is related to theorems already known in
literature, see e.g. Kalai S Muller [1977], and Ritz [1983].
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There the conditions imposed on the welfare function are weaker,
that is the independence of irrelevant alternatives is taken
instead of the positively associativity, but the domains studied
are more restrictive. Only domains of the following type are
studied: for all i,j e N L(A)j - L(A)i. It is clear that the
results are not related in a stronger or weaker relation, because
of these incomparabilities. Although by their characterization it
immediately follows by theorem 4.5.11 that positive associativity
may be replaced by the independence contion.
By Ritz [1985] and theorem 4.5.18 the domains pointed out in
(4.5.18) are characterized. Like the other charaterizing
theorems, however, it is not easy to verify whether or not a
given domain satisfies this characterization.
We end this monograph with some summarizing remarks. In the
Theory of Social Choice collective group decisions are studied.
Normally the formal models for these group decisions are based on
three primitive notions, namely: individuals (the participants in
the collective group decision), alternatives (the possible
decisions) and orderings (the basis on which the collective
decision). Compared to the first two primitive notions the latter
notion is complex. Notwithstanding, there does not exist a model
for orderings in literature.
In chapter 2 a classification system for orderings is
formulated. Within this model sets of relations can be classified
as sets of orderings. This classification is based on some
constructive (binary) operations. If a set of relations is closed
with respect to these operations, then it can be classified. It
is shown that every well-known type of ordering can be
classifíed. Furthermore, a generalization of the transitivity
condition is introduced. Since a set of relations, satisfying
this condition, can be classified as a set of orderings, this
generalized transitivity condition is a very símple sufficient
condition in order to classify such a set. Besides, minimal
extensions are characterized, all classified sets of orderings
between the linear and interval-orderings are determined, several
sets of tournaments are classified and all order morphisms are
found.
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On this fundamental knowledge welfare functions and choice
correspondences are studied in chapter 4. In ~4.1 the notion of
order morphism is extended to order morphism between sets of
profiles. It turns out that Pareto-optimal, neutral and
independent of irrelevant alternatives welfare functions uniquely
correspond to order morphisms. This type of welfare function is
often studied in Social Choice Theory. Furthermore, in ~4.2 it is
shown that specific choice correspondences, often studied in
Social Choice Theory, also correspond uniquely to order morphism
by means of a reconstruction principle.
By these fundamental results it is worthwhile to study order
morphisms within the classification system. Let us call an order
morphism to be simple if it is a projection on one of its
coordinates (dictatorship). We are interested in non-simple order
morphisms, since simple order morphisms correspond to simple
(dictatorial) decision mechanisms and we think that such
mechanisms are not the only practically known ones.
Particularly, we are interested in the relations between the
domain and range of a non-simple order morphisms. For instance,
taking for the domain the set of linear profiles and for the
range the set of weak orderings, then by Arrow's paradox there
are only simple order mophisms between those two sets.
To explain this relation between domain and range here, a
new primitive notion of operationality is needed. This notion
indicates a degree of complexity when working with a specific
notion within a gíven set of other notions. Let
V:- {x e R: There is a minimal denotation of x which has at
least 999 nines in it}. Compared to the e-relation
V is not very operational, which becomes clear from the following
questions. n e V? e e V? rz t e e V? On the other hand the empty
set is operational with respect to the e-relation.
In ~4.3 we have shown that if this operationality of the
range is in terms of transitivity, then only simple order
morphisms are possible (See theorem 4.3.10 and 4.3.11). Note that
cyclicity is a special type of transitivity (as introduced in
chapter 2 definition 2.3.11). So operationality within
transitivity conditions is a strong requirement because only
simple order morphisms can satisfy this condition. Although this
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is not a very surprizing result, because there are many specific
concrete parial results in literature connected to this one, here
a pausible framework is formulated in which transitivity
conditions on the range appear to be inherent to simple order
morphisms (dictatorship).
Likewise, operationality, in terms of the constructive
operations of the classification system, imposed on the range is
inherent to simple order morphisms (See theorem 4.3.12). So for
non-simple order morphisms the range cannot be constructed from
the domain in finite steps within the classification system.
Intuitively this means that collective orderings are much more
less structured than individual orderings. For instance it is
still an open question what the image of L3(U) is like under a
non-simple order morphism (See (4.3.19) up to (4.3.23)).
Given these fundamental impossibility results, it is natural
to weaken the conditions imposed on welfare functions. Especially
the independence of irrelevant alternatives requierment seems
suitable to be weakened. It requires that the collective
preference can be deduced uniquely from pairwise comparisons of
the alternatives. This is a strong requirement, but guarantees
operationality of the welfare function. Aow should this condition
be weakened such that not all of this operationality is lost?
In chapter 3 continuity properties for functions between
discrete metric spaces have been defined. These properties are
weaker than the independence condition for welfare functions (See
theorem 4.4.15). In spite of this weakening only simple welfare
functions remain to be possible (See theorems 4.4.26 up to
4.4.28). In the proofs of these theorems it becomes clear, even
more than in the proofs of the impossibility theorems of ~4.3,
that the fact that the domain contains every possible profile
is used. For instance maximal confilicts are used extensively
(See lemma 4.4.20).
It is very unlikely that a collective decision rule should
take every possible profile into account (unrestricted domains).
Note that individual preferences are often interdependent or not
totally arbitrary to choose. In ~4.5 we therefore study
restricted domains. In that section necessary and sufficient
conditions, for several special types of domain restrictions, are
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found in order that there exists Pareto-optimal, positively
associated and non-dictatorial welfare functions on such domains.
Here the range is equal to the set of weak orderings. The
necessary and sufficient conditions are technical and not all of
these are easily verified in a given restrícted domain.
Therefore, it is possible to doubt this approach with respect to
operationality. However, gíven the foregoing ímpossibilities and
noting that this approach leads to possibility theorems it ís
possible to reverse the operationality argumentation and give it
up to a certain degree. Namely by argueing that the problems
studied in Social Choice Theory are complex and due to this lead
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SUBJECT REFERENCE AND SYMBOL REFERENCE TABLE
Symbols Subject Reference~Page
acyclic (2.2.8),52
approximated by interiors of ellipses (3.5.9),20
antisymmetric (1.1.4),(2.2.8),4,52
mR antisymmetric part of R (1.1.4),(2.2.3),4,37
asymmetric (2.2.8),52
áR asymmetric part of R (1.1.4),(2.2.3),4,36
B(x,u,V,d) ball in ~V,d~ (3.1.2),149
Better(RA,a) better elements than a in RA (2.7.8),139
between (3.2.3),152
(q)B(F,S,~x,y~,r) S is (quasi-)blocking at r and F on Cx,y~
(1.6.1),26
(q)B(F,S,~x,y~) S is (quasi-)blocking at F on ~x,y~
(1.6.1),27
(q)B(F,S) S is (quasi-)blocking at F (1.6.1),27
Vn(A), Vn(U) n-fold cartesian product of V(A), V(U)
EC(V(A)), elementary changes (4.4.3),261
ECn(V(A))
C choice correspondence (1.1.6),7





cR complement of RA (2.2.3),37
qR relative diagonal complement of RA (2.2.3),37
complete (1.1.4),(2.2.8),4,52
strongly complete (2.2.8),52
composition of monadic operations 37
composition of relations, k-times (2.2.1),35
concatenation of relations, profiles
(2.2.1),(4.1.2),35,207
closed under concatenation (2.2.15),(4.1.2),55,207
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E4 closure under concatenation (2.4.2),89
N1'N2'~3'~4 other concatenation operations (2.7.9),140
connected (2.2.8),52
strongly connected (2.5.1),101
(rl,i2)-continuous continuity with respect to tl and t2
(3.4.1),187
vRA conversion of RA ( 2.2.3),36
closed under conversion (2.2.12),(4.1.2),55,207
E2 closure under conversion ( 2.4.2),89













S is (quasi-)decisive at r and F on ~x,y~
(1.6.1),26
S is (quasi-)decisive at F on tx,y~
S is (quasi-)decisive at F
symmetric decisive
decision procedure
is defined to be equal to




distance function on Qn(A)
distance function on Ln(A)
















empty relatíon on A 36
"constant" empty operation (2.2.3),37
circularly enclosedness ( 3.5.4),198
minimal extension ( 2.4.1),89










x? y: R x is as least as good as y according to R
(1.1.4),4
G - ~V,E~ graph (3.2.2),152




"constant" identity operation (2.2.3),37
identity relation on A 36
image of V under .-, a (2.2.11).54
(y) : R
x. .y x is incomparable to y according to R (1.1.4),4
Y.--- V
independence of irrelevant alternatives (1.3.1),
(4.2.2),(4.1.6),12,217,209
indifference class (1.1.5),5
maximal indifference class (2.6.1),112
x-y: R



























Max(RA) maximal elements of RA (2.7.8),139
mesh-ball 157
mesh-edged-bal~ (3.2.11),155
mesh pertubationally robust (3.4.2),188
Mesh(V,d) meshwidth of ~V,d~ (3.1.2),148
M - ~V,d~ metric space 150
Min(RA) minimal elements of RA (2.7.8),139
NHM(L) neighbourhood of L
NHM(L,R) neighbourhood of ~L,R~
(3.5.1),197
(3.5.1),197
SNHM(X,u) standard neighbourhood based on ~X,u~ (3.5.3),198
SNHM(~X1,u1~,~X2,u2~) standard neighbourhood
based on tXl,u~ and ~X2,u2~
u-neighbourhood
neutrality

















v,c,r,a,t,s, monadic operations on relations (2.2.23),36-37
á,d,n,i,ó,é,q,m
M set of all possible monadic operations on
relations based on local information (2.2.41,40
N special subset of M (2.2.4),49
M special subset of M (2.2.4),48
order (iso)morphisms (2.2.24),(4.1.3),61,207



















special acyclic orderings 121
complete orderings 122
special complete orderings 121
interval orderings 110
special interval orderings (2.6.15),128
linear orderings (on A) (1.1.4),5,67
quasi orderings (on A) 110,88
semi-orderings 111
special semi-orderings 116
special reflexive orderings 121
reflexive orderings 67
reflexive and complete orderings 67
reflexive and quasi-transitive orderings 67
reflexive and antisymmetric orderings 67
weak orderings (on A) (1.1.4),5,88




n-tx0,...,xk~ path from x0 to xk along ... in...
of type ..... (2.3.5),73
vrz conversed path of rz (2.3.5),73
na permutated path of n (2.3.5),75
SU,SA permutations on U, A (1.5.1),34,23
aR,ar permutation of R,r (1.5.1),(2.2.23),23,36
closed under permutation (2.2.10),(2.4.2),
(4.1.2),53,89,207
E1 closure under permutation (2.4.2),89
positive associativity (1.4.5),20
strong positive associativity (1.4.8),21
x~ y: R x prefered to y according to R
x.- ~ .y
x? r, nn(R) r is as least as much prefered to r
(1.1.4),4









set of possible profiles 205
classified as set of profiles (4.1.2),206
set of profiles on V and X 207
special profile (4.2.7),225
set of real numbers
(ir)reducible
reflexivity
reflexive closure of RA
relation R on A, X,...
set of possible relations
set of possible relation domains
special relation on A







special relation on A
special subset of V(A)











set of reversible relations in V













[a,b]M segment (a,b in space M) (3.3.1),163
simple segment (3.3.11),171
separability (3.2.16),159
P - tA,N~ society (1.1.1),2
Sub(RA,a,RB) substitution (of RB on a in RA) (2.2.17),156
Sub(rA,a,rB) substitution (of rB on a in rA) (4.1.2),207
closed under substitution (2.2.19),(4.1.2),57,207
E6 closure under substitution (2.4.2),90
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Subl, Sub2 other substitution operators (2.7.11),144
x- y: sucR x and y succeed each other in R (4.9.2),261
symmetric (2.2.8),(4.1.6),52,209







d-induced topology on EM U V (3.2.13),157
standard topology on metric space M (3.2.15),158
tournaments 88
(2,5,6),99~Tk 1(U) special tournamentsTk l~m(U)
~wl,w2~-transitive transitivity
classifiable transitivity






















set of unanimity feasible pairs
(4.2.2),217
by S in Vn(A) (1.6.1),26
inverse 34
.- {~x,y~ e U x U: ~{x,y}~ - 2} (4.3.2),230
single valuedness (1.5.4),25
relative majority voting (1.2.1),8
welfare function (1.1.6),7
complete welfare function ( 4.1.5),208
word over an alfabet (2.3.51,73
conversed word (2.3.5),73
For symbols concerning set operations see (1.1.3) page 3.
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SAMENVATTING
In de Sociale Keuze Theorie bestudeert men collectieve
groepsbeslissingen. Normaliter zijn de formele modellen voor die
groepsbeslissingen gebaseerd op 3 primitieve begrippen tw:
individuen (de collectieve beslissers), alternatieven (de
mogelijke collectieve besluiten) en orderingen (de basis waarop
't collectief besluit tot stand verondersteld wordt te komen).
Vergeleken met de andere twee primitieve begrippen is 't begrip
ordering complex. Desondanks bestaat er geen model voor dit
complex begrip.
In hoofdstuk 2 wordt er een classificatie voor orderingen
gegeven. Binnen dit model kunnen verzamelingen van relaties als
een verzameling van orderingen geclassificeerd worden. Deze
classificatie geschiedt op basis van enkele constructieve
bewerkingen. Als de verzameling van relaties gesloten is t.a.v.
die bewerkingen, dan is hij classificeerbaar. Er wordt aangetoond
dat alle bekende typen van orderingen classificeerbaar zijn. Ook
wordt er een generalisatie van transitiviteits condities gegeven.
Daar een verzameling van relaties, die aan deze generale eis
voldoet, classificeerbaar is en daar de eis relatief eenvoudig
is, hebben we een eenvoudig voldoende criterium. Bovendien worden
minimale uitbreidingen gekarakteriseerd, alle classificeerbare
verzamelingen tussen de lineaire ordenigen en de interval
ordenigen beschreven, (met 't oog op orderingen) toernooien
bestudeerd en de verzameling van alle orde morfismen afgeleid.
Vanuit deze basiskennís worden in hoofdstuk 4
voorkeurregels en keuzeregels bestudeerd. In ~4.1 breiden we 't
begrip orde morfisme voor ordeningen uit tot orde morfisme voor
profiel verzamelingen. Het blijkt dat Pareto-optimale, neutrale
en onafhankelijke van irrelevante alternatieven zijnde
voorkeurregels een eenduidig overeenkomen met orde morfismen.
Deze voorkeurregels worden vaak bestudeerd in de Sociale Keuze
Theorie. Voorts blijkt in ~4.2 dat vaak bestudeerde keuzeregels
middels een reconstrueerbaarheids principe eveneens eeneenduidig
corresponderen met orde morfismen.
De fundamentele resultaten van hierboven verantwoorden een
studie in orde morfismen binnen 't classifíceerbaarheids kader.
343
We noemen een orde morfismen eenvoudig als hij bíjvoorbeeld een
projectie is (dictatuur). Daar zo'n orde morfismen collectieve
beslissingsmechanismen beschrijft, en deze laatste in de praktijk
vaak als ingewikkeld ervaren worden en zeker niet uitsluitend als
dictaturen, zijn we geïnteresseerd in de relatie tussen het
domein en het bereik van een niet eenvoudig orde morfismen. Nemen
we bijvoorbeeld als domein de verzameling van profielen bestaande
uit lineaire orderingen en als bereik de verzameling van zwakke
orderingen, dan betekent Arrow's paradox dat er uitsluitend
eenvoudige (dictatoriale) orde morfismen tussen deze twee
bestaan.
Om die relatie tussen domein en bereik te bespreken is een
begrip als "hanteerbaarheid" nodig. Dit hier primitief
veronderstelde begrip is een maat welke aangeeft hoe eenvoudig
men met een notie binnen een stel andere gegeven noties om kan
gaan. Bijvoorbeeld laat
V:- {x e R: Er is een decimale ontwikkeling van x, welke
tenminste 999 verschillende keren 't cijfer 9
bevat}.
T.o.v. de e- relatie is V hoogst waarschijnlijk niet zo
hanteerbaar. Probeer de volgende vragen maar te beantwoorden:
n e V? e e V7 n f e e V? De lege verzameling is t.a.v. deze
e-relatie hanteerbaar te noemen.
In ~4.3 hebben we nu aangetoond dat als we het bereik binnen
transitiviteits noties hanteerbaar willen houden, dan zíjn er
enkel eenvoudige orde morfismen mogelijk. (Zie stellingen 4.3.8,
4.3.10 en 4.3.11). Dit resultaat generalizeert vele stellingen
uit de literatuur. Dus hanteerbaarheid binnen transitiviteits
noties is een te sterke eis, daar hierbij alleen eenvoudige orde
morfismen mogelijk zijn. Ofschoon dit geen schokkend resultaat
is, gezien de vele in de literatuur gevonden deelresultaten, is
hier echter wel een plausibel kader aangegeven waarbinnen blijkt
dat transitiviteits condíties voor het bereik onlosmakelijk
verbonden zijn met de eenvoud van orde morfismen (dictaturen).
Evenzo is hanteerbaarheid van het bereik beschreven vanuit
het domein, in termen van de constructieve bewerkingen, welke
binnen het classificatie systeem voor handen zijn, onlosmakelijk
verbonden met de eenvoud van orde morfismen (Zie stelling
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4.3.12). Dus bij niet eenvoudige orde morfismen is het bereik
niet met een eindig aantal stappen uit 't domein te construeren
binnen 't classificatie systeem. Intuïtief betekent dit dat de
collectieve orderingen veel minder gestructureerd zijn dan de
individuele orderingen. Het is bijvoorbeeld een open vraag wat
het beeld van L3(U) onder een orde morfisme F is, als F niet
eenvoudig is (Zie (4.3.19) t~m (4.3.23)).
Gezien de fundamentele resultaten van hierboven ligt het nu
voor de hand, dat we de eisen welke men aan een voorkeurregel
oplegt afzwakt. Vooral de onafhankelijkheid van irrelevante
alternatieven lijkt op het eerste gezicht een geschikte conditie
om afgezwakt te worden. Zij stelt namelijk dat de
gemeenschappelijke voorkeur eenduidig kan worden afgeleid uit
paarsgewijs vergelijken van de alternatieven. Dit is een sterke
eis en garandeert de hanteerbaarhied van de voorkeurregel. Hoe
kan men deze conditie zinnig, binnen de context van
hanteerbaarhied, afzwakken?
In hoofdstuk 3 worden continuïteits eigenschappen voor
functies van en naar discrete metrische ruimten gedefinieerd,
welke voor voorkeurregels zwakker zijn dan de onafhankelijheid
van irrelevante alternatieven (Zie stelling 4.4.15). Het blijkt
echter, ondanks deze afzwakking, dat enkel eenvoudige
(dictatoriale) voorkeurregels mogelijk zijn (Zie stellingen
4.4.26 t~m 4.4.28). Voorts zien we bij de bewijzen van deze
resultaten, meer nog dan bij de bewijzen in ~ 4.3, gebruikmaking
van het feit dat alle mogelijke profielen voorhanden zijn in het
domein. Onder andere alle maximale conflict profielen worden
verondersteld in het domein te zitten (Zie lemma 4.4.20).
Het is zeer onwaarschijnlijk dat een collectieve
beslissingsregel rekening dient te houden met alle mogelijke
profíelen, bedenk dat individuele voorkeuren onderling
afhankelijk van elkaar kunnen zijn. In ~ 4.5 bestuderen we dan
ook beperkte domeinen. In deze paragraaf worden noodzakelijke en
voldoende eisen voor speciale typen van domeinbeperkingen
geqeven, z.d.d. er niet dictatoriale Pareto-optimale en positief
associatieve voorkeurregels op zo'n domein mogelijk zijn, waarbij
het bereik binnen de zwakke ordeningen valt. Die noodzakelijke en
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voldoende eisen zijn vaak technisch en niet allen eenvoudig
toestbaar voor een beperkt domein. Men is derhalve ook hier
geneigd hun hanteerbaarheid in twijfel te trekken. Echter, gezien
het voorafgaande, en in ogenschouw nemend dat het híer
mogelijkheden betreft, kan men ook omgekeerd redeneren. Namelijk
dat de problematiek, bestudeerd in de Sociale Keuze Theorie,
complex is en dien ten gevolge tot meer complexe model
beschrijvingen van deze problemen leiden zal, dan men in het
begín verwacht.
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